National Resilience

Debate between David Reed and Mark Sewards

Wednesday 10th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[David Reed]

The hon. Member raises a serious points, which I will come on to, on interconnectedness. We saw how covid-19 affected so many different parts of society—it closed down industry and the economy. We have to start to think about these things cross-departmentally.

The Government’s definition of national resilience is a society’s ability to anticipate, withstand, respond to and quickly recover from severe crises, whether natural disasters, pandemics, geopolitical shocks or deliberate attacks. It rests on a whole-of- society approach in which Government, business and the public work together to protect critical national infrastructure and maintain vital services.

Last year’s strategic defence review made precisely that point. One of its central recommendations was a national conversation on defence and resilience built on that whole-of-society approach and premised on a simple idea: that defending the nation is no longer the job of the armed forces alone. A year on, however, I think it is fair to say that that conversation has barely begun.

One critical central challenge, both to having that conversation with the British public and, more importantly, to making the preparations to be resilient, is that living memory of needing to be resilient in this country is fading. I often speak to my father about this. He was born in 1942 in Plymouth during the blitz. His generation is the last with a direct lived experience of national insecurity on home soil. The contrast is stark. To the young people I speak to about the risks we face, the idea that we might have to defend our homeland, our democracy and our way of life, remains abstract—something that happens to other people in other places.

We are in a more vulnerable position still, however, because beyond the fading of that memory, resilience is no longer woven into our national story. In Taiwan or Finland, the people I speak to have a geographical proximity to the threat, which they feel in their bones: the Chinese dragon across the strait and the Russian bear across the border. Those threats are real and they are close, and that is precisely why those countries do resilience well: their people and their institutions understand in their core the need to be strong. A quotation that has stayed with me since my Royal Marines training puts that well:

“You cannot dream yourself into a strong character: you must hammer and forge yourself into one.”

As a country, we must wake from that dream, and it is incumbent on the Government to have the hard conversation with the public about how we fund our national resilience.

[Mark Sewards (Leeds South West and Morley) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing this debate and making an excellent speech. Clearly, the UK faces malign threats from Russia, from China and especially from Iran, as recent examples have shown. I commend the Government for bringing forward the tackling state threats Bill—reportedly next Wednesday, but we will see the business statement tomorrow—that will allow us to deal with the threats, but the public do not necessarily know just how severe they are. Does he agree that, as well as dealing with the threats, we need to educate the public on just how threatening these state actors are and why we need to deal with them now?

[David Reed]

There must have been a leak, because I am going to come on to that paragraph straight away.

Beyond the issue of funding, the obvious question that flows from this is who in Government should take the lead in having that conversation with the public about the panoply of threats that we face. That leads to the central argument of this debate: is the British state structured to deal effectively with them? I accept that the machinery of government is a surefire way to send those in this Chamber to sleep, but it is central to the direction of travel we must take.

I was waiting with bated breath to see who the Government would send to respond to the debate this evening, because logic would dictate that the Minister responding should come from the Department that the Prime Minister has charged with leading the national conversation on resilience. Here lies the first problem. The Security Minister sits across both the Cabinet Office and the Home Office. His portfolio is broad, but it clearly does not cover anywhere near the full range of threats set out in the Government’s own definition of national resilience.

The Cabinet Office has a resilience directorate, which does important work co-ordinating civil contingency planning, crisis management and emergency response across national and local levels. I would not diminish the work that it does for a moment, but let us consider its design: a directorate for preparedness and a Cobra unit for crisis response. Risk and response. Notice what is missing. There is machinery to assess the threat and machinery to manage the emergency, but nowhere is anyone charged with turning to the public and saying, “Here is the threat we face, here is your part in it, and here is what is being done in your name.” The national conversation that we need therefore finds no natural home. It does not emanate from the directorates whose remit is risk and response; nor has the Ministry of Defence acted on the strategic defence review’s own call for a national conversation on defence and resilience.

The result is a system in which responsibility is spread so thinly that no single Minister owns the problem. The danger of that is not merely administrative tidiness but that when a crisis strikes, command and control will fracture at precisely the moment it must hold. For example, the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill—which hands the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology sweeping new powers to direct critical entities—illustrates the trend rather than reversing it. Individual Departments are accruing resilience powers of their own, with each cooking up policies to support their own patch. A whistle must be blown on this approach, because we risk spreading responsibility through legislation so thinly that no one truly understands where it lies.

When I speak to civil servants—all of whom want to see a stronger and safer country—I notice that the word “resilience” has itself become something of a buzzword, a phrase to attach to a business case to secure a bigger departmental budget. That is a sign of a system without a clear centre of gravity, not of one that is working. That led me to research in depth how our near neighbours have approached this problem—countries with national stories like our own and populations whose memories of insecurity have faded, just as ours have.

The clearest exemplar I found is Denmark. The Danes have grasped something that we have not yet acted upon: in an age of interconnected threats—where cyber-attacks become supply shocks become public-safety emergencies—danger no longer respects departmental boundaries. For decades they had run, as we still do, on a principle of sectoral responsibility—each Department minding risk in its own lane. They concluded that a system in which everyone is responsible is one in which, in practice, no one is.

In August 2024, the Danes acted, creating a dedicated ministry of resilience and preparedness, the first of its kind in the region, with a Cabinet Minister in charge. Within months, they established a resilience agency beneath it, drawing scattered functions into one organisation—one ministry, one Cabinet Minister, one clear line of accountability.

If truth be told, it is too early to say with certainty whether the model delivers the better outcomes that the Danes expect. The real test will come in the next crisis, not the last reorganisation. But the logic is sound because the alternative—broadly what we have—is a system where resilience is everyone’s second priority and nobody’s first. As someone who wants to see a smaller and sharper state, the answer is not a new layer of governance, but collapsing many duplicated ones into a single, accountable home. It is an idea that the Government should actively investigate.

I have also been struck by how our Danish and Dutch friends have begun to share the responsibility for resilience with their citizens, reinforcing civic duty in a far more deliberate way than we do here in the UK. Both have started speaking plainly to their people about preparedness and, strikingly, they tell them much the same thing: “Be ready to look after yourself for three days, or 72 hours.” The Dutch Government now tell every household to hold enough to manage for 72 hours in the event of war, a cyber-attack or a major disaster—things such as water, food, medication, a battery radio, some cash and key documents. They did not merely issue advice; they delivered a printed survival guide to every door and published it online in dozens of languages. Its message was carefully chosen, and the aim, Ministers said, is not to frighten people but to prepare them, because those who think through the first 72 hours of a crisis feel safer, not more fearful. The campaign’s slogan is simple: “Think Ahead”.

Denmark’s advice is almost identical, and the reasoning is the same: if ordinary people can get through the first three days, the authorities can concentrate on those who cannot. Denmark sent that guidance to every adult through its secure Government messaging system and placed 300,000 printed copies in libraries and public offices. It does not shy away from naming why, either. Its Defence Minister told Danes plainly that they and their allies face hybrid war and that each of us should prepare to be without power, water or shops for a short while. In both countries, the principle is the same: resilience is not something the state can simply hand to its people; it is a habit that the public must share in.

Employment Rights Bill

Debate between David Reed and Mark Sewards

Consideration of Lords message
Monday 15th December 2025 Commons Chamber

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

When I look to the other House, across the political divide I see captains of industry—people who have led businesses small and large. Does the hon. Member see any merit in their arguments?

[Mark Sewards]

We will always pay attention to the arguments made in the other place, but I place more credence on the arguments made by life peers—people who have been appointed because of their expertise and not because of the family they were born into. However, I appreciate that that point has been well made, Madam Deputy Speaker, and I will move on.

Along with the fact that the Government have already compromised in good faith on the Bill with trade unions and businesses, and that those businesses and their representative organisations have welcomed what we have put in the Bill and called on us to pass it today, we were elected on a promise to get this Bill passed into law. Fire and rehire must be banned. Exploitative zero-hours contracts must be ruled out. Day one rights for parental and bereavement leave must be rolled out, and sick pay must be improved. Whichever way the House votes on these amendments today, I implore the hereditary peers in the other place to do the right thing, get out of the way, let this Bill pass and make work pay.