Universal Credit

Anne Begg Excerpts

Monday 7th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Dame Anne Begg (Aberdeen South) (Lab)]

Universal credit is a major welfare reform. It will eventually replace tax credits and most existing working-age benefits, including out-of-work benefits and housing benefit. It is estimated that, by the time it is fully implemented, universal credit—or UC, as it has now become known—will be paid to 7.7 million households, and we hope that that will be the case.

During last week’s debate on work and pensions, I said that the problem with welfare reform was that it was devilishly complex, took a long time to implement, and always had unintended consequences. I think that all three of those things apply to universal credit. We can agree that its design should bring some advantages. It should improve the position of claimants when they move into work or take on more work, because their benefit will be reduced gradually on the basis of how much they earn, rather than suddenly being cut off if their working hours exceed a certain limit. It should remove many of the “cliff edges” that exist in the current system. Because it is both an in-work and an out-of-work benefit, it will remove the constant applying and reapplying for different benefits as someone moves in and out of work.

However, it is wrong to talk about UC’s “simplifying the benefits system”, because that is not possible to any significant extent. The benefits system is complex because people’s lives are complex, and are constantly changing. UC will be a more streamlined system, but it will not be a simple one. That is clear from the problems that have been encountered in efforts to implement it. The national roll-out of new UC claims was due to take place between October 2013 and April this year. Existing claimants of “legacy benefits”, including jobseeker’s allowance, employment and support allowance and housing benefit, would then be migrated to UC between April 2014 and the end of 2017. However, problems with IT systems meant that major changes to the implementation timetable were made in July 2013, and then again in December last year. That slowed down the process dramatically.

UC claims were introduced on a very small scale from April last year in a few jobcentres in Greater Manchester, which were initially called “pathfinders” but are now referred to by the Department for Work and Pensions as “live service sites”. In the event, national roll-out from last October amounted to the expansion of new UC claims to only a further six jobcentres around Britain, and it has recently been expanded again to a further nine sites in the north-west, bringing the total number of jobcentres where UC is available to 19, less than 3% of the jobcentre network—hardly a national roll-out.

New claims to UC are now not expected to be extended to the whole of Great Britain until 2016 and the bulk of existing claimants will not be moved on to UC until 2016-17. The process will not be completed until later than the original target date of 2017.

The Secretary of State brushes aside any criticism of the very small number of people who are on UC by arguing that the Government are

“taking a careful and controlled approach to achieve a safe and secure delivery.”—[Official Report, 30 June 2014; Vol. 583, c. 645.]

I think we would all agree that it is right to ensure that the system works properly before extending it, but, as the Work and Pensions Committee said, there is a difference between cautious progress and a snail’s pace.

The facts are clear. Since UC started in April last year fewer than 7,000 claims have been processed. By comparison, more than 1 million people claim just jobseeker’s allowance. In January this year alone, there were almost 250,000 new jobseeker’s allowance claims. That is how much churn there is in the system. Almost all the 7,000 UC claims are from people in the simplest circumstances: young, single, and usually recently unemployed. Last week, 15 months after UC began, claims from couples started to be accepted—but only in a handful of the live service sites. We have been told that claims from people with children will begin “later in the summer”. We all know what Parliament’s timetables are like and we wonder when “summer” actually is, so can the Minister give us an idea of what “summer” means in this context?

Achieving only that tiny number of claims to date illustrates the scale of the challenge still facing the Government in trying to replace existing working-age benefits and tax credits with UC by 2017, including migrating all the claimants of the relevant existing benefits over to it. Given the excruciatingly slow pace of roll-out to date, it is hard to see how the target date can be met.

To put this into context, the other new benefit which has had its implementation slowed down is the personal independence payment, although even PIP has more new claims in payment than UC. By March this year 83,900 PIP decisions had been made, which is far higher than for UC, and that involves a smaller cohort and has been done in a shorter time scale. In our report, we asked the DWP to set out its revised estimates of UC caseloads and costs for each year to 2017-18, to reassure Parliament and the public that there is a clear and detailed revised implementation plan. The Government’s response to our report did not include any of that information.

The problems with implementing UC arise largely from failure to get the IT right. Problems with Government IT systems have happened so frequently that they have almost become a cliché, but the UC IT challenge seems especially difficult to tackle and to be throwing up particular challenges. Some £40 million in IT expenditure had to be written off in 2012-13, and a further £90 million is being “written down” in five years instead of 15 because the useful life of the software is much shorter than anticipated. That may seem like an accounting detail, but it shows that the use of public money has not been cost-effective to date, and a great deal more public money is at stake in the UC programme.

The Government’s current approach to the IT problems is to continue to spend millions of pounds—between £37 million and £58 million—on the old IT system during 2014 to extend its functionality so that it can cope with a wider range of claimants in the live service sites. At the same time, extensive sums are being spent on developing IT for the long term. That has had various names and various incarnations: first it was called “the digital solution”, then “the end-state solution”, and the latest terminology seems to be the “enhanced digital service”. Unfortunately we on the Select Committee still do not know what that means. The Secretary of State’s explanation last Monday did not help us clear that up.

The National Audit Office has summed up very well the lack of information available on how the IT for UC will be taken forward. It said last December that the uncertainties include the following: how it will work; when it will be ready; how much it will cost; and who will do the work to develop and build it. We still do not have answers to any of these questions. It would be helpful if the Minister provided some answers to those key points in her response to the debate, because the Work and Pensions Committee has still not had an explanation.

We have asked Ministers for more information about the IT during three evidence sessions over the space of nine months. We repeated this request in our report, including asking the DWP to set out the costs of the IT development work, because the published information on IT costs does not take us beyond November 2014, but we received no answers in the Government response to our report. All it said was that UC will be delivered via

“a multi-channel service that makes greater use of modern technology to ensure the system is as effective, simple and transparent as possible.”

I still do not know what that means, and I do not know if anybody does.

The one thing we do know is that the new “enhanced digital service” will not be ready to test before the end of this year, and even then it will only be tested on 100 claimants to start with. We still have no indication of when it will be possible to test it on a bigger and more representative group of claimants. The challenge of getting from an IT system that is capable of processing 100 claims by the end of 2014 to one that can deal with frequently changing claims from more than 7 million households by 2017 is clearly an extreme one.

Our report recommended that, given the small number of people currently claiming UC, the Government should consider whether it would be a better use of taxpayers’ money to abandon further development of the existing system and focus solely on the end-state solution. The Government said in answer to a recent parliamentary question—although this was not set out in their response to our report—that the enhanced digital service will be integrated with the existing UC service where

“it is both practical and operationally sensible”.—[Official Report, 30 June 2014; Vol. 583, c. 434W.]

Again, I am not sure what that means, so perhaps the Minister can translate those vague phrases into something more meaningful and detailed when she responds.

[David Mowat (Warrington South) (Con)]

The Chairman of the Select Committee talks about the enhanced digital solution, which I think has the characteristics of a front-end which is then fed by a number of the legacy systems, which is why applications development work must be done on both of them. In terms of the technical architecture, I do not think that is altogether surprising, different or new.

[Dame Anne Begg]

I have to say that that is a better explanation than anything I have heard from any of the Ministers—although I am not sure I even understand that explanation—but the question of what this digital solution actually entails is concerning: is it a complete rewriting of the IT or is it, as the hon. Gentleman says, about bringing the legacy systems in and developing them? That was not the original impression we were given, however. Is there to be an original design or the use of the original IT—although, as we know, there is a failure to develop that or to adapt it to cover the different circumstances that people have?

The Committee was also concerned—we expressed this quite forcefully in our report—about the DWP’s lack of co-operation with our formal role in scrutinising UC. I am sure the House would agree that, as our report says, effective Select Committee scrutiny depends on the provision of accurate, timely and detailed information by Government Departments. The DWP has not always provided that to the Committee in the case of UC.

As well as publishing a highly critical report on UC last September, the National Audit Office was then involved in a long-running dispute with the DWP about how much it should write off for the wasted IT. Because of the accounting concerns, the NAO refused to sign off the DWP accounts for 2012-13 for six months, which delayed their publication from June to December. The Secretary of State was, not unreasonably, unwilling to appear before the Committee to give oral evidence about UC until the accounts were published, so our own scrutiny process was delayed and hampered.

The DWP has also been very reluctant to provide us with information about UC and the serious problems it has encountered with it. When the NAO reported on those problems in September last year, it came as news to us, because the Government had not told us about their own concerns about UC and the actions they had taken to address them during 2012 and early 2013, even though our Select Committee had held several oral evidence sessions during that time and published a substantial report. On two occasions the Government published details about major changes to the timetable for UC implementation only when forced to do so by the prospect of the Secretary of State having to appear before us to give oral evidence. Information was released at the session itself on one occasion, and two working days before on another—even then, very little detail was available. That, of course, gave the Committee no time to assess the implications of these announcements properly before we put our questions. We believe that it is unacceptable for the Government to provide information about major policy changes to Committees only when forced to do so by the imminent prospect of being held to account in a public evidence session.

The Committee does not, as the Secretary of State has suggested, want to run his Department—far from it—but we do expect to have access to the information we need to scrutinise it effectively. However, the Secretary of State told us in February:

“I do not have to tell the Committee everything that is happening in the Department until we have reached a conclusion about what is actually happening”.

That view was reiterated in the formal Government response to our concerns, which said that the DWP

“does not regard it as necessary to provide a running commentary on the day to day management of the many large and complex programmes currently underway”.

I will let hon. Members come to their own conclusions about what that implies in terms of respect for accountability, transparency and the formal scrutiny role of departmental Select Committees.

Our report also highlighted the problems the UC delays are causing for other key organisations, particularly local authorities. Local authorities currently administer housing benefit on the Government’s behalf but were expecting the introduction of UC to mean that new claims for housing benefit would end by April this year. The UC implementation delays mean that local authorities will now be administering housing benefit until at least 2016. It is very difficult for them to know how best to run and staff their housing benefit departments until the Government clarify what funding they will make available for that. We asked the DWP to clarify the funding that will be available in 2014-15 and 2015-16 to cover the additional costs to local authorities, but no details were provided in the Government’s response; they simply said that they would ensure that they were in a position to inform local authorities of their individual budget allocations

“in sufficient time before the start of the 2015/16 financial year”.

Local authorities will also have an important role in helping more vulnerable claimants cope with the transition to UC. Our 2012 report on UC examined the implications for vulnerable people in detail. Since then, the fundamental problems with implementing UC have, understandably, dominated public debate and the Committee’s attention. Ensuring that vulnerable people are not excluded from, or disadvantaged by, UC should remain a priority for the Government, and how vulnerable people will be supported through the transition remains a key concern for the Committee. The Government have acknowledged that vulnerable people will need support to adjust to UC. Lord Freud, the Minister with responsibility for welfare reform, told us that how support would be provided for vulnerable people was almost as important as UC itself. But it is still far from clear how that will work in practice, and a great deal still needs to be clarified about how that support will be provided and funded.

Working with the Local Government Association, the Government produced the first version of the local support services framework—LSSF—last year. That sets out how they expect support for vulnerable people to be provided, in partnership with local authorities, housing providers and the voluntary sector. However, there is little detail on how the LSSF will operate in practice and how it will be funded, even though an “update” was published at the end of last year. The Government said last December that the final version of the LSSF would be published in autumn 2014, but in their response to our report that date had changed to autumn 2015. We understand that the delays to UC implementation mean that the timetable for providing support to claimants will also need to change, but the organisations DWP expects to deliver this support—local authorities, housing providers and voluntary organisations —all need to know what they are expected to provide, so that they can plan and budget for these new responsibilities.

In all the debate about IT systems, costs and case loads, it concerns me that the central point of UC is being lost: it is meant to make the benefit system work better for millions of claimants, help them to move into jobs or work more hours, and make it less complicated for them to move on to and off benefit as their lives change. Until we have more clarity, transparency and detail from the Government about progress with the UC project, it is difficult for anyone, including my Committee, to make a proper assessment of whether UC will genuinely deliver the improvements for claimants that this costly and complex welfare reform was intended to deliver.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sheila Gilmore (Edinburgh East) (Lab)]

Some social security commentators have described a universal credit-type proposal as the holy grail of social security thinking. It is certainly true that the idea is nothing new. It was not invented by the current Government; it has been debated and investigated by previous Governments. In an earlier debate on the subject—I think it was an urgent question —my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling) made it quite clear that when he was Secretary of State for Social Security, he looked at the project and concluded that without very significant time and money being invested, it would be too difficult to deliver.

There has obviously been a learning curve to which, for whatever reason, the current Government seem to have decided to pay no attention. If we sometimes seem quite cynical and sceptical about the whole process, it is because of a lot of what we have heard over the past four years. There was total confidence that UC would be the answer to all sorts of questions, and would be relatively easy. I do not think that many people present, except my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms), were on the Welfare Reform Bill Committee in 2011. The then Minister of State for Employment, the right hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Chris Grayling), who responded to most of the debates in Committee, was prone to describing his proposals as an empty bookcase. The Bill was the architecture; a lot of other things would come along later. I think he spoke more truly than he thought he did, because clearly it was a rather empty bookcase; a lot of the issues had not been fully bottomed-out and talked about in the way that they should have been.

One example of that—I will come on to others—is free school meals. We discussed the issue in the Bill Committee in 2011. Various people made written submissions and proposals, and there were discussions, about how that might or might not work as part of the project. We learn now that the Department still does not know how it will deal with free school meals in the further roll-out of universal credit. Three years later, we have not made much progress on something quite important and basic.

[Dame Anne Begg]

Does my hon. Friend agree that anyone building a bookcase has to know the size of the books that will be displayed on it before they can get the architecture right? Perhaps that was a lesson that the Minister forgot.

[Sheila Gilmore]

That is a very good analogy for how we have arrived in this position. The trouble is that it is not some sort of blunder: my hon. Friends have referred to some of the other big changes going through the DWP, and the same pattern has been seen with disability living allowance and the personal independence payment. First, a straw man was erected: there was a statement about certain things in the previous system, some of which were not entirely accurate, being really bad and having to be changed. There was then a brief initial consultation period before the Department went ahead with the change, which was not properly piloted. As a result, every new PIP applicant since June 2013 is part of the testing process. That is not a pilot, unless it is a pilot on a gigantic scale. Many people who are anxious and worried while they wait for their PIP payments to come through, are being treated as guinea pigs, after a failure to analyse the problem, implement the scheme or test the proposals. The pattern is not unique to universal credit.

Had we been told from the outset that there would be a slow roll-out because of the need for testing, we might not be standing here now debating whether the glass is half full, but we have been told so often that the glass is full and everything is going well. When the Select Committee prepared a report in November 2012, we concentrated on vulnerable claimants. At that time we were told that all the implementation plans were on track for 2013, which was not the case. By February 2013, the Major Projects Authority told the DWP to reset the entire project—that was an internal, private report of which Members had no knowledge at the time. That information did not come out clearly until July 2013, when the Secretary of State told the Select Committee that there were major changes to the roll-out. The NAO reported in September 2013, and the Secretary of State’s response was, “Oh, I knew about all those problems all along.” Perhaps he did know about the problems all along, but he did not tell many people about them. There were further changes in December 2013.

Some speakers, in trying to support universal credit, suggested that at least we have some people on it. There are 6,000 people on universal credit, and it will be rolled out to more jobcentres, but those are the very simplest cases. In essence, for those claimants universal credit is little different from jobseeker’s allowance. There is little to say that universal credit is a big breakthrough to a different form of benefit, because until now claimants have been single people. Apparently, we are now able to roll out universal credit to some couples, but the claimants so far have been single people. Some 70% of claimants are relatively young. They are new benefit claimants who do not have complications, basically. If universal credit is to bring together various benefits successfully, the difficult cases will be the real test, not the straightforward ones.

One bit of universal credit thinking that has been rolled out is the claimant commitment, which has been rolled out to JSA claimants, not merely those who are technically in receipt of JSA-style universal credit. The Government have rolled out the stick without rolling out the carrot. One of the problems with the claimant commitment is not necessarily getting people to agree what they will do to find work but that minor breaches of that agreement can lead to loss of benefits. The carrot—the bit that is meant to help people not only to find work but to make work pay—has not yet been introduced because the vast majority of people are nowhere near being on universal credit.

Since our original debates on the Welfare Reform Act 2012, we have experienced obfuscation through the use of computerese. MPs, like many lay people, are not IT experts. Initially, concerns were raised about the size of the IT project—various Governments have run into trouble with IT in the past—and people asked, “How do we know this will be different?” Any concerns were simply brushed aside because the Government had a new “agile” way of doing things that meant everything was going to be fine. About 18 months later we learned that that way of doing things had been abandoned, so clearly everything was not fine, but that is what we were told.

Other things that were “fine” included security, establishing people’s identity and the difficulties with online transactions. Those concerns were raised from the outset. I recall an informal briefing at which the Minister, Lord Freud, was asked questions by people who were expert, such as people who had served on housing associations. They asked, “What about the verification of people’s housing claims? How is that actually going to be done?” At the moment, those claims are done fairly intensively with people having to produce information, although housing associations have been allowed to verify that information because they have seen the lease, and so on. Lord Freud simply ignored all that and said, “No, universal credit will have far less fraud and error, and it will all be fine.” But of course it has not been fine, and it is now recognised that the notion that everything could be done online has not only been delayed but will never happen. One reason why that will not happen is that security has been recognised as a major issue. The same Ministers who told us that security was not a problem have now told us that it is a problem. When a Department is paying out substantial sums of money to millions of individuals, doing it fully online is not practical. After Ministers initially enthused about how everything would be straightforward, and after having been told different things at different times—even when the reality was that something else was going on—we are somewhat sceptical.

As other speakers have said, we were told that a certain type of IT is being used for the very small number of current claimants but that, at the same time, the Department was working on what in February 2014 was called the end-state, open-source, web-based solution. [Laughter.] Exactly. I know the meaning of each individual word, but I have never been clear about what the phrase means. We were told that it was a digital solution—it therefore seems to be an important aspect of the whole programme—and that it would be ready to be tested on 100 claimants by November 2014. As the Select Committee report found, the system is still a long way from being viable. There is a huge difference between operating something like that for a small group of 100 claimants and operating it for far more people.

The Select Committee thought that what we were being told about was a different and digital way of doing things, and we specifically asked for more detail. The Government’s response to the Select Committee report evaded the question, and it is all there. First, the response talked about the claimant commitment, which I have already mentioned and did not have anything to do with the digital solution. Secondly, the response talked about a

“more challenging and supportive relationship between claimants and coaches.”

“Coaches” is the new name for jobcentre advisers. Again, that does not really tell us anything about the digital solution. There are concerns about how scalable those intensive relationships will be. Thirdly, we were told that there will be more online services, but many JSA claims are already made online, so again it is unclear whether that has anything to do with the end-state or digital solution.

Therefore, having gone around the houses about the claimant commitment, the things that are already happening online and the more supportive relationship, all that we have been told is that the digital solution is

“a multi-channel service that makes greater use of modern technology”—

I am glad that it makes use of modern technology, rather than ancient technology—

“to ensure the system is as effective, simple and transparent as possible.”

Those are all worthy aims, but they tell us nothing about what the end-state solution actually is, what it does, how much progress has been made towards it, how many people are working on it, what it will cost or what the interface will be between claimants and the system. It is nothing more than an aspiration.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Mowat]

The problem arises precisely because the systems are nearing completion. Costs in the life cycle of an IT project escalate the nearer to the end we get. To repeat a couple of the estimating parameters I used, Labour’s plan would require 11 new applications and 47 new screens. If the Labour party has its own estimate and it took it more than 11 minutes to put it together, I would be very happy to accept that it is right, but all it has done is write a sentence.

[Dame Anne Begg]

From the Select Committee’s point of view—not that of Labour Back Benchers—the problem is that we do not know any of those things. The hon. Gentleman has made assumptions, but we do not know whether the IT has developed sufficiently to take account of families with children or whether it would cost anything to make the payment to the primary carer instead. We do not know—that is our objection. We have not been told. We have not been kept in the loop.

[David Mowat]

The hon. Lady makes a reasonable intervention and I understand it, but if Labour Front Benchers, whose four-point plan this is, do not know the cost of their proposed scope increases—which is reasonable, because I do not know how much they would cost, either—we would expect them to say, “We don’t know the costs,” not, “These scope increases will be delivered within the same budget as the rest of the programme.” The point I am making is that that is irresponsible. It is not indicative of Front Benchers who take what has to happen to the programme seriously or who, 10 months from now, intend to be the Government of this country. The reality is that 10 years—two Parliaments—is too soon.