Oral Answers to Questions

David Reed Excerpts

Tuesday 13th May 2025 Commons Chamber

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

10. What discussions he has had with his US counterpart on the policy of the US Administration on Iran.

[The Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs (Mr David Lammy)]

The UK is supportive of US efforts to reach a nuclear deal with Iran. We have encouraged Iran to engage with President Trump’s efforts in good faith and to find a diplomatic solution. Since the beginning of May, I have raised Iran with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the special envoy to the middle east, Steve Witkoff. We have discussed the range of threats that Iran poses to the UK and our partners.

[Mr Lammy]

I remind the hon. Gentleman that on 4 March the UK specified Iran under the foreign influence registration scheme, which targets those who undertake malign activity in the UK. Of course we keep proscription under review. We are looking closely at the area of state threats; that is traditionally very different from the sorts of cells and terrorist communities that we do proscribe. That is why the Government continue to look at this area very carefully.

[David Reed]

Our United Kingdom and the United States are aligned in the view that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose a serious threat to global stability. With nuclear negotiations currently under way between the US and Iran, can the Secretary of State inform the House what outcome his Department would consider to be a success from a British perspective? Crucially, does he have a contingency plan if those talks fail to produce an acceptable result?

[Mr Lammy]

Iran is now producing roughly one significant quantity of highly enriched uranium every six weeks. That is 40 times above the limit in the joint comprehensive plan of action—the deal that we struck with Iran, which I have in front of me. I am really crystal clear about this. Iran must never develop a nuclear weapon; it must reverse its escalations—we have seen that in its enrichment programme; it must not carry out any critical weaponisation work; and these terms have to be fully verifiable. Unless we get that, we will see a snapback of the sanctions regime that we struck with it 10 years ago.