Awards for Valour (Protection) Bill

David Nuttall Excerpts

Report stage: House of Commons
Friday 24th February 2017 Commons Chamber

[Philip Davies]

As I said on Second Reading, I do not support the Bill. In fact, as I went through it with a view to amending it, what struck me was that, in many respects, I was trying to amend the unamendable. I cannot emphasise enough, however, how much I understand the sincere intentions of my hon. Friend the Member for Dartford (Gareth Johnson) in introducing the Bill, the effort he has put into it and his efforts to find a compromise that suits everyone. I commend him for his sincerity and for his attempt to find a way forward with which everyone agrees. I just cannot agree with him on this occasion. Should the Bill proceed, I hope that my amendments will be accepted, as I believe they will save it from having some unintended consequences and reduce the chances of criminalising people who may be unintentionally caught by it as it stands.

The Bill is considerably different from the one that appeared on Second Reading. That is very much to my hon. Friend’s credit and shows how much effort he has made to find a workable solution. I am grateful to him for taking on board many of the points that I made in the Second Reading debate. However, I still feel that the Bill is deficient, so I will go through the amendments I have tabled. I hope that they may find favour.

New clause 1 would ensure that

“The offence of wearing awards with intent to deceive is triable only summarily.”

It implies that the offence must be dealt with in a magistrates court only. Some may think that the new clause is unnecessary, but it would mean that people had to think twice before amending the legislation to increase the sentence. That is the purpose of new clause 1: it is a safeguard in that respect. That was specifically mentioned by the Select Committee on Defence in its report on the Bill.

New clause 2 would ensure that

“A person is not guilty of an offence under section 1(1) if they are wearing the ‘award’ in a public house.”

The “intention to deceive” element of the offence could be committed in a variety of circumstances. Seeking to deceive for financial gain would already be covered by fraud legislation. This Bill is clearly supposed to include other types of deception. That could be the intention to deceive to gain respect or to impress a potential future partner. The new clause deals with people in a pub.

We all know that pubs are places where all kinds of rubbish are talked at times by people—not just in pubs, I hasten to add, but particularly in pubs. To think that someone could have a few too many, boast about something to which they have no right with a cheap replica medal bought off eBay or wherever and end up with a criminal conviction is rather over the top. The new clause would remove that possibility. When my hon. Friend conceived the Bill—again, I applaud his sincerity—it was about people who turn up at Remembrance Day parades and events such as that purporting to be someone they are not. Therefore, ensuring that the provision does not apply to people in a public house would help to get us back to the Bill’s original intention.

New clause 3 would ensure that

“A person is not guilty of an offence under section 1(1) if they are not wearing the ‘award’ in a public place.”

Therefore, it would provide the defence of the offence taking place in private. It is important, given the Bill’s intention, to limit the offence to a public place. If someone gets a medal out and uses it to impress someone in their own home or in private property—a private club or somewhere like that—I do not see why that should be an offence. I cannot believe that that is what people think of when they think of people with criminal convictions. If someone wants to argue that some private places should be covered, I would ask, what about the unintended consequences? Is it not time that we stopped ignoring the foreseeable consequences of legislation? Someone who boasts to a woman he has met in a pub that he has a medal, which turns out not to be his, is a copy or is something that looks like an award, could find himself in court with a criminal record for the first time. Some people might not care about that—they might think, “Well, they had that coming”—but I do care. I think we have enough people committing serious offences that we do not deal with properly, and to create offences for those who are likely to have issues anyway, probably including mental health ones, to be committed in the privacy of their home strikes me as being rather over the top.

New clause 4 would insert:

“A person is not guilty of an offence under section 1(1) if they are entitled to wear any of the other awards listed in the Schedule.”

The defence would be that they are entitled to wear a medal named in the long list at the end of the schedule, but they just happen to be wearing the wrong one. If someone is allowed to wear one medal but wears a different one—not an additional one, but just a different one—even if it is a case of enhanced valour, why should they be criminalised if they were entitled to wear a medal on the list? I do not think that that should be a criminal offence. It might not happen often, but it is certainly not impossible, and, assuming it did happen, would we really want to criminalise that person? Would it not be better to make it clear in the Bill that that person would not be criminalised?

New clause 5 would insert:

“A person is not guilty of an offence under section 1(1) if they have served in the Armed Forces for more than 2 years.”

As with the amendment on existing entitlement, I do not think people really had it in mind to criminalise former or current members of our armed forces for this offence. I return to the point about an intent to deceive to gain respect—added respect, I guess. Do we really want to go down that route? We should not want to risk criminalising someone who has risked their life serving our country just because they might have tried to embellish their record in some way. This amendment would remove that possibility for those who have served for two years or more in the armed forces.

New clause 6 would insert:

“A person is not guilty of an offence under section 1(1) if they have served in the Armed Forces and as a result of front line service have been medically diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.”

In a similar vein to the amendments about serving or former members of the armed forces, this amendment would protect, in many respects, many of the most vulnerable people—those with diagnosed PTSD. Those who have been seriously affected by frontline service and who have this condition as a result could be more susceptible than those without to fall foul of this proposed legislation, and I would not want to see that person either intentionally or unintentionally caught out. I would rather make it abundantly clear in the Bill that they could not be caught by the legislation.

New clause 7 would insert:

“(1) A person is not guilty of an offence under section 1(1) if they are a family member of the person given the award.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), someone is a family member of the person if—

(a) he is the spouse or civil partner of that person, or he and that person live together as husband and wife or as if they were civil partners, or

(b) he is that person’s parent, grandparent, child, grand-child, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece.

(3) For the purpose of subsection (2)(b)—

(a) a relationship by marriage or civil partnership shall be treated as a relationship by blood,

(b) a relationship of the half-blood shall be treated as a relationship of the whole blood,

(c) the stepchild or adopted child of a person shall be treated as his child, and

(d) an illegitimate child shall be treated as the legitimate child of his mother and reputed father.”

Again, this amendment deals with family members of those given an award. My concern is that they might well have a medal, especially if the person in question has sadly died. Their chances of becoming susceptible to the provisions of the Bill must therefore be greater than for the average person, by definition.

[Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend think that this new clause would deal adequately with the points raised by the Royal Air Force Families Federation in its written evidence to the Defence Committee?

[Philip Davies]

My hon. Friend makes a pertinent point. I will come to that in a moment.

I know that it is not the intention of the Bill to create the outcome I have just described, but it remains a possibility. As my hon. Friend says, the Royal Air Force Families Federation said in its written evidence to the Defence Committee:

“Yes, there should most certainly be safeguards for family members. The key question is who ‘qualifies’! The definition we use is ‘anyone who is a blood relation’ but this may not be ?appropriate in these circumstances and can be difficult to prove on occasions. Interestingly, the MoD is struggling with its own definition of a family member but it may be sensible to align any definition for these circumstances with the MoD definition if and when they decide what it should be. Otherwise, it’s probably a matter for common sense.”

I know that the issue is dealt with differently now, but I believe that it is worth having a definition of “family” in the Bill, in its new sense.

As I mentioned on Second Reading, the Defence Committee’s report states:

“A number of our witnesses emphasised the importance of ensuring that relatives of deceased or incapacitated medal recipients can continue to wear their relations’ medals at commemoration events without risk of prosecution.”

The report also states:

“Mr Johnson indicated that family members would be doubly protected as they would lack the necessary intention to deceive, as well as being able to avail themselves of a specific defence that will be placed in the Bill.”

I agree that a specific defence should be included in the Bill, and that is the reason for this new clause. How we define “family” is an issue. Crucially, the report goes on:

“The term ‘family member’ must however be defined in terms of the proximity of the relations that it is seeking to include in the defence. It is not a legal term of art with a single definition. Acts of Parliament which use the term commonly carry a definition of ‘family’ within them to be used for the purposes of that Act. Mr Johnson suggested in oral evidence that he was minded that this defence should be quite narrow, so that for example a nephew deceitfully wearing medals could not rely on the defence by claiming that they were his uncle’s awards.”

It also states:

“The inclusion of a defence to ensure that family members representing deceased or incapacitated relations who are recipients of medals is vital, but ‘family member’ must be properly defined to ensure that there is no room for uncertainty or abuse. We suggest that the Bill include a definition of ‘family member’ in order to provide certainty over who will be covered by this category.”

That is what I am trying to do in the new clause. I have taken it as read that spouses should be included, as should blood relatives and step relatives. I have also included provision for those who are adopted into families, which slightly extends the basic definition of “family” according to section 113 of the Housing Act 1985. In reality, there will be only one actual award, so we can assume that the closest family member might have it, or that it would be shared by close family members, in which case it is unlikely that a distant relative would use the award.

The new clause would also prevent the situation from arising in which, for example, a son pinches his father’s medal for a bit of fun and goes around bragging that it is his. However unlikely or unbelievable that claim might be, the act of intending to deceive does not take account of the perception of others. They might well laugh out loud at the absurdity of a 17-year-old wearing a medal when everyone knows he has never been in the armed forces, but as the Bill stands that does not prevent the offence from being committed. I hope that the new clause will help with that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Philip Davies]

I apologise to my hon. Friend for not being well enough prepared to answer his question, but I do not have that information. I do not even know whether anyone has that information. Someone might have it, but I do not.

New clause 9 states:

“(1) This Act shall expire at the end of 2022 unless an order is made under this section.

(2) An order under this section shall be made by statutory instrument; but no order shall be made unless a draft has been laid before, and approved by resolution of, each House of Parliament.”

Basically, this is a sunset clause. If it became apparent that the Bill was not doing as intended, new clause 9 would be a nice way for the Bill to fall without any fanfare. Of course if the Bill were enacted and doing particularly well, someone would be able to rehash it.

[Mr Nuttall]

Does my hon. Friend agree that new clause 9 strengthens the case for accepting new clause 8? New clause 8 would make things far easier for those wanting to assess the success, or otherwise, of the Bill.

[Philip Davies]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. New clauses 8 and 9, in many respects, go together. If we had a sunset clause, we would need to be able to measure the success, or otherwise, of the legislation, and the reporting set out in new clause 8 would help with that task. He is right to draw attention to the fact that, in many respects, new clauses 8 and 9, though not reliant on each other, flow nicely from each other.

I appreciate that that was a quick canter around the course of new clauses.

--- Later in debate ---

[Philip Davies]

As it happens, yes I do, but I think we are straying from the point. I do not want to test your patience by going off on a tangent, Madam Deputy Speaker; I am trying to stick to my amendments. As it happens, I agree with my hon. Friend, but unfortunately that is not what the Bill is about, and it certainly is not what my amendments are about.

The amendments would remove the custodial sentence for the offence in England and Wales. It is bizarre: as a member of the Justice Committee, I regularly listen to Justice questions, and I hear everyone—apart from me and a few other notable exceptions—seemingly agreeing that fewer people should be sent to prison. In fact, the Labour party recently proposed that we should let half the people out of prison—not too long ago, the shadow Attorney General in the Lords recommended that the prison population should be halved, although the Commons Front-Bench team distanced themselves from that suggestion. How on earth can we be desperately trying to get people out of prison who have been convicted of burglary, robbery, arson and all these things—

[Mr Nuttall]

And domestic violence.

[Philip Davies]

Indeed. People are desperate to get those people out of prison as quickly as possible, but at the same time they are supporting a Bill that would send somebody to prison for this offence. You literally could not make it up! How could anybody put those two things together? They think there are too many people in prison and that we should be letting them out, but that the people covered by the Bill should be sent to prison. How on earth can anyone make that argument?