Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between David Ruffley and Chris Leslie

Monday 8th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

I am delighted that the hon. Gentleman has taken the trouble to look at the new clause, because it is our second attempt to cajole or persuade the Government to look at this issue. In Committee, we took a different approach to the question of leverage, and tried to clarify that there was a clear power for the Government to act. I hope in the spirit of consensus and trying to move the arguments forward, the Minister and the House will accept that we have taken a new approach, thinking about leverage as it affects the UK economy as a whole. Leverage—and I shall come on to make this argument—is part and parcel of the way in which an economy works, and in the new clause we have looked at a particular design that would encompass other institutions. I do not want to be misinterpreted: we mention foreign banks, for example, but I do not intend any extra-territorial reference in the new clause. It simply makes it clear that the provision has to encompass effective leverage on the UK financial services sector as a whole.

I have referred to the Vickers commission, and it is important that we do not forget the work that it did, and that we pay tribute to it. It said that

“a leverage cap of thirty-three is too lax for systemically important banks, since it means that a loss of only 3% of such banks’ assets would wipe out their capital.”

The commission recommended a 25:1 ratio—a 4% ratio—but the Chancellor dismissed that concern. It is essential that the ring fence is supported by tougher capital requirements, as well as by a leverage ratio.

The parliamentary commission said that it was not convinced by the Government’s decision to reject the Vickers recommendation to limit leverage in this way. The parliamentary commission said that it

“considers it essential that the ring-fence should be supported by a higher leverage ratio, and would expect the leverage ratio to be set substantially higher than the 3 per cent minimum required under Basel III. Not to do so would reduce the effectiveness of the leverage ratio as a counter-weight to the weaknesses of risk weighting.”

Sir Mervyn King, the former Governor of the Bank of England, said that the leverage ratio turned out to be

“a far better predictor of the institutions that failed in the crisis”

than measures of risk-weighted assets. I could go on; a great deal of debate has taken place on this issue.

Our new clause seeks a way of ensuring clarity on the powers and what sort of process would take place. We suggest that the powers of the Financial Policy Committee in the Financial Services Act 2012 should be amended to make it clear that a target should be set by the Treasury for the overall leverage of the United Kingdom’s financial system to encompass all the activities of those institutions that are originators of credit.

[Mr David Ruffley (Bury St Edmunds) (Con)]

May I unpick what the hon. Gentleman is saying? Does he mean a minimum leverage ratio or a target? There is a difference. Perhaps he could clarify that.

[Chris Leslie]

That is a very good question and I am open to debate on that. I believe that looking at that minimum leverage ratio as a target to be set for the leverage of the system as a whole in the UK would be the point of public policy, which is why it needs to be dealt with in a policy-making context by the Treasury, with reference to Parliament if need be. The key point is that it should then be for the regulators to look at the detailed implementation of that on a firm-by-firm basis.

Essentially, there is a parallel to be drawn between the way that the Chancellor of the Exchequer sets an inflation target for the Bank of England and the Monetary Policy Committee is given operational independence to find ways of meeting that target. The purpose of the debate today is to look at the potential parallel to be drawn there, with a target being set and operational independence for the implementation of that target being given to the Financial Policy Committee and the Bank of England. Over every three-month period the FPC should respond by notifying any changes and any actions that it has taken in order to regulate leverage, so that there is a dialogue and a process that is fairly self-explanatory.

[Mr Ruffley]

The hon. Gentleman is being very generous in giving way, but I want to be clear about his proposition. A target would imply that a bank that was just 10 times leverage would have to raise its leverage ratio to 25 times if it was a 4% target, whereas if it was a 4% minimum leverage ratio, that would be totally different. The bank that leveraged 10 times would not be in breach of that.

[Chris Leslie]

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point. Let me be clear. The target that should be set would be for the financial system as a whole. It would be for the regulators to make judgments about firm-by-firm leverage arrangements, so it would be on a more sophisticated basis. There is a case to be made for a regulator to look at each individual institution. Some institutions are significantly different from one another. Some of the building societies, for example, have recently been making the point that they have different asset structures and so on, and that exactly the same leverage arrangement across the board for all firms simultaneously would not necessarily be appropriate. In an effort to work towards some way of dealing with the issue, this design is one that I have suggested.

Finance Bill

Debate between David Ruffley and Chris Leslie

Monday 1st July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 9 calls for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, within six months of Royal Assent to the Finance Act, to lay before Parliament proposals for an income tax rate of 10% on a band of income above the personal allowance. The range of income to be covered by that 10% rate should be determined by the Exchequer yield from a mansion tax—a Liberal Democrat proposal that I used to think the Liberal Democrats stood four-square behind. Perhaps in a moment those Liberal Democrats who remain in the Chamber—they are diminishing in number—will tell us a little about where they stand on the issue.

We feel that the full benefit of that 10% or 10p rate of income tax should not be available to taxpayers paying the higher or additional rates—the £50,000-and-above levels, or higher rate payers. It should be targeted and focused on basic rate taxpayers. That is the logic of new clause 9.

We think that the measure would be welcomed across the country, and that all hon. Members, including Conservative Members, should consider it seriously, because living standards are being squeezed, and for most people, life is getting a lot harder, as is manifested by the fact that wages have fallen in real terms. In fact, at the beginning of the year, we saw the steepest fall in living standards since the 1970s. That is a direct consequence of the tax and spending choices and priorities of the Government parties—the tax credit cuts that have hit lower and middle-income households; the squeeze on child benefits; and the rise in the VAT rate to 20%.

[Mr Ruffley]

What does the hon. Gentleman say to the Institute for Fiscal Studies, which states that the latest Labour proposal to reintroduce the 10p rate

“has no plausible economic justification. It would complicate the income tax system and achieve nothing that could not be better achieved in other ways”?

[Chris Leslie]

I would say that the aim of the 10p policy should be to encourage people on low incomes to take higher-paid work, to work longer hours and to start the transition up the income scale. That is why it

“is right that we need to introduce a 10p tax rate in the interim; otherwise, people will go straight from their tax-free allowance to being taxed on any income above that.”—[Official Report, 22 January 2013; Vol. 557, c. 37WH.]

Those are not my words but those of the hon. Member for Camborne and Redruth (George Eustice), in a debate in favour of a 10p starting rate of tax that was held some months ago.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Ruffley]

I want to return to the question that I asked the hon. Gentleman. Most technical experts say that a 10p rate would complicate the tax system. Let me ask him once again: would not his proposal complicate the tax system? Indeed, was not that the reason why the Labour Government abolished the 10p rate in 2007?

[Chris Leslie]

I would be the first to concede that it was a mistake to abolish the 10p rate in 2007. I do not think that it creates complexity in the tax system. The Institute for Fiscal Studies has long been in favour of simplicity in the number of tax bands, but I believe that there is a genuine debate to be had about progressivity in the income tax system. The hon. Gentleman’s colleagues can see the case for a 10p rate, and I believe that it would be a useful way of introducing a transition from the tax-free personal allowance to the 20p basic rate of tax. A 10p rate would be an important staging post along the way. A tax cut for those on lower and middle incomes would be broadly welcomed throughout the country.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between David Ruffley and Chris Leslie

Monday 23rd April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

I was just coming to my conclusion and am conscious that other Members wish to speak, so I will not give way. I simply urge the House to vote for the amendment in the hope that the House of Lords will improve clause 5.

[Mr David Ruffley (Bury St Edmunds) (Con)]

I rise to support new clause 1 briefly. I had the privilege of sitting on the Joint Committee on the draft Bill and of being a member of the Treasury Committee, which is chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie)—colleagues have noted that he is not a Privy Counsellor, but as far as many of us are concerned he is right honourable in spirit.

The main purport of new clause 1 is to establish a duty on the court of directors to conduct retrospective reviews of the Bank’s performance. The Governor of the Bank of England, in giving evidence to the Joint Committee and the Treasury Committee, has argued that it would be a bad idea to have a review into anything other than the processes by which certain policy decisions are reached. In other words, he does not want there to be a duty on the Bank to scrutinise retrospectively how good its decisions—meaning the decisions of the Financial Policy Committee or the Monetary Policy Committee—turned out to be. One of the reasons he gave was that there are lots of external commentators, such as outside economists in the City and the commentariat in the fourth estate, but it is fairly obvious that those entities are under no statutory duty to crawl through every decision of the FPC or the MPC and decide with hindsight whether they were good or bad.

The second reason the Governor gave is that the Treasury Committee holds the Bank to account, a point alluded to by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie). The Treasury Committee, packed with talent though it is on a yearly basis, still has a huge amount of work to do and, not for the want of trying, does not have the amount of technical expertise or the number of macro- and micro-economists needed to conduct work month after month, tracking back and looking at how good or bad the judgment calls of the FPC, as constituted by the Bill, and the extant MPC turned out to be. My word, don’t we need such backward-looking analysis? If it had been present in 2007 and 2008, we might have avoided the difficulties of which we are all too well aware.

The Bill gives the Bank of England unprecedented powers. As a result of it, we will have a Governor of the Bank of England, whomever he or she is in the future, who will be chair of the Monetary Policy Committee, have a place on the court of directors of the Bank of England, chair the Financial Policy Committee and chair the Prudential Regulation Authority. With the creation of the FPC, alongside all the work that the Bank does on monetary policy, a lot of decisions are going to be made.

Not since the creation of the Bank of England in the late 17th century has its senior management and Governor had so much power, and, from even a cursory glance, the Joint Committee’s evidence and the evidence taken by the Treasury Committee in recent months all leads to one thing: one cannot have enough scrutiny of this big beast that the Bank will become as a result of the Bill coming into force.

The Treasury Committee argued forcefully for a severe new set of accountability and scrutiny powers. We advocated the creation of a new supervisory body inside the Bank of England in order to replace the court of directors, because the court, as everybody knows, is packed full of amateurs—well-meaning amateurs, but people who simply are not, by any stretch of the imagination, able to hold the Bank of England’s senior executive members, who are on the MPC and will soon be on the FPC, to account.

The court includes has-beens in the City, or “never-was’s”, and people with indifferent reputations in the trade union movement, in manufacturing and in all aspects of public policy. But the evidence shows that remarkably few of them have any expertise in central banking matters, in fiscal policy, in macro-prudential policy or in monetary policy. The court is desperately under-geared, and its intellectual horsepower is not what it should be.

A supervisory body, with a majority of external members, overseeing the FPC’s and MPC’s judgments and undertaking retrospective reviews is the best-case scenario; it is what the Treasury Committee thought would be the best solution for scrutinising this very powerful—all-powerful, I might add—Bank.

I understand why Ministers have concluded that they do not want to go into battle with the Governor and the senior executives about a supervisory body, because it is way too radical, but it is absolutely incumbent on this House to look at the purport of new clause 1 to see that it actually imposes more scrutiny than the Bill currently provides on the policy decisions of not just the MPC, but the FPC. Let us not forget that the MPC has recently acquired, or arrogated to itself, certain very significant discretionary powers over monetary policy—not in setting the bank rate, but in quantitative easing.

How many debates have we had in this Chamber about QE and its merits or relative de-merits? The answer is relatively few. The Monetary Policy Committee is held to account only by the Treasury Committee. It is my suggestion that the Treasury Committee, marvellous and wonderful though it is—I am a member of it, so I would say that—will need the assistance of ex-post reviews to look retrospectively at the quality of the decisions that the Bank, with its new powers, makes. I therefore urge colleagues to support new clause 1.