National Resilience

David Reed Excerpts

Wednesday 10th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

It is a privilege to lead this evening’s Adjournment debate on improving national resilience. I am also glad that the Security Minister is responding. He is a man for whom I have a great deal of respect. As we have both served in what is now the Special Forces Strike Group, albeit at different times, I know he is one of the few people in this House who has seen the sharp end of national insecurity at first hand.

It has sadly become commonplace to say that we are living through unprecedented times. The international system we have all lived under has fractured, war has broken out across multiple continents and technological upheaval and a warming planet compound to create an increasingly volatile world.

We hear repeatedly across this House that the first duty of any Government is the defence of the realm. It is repeated so often that it risks becoming a platitude, but here is the hard question: are we actually living up to that duty here in the UK in 2026? This evening, I will set out why I believe we are falling short and, more importantly, what we might do about it and how we might build a country and citizenship resilient enough to meet the growing and interconnected number of threats to our homeland.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I commend the hon. Member. Resilience is about not just defence but health. To cast the mind of the hon. Gentleman and that of the House back to the national emergency of covid-19, the report of the UK covid inquiry mentioned “fatal strategic flaws”. The NHS did not collapse, although it came close and patients often did not receive the standard of care that they were due, and that led to delays in diagnosis and treatment. Does the hon. Member not agree that serious concerns about the lack of the health service’s effective surge capacity need to be addressed in anticipation of another national health emergency and to secure national resilience in the face of medical uncertainty?

[David Reed]

The hon. Member raises a serious points, which I will come on to, on interconnectedness. We saw how covid-19 affected so many different parts of society—it closed down industry and the economy. We have to start to think about these things cross-departmentally.

The Government’s definition of national resilience is a society’s ability to anticipate, withstand, respond to and quickly recover from severe crises, whether natural disasters, pandemics, geopolitical shocks or deliberate attacks. It rests on a whole-of- society approach in which Government, business and the public work together to protect critical national infrastructure and maintain vital services.

Last year’s strategic defence review made precisely that point. One of its central recommendations was a national conversation on defence and resilience built on that whole-of-society approach and premised on a simple idea: that defending the nation is no longer the job of the armed forces alone. A year on, however, I think it is fair to say that that conversation has barely begun.

One critical central challenge, both to having that conversation with the British public and, more importantly, to making the preparations to be resilient, is that living memory of needing to be resilient in this country is fading. I often speak to my father about this. He was born in 1942 in Plymouth during the blitz. His generation is the last with a direct lived experience of national insecurity on home soil. The contrast is stark. To the young people I speak to about the risks we face, the idea that we might have to defend our homeland, our democracy and our way of life, remains abstract—something that happens to other people in other places.

We are in a more vulnerable position still, however, because beyond the fading of that memory, resilience is no longer woven into our national story. In Taiwan or Finland, the people I speak to have a geographical proximity to the threat, which they feel in their bones: the Chinese dragon across the strait and the Russian bear across the border. Those threats are real and they are close, and that is precisely why those countries do resilience well: their people and their institutions understand in their core the need to be strong. A quotation that has stayed with me since my Royal Marines training puts that well:

“You cannot dream yourself into a strong character: you must hammer and forge yourself into one.”

As a country, we must wake from that dream, and it is incumbent on the Government to have the hard conversation with the public about how we fund our national resilience.

[Mark Sewards (Leeds South West and Morley) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing this debate and making an excellent speech. Clearly, the UK faces malign threats from Russia, from China and especially from Iran, as recent examples have shown. I commend the Government for bringing forward the tackling state threats Bill—reportedly next Wednesday, but we will see the business statement tomorrow—that will allow us to deal with the threats, but the public do not necessarily know just how severe they are. Does he agree that, as well as dealing with the threats, we need to educate the public on just how threatening these state actors are and why we need to deal with them now?

[David Reed]

There must have been a leak, because I am going to come on to that paragraph straight away.

Beyond the issue of funding, the obvious question that flows from this is who in Government should take the lead in having that conversation with the public about the panoply of threats that we face. That leads to the central argument of this debate: is the British state structured to deal effectively with them? I accept that the machinery of government is a surefire way to send those in this Chamber to sleep, but it is central to the direction of travel we must take.

I was waiting with bated breath to see who the Government would send to respond to the debate this evening, because logic would dictate that the Minister responding should come from the Department that the Prime Minister has charged with leading the national conversation on resilience. Here lies the first problem. The Security Minister sits across both the Cabinet Office and the Home Office. His portfolio is broad, but it clearly does not cover anywhere near the full range of threats set out in the Government’s own definition of national resilience.

The Cabinet Office has a resilience directorate, which does important work co-ordinating civil contingency planning, crisis management and emergency response across national and local levels. I would not diminish the work that it does for a moment, but let us consider its design: a directorate for preparedness and a Cobra unit for crisis response. Risk and response. Notice what is missing. There is machinery to assess the threat and machinery to manage the emergency, but nowhere is anyone charged with turning to the public and saying, “Here is the threat we face, here is your part in it, and here is what is being done in your name.” The national conversation that we need therefore finds no natural home. It does not emanate from the directorates whose remit is risk and response; nor has the Ministry of Defence acted on the strategic defence review’s own call for a national conversation on defence and resilience.

The result is a system in which responsibility is spread so thinly that no single Minister owns the problem. The danger of that is not merely administrative tidiness but that when a crisis strikes, command and control will fracture at precisely the moment it must hold. For example, the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill—which hands the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology sweeping new powers to direct critical entities—illustrates the trend rather than reversing it. Individual Departments are accruing resilience powers of their own, with each cooking up policies to support their own patch. A whistle must be blown on this approach, because we risk spreading responsibility through legislation so thinly that no one truly understands where it lies.

When I speak to civil servants—all of whom want to see a stronger and safer country—I notice that the word “resilience” has itself become something of a buzzword, a phrase to attach to a business case to secure a bigger departmental budget. That is a sign of a system without a clear centre of gravity, not of one that is working. That led me to research in depth how our near neighbours have approached this problem—countries with national stories like our own and populations whose memories of insecurity have faded, just as ours have.

The clearest exemplar I found is Denmark. The Danes have grasped something that we have not yet acted upon: in an age of interconnected threats—where cyber-attacks become supply shocks become public-safety emergencies—danger no longer respects departmental boundaries. For decades they had run, as we still do, on a principle of sectoral responsibility—each Department minding risk in its own lane. They concluded that a system in which everyone is responsible is one in which, in practice, no one is.

In August 2024, the Danes acted, creating a dedicated ministry of resilience and preparedness, the first of its kind in the region, with a Cabinet Minister in charge. Within months, they established a resilience agency beneath it, drawing scattered functions into one organisation—one ministry, one Cabinet Minister, one clear line of accountability.

If truth be told, it is too early to say with certainty whether the model delivers the better outcomes that the Danes expect. The real test will come in the next crisis, not the last reorganisation. But the logic is sound because the alternative—broadly what we have—is a system where resilience is everyone’s second priority and nobody’s first. As someone who wants to see a smaller and sharper state, the answer is not a new layer of governance, but collapsing many duplicated ones into a single, accountable home. It is an idea that the Government should actively investigate.

I have also been struck by how our Danish and Dutch friends have begun to share the responsibility for resilience with their citizens, reinforcing civic duty in a far more deliberate way than we do here in the UK. Both have started speaking plainly to their people about preparedness and, strikingly, they tell them much the same thing: “Be ready to look after yourself for three days, or 72 hours.” The Dutch Government now tell every household to hold enough to manage for 72 hours in the event of war, a cyber-attack or a major disaster—things such as water, food, medication, a battery radio, some cash and key documents. They did not merely issue advice; they delivered a printed survival guide to every door and published it online in dozens of languages. Its message was carefully chosen, and the aim, Ministers said, is not to frighten people but to prepare them, because those who think through the first 72 hours of a crisis feel safer, not more fearful. The campaign’s slogan is simple: “Think Ahead”.

Denmark’s advice is almost identical, and the reasoning is the same: if ordinary people can get through the first three days, the authorities can concentrate on those who cannot. Denmark sent that guidance to every adult through its secure Government messaging system and placed 300,000 printed copies in libraries and public offices. It does not shy away from naming why, either. Its Defence Minister told Danes plainly that they and their allies face hybrid war and that each of us should prepare to be without power, water or shops for a short while. In both countries, the principle is the same: resilience is not something the state can simply hand to its people; it is a habit that the public must share in.

[Adrian Ramsay (Waveney Valley) (Green)]

I thank the hon. Member for bringing this debate and in particular for his focus on the need for cross-Government action and to address the range of threats we face. Does he agree that as part of the resilience planning, addressing the risks attached to climate breakdown and nature collapse are absolutely central? On his point about transparency, does he agree that the two suppressed reports from the Joint Intelligence Committee and from the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs’ futures team need to be made available if the Government and Members across parties are to work clearly to address these issues and inform the public?

[David Reed]

The hon. Member raises an important point. For anyone who understands the science and sees the effects globally, climate change is happening, the planet is warming up, and we will all feel the effects of a heating planet. What that does to our critical national infrastructure, to businesses and how they operate, and to our energy systems will be profound, and it is something that I do not think we talk about enough. We talked about it a great deal a few years ago, but it sort of slid off the agenda. However, I also understand the challenges that the Government are facing at the moment: there are international threats, which seem to be conjoining, and climate change seems to be a further away problem. I understand the issues, and I hope the Minister can draw that subject in to show the interconnection of threats and how we will deal with them.

The uncomfortable part is that in terms of national messaging Britain has said and tried to do the same thing, but we say the words without a plan behind them, the public get alarmed, the moment passes, and nothing changes. Denmark and the Netherlands said those words and built them into the life of the nation, and that, in a sentence, is the difference between talking about resilience and doing it.

Let me close with three concrete asks of the Government. First, will the Minister confirm whether any Department or Minister has been formally charged with delivering the national conversation on resilience called for by the strategic defence review? If not, that gap must be filled—I think we would all agree on that. Secondly, will the Government commission a review, led from the centre, into whether the current dispersal of resilience responsibilities across Whitehall is fit for purpose, with the Danish and Dutch models considered explicitly? Thirdly, will the Government speak plainly to the British public about the threats we face, and back those words with a sustained public preparedness campaign, not a single statement that fades within a week, but a message built into the life of the nation?

I return to the statement that is made repeatedly in this House, which is that the first duty of any Government is the defence of the realm. Meeting that duty requires a state that is structured to lead, and a public who are prepared to follow. We are not yet that country, but I have faith we can be.

Lord Mandelson Humble Address: Government Response Update

David Reed Excerpts

Monday 27th April 2026 Commons Chamber

[Darren Jones]

All relevant documents will be published in the normal way.

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

The Minister says that 300 documents have now been shared with the ISC, but how many are left to be processed? More importantly, what has the process been in ascertaining a document’s relevance, and who decides whether a document is important?

[Darren Jones]

The Cabinet Office has now processed all the documents ready for the second tranche. In relation to the Intelligence and Security Committee, those final documents have been sent or will be sent today. In relation to who decides whether a document is referred to the Committee, that is based on officials screening each document to see whether they engage international relations or national security, and whether they warrant a redaction request.

Security Vetting

David Reed Excerpts

Monday 20th April 2026 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

The attention to the process began very much in September ’25, when the Bloomberg emails were published. That is when I agreed with the Cabinet Secretary that he would carry out a review of the entire process, and I have set that out at some length this afternoon.

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

The Prime Minister has chosen to blame his officials for this debacle, so can he confirm that he knows the names of the FCDO civil servants who made the decision to override UKSV on 29 January 2025—yes or no? Has he made the decision to suspend them all from duty, pending a full independent inquiry—yes or no?

[The Prime Minister]

I have set out the facts to the House this afternoon. I have ordered a review of security vetting by Sir Adrian Fulford, so that if any further changes are needed, we can put them in place.

Middle East

David Reed Excerpts

Monday 2nd March 2026 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

We are working with all our allies to ensure that all those who need our help get our help and are safely and swiftly removed from a region that is dangerous for them.

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

I think we can all agree that international law has an important role to play, but the world is changing and we must adapt to protect our national security. Given that international law is broad in nature and open to interpretation—we have seen that in the differing views of the Attorney General and the shadow Attorney General—for public accountability, and given the seriousness of this situation, can the Prime Minister tell us how many and which international lawyers he consulted before he made his decisions over recent days?

[The Prime Minister]

I am not going to disclose the full advice. International law does not just have an important role to play; it is vital if we are taking action that involves our personnel. That is why I took advice, and I have published the summary of that advice. I said that I will look at the shadow Attorney General’s advice. if he is setting out a lawful basis, I would be very interested to read it.

Storm Goretti

David Reed Excerpts

Tuesday 13th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Order. We have to get through this business quite quickly as we have the Finance (No. 2) Bill later, so I urge the Minister to make his responses as brief as possible. We are focused on calling Members from incredibly close to where the storm was, so if it was nowhere near you, please do not bob.

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

I place on record my thanks to the Met Office, which is based in my constituency, for its sterling work throughout Storm Goretti and all year round. It has international expertise and is a real asset to our country.

One of the main issues that comes up when we have big storms such as Goretti is rail in the south-west. Our main line from Paddington was cut off, and many constituents from across the south-west were unable to get home. There are practical solutions to put in place, such as a passing loop on the Waterloo line. I have raised that directly with the Rail Minister and the Prime Minister, and although I get warm words, no action seems to be taken. From a Cabinet Office perspective, what more can be done to add resilience to our train infrastructure?

[Dan Jarvis]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point about the Met Office in his constituency. I completely agree with that, and I pay tribute to the vital work it does. He raises an important point about connectivity, and I agree with him. I want our country to be as resilient as it possibly can be, which is why I can say to him that National Rail’s winter preparedness regime begins in September each year, when special trains and equipment are fully checked, any repairs are carried out and contingency plans are reviewed. I give him an assurance that we take these matters seriously, and we work closely with Transport Ministers.

China Spying Case

David Reed Excerpts

Tuesday 28th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

Not for a moment.

On 1 September, the National Security Adviser convened a routine meeting to discuss the UK’s relationship with China in the context of this case and several other upcoming moments. That is entirely what we would expect the National Security Adviser to do. We have learned that entirely separately, and entirely independent of Government, the CPS was deliberating on not offering evidence in this case. On 3 September, the DPP told the Cabinet Secretary and the DNSA of his intention, subject to confirmation, not to put forward evidence, and unfortunately that decision was confirmed on 9 September. I must say to the Opposition that that is a matter of regret. It is quite rightly an independent decision, but it is a matter of regret. On 15 September 2025, the CPS officially confirmed the decision to discontinue the case against Cash and Berry.

I actually welcome scrutiny of that decision. That is why I welcome the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy’s inquiry into espionage cases and the Official Secrets Act and the Intelligence and Security Committee’s investigations into how classified intelligence was used. Since we last discussed the matter in this House, the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Attorney General, the Cabinet Secretary, the National Security Adviser and the deputy National Security Adviser have all submitted evidence to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy.

Yesterday, the Joint Committee heard evidence from the Director of Public Prosecutions and the First Treasury Counsel, and from the Cabinet Secretary and the deputy National Security Adviser at a later session. Tomorrow, the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister and the Attorney General will give more evidence. A question has been raised about the National Security Adviser; he will also be giving evidence soon, and certainly before the end of the year.

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

The Minister expresses deep regret that this case has not gone to trial. I want to believe him on that, but the case did not go to trial. With the power of hindsight, if he was to go back and do this all again, what would the Minister have done differently to ensure that this case did go to trial?

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I will tell the hon. Gentleman exactly what would have made a massive difference: if we could have updated the Official Secrets Act far sooner than 2023. That would have made a material difference. This case was being prosecuted under a 1911 Act. The National Security Act was passed in 2023. If only the shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster had been in the Cabinet Office to be close to what was going on; perhaps the legislation could have been changed at an earlier stage and we would not be in this position.

Let me be clear with the House: the allegations of political interference in this case are absolutely baseless. The CPS decision to discontinue the case was independent of Government. Indeed, the Opposition should ask what the Director of Public Prosecutions himself said about that; he reiterated it again yesterday when he gave evidence, sitting alongside Tom Little KC.

Security Update: Official Secrets Act Case

David Reed Excerpts

Monday 13th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis]

With great respect to the hon. and learned Gentleman, that is what I was at great pains to explain in my opening remarks.

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

Does the Minister agree that the Government have now set a perverse incentive for British officials, in that admitting to espionage problems with China is seen as rocking the boat?

[Dan Jarvis]

No, I do not agree.

G7 and NATO Summits

David Reed Excerpts

Thursday 26th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

There are two or three principles here. First, we need to see the increase to our defence spend reflected in good, well-paid jobs in constituencies across the country. Secondly, the big sectors in defence will obviously benefit, but we have also put together a hub for smaller supply chain businesses—which, whether defence-specific or not, are in pretty well every constituency —to ensure that they take advantage of the contracts and extra spending on defence. In that way, we can ensure that there is a dividend back in the United Kingdom from the extra spend we are putting in place.

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

There has been some recent confusion from Defence Ministers surrounding the purchase of 12 F-35A nuclear-capable fast jets. Can the Prime Minister please inform the House of the proposed in-service date for this important capability?

[The Prime Minister]

We made the commitment to that capability, and we are now talking to allies about precisely what the timetable will be; I will update the House. The important thing is that the commitment is there. It is a commitment to the NATO initiative, and it brings us within that initiative. Therefore, there are a lot of moving parts, but we have made a very firm commitment, and I will set out the timeline and progress on that in due course.

National Security Strategy

David Reed Excerpts

Tuesday 24th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Pat McFadden]

I pay tribute to the work of Rolls-Royce and the contribution it makes to our national security. I assure my hon. Friend that our commitment to the nuclear deterrent as a cornerstone of our national security is right there as part of our national security strategy.

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

Labour has repeatedly stated that food security is national security—a point with which I and many of my constituents wholeheartedly agree—yet there remains a clear disconnect between that rhetoric and the substance of current policy. Beyond the announced biosecurity measures, does the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster genuinely believe that the national security strategy goes far enough to address the resilience of domestic food supply chains, the risk posed by climate change to agriculture, and systemic vulnerabilities in our food system?

[Pat McFadden]

As I said a few moments ago, this Government have lifted the cost, delay and bureaucracy burdens on our food producers by reaching an SPS veterinary agreement with the European Union that the Conservatives would never have reached because of their ideological objection to doing so. The agreement is good for our farmers and food producers, and it is something that this Government have done.

UK-EU Summit

David Reed Excerpts

Tuesday 20th May 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

We will develop the plan on the youth experience scheme with our partners. We have instructed our teams to move on all fronts as quickly as we can.

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

The Prime Minister states that a new security and defence partnership will pave the way for British defence firms to access the new European defence fund, which I am sure we can collectively agree will allow our continent to defend ourselves against Putin’s autocratic regime. How long does the Prime Minister think access to this fund will take—weeks, months or years?