Energy Supply

David Mowat Excerpts

Thursday 6th September 2012 Westminster Hall

[Mr Yeo]

The hon. Gentleman—in terms of the Committee’s work, he is probably my hon. Friend—is absolutely right about that point. The situation will get much more serious from Europe’s point of view in relation to its reliance on imports from Russia. I commend the work of the International Energy Agency, and especially of Fatih Birol, who has a particularly mature and perceptive view of long-term energy trends. The IEA’s work gives us a lot of warnings.

Despite all that, in what I hope will be a diversified mix of energy sources—gas, nuclear, low-carbon and renewables—gas will remain important in the next 15 years. We cannot do without it, so I hope that the Government’s gas strategy will include a further expansion of gas storage capacity, which is currently only a fraction of that routinely maintained by Germany, Italy, France and the United States.

Our report also recommended that the Government should set up an independent central agency to manage Britain’s strategic oil stocks, so we look forward to progress on that. We distinguished, although not everyone does, between independence and security. Independence of energy supplies is not attainable for Britain in the foreseeable future but, in any event, security is more important. Security means much more than just reliable sources and supplies of energy, although that is a pre-requisite, as it makes storage and interconnection important factors, too. It means having adequate generating capacity and a mix of generation that delivers value for money to consumers and protects consumers in the event of a much higher carbon price, which may well emerge—indeed, it is likely—in the 2020s and 2030s.

I note en passant, and with approval, the continued spread of emissions trading as a policy instrument. It has been adopted in a growing number of countries, although that trend that was not apparent three years ago. We now see it in countries in Asia, in Australia and in parts of America, and pilots are taking place inside China, as we reported recently. That points to the use of emissions trading and the possibility of a rising carbon price in 15 or 20 years.

[David Mowat (Warrington South) (Con)]

I have just been reflecting on that point about security and diversity going hand in hand. Does my hon. Friend think that France, which is relatively undiversified—it has 70% to 80% nuclear—has inherently less secure energy than us?

[Mr Yeo]

That is an interesting point. France is exposed to the risk of something that derails nuclear technology. Last year’s Japanese accident, which was actually an industrial rather than a nuclear accident, effectively led to the closure of nuclear power in Germany. France has rightly taken a more robust attitude. The factors that led to the Japanese accident would not apply for the most part to French nuclear power stations. None the less, a great reliance on a single technology inherently puts a country in an exposed position, although that is perhaps less the case for nuclear power, given that the supply of uranium is probably reliable for the foreseeable future. Interestingly, France is also quite a big investor in wind power which, again, is not something that depends on imports. I would not say that France is excessively exposed, but would be in the event that something went wrong with its nuclear power stations. It is also struggling to renew its nuclear power stations, and cost overruns and time delays have affected EDF quite badly. None the less, I remain a strong supporter of investment in new nuclear power.

[Mr Yeo]

I am always encouraged when a Minister intervenes on my remarks. It suggests that he is listening, not that I expect anything else from the present Minister, and that we are debating something that is of some consequence. It is an interesting question. We are likely to see from China and the other Asian tigers huge demand for imported energy. China has a lot of coal and it may have some more gas that we do not yet know about, but the likelihood is that it will become an importer. Countries such as Korea are already huge importers of fossil fuels. I suspect that the world price of gas will tend to be driven up by the growth in these economies. There will be some interesting consequences. America, which may well be self-sufficient in gas for the time being, will thereby have a competitive advantage because if it wants, it can keep down its gas prices, although if I were a gas producer in America I would wonder about exporting it to a jurisdiction where the price was higher. It would be prudent for Britain to assume that, even if the price of gas remains decoupled from that of oil, we may see a significantly higher gas price by 2030, and that if we were too dependent on gas we might find that we were paying more for our energy than if we had a more diversified mix. A lot will depend on how much investment takes place in nuclear power in some of these countries, because at the moment that seems to be an open question.

[David Mowat]

I hesitate in trying my hon. Friend’s patience further. I was going to mention this earlier. There is no such thing as a world price of gas. There is a European price of gas and a Henry hub price of gas in the United States of America. Currently, the gas price in the US is one quarter of the price here—that is a game changer. Although the demand in China will be high, the US price may represent a constraint on price even in Europe because, if the US lets it happen, liquefied natural gas can be imported into Europe at a cost that is less than the differential between US gas prices and our gas prices now.

[Mr Yeo]

I agree with my hon. Friend: clearly, there is an opportunity for the very low price in the United States to influence prices here. If the US is allowed to do that—and it is converting some of its terminals to export rather than import LNG—the differential is too attractive not to pursue it. However, I doubt whether that by itself would be sufficient to offset the upward pressure from the much faster-growing and larger economies in the east.

Security also depends on a much greater investment in energy efficiency. As we all know, Britain now needs a huge investment in generating capacity. There is no guarantee that that will be forthcoming unless we have clarity and general stability of policy. I urge the Minister to ensure that there is no slippage in the discussions—not just those about the energy Bill but the negotiations on strike prices for contracts for difference—that are under way. The nuclear industry in particular requires as much clarity as possible as it has enormous capital needs and long delays before any return is achieved. I am sure the Minister will find that matter pretty high up his briefing pack.

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[Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)]

I am delighted to speak in this important debate, and I am particularly delighted to welcome the Minister to his position. His work within his previous skills portfolio was much respected, and I think that many of us hope that he will bring not only the dedication that he showed in that role, but his focus on developing green skills, into this new portfolio, where he is considering the UK’s energy supply. It is a difficult time to be taking on the brief, and I think that we all sympathise with him for taking over at this juncture, with so much on his ministerial plate. I assure him that the Committee—both sides of it, I think—will seek to co-operate with him to ensure that he gets his feet under the ministerial desk as quickly as possible and can take the brief forward.

I do not want to go over the ground that the Chairman of the Committee and the hon. Member for South Thanet (Laura Sandys) have already covered—I entirely agree with most of what they said, particularly the hon. Lady’s call for certainty in policy. She is absolutely right; that is one of the key things that will hold back—is already holding back—the investor community from pressing ahead with the sort of investments that we need, if we are to see the £200 billion investment come on stream and ensure that we have the continuity of a secure supply of energy over the next decade.

I want to focus on subsidy and the importance of getting subsidy right. Earlier this summer, there was a contretemps between the Treasury and the Department of Energy and Climate Change on the subsidy for onshore wind. The debate was not phrased in that way; it was phrased, “How much can we cut from that subsidy?” Should the subsidy be cut by 10%, which is the Department’s public position? Or should it be the far more severe cut of 25% proposed by the Treasury? Interestingly, the Department won the day in that political debate. In a straight fight between the Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, most people in most circumstances would back the Chancellor, but in this case the Department won.

We need to consider the economic case for onshore wind. The new Minister has previously commented on onshore wind. We subsidise the technology, which operates intermittently. Wind does not blow all the time and cannot provide the base load of electricity supply. On a number of occasions, the Minister has remarked on the way in which the technology adversely affects communities in the countryside.

Long-term subsidies are not good. I think we can all agree with that. In my view, we should not subsidise any energy in the long term. Subsidies should never be a permanent feature of any market. Subsidies should be introduced only to address market failure and they should be withdrawn gradually as such market distortions are addressed. I hope even the Chancellor and the Treasury accept the economic rectitude of those remarks. Whether they can square that with this country’s ongoing fossil fuel subsidy is an entirely different matter.

Last year, the OECD estimated that, in 2010, UK subsidies for coal, gas and petrol amounted to £3.6 billion. Additionally, the Chancellor announced in his 2012 Budget further exploration and production subsidies of £65 million to develop the west of Shetland fields. The market failures addressed by those subsidies are unclear. On the contrary, fossil fuels appear to have an entrenched subsidy culture in which such taxpayer handouts are regarded as a right, rather than a means of addressing an otherwise unlevel playing field.

By contrast, the total subsidy paid to onshore wind amounted to less than £400 million in 2010-11, or £6 on the average household’s annual bill. That gives a better sense of the subsidy onshore wind currently enjoys against the £3.6 billion in consumption subsidies that fossil fuels enjoy before factoring in the cost of carbon emissions.

[David Mowat]

I am interested in the make-up of the £3.6 billion. Are we talking about tax reductions, or am I missing something?

[Barry Gardiner]

I hesitate to speak for the OECD, but my understanding is that the £65 million is composed of production subsidies, VAT subsidies and other things. I am sure information on the figures is available from the OECD, because they are the OECD’s figures, not mine.

[David Mowat]

I am sorry, but I do not understand that answer, because £3.6 billion is a very large amount of money. The hon. Gentleman makes a powerful point if that figure is a true reflection of the situation, and it is reasonable to ask how the money is being transferred at that rate to the energy companies and, presumably, their shareholders, because that had previously passed me by.

[Barry Gardiner]

Members of Parliament are not noted for admitting ignorance, but I am happy to do so. I cannot give the hon. Gentleman a detailed breakdown, but that figure has been given by the OECD. As I said in response to his previous intervention, my understanding is that the subsidy is accounted for in VAT subsidies and in other production subsidies, such as the ones I mentioned. I cannot go further than that. I do not claim to be the economist or accountant who worked out the figures published by the OECD, to which I refer him.

The real market failure is that the environmental, economic and social costs of greenhouse gas emissions are not properly factored into our fossil fuel price. The Government recognise that and have tried to attribute a price to carbon emissions through the EU emissions trading scheme. Unfortunately, the carbon price has neither been stable enough, as the Chairman of the Select Committee mentioned earlier, nor high enough to redress that market failure, even for the 40% of UK carbon emissions covered by the ETS. Fossil fuels are operating in a market tilted distinctly in their favour. Those who support renewables such as onshore wind that do not produce polluting carbon emissions are perhaps entitled to claim that there is clear justification for that level—albeit a very low level, as I have shown—of subsidy.

Bringing new technologies to market can be difficult, and many technologies have died in the valley that lies between demonstrator a prototype and full commercial development. If the UK is to develop world-leading renewable technologies, such as those mentioned by the Chairman of the Select Committee, particularly marine technologies, we need further subsidies to enable renewables to make that transition from prototype to full commercial scale. The renewables obligation subsidy introduced by the previous Government was designed to do that to some extent and supported new wind generation as the technology successively improved and economies of scale reduced production costs. It is worth noting that it is onshore wind’s positive trajectory in reducing costs that led the Department to argue that the subsidy could be reduced by 10% in the first place. As the technologies become cheaper, it is right to scale down the subsidies. That trajectory has led some in the industry to project that onshore wind will be cost competitive with gas by 2020, which brings another element to our discussion. Indeed, the hon. Member for Warrington South (David Mowat) highlighted that differential and the possibility of seeing cheaper gas in the UK because of shale gas in the United States.

Clear social and environmental costs are associated with shale gas in the United States, and the Committee flagged them up in its report on the potential for shale gas in the UK. However, at every point we should aim to factor the cost of pollution into the true cost of the fuels that we use. That is really how we should evaluate the cost. We do not, for example, factor into the cost of fossil fuels the cost to the health service of people with bronchial or asthmatic conditions caused by carbon emissions from diesel and petrol engines. If we want to get a far better handle on our energy needs and supply, and the security of that supply, let us compare the true costs of the separate parts of our energy mix, and not simply look at the market cost.

I want to go off slightly on a tangent and mention, in response to the shale gas debate, one other aspect that I think it important to draw to the attention of the House. As shale gas provides the USA with increasingly low-cost fossil fuel, there will be a substantial shift in American foreign policy, which has been fixated on the middle east—for good reason. Its fossil fuel supply has substantially depended on stability in the middle east providing continuity of supply. The discovery and exploitation of shale gas in the United States significantly changes that perspective, and when we look to the future of European and UK energy we need to factor that in too. The drivers that caused the US to be so involved with middle east countries will shift. We need to recognise that, as much as we recognise the shift happening in the gas fields in Siberia, and the rise in demand from India and China.

There is one further thing I want to comment on: the fourth pillar of the Government’s proposals on electricity market reform—the emissions performance standard, the carbon floor price and the way in which they interact. Is not it strange that the emissions performance standard was set at 450 grams per kWh? Whom did the Department think it was fooling by setting that figure? It is clear that it was set because it excludes dirty coal without carbon capture and storage, but it has a beneficial effect on investment in nuclear, boosting the price.

In the past year and a half, the Committee has spent a lot of time talking to the investment community, which has been generous with its time and views and has made clear the way in which the risks associated with different technologies and energies manifest themselves. There are planning, construction, operational and price risks and, particularly with the nuclear industry, a decommissioning risk. The key matters on which the investment community focused in discussions with the Committee were construction risk and the period during which capital is exposed in the construction of new nuclear, as opposed to new gas, technology, and the different lengths of time needed to get production in place and price coming through. The investment community made clear to the Committee its belief that without Government subsidy—not covert subsidy by way of price subsidy through the EPS but real subsidy in relation to those risks and the extra cost of capital—there will not be the level of nuclear infrastructure development that the Government have said they want.

I come back to where I began on the question of subsidy: without a much more transparent understanding of the subsidies going to fossil fuels, and the lack of accounting for their cost in damage to health and the environment, and pollution; without factoring those things in; without a clear understanding of the subsidies necessary as technologies develop, and the reduction in subsidy necessary as they become more cost-effective; and without transparency about the real subsidies that the Government are offering the nuclear industry, and the structuring necessary to get the development we need, we will not have a successful energy policy.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Mowat (Warrington South) (Con)]

As the second hon. Member to speak who had nothing to do with the report, I congratulate the Select Committee. Three of the report’s features strike me as particularly good. It was short, which is always good for Select Committee reports. Secondly, it talked about gas storage. It is odd that we talk so little about gas storage, because it is a structural issue. Thirdly, I want to talk about recommendations 5 and 6, which ask the Department to publish performance indicators on security and the route or road map that we are trying to get through. That is needed, because there is a lot of misinformation on this subject and the Government’s response to the recommendations was quite weak; the only part that was perhaps adequate was the last sentence, which stated:

“The Government continues to examine options for further improvements.”

That needs to be considered by the Government, and I would just like to put into the mix four potential issues that have not been talked about.

Biofuels are rapidly becoming the biggest source of renewable energy in the UK. We have to be very careful on this with regard to security. In October, the United Nations described the increasingly prevalent practice around the world of turning corn and wheat into ethanol as a “crime against humanity”. One of the best points in the speech by the hon. Member for Brent North (Barry Gardiner) was about how the geopolitical aspects of shale gas are affecting US foreign policy. That is absolutely right. There are geopolitical issues in continuing to put corn and wheat into cars and power stations, as though we are pursuing some great environmental truth when we are not, and that is difficult.

The unique point about the UK’s energy position compared with the rest of Europe is that we have to spend £200 billion in the next decade. We will apparently double the amount of electricity that we currently generate at the same time as decommissioning coal stations—let alone the oil refineries to which my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) referred—and nuclear power stations. It is beginning to look like a very difficult issue indeed, and the Minister has come in just in time to manage it.

We have put ourselves in a position, particularly on nuclear, where we are negotiating with a single supplier. People talk about the cost of nuclear. A colleague of mine who I used to work with once told me that, if he was running a utility and was dealing with the UK Government, the only coherent strategy to take would be to wait until they were desperate enough to pay the money. Roughly speaking, that appears to be what is happening, and I wish the Minister luck with those negotiations. In a scenario in which we are not going to let the lights go out—let us assume that that is going to be the case—I always thought there would be a dash for gas. When considering a strategy, one always asks, “If this strategy fails, how do we know it has failed?” The dash for gas is obviously the default.

In the past few months, and possibly the past year, there has been another emerging aspect of strategy failure: the increasing amount of imported electricity through the interconnector from France and Holland. Currently, we import approximately double the amount of electricity that we generate from renewables. If there is a policy failure above all policy failures, it is the fact that this country is apparently no longer able to generate its own electricity and has to take electricity from the French and the Dutch, even though much of it is generated using relatively cheap nuclear power.

I add in passing that in the past six months there have been two announcements about increased capacity in the French nuclear grid—1.6 GW in Flamanville and 1.8 GW in Penly—coming on stream in the next 18 months. France appears to be able to do this a lot more easily than we do. This may be an issue for the Select Committee, but I do not wholly understand why the French can get nuclear power stations on stream without the pain that we apparently need to go through. A road map of the Department’s plan in this regard would be very useful. The fundamental strategy of putting out the energy market and saying that the market will decide will become increasingly untenable, as we get close to the day when the lights might go out.

Finally, what is causing so much error in policy is the conflict between the Climate Change Act 2008, which I support, and the need to reduce emissions and the EU 20-20-20 directive, which states that not only do we need to reduce emissions, which I support, but that that must be done with renewables. That has caused a huge amount of misallocation of capital resource and expertise. Germany is often used as a great example of a country that has hit the renewable button hard and has done it well. It is true that Germany has four times as many renewables as the UK. It also has 30% more carbon per head than the UK, because it burns more coal. We have to focus on what matters, and the directive is deeply flawed and has caused a misallocation of capital and the resources that go with that. The Minister may wish to consider that in the months and years ahead.