Universal Credit

David Mowat Excerpts

Monday 7th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Dame Anne Begg (Aberdeen South) (Lab)]

Universal credit is a major welfare reform. It will eventually replace tax credits and most existing working-age benefits, including out-of-work benefits and housing benefit. It is estimated that, by the time it is fully implemented, universal credit—or UC, as it has now become known—will be paid to 7.7 million households, and we hope that that will be the case.

During last week’s debate on work and pensions, I said that the problem with welfare reform was that it was devilishly complex, took a long time to implement, and always had unintended consequences. I think that all three of those things apply to universal credit. We can agree that its design should bring some advantages. It should improve the position of claimants when they move into work or take on more work, because their benefit will be reduced gradually on the basis of how much they earn, rather than suddenly being cut off if their working hours exceed a certain limit. It should remove many of the “cliff edges” that exist in the current system. Because it is both an in-work and an out-of-work benefit, it will remove the constant applying and reapplying for different benefits as someone moves in and out of work.

However, it is wrong to talk about UC’s “simplifying the benefits system”, because that is not possible to any significant extent. The benefits system is complex because people’s lives are complex, and are constantly changing. UC will be a more streamlined system, but it will not be a simple one. That is clear from the problems that have been encountered in efforts to implement it. The national roll-out of new UC claims was due to take place between October 2013 and April this year. Existing claimants of “legacy benefits”, including jobseeker’s allowance, employment and support allowance and housing benefit, would then be migrated to UC between April 2014 and the end of 2017. However, problems with IT systems meant that major changes to the implementation timetable were made in July 2013, and then again in December last year. That slowed down the process dramatically.

UC claims were introduced on a very small scale from April last year in a few jobcentres in Greater Manchester, which were initially called “pathfinders” but are now referred to by the Department for Work and Pensions as “live service sites”. In the event, national roll-out from last October amounted to the expansion of new UC claims to only a further six jobcentres around Britain, and it has recently been expanded again to a further nine sites in the north-west, bringing the total number of jobcentres where UC is available to 19, less than 3% of the jobcentre network—hardly a national roll-out.

New claims to UC are now not expected to be extended to the whole of Great Britain until 2016 and the bulk of existing claimants will not be moved on to UC until 2016-17. The process will not be completed until later than the original target date of 2017.

The Secretary of State brushes aside any criticism of the very small number of people who are on UC by arguing that the Government are

“taking a careful and controlled approach to achieve a safe and secure delivery.”—[Official Report, 30 June 2014; Vol. 583, c. 645.]

I think we would all agree that it is right to ensure that the system works properly before extending it, but, as the Work and Pensions Committee said, there is a difference between cautious progress and a snail’s pace.

The facts are clear. Since UC started in April last year fewer than 7,000 claims have been processed. By comparison, more than 1 million people claim just jobseeker’s allowance. In January this year alone, there were almost 250,000 new jobseeker’s allowance claims. That is how much churn there is in the system. Almost all the 7,000 UC claims are from people in the simplest circumstances: young, single, and usually recently unemployed. Last week, 15 months after UC began, claims from couples started to be accepted—but only in a handful of the live service sites. We have been told that claims from people with children will begin “later in the summer”. We all know what Parliament’s timetables are like and we wonder when “summer” actually is, so can the Minister give us an idea of what “summer” means in this context?

Achieving only that tiny number of claims to date illustrates the scale of the challenge still facing the Government in trying to replace existing working-age benefits and tax credits with UC by 2017, including migrating all the claimants of the relevant existing benefits over to it. Given the excruciatingly slow pace of roll-out to date, it is hard to see how the target date can be met.

To put this into context, the other new benefit which has had its implementation slowed down is the personal independence payment, although even PIP has more new claims in payment than UC. By March this year 83,900 PIP decisions had been made, which is far higher than for UC, and that involves a smaller cohort and has been done in a shorter time scale. In our report, we asked the DWP to set out its revised estimates of UC caseloads and costs for each year to 2017-18, to reassure Parliament and the public that there is a clear and detailed revised implementation plan. The Government’s response to our report did not include any of that information.

The problems with implementing UC arise largely from failure to get the IT right. Problems with Government IT systems have happened so frequently that they have almost become a cliché, but the UC IT challenge seems especially difficult to tackle and to be throwing up particular challenges. Some £40 million in IT expenditure had to be written off in 2012-13, and a further £90 million is being “written down” in five years instead of 15 because the useful life of the software is much shorter than anticipated. That may seem like an accounting detail, but it shows that the use of public money has not been cost-effective to date, and a great deal more public money is at stake in the UC programme.

The Government’s current approach to the IT problems is to continue to spend millions of pounds—between £37 million and £58 million—on the old IT system during 2014 to extend its functionality so that it can cope with a wider range of claimants in the live service sites. At the same time, extensive sums are being spent on developing IT for the long term. That has had various names and various incarnations: first it was called “the digital solution”, then “the end-state solution”, and the latest terminology seems to be the “enhanced digital service”. Unfortunately we on the Select Committee still do not know what that means. The Secretary of State’s explanation last Monday did not help us clear that up.

The National Audit Office has summed up very well the lack of information available on how the IT for UC will be taken forward. It said last December that the uncertainties include the following: how it will work; when it will be ready; how much it will cost; and who will do the work to develop and build it. We still do not have answers to any of these questions. It would be helpful if the Minister provided some answers to those key points in her response to the debate, because the Work and Pensions Committee has still not had an explanation.

We have asked Ministers for more information about the IT during three evidence sessions over the space of nine months. We repeated this request in our report, including asking the DWP to set out the costs of the IT development work, because the published information on IT costs does not take us beyond November 2014, but we received no answers in the Government response to our report. All it said was that UC will be delivered via

“a multi-channel service that makes greater use of modern technology to ensure the system is as effective, simple and transparent as possible.”

I still do not know what that means, and I do not know if anybody does.

The one thing we do know is that the new “enhanced digital service” will not be ready to test before the end of this year, and even then it will only be tested on 100 claimants to start with. We still have no indication of when it will be possible to test it on a bigger and more representative group of claimants. The challenge of getting from an IT system that is capable of processing 100 claims by the end of 2014 to one that can deal with frequently changing claims from more than 7 million households by 2017 is clearly an extreme one.

Our report recommended that, given the small number of people currently claiming UC, the Government should consider whether it would be a better use of taxpayers’ money to abandon further development of the existing system and focus solely on the end-state solution. The Government said in answer to a recent parliamentary question—although this was not set out in their response to our report—that the enhanced digital service will be integrated with the existing UC service where

“it is both practical and operationally sensible”.—[Official Report, 30 June 2014; Vol. 583, c. 434W.]

Again, I am not sure what that means, so perhaps the Minister can translate those vague phrases into something more meaningful and detailed when she responds.

[David Mowat (Warrington South) (Con)]

The Chairman of the Select Committee talks about the enhanced digital solution, which I think has the characteristics of a front-end which is then fed by a number of the legacy systems, which is why applications development work must be done on both of them. In terms of the technical architecture, I do not think that is altogether surprising, different or new.

[Dame Anne Begg]

I have to say that that is a better explanation than anything I have heard from any of the Ministers—although I am not sure I even understand that explanation—but the question of what this digital solution actually entails is concerning: is it a complete rewriting of the IT or is it, as the hon. Gentleman says, about bringing the legacy systems in and developing them? That was not the original impression we were given, however. Is there to be an original design or the use of the original IT—although, as we know, there is a failure to develop that or to adapt it to cover the different circumstances that people have?

The Committee was also concerned—we expressed this quite forcefully in our report—about the DWP’s lack of co-operation with our formal role in scrutinising UC. I am sure the House would agree that, as our report says, effective Select Committee scrutiny depends on the provision of accurate, timely and detailed information by Government Departments. The DWP has not always provided that to the Committee in the case of UC.

As well as publishing a highly critical report on UC last September, the National Audit Office was then involved in a long-running dispute with the DWP about how much it should write off for the wasted IT. Because of the accounting concerns, the NAO refused to sign off the DWP accounts for 2012-13 for six months, which delayed their publication from June to December. The Secretary of State was, not unreasonably, unwilling to appear before the Committee to give oral evidence about UC until the accounts were published, so our own scrutiny process was delayed and hampered.

The DWP has also been very reluctant to provide us with information about UC and the serious problems it has encountered with it. When the NAO reported on those problems in September last year, it came as news to us, because the Government had not told us about their own concerns about UC and the actions they had taken to address them during 2012 and early 2013, even though our Select Committee had held several oral evidence sessions during that time and published a substantial report. On two occasions the Government published details about major changes to the timetable for UC implementation only when forced to do so by the prospect of the Secretary of State having to appear before us to give oral evidence. Information was released at the session itself on one occasion, and two working days before on another—even then, very little detail was available. That, of course, gave the Committee no time to assess the implications of these announcements properly before we put our questions. We believe that it is unacceptable for the Government to provide information about major policy changes to Committees only when forced to do so by the imminent prospect of being held to account in a public evidence session.

The Committee does not, as the Secretary of State has suggested, want to run his Department—far from it—but we do expect to have access to the information we need to scrutinise it effectively. However, the Secretary of State told us in February:

“I do not have to tell the Committee everything that is happening in the Department until we have reached a conclusion about what is actually happening”.

That view was reiterated in the formal Government response to our concerns, which said that the DWP

“does not regard it as necessary to provide a running commentary on the day to day management of the many large and complex programmes currently underway”.

I will let hon. Members come to their own conclusions about what that implies in terms of respect for accountability, transparency and the formal scrutiny role of departmental Select Committees.

Our report also highlighted the problems the UC delays are causing for other key organisations, particularly local authorities. Local authorities currently administer housing benefit on the Government’s behalf but were expecting the introduction of UC to mean that new claims for housing benefit would end by April this year. The UC implementation delays mean that local authorities will now be administering housing benefit until at least 2016. It is very difficult for them to know how best to run and staff their housing benefit departments until the Government clarify what funding they will make available for that. We asked the DWP to clarify the funding that will be available in 2014-15 and 2015-16 to cover the additional costs to local authorities, but no details were provided in the Government’s response; they simply said that they would ensure that they were in a position to inform local authorities of their individual budget allocations

“in sufficient time before the start of the 2015/16 financial year”.

Local authorities will also have an important role in helping more vulnerable claimants cope with the transition to UC. Our 2012 report on UC examined the implications for vulnerable people in detail. Since then, the fundamental problems with implementing UC have, understandably, dominated public debate and the Committee’s attention. Ensuring that vulnerable people are not excluded from, or disadvantaged by, UC should remain a priority for the Government, and how vulnerable people will be supported through the transition remains a key concern for the Committee. The Government have acknowledged that vulnerable people will need support to adjust to UC. Lord Freud, the Minister with responsibility for welfare reform, told us that how support would be provided for vulnerable people was almost as important as UC itself. But it is still far from clear how that will work in practice, and a great deal still needs to be clarified about how that support will be provided and funded.

Working with the Local Government Association, the Government produced the first version of the local support services framework—LSSF—last year. That sets out how they expect support for vulnerable people to be provided, in partnership with local authorities, housing providers and the voluntary sector. However, there is little detail on how the LSSF will operate in practice and how it will be funded, even though an “update” was published at the end of last year. The Government said last December that the final version of the LSSF would be published in autumn 2014, but in their response to our report that date had changed to autumn 2015. We understand that the delays to UC implementation mean that the timetable for providing support to claimants will also need to change, but the organisations DWP expects to deliver this support—local authorities, housing providers and voluntary organisations —all need to know what they are expected to provide, so that they can plan and budget for these new responsibilities.

In all the debate about IT systems, costs and case loads, it concerns me that the central point of UC is being lost: it is meant to make the benefit system work better for millions of claimants, help them to move into jobs or work more hours, and make it less complicated for them to move on to and off benefit as their lives change. Until we have more clarity, transparency and detail from the Government about progress with the UC project, it is difficult for anyone, including my Committee, to make a proper assessment of whether UC will genuinely deliver the improvements for claimants that this costly and complex welfare reform was intended to deliver.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sheila Gilmore]

Again, there is the theory and then there is what happens in practice. If in all cases the information from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs works, it should be reasonably accurate, but when people have very variable earnings there will be considerable problems, particularly with monthly payments, because it will take a long time to adjust for somebody whose earnings vary a great deal. That will leave some people in considerable hardship.

[David Mowat]

To answer the intervention made by the hon. Member for Ealing North (Stephen Pound), the whole purpose of having the real-time information interface out of the HMRC systems, which was a prerequisite to universal credit, was to address precisely that point.

[Sheila Gilmore]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, but obviously there are other complications for people with very variable earnings, and I am not confident that they will all be overcome.

Finally, on the IT that we are expected to believe will be in place at some point, last week the Secretary of State delivered absolutely no clarity when we debated this in the Chamber. When I intervened to ask him what the end-state solution was, he replied:

“It is universal credit completely delivering to everybody in the UK. That is the end-state solution—live, online and fully protected.”—[Official Report, 30 June 2014; Vol. 583, c. 645.]

Again, that is describing the end aspiration in a very generalised way, but it tells us absolutely nothing about whether it will work.

Any change of this sort requires a lot of thought and practice. One of the issues about which there remains considerable concern—we have not heard a great deal about this from DWP—is the direct payment of housing benefit to the claimant and then to the landlord. To be fair, DWP has been carrying out pilots for two years to see how that would work, and I think that they have now come to an end. I understand that an independent evaluation is now with the Department, although it has not yet been published—perhaps the Minister knows more about that than I do. However, the data from the organisations that have been piloting it are now in the public domain. They looked initially at some 6,700 people —in different small groups across the country—that it was tested on. At the end of the pilot, 4,700 were still on direct payments, but 1,993 of the original group had been returned to having payments made directly to their landlord. That is a considerable proportion of the total. That rings some alarm bells on how well it will work. The landlords involved in those pilots have said constantly that it worked only as a result of very intensive work that has been done precisely because they are pilots. There is considerable concern that that will not be scalable to the required extent. Although I certainly commend the Department for running those pilots, we need to hear what lessons have been learnt, whether any further changes to the plans are required and how these things will be made to work in the longer term.

There are many other aspects of universal credit that people have raised concerns about. In many ways we have almost forgotten about some of the downsides, such as second earners being less incentivised to work under universal credit rules, as drawn up by the Government—they could be changed—than they are under the current system, and there is the fact that some families with disabled children will receive less than they do at the moment. There was a lot of debate about those issues, and the fact that we are nowhere near including some of those people is probably why those concerns have gone off the boil, but we should not forget about them. Even if universal credit is properly implemented, it is not a case of all winners and no losers, because a significant number of people will still be worse off under universal credit.

The detailed rules for universal credit can be changed, and in some ways that is where the bookcase has its merits. Some of the concerns about the rate of tapering of income, which has been changed since the original proposals, and how we deal with school meals, child care and families with disabled children could all be addressed. I think that it is a pity that at this stage we are so far away from those people being included in the new system that we do not even need to look for the answers. Just over 6,000 people are on universal credit, and that is predominantly JSA with a few changes, so the simplest of cases and situations. That is not really a fantastic achievement. I am sorry if that is describing the glass as being half empty, but that is certainly how it appears to me.

[David Mowat (Warrington South) (Con)]

It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Edinburgh East (Sheila Gilmore). This is the second time in a week that we have had the opportunity to debate universal credit. I will focus my brief remarks on some of the comments made by Labour Members, which I think can be characterised thus: “We are doing our job. If only the Secretary of State would do his job, everything would be okay.”

I had thought that it was agreed that universal credit is a much-needed project. It is a project of national significance. I think that it is analogous to the Olympics, but in fact harder to deliver. Opposition Front Benchers might give that some thought when considering how to conduct themselves in this debate. The project might be harder to deliver than the Olympics, but it is as important to our country. I will comment on the progress and some of the issues around that, and also talk at some length about Labour’s four-point plan—it has now been published—to “save” the programme, and a rattling good yarn it is too. I will not repeat the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Newton Abbot (Anne Marie Morris), but the project is a national imperative. We are trying to make work pay, to streamline benefits and to mimic the whole process of transition to work.

Developing a set of IT applications to be used by 8 million users is quite difficult. Frankly, neither political party has shown a great deal of success in doing that over the past decade or so. If we accept that it is a hard thing to do, then perhaps Members might try to do a little more than they have today in getting behind the 1,000 or 2,000 people who are working on the programme —working weekends and doing the stuff that needs to be done to get this to happen.

Are there problems with this project? I do not know; I am not an expert on it. I hate to say this, but I do not even serve on the Select Committee. Perhaps I am here as an imposter. I have had some experience of IT. I have spent a large part of my life explaining to people why IT projects are late and why it is not my fault but somebody else’s—I got quite good at that by the end. During a quality assurance test on an IT project—in fact, we do not have IT projects any more; this is a business change project—one of the indicators of difficulties relates to the number of project managers. If the project manager has changed a lot, there will be reasons for that: it is a very clear flashing red light. This programme has been unlucky—I use that word advisedly—in that it has had a number of different project managers who have had to move on for different reasons. Of course, that creates issues about how things are done, as in this case.

I listened carefully to what the hon. Member for Edinburgh East said about roll-out. It was not clear that she thought that the Secretary of State was rolling it out wrongly; rather, she seemed concerned that he had not told her in advance, at the start, how he was going to do it. That is an entirely different matter, because sometimes things are changed for tactical reasons. When the Olympics are being delivered, things are sometimes done in a different order. That is not unreasonable and not necessarily wrong.

[Sheila Gilmore]

I hope that the hon. Gentleman would not want to misinterpret what I said. There is nothing wrong with changing one’s mind and trying to adjust as one goes along, but what has been wrong has been the complete confidence, with each turnaround, in everything being fine and in how we should not be worried any more. We have seen that on several occasions.

[David Mowat]

As I said, I have not been serving on the Select Committee and I have not heard about the confidence she mentions. My point is that decisions are made during the life cycle of a programme that effect changes, and if, every time that happens—

[Debbie Abrahams]

There was a two-week difference between the Department saying that everything was fine in a memo that we received and the NAO’s publication of its cataclysmic report condemning what the Department is doing. Is that the sort of time scale that the hon. Gentleman has in mind?

[David Mowat]

I do not know, because I was not aware of that. The hon. Lady’s intervention, like much of her speech, is along the lines of, “We’re doing our job; if only the Secretary of State would do his job and hurry up and get this delivered, everything would be all right.” My substantive point is that delivering this application is harder than delivering the Olympics, and it behoves all of us to get behind the 1,000 or 2,000 people who are trying to do it. That is not to say that individual mistakes have not been made. There have almost certainly been lots of mistakes; it would be odd if there had not been.

As to progress, the issue is not that things have not been done; it is what we do now and how we deal with it. I am going to be kind to the Opposition and talk about the Olympics rather than the national health service project that wrote off about £10 billion. The Olympics was a joint success—a success for our country—and yet its budget increased by a factor of four. When the right hon. Member for Dulwich and West Norwood (Dame Tessa Jowell) came to the House and announced that the budget was going up by a factor of four, Members on both sides of the House, broadly speaking, tried to understand why that had happened, accepted it, and knuckled down to get the project delivered. In the end, there was not a cigarette paper between the two parties in terms of the approach to that project of national significance—as this one is. The Secretary of State and his team are trying to do a very difficult thing in delivering this application, to be used by 10 million people, in parallel with existing systems which, every week, continue to be used by 10 million people. Of course mistakes have been made; as I say, it would be odd if they had not. The issue is whether, on the whole, it is being managed correctly and whether, structurally, we are doing the right thing.

I had thought that Labour supported the basic tenets of universal credit, but some of the comments by the hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams) about scope implied that she has severe reservations. She may be right; I am not an expert. It seems odd that Labour Members are raising issues such as scope at such a late stage of the programme. To some extent, they are the Opposition and perhaps it is reasonable that they oppose, but there is a difference between opposing and what I would call opportunistic carping—not only that, but opportunistic carping that is destructive, not constructive.

That brings me to Labour’s four-point plan, to which Mr Baldrick would have been delighted to give his name. Point 1 is to stop the programme and think about it for three months—not to review it, not to stop rolling it out, but to stop it completely. It is not totally clear to me what they would be stopping—development, implementation, the front end, the legacy systems and interface work, or perhaps all of it. It is not totally clear to me what they would do with the 1,000 people—to take a round number—who are currently doing all these tasks. They are saying, “No, let’s just stop it, with an immediate write-off of all that.”

Point 2 is to get the NAO to have a look at the programme. That is fair enough; one cannot argue with asking the NAO to look at something. Of course, it would have to use people with expertise in programmes of this type, of whom most of the good ones are in the civil service and working on this programme. Nevertheless, let us do it anyway.

The really interesting thing about the plan is points 3 and 4, which represent major, significant scope changes. If we make such changes to a programme right near the end, that is when everything goes wrong—when things have to be retested, budgets change, and all the rest of it. The great thing about these major scope changes is that, according to the four-point plan, they will be done at “no additional cost”. The two points propose to remove some of the onus on self-employed people and to continue to pay the primary carer.

On the train this morning, between Watford and Euston, I costed Labour’s four-point plan at £89,611,207.31. That costing—I am very happy to take an intervention on it—includes 11 new applications, 47 new screens, 190 database changes, 201 reports, a 40% test rerun, and 88 new interfaces. I may have spent only 11 minutes on the calculation to come up with that number, but that is 11 minutes more than Labour Members have spent on putting it into their plan and saying they can achieve it with “no additional cost”. I would be delighted if one of them wants to intervene on me—but intervention came there none.

[Sheila Gilmore]

rose—

[David Mowat]

Ah!

[Sheila Gilmore]

The hon. Gentleman should be clearer about why he thinks, for example, that making payment to the primary carer would have such huge costs, especially at a point when, it is fair to say, the systems are unlikely to have reached implementation for families with children.

[David Mowat]

The problem arises precisely because the systems are nearing completion. Costs in the life cycle of an IT project escalate the nearer to the end we get. To repeat a couple of the estimating parameters I used, Labour’s plan would require 11 new applications and 47 new screens. If the Labour party has its own estimate and it took it more than 11 minutes to put it together, I would be very happy to accept that it is right, but all it has done is write a sentence.

[Dame Anne Begg]

From the Select Committee’s point of view—not that of Labour Back Benchers—the problem is that we do not know any of those things. The hon. Gentleman has made assumptions, but we do not know whether the IT has developed sufficiently to take account of families with children or whether it would cost anything to make the payment to the primary carer instead. We do not know—that is our objection. We have not been told. We have not been kept in the loop.

[David Mowat]

The hon. Lady makes a reasonable intervention and I understand it, but if Labour Front Benchers, whose four-point plan this is, do not know the cost of their proposed scope increases—which is reasonable, because I do not know how much they would cost, either—we would expect them to say, “We don’t know the costs,” not, “These scope increases will be delivered within the same budget as the rest of the programme.” The point I am making is that that is irresponsible. It is not indicative of Front Benchers who take what has to happen to the programme seriously or who, 10 months from now, intend to be the Government of this country. The reality is that 10 years—two Parliaments—is too soon.

[Stephen Timms (East Ham) (Lab)]

The Work and Pensions Committee has done the House a service with its report, and the tributes to its Chair from both sides of the House are well deserved.

The hon. Member for Newton Abbot (Anne Marie Morris) is absolutely right to say that there is widespread agreement that universal credit is, in principle, a good idea, but I am afraid the universal credit project has had all the hallmarks of disaster right from the start, as a number of us pointed out at the time. Everybody hoped, as we were assured, that the lessons of previous failures had been learned, but unfortunately they had not.

It started to go wrong within just a few weeks of the general election. Ministers published a Green Paper entitled “21st Century Welfare”—I have my well-thumbed copy with me—which introduced the idea of universal credit. Paragraph 7 of chapter 5 stated:

“The IT changes that would be necessary to deliver a more integrated system would not constitute a major IT project”.

There was an utter failure, right at the outset, to grasp the scale of what the Government were about to embark on. How on earth the phrase “would not constitute a major IT project” came to be written in a Green Paper, I have absolutely no idea, but I am quite sure that no official in the Department would have been responsible for writing such a ludicrous claim. I am afraid that from that moment on, things have got progressively worse.

Will the Minister comment specifically on my intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead and Kilburn (Glenda Jackson) about this afternoon’s announcement by the head of the civil service, Sir Bob Kerslake, in evidence to the Public Accounts Committee, that the Treasury has not yet approved the revised business case? A week ago today, the Minister said in response to a question from my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves), the shadow Secretary of State for Work and Pensions:

“The Chief Secretary to the Treasury has approved the UC Strategic Outline Business Case plans for the remainder of this Parliament (2014-15) as per the ministerial announcement (5 December 2013, Official Report, column 65WS)”.—[Official Report, 30 June 2014; Vol. 583, c. 434W.]

The Minister said that the Treasury had agreed the business case, but today the head of the civil service told the Public Accounts Committee that the Treasury has not agreed the business case. The Minister owes us an explanation of the discrepancy between her answer a week ago and what the head of the civil service has said today.

The project has suffered from three levels of failure: policy failure, delivery failure and governance failure. I will say a little about each of them. First, policy failure is perhaps the most serious one. As the hon. Member for Hornchurch and Upminster (Dame Angela Watkinson) has rightly pointed out, the point of universal credit was to make sure that people would be better off if their income increased because they got a job or did extra hours or for some other reason. However, the difficulty involved in achieving that apparently simple goal was never understood by Ministers, and the hard graft of delivering it has therefore never been done.

Last September’s National Audit Office report, which my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams) has rightly described as cataclysmic, noted:

“Throughout the programme the Department has lacked a detailed view of how Universal Credit is meant to work.”

That has been the central failure: the Department simply has not worked out what the system is supposed to do.

More than three years after the implementation of universal credit started, we still do not know, as we have been reminded in this debate, which recipients of universal credit will be entitled to free school meals for their children. That is not a minor detail; it is a very serious problem for the aim of making sure that people are always better off if their income goes up. If the truth is that a household will suddenly lose their entitlement to free school meals if they reach a specific income threshold—that appears to be where we are heading—of, for example, £9,000 a year, their income will be a great deal less than it was before the small increase that triggered that change. The Citizens Advice briefing for today’s debate has an example of a lone parent who, if free school meals are decided on the basis of income threshold,

“will be worse off by taking on extra work however many hours she works”.

Solving that genuine policy difficulty is at the heart of what the Government are trying to do with universal credit. As my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East (Sheila Gilmore) has reminded us, she and I served on the Welfare Reform Bill Committee. On 24 March 2011, the Secretary of State said:

“we have to resolve some of these issues like free school meals…You asked when. I believe that during the Committee stage we should be in a much stronger position to make it much clearer how we will do that.”––[Official Report, Welfare Reform Public Bill Committee, 24 March 2011; c. 154-55, Q299.]

The Committee stage ended on 24 May 2011, just over three years ago. When I asked the Schools Minister about the subject last Thursday, he said that an announcement would be made “shortly”. It appears that we are heading for some sort of income threshold. If that happens, it will create a huge new work disincentive in universal credit for a very large number of people that will be far worse than anything in the current system, for all its flaws.

The universal credit rescue committee—I am grateful to the hon. Member for Warrington South (David Mowat) for drawing attention to its work—submitted its report to the Labour party two weeks ago. It pointed out that the work incentives for second earners in a couple are a good deal worse in universal credit than they are in the current system. My hon. Friend the Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth underlined the importance of that point.

Leaving council tax support out of universal credit undermines simplicity, with many claimants facing two separate rates of benefit withdrawal when they move into work or their incomes increase.

The decision to pay universal credit to only one member of a couple, rather than reflecting the current system in which payment with respect for children is paid to the main carer—an arrangement with which you, Madam Deputy Speaker, are particularly familiar—raises significant risks for many women and their children.

Universal credit also creates an extraordinary new red tape burden for self-employed people and partners in small partnerships who want to claim universal credit. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales says that about 60,000 partners in small partnerships will want to claim universal credit and that it will be virtually impossible for them to meet the proposed red tape challenge.

It is the policy failures that are the most serious, but it is the delivery failures that are the most spectacular. As the Minister for the Cabinet Office said in a television interview, implementation has been “lamentable”. I wrote to the Secretary of State on 16 November 2010 to point out that his timetable was unrealistic, and I wrote to him again on 18 April 2011. The Secretary of State wrote a perfectly friendly response on both occasions, but simply denied that he had a problem.

In November 2011, the Secretary of State announced that 1 million people would be claiming universal credit by April 2014; in fact, there were approximately 6,000. In May 2012, he announced that new applications for existing benefits and credits would be entirely phased out by April 2014; Ministers now say that that will not happen until 2016. Even assuming that everything goes well from here, which it will not, the project is at least two years late.

Late last year, it was finally admitted that the transition to universal credit will not be complete by 2017. Everybody has known that for months. The hon. Member for Amber Valley (Nigel Mills) was right to make some very thoughtful comments about that. However, while everybody knew about the problems, Ministers flatly denied them. The Secretary of State told the House on 5 September 2013:

“The plan is, and has always been, to deliver this programme within the four-year schedule to 2017…that is exactly what the plan is today. We will deliver this in time”.—[Official Report, 5 September 2013; Vol. 567, c. 472.]

That was complete fantasy. He was still doing it on 18 November, when he said that

“universal credit will roll out and deliver exactly as we said it would.”—[Official Report, 18 November 2013; Vol. 570, c. 947.]

Everybody knew that that was untrue. Why do Ministers not simply tell us the truth about what is going on? Some £40 million has been written off so far, with more undoubtedly to come.

I was worried about achieving one universal credit IT system in anything like the proposed time scale, but we are now in the extraordinary situation of building two different universal credit IT systems. How much more will that cost? The Select Committee asked that question—surely that is what Select Committees are supposed to ask about—but the Government response simply does not provide any answers. Surely we can at least be told how much extra it will cost us to have two IT systems instead of one.

Lessons also need to be learned from another group of serious failures—the governance failures in the project. To answer the question quite rightly asked by the hon. Member for Warrington South, five different officials have had responsibility for the project since it started. However, the central problem is that the project has been managed primarily with a view to minimising embarrassment for the Secretary of State. That is essentially what decisions have been about. Problems, when obvious, have simply been denied; information that would have shed light on what was going on has been buried; and the people who have asked difficult questions have been fobbed off. Members of the public have made freedom of information requests to see the risk register, the milestone schedule and the project assessment review, but applications have of course been refused, and when the Information Tribunal found in favour of those members of the public, the Department simply appealed again.

Ministers are absolutely determined that nobody should know what is really happening. With this project, there is an obsession with hiding things; of pretending that all is well when it obviously is not; and, as the National Audit Office has pointed out, of only admitting to good news. That is not a culture that will deliver a successful project, and it certainly has not delivered success in this case. My hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead and Kilburn referred to a “bunker mentality”, and there absolutely is such a mentality.

Obsessive secrecy has no doubt spared the blushes of the Secretary of State, at least for a time, but it has hindered progress on the project. It has meant that it has taken longer than it should have done to recognise problems and to deal with them, and a large amount of money has been wasted. If, two years ago, the Secretary of State had put up his hands, and recognised that he and his advisers had got it wrong and that the project would take longer than they first said, much of the subsequent waste and delay could have been avoided. Instead, they just kept on denying that there were any problems, so the problems kept on getting worse—and the project is not finished yet.

The project is at least two years late, and it will have wasted much more than the £130 million already acknowledged. It is essential, as the universal credit rescue committee has argued, that the project is now paused. Central policy decisions still have not been made—Ministers cannot spend hundreds of millions of pounds on an IT system if they do not know what it is supposed to do—and Ministers have not made such decisions. As has rightly been said by the rescue committee, taking advice from the former chief information officer of Rolls-Royce, who served on it with distinction, we need a plan that is published, is audited by the National Audit Office and contains milestones with dates, so that everybody knows how the project is going. Why pretend that it going well when it clearly is not?

[David Mowat]

The point I made was that the review could be done in parallel with continuing the programme. Let us say that 1,000 people are working on the programme at the moment. What will the right hon. Gentleman do with those 1,000 people during that three-month review?

[Stephen Timms]

As I have said, the idea for the pause is based on the recommendation of Jonathan Mitchell, the retired chief information officer of Rolls-Royce, who has managed extremely large IT projects in that company—possibly even larger than those for which the hon. Gentleman had responsibility. He has said that when a project is as out of control as this one clearly is, it is essential to stop, to make policy decisions and to draw up a plan before simply shovelling in hundreds of millions pounds more.

[David Mowat]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Stephen Timms]

I will not, because I should conclude.

Outstanding policy issues need to be decided, the work incentive design flaws need to be fixed and a hard-headed view needs to be taken about whether this project can be rescued within an acceptable time and cost. Opposition Members hope the answer to such a question will be yes, but we cannot assume that it will be. The question needs to be asked frankly and answered honestly. It should not be left until the election; it should be done now.