Trident Alternatives Review

David T C Davies Excerpts

Wednesday 17th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Danny Alexander]

No, I will not. I will give way later, but I want to make some progress first.

The review presents a much greater opportunity for change and the consideration of alternative postures, and that in turn presents the possibility of maintaining our nuclear deterrent capability with fewer submarines. This is where the real opportunity resides for making long-term savings, for recalibrating our policy to the requirements of our ages, and—as we just heard from my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell)—for contributing to nuclear disarmament.

Analysis of the national security strategy confirms the position adopted by successive Governments that

“no state currently has both the intent and the capability to threaten the independence or integrity of the UK. But we cannot dismiss the possibility that a major direct nuclear threat to the UK might re-emerge.”

With no hostile backdrop and a surprise attack against the UK highly unlikely, the United Kingdom could adopt a number of viable and credible alternative postures while maintaining a nuclear deterrence capability that meets the needs of national security.

The review demonstrates that our current nuclear posture of continuous-at-sea deterrence is not the only one available. Let me briefly describe four of the alternative postures that were considered in the review, from highest to lowest readiness. Each of them represents a different rung on the nuclear ladder, with CASD at the top.

A posture of focused deterrence would maintain a continuous nuclear deterrent for a specific period in response to a specific threat. At all other times, the system could adopt a reduced readiness level. We considered three options for reduced readiness. A so-called sustained-deterrence posture would mean regular patrols that maintained deterrence capability, but the number of platforms could be reduced. A responsive posture would allow gaps of irregular frequency and length between deployment, so that a potential adversary could not predict when and for how long a gap in deployment might occur. A posture of preserved deterrence would hold forces at low readiness. Under preserved deterrence, no platforms would be regularly deployed, but the UK would maintain the ability to deploy if the context changed.

The review clearly demonstrates that the concept of a ladder of nuclear capability and readiness is viable and credible, and that there are a number of options for taking steps down the rungs without getting off altogether.

[David T. C. Davies (Monmouth) (Con)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Alexander]

I do not accept the premise of the hon. Gentleman’s question and I have answered the substance of it in answer to an earlier intervention.

[David T. C. Davies]

Surely we either have a full-time deterrent or we do not. If we do not have one, we might as well stand as high as we possibly can on the ladder so that our enemies can see the white flag that we will need to wave at them.

[Danny Alexander]

I am afraid that my hon. Friend has clearly not been listening to the analysis or read the review. Just last month, in Berlin, President Obama called for movement beyond the “cold war nuclear postures” and announced a major reduction in the US nuclear arsenal. It is my hope that in the next Parliament the UK will answer that call with a serious consideration of ending continuous nuclear deterrence.

The review is the most comprehensive study on nuclear weapon platforms and postures ever published by the UK Government. I believe that as large numbers of nuclear weapons remain and the risk of proliferation continues, it is right that the UK retains a nuclear capability for as long as the global security situation makes that necessary. But I also believe that that capability should be scaled and deployed to meet the threat we face now, and held as a contingency to deal with the threats we may face in the future. We should seek to balance the costs of this insurance policy against the other needs of defence and, indeed, other priorities across government.

The conclusion I draw from the Trident alternatives review is that although alternatives exist, there is no new system available before the lives of the current Vanguard submarines come to an end to meet those criteria. But a step down the ladder is available: ending 24-hour patrols when we do not need them and procuring fewer successor submarines, moving on from an outdated cold war concept of deterrence to one fit for the world we inhabit now. For the remainder of this Parliament the coalition Government’s policy will remain exactly as set out in the strategic defence and security review. We will maintain the deterrent as it is, and preparations for a successor system will continue. But the final main-gate decision on whether to proceed with a like-for-like replacement of Trident will be made in 2016, after the next general election. It is therefore up to the different political parties in this House to decide the positions they will take before that time. For the country, I hope that the publication of this review will mark the start of a national debate on one of the most profound questions of our time, and I commend the Trident alternatives review to the House.