European Union Bill

David Lidington Excerpts

Tuesday 11th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Nuttall]

I am conscious of the fact that this has been a long debate and that there are many points for the Minister to respond to so I shall keep my remarks short. Much of what I would have said has been admirably covered by my colleagues on this side of the Committee.

It is a sad indictment of how much power has drained away from the House that we have to debate a sovereignty clause. My hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd), who is no longer in his place, said that when he came to the House in 1979, such a debate would have been unthinkable. We must ask why we are in this position now. Obviously, it is because of the European Communities Act 1972, which was the start of the problem. As a result of that Act, the House handed over to Brussels—in those days it was not the European Union but the European Economic Community—the power to take decisions on behalf of the British people on matters of commerce. Over the years, that power has expanded to include many different areas.

I know from my constituents that time and again they are infuriated by the amount of legislation affecting their everyday lives that emanates not from Parliament but from the European Union. I congratulate the coalition Government on trying to do something about this problem, but, sadly, I fear it is too late—like shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted. The problem is that the powers have already gone and we are just putting a sticking plaster over what is sadly now a gaping hole.

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) for attempting to stiffen and improve clause 18 on the House’s sovereignty. We should not have to say that this House is sovereign—as Lord Tebbit said in an article a few weeks ago, it is rather like the drunk in the bar saying he is sober. The House is sovereign and we should not have to keep saying so. The clause seems to do no more than state what we already know to be the position. It does not try to amend the law at all. It was sensible of the European Scrutiny Committee, as soon as it saw the Bill and this clause, to embark on a detailed examination of what they meant, sensibly calling witnesses before it. The House sets up Select Committees, so it makes sense to heed what they say. The Committee and its Chairman have tabled the amendments to the Bill and for that reason, among others, I will support their amendments.

There are doubts about why it is necessary to include clause 18 in the Bill. The amendments seek to clarify the position, and to make it easier for judges to examine the reasons why the clause has been included, should they ever be in the position of determining where sovereignty lies, as they will see that the House wants to ensure that it lies here with the House. We derive our power from the will of the British people, who give us power. I believe that that power should stay with us in the House, and not be passed to Brussels, but those are arguments for another day. Today is about how we make best use of the work that has been done by the European Scrutiny Committee to strengthen clause 18, and for that reason I support the amendments.

[The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)]

I am grateful to all right hon. and hon. Members who have taken part in today’s debate: my hon. Friends the Members for Bury North (Mr Nuttall), for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison), for Daventry (Chris Heaton-Harris), for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin), for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) and for Dover (Charlie Elphicke); my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) and my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Neil Carmichael); and equally the hon. Members for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins), for Caerphilly (Mr David), for North Durham (Mr Jones), for Dunfermline and West Fife (Thomas Docherty), and for Linlithgow and East Falkirk (Michael Connarty).

The debate has moved between passion and intense thoughtfulness, and both those qualities were demonstrated in the opening speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash). Although he and I have our differences this evening, I want to place on the record my respect not just for the contribution that he has made to tonight’s debate but for the commitment that he has shown in his chairmanship of the European Scrutiny Committee. He is a gentleman with whom I may disagree from time to time, but I happily salute him as a patriot and a champion of the rights and privileges of the British Parliament. We differ over which form of words and which draft of amendment will best accomplish the objectives that we seek. As today’s debate covers both the question of approving clause 18 and the amendments and new clauses that have been tabled, I want to structure my comments first by making clear the Government’s purpose in introducing the clause and then going on to address the individual amendments and new clauses.

Clause 18 addresses the concern that the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, as it relates to European Union law, might in future be eroded by decisions of the United Kingdom’s domestic courts. It would provide authority that could be relied on to counter arguments that European law could become an integral and autonomous part of the UK’s legal system independent of statute. It responds to concerns that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as it relates to EU law may not be unassailably absolute, and may be qualified. The concern is that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is part of common law—a point illustrated by the report by the European Scrutiny Committee and the evidence it took, and clearly a matter that is subject to intense academic debate and contention.

The risk is that British courts might, in future, be attracted to the argument that European law no longer takes effect in this country by virtue of an Act of Parliament but has become entrenched in our legal system, enjoying an autonomous status—in the jargon, it has become a basic “grundnorm” underlying the UK legal system, to be applied by our courts and against which ultimately UK legislation falls to be measured.

There are three main sources for that concern. The first stems, yes, from the arguments run by the counsel for the prosecution in the so-called “metric martyrs” case of Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council. It is worth saying a little about that case because the issues raised were of great significance. The prosecution argued that the European treaties’ effect in domestic law did not depend—merely, at least—on the terms of their incorporation by the European Communities Act 1972 but, to a decisive extent, on the principles of European law itself.

The argument was that European law had been entrenched rather than merely incorporated, by virtue not of any principle of domestic constitutional law but of principles of Community law already established in cases such as Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen and Costa v. Enel, to which hon. Members have referred in this debate.

If that argument had prevailed and if it were to prevail in the future, we would need to think about what the practical effect might be. For example, let me take the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of nationality set out in article 18 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union. Our courts have recognised that the provision has direct effect in the United Kingdom. Under the prosecution’s principle in the “metric martyrs” case, the courts would interpret that prohibition and seek to enforce it as part of UK law, even if Parliament were to remove the statutory mechanism by which it had been given effect in the UK, by either repealing or amending the European Communities Act 1972.

But if we pass clause 18 and enshrine in statute the principle that the authority of European law derives solely from Acts of Parliament, then the courts could not do that because article 18 could have direct effect in the UK only because Parliament had provided a statutory mechanism to allow that. If that statutory mechanism were to be repealed without replacement, there would be no basis on which it could be given direct effect in this country. Although those arguments were rejected by Lord Justice Laws, they could well be made again in future cases.

[Mr Cash]

That was a case of first instance and we do not know what might happen in future. Does my right hon. Friend accept the reasoning of Lord Bridge in Factortame? He clearly stated that our adherence to the principles that flowed from an Act—the European Communities Act 1972—and therefore his judgment was based on a voluntary acceptance by this House, in its sovereignty. I add the words “in its sovereignty”, because that is the key issue.

[Mr Lidington]

Yes, and I shall come on to say a bit more about that in a moment.

[Mr Jenkin]

Clause 18 can be read simply as a historical fact. It does not give continuing force to the sovereignty of Parliament. It states:

“It is only by virtue of an Act of Parliament that directly applicable or directly effective EU law…falls to be recognised and available in law in the United Kingdom.”

That is a historical fact, and can be relegated as no more than that.

[Mr Lidington]

What is different about clause 18 compared with the current legal position is that for the first time it provides a clear statutory point of reference, to which the courts would have to have regard in considering any cases in future that were comparable to that brought before Lord Justice Laws.

The second source of the concern that has been expressed are the various obiter remarks, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Stone and others have referred, made by senior judges such as Lord Hope and Lord Steyn, albeit in cases that did not deal directly with European Union law. My hon. Friend starkly expressed his concern that at least some members of the senior judiciary had an agenda that deliberately set out to challenge the historic privileges and authority of Parliament.

The third source of concern arises from various academic commentators on EU law, ranging from Professor J. D. B. Mitchell back in 1980 to Martin Howe QC in 2009.

[Mr Cash]

The reference that the Minister slipped in about Martin Howe is quite unreasonable. What Martin Howe said in his written evidence is that he thought that the provision, if it were to be made properly and correctly, ought to be done within the framework of the European Communities Act 1972.

[Mr Lidington]

I will come to that precise point later in my remarks. The point I was making a moment ago was that, in a pamphlet published in 2009, Mr Howe expressed very similar concerns to those expressed today by my hon. Friend and others that there is a serious risk —if not an immediate one—that there would be further challenges to the principle that it is only parliamentary action that gives authority to EU law in this country.

We have taken advice from lawyers across Government, not just from those in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—although I would be the first to defend the lawyers in my Department from some of the criticisms made during the debate. The Government’s analysis has led us to the conclusion that to date there is no persuasive legal authority to support the contention that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in relation to EU law is no longer absolute. However, there is a need to put the matter beyond speculation for the future. By confirming in statute that directly effective and directly applicable EU law takes effect in this country only by virtue of an Act of Parliament, we are putting the matter beyond doubt for the future.

[Mr David]

Just for clarification, is the Minister saying that there is a difference in legal opinion between the lawyers in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the rest of Government?

[Mr Lidington]

Certainly not. I am saying that we made sure we took legal advice from all the relevant Departments across Whitehall. The views I am expressing—what is in the Bill—reflect the legal advice that has been given, as well as the political decisions that Ministers have taken about what should be included in the legislation.

As I said on Second Reading, clause 18 is declaratory or, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dover said, it is a codification. The clause creates a statutory point of reference to which any future court that considers an argument about the source of authority for European law in this country must have regard. It reflects the dualist nature of our constitutional system, under which international obligations—including those assumed by the UK through our membership of the European Union—are not self-executing within the UK legal system. The fact that the UK is dualist means that European Union law is enforceable here only because this Parliament has legislated to make it so. The clause makes it clear that such European law has authority only by virtue of the fact that Parliament has, through its Acts, decided to import it into the domestic legal order.

In the event of any litigation arising where a party sought to claim that directly applicable or effective EU law had an autonomous legal existence in the UK, the other party would be able to counter that argument by referring to clause 18 and, similarly, judges would take this into account in addressing the arguments raised in their judgments.

[Mr Cash]

I am most grateful for the Minister’s final remarks about the judges. He tried to discharge the point, which I had already made, about the argument that comes from the judges in the Supreme Court and the judicial trends—there was pretty well unanimous agreement on those in the evidence that was given to us—towards a diminution of parliamentary sovereignty through the courts. He must accept that the very fact the judges made those remarks with regard to the Hunting Act 2004 and the case of Jackson in 2005 not only indicates but makes it a darned certainty that they will say such things in respect of other case law, irrespective of whether it is in the European framework or not.

[Mr Lidington]

That enforces the need for us to put on a statutory basis the position that European law has effect here solely because of parliamentary decision and not any other source of authority.

[Michael Connarty]

Clause 18 says that we gave away our primacy in terms of European law in section 2(1) of the 1972 Act. What is being done in the clause to take back from Europe the power that the people were promised would be taken back?

[Mr Lidington]

The hon. Gentleman is pre-empting the next section of my speech in which I want to make it clear what clause 18 does not do. I am not going to try to pretend to the Committee that it seeks to accomplish things that it does not do and is not intended to do.

The clause does not alter the existing relationship between European and UK domestic law, nor does it affect the primacy of EU law—a concept developed by the European Court of Justice well in advance of our membership of the European Community, and to which this Parliament gave effect in UK law as defined under section 2(4) of the European Communities Act 1972. My hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex was right to say, in quoting Martin Howe, that the clause would not stop the escalator, but that it would stop things getting any worse, as my hon. Friend would describe it, than the current position. It is worth saying that although Mr Howe made that comment about the escalator, he also said:

“In my view Clause 18 as presently drafted is valuable and is almost certainly sufficient to achieve its intended purpose of preventing judicial drift towards the erosion of the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty.”

As our judges have recognised to date, Parliament remains free to amend or repeal the 1972 Act, or indeed other Act of Parliament, at any time. But of course the political reality is that if we chose to repeal the 1972 Act or to disapply unilaterally a particular piece of European Union legislation, there would be a serious crisis in terms of this country’s relationship with the European Union. That might be a state of affairs that some hon. Members would wish to bring about and see as an opportunity, but that is not the Government’s aspiration.

Clause 18 will also not alter the rights and obligations assumed by the United Kingdom on becoming a member of the EU, and it will be in line with the practice of other member states such as Germany, whose federal constitutional court ruled in 1993, in the case of Brunner v. European Union, that Community law applies in Germany only because laws passed by the German Parliament say that it does. Similarly, in Denmark the supreme court held in its judgment of 6 April 1998 in the case of Carlsen v. Rasmussen that Community law applies in Denmark only by reason of, and to the extent permitted by, the Danish constitution. Therefore, although they have a different constitutional framework from that of our country, other member states have given effect to EU law through sovereign acts.

I want briefly to deal with two challenges that were made to the Government’s case: Professor Tomkins’s comments about partial legislation being worse than no legislation at all, and why we do not explicitly make this provision an amendment to the 1972 Act. On Professor Tomkins’s argument, we disagree with his conclusion. The Government are clear about the particular mischief that we are seeking to address, which is to put beyond speculation the fact that this country has a dualist system and that the rights and obligations under the EU treaty, in order to be justiciable before our courts, have to be incorporated in our system through an Act of Parliament. It has never been the Government’s intention in bringing forward this legislation to address the broader issues of potential challenge to parliamentary sovereignty over things such as human rights legislation or the impact of the devolution settlements, to which the European Scrutiny Committee drew attention in its reports.

[Mr Jenkin]

The confusion arises in thinking that it is somehow possible to segment European law from domestic law when in fact the European Communities Act itself is domestic law, and the judges who are likely to adjudicate on the sovereignty of Parliament are our own domestic judges. It may well be an adjudication on a European case, or it may well be on another case, but unless the Minister addresses the potential challenge from the Supreme Court on whatever case, particularly under European Community law, he is not addressing the problem.

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend is inviting me to go much further than my Department’s responsibilities. I am very willing to put on record that, contrary to Professor Tomkins’s fears, the Government, in choosing to legislate in this area, have no intention of indicating that other challenges to parliamentary sovereignty are unimportant or insignificant.

Hon. Members have asked why we are not amending the European Communities Act 1972. The principle that we applied is that what is important is what the clause does, rather than where in the statute book it is placed. Although the 1972 Act is the principal statute by which European law is given effect in this country, it can be argued that it is not the only statute that has that effect. Statutes as disparate as the Trade Marks Act 1994, the Chiropractors Act 1994, the Enterprise Act 2002 and the Equality Act 2006 make reference to giving effect to European law. Some provisions of the Scotland Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act 2006 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998 place Ministers from the devolved Administrations under an obligation to act in accordance with European law. That is why we have made reference in the clause to Acts of Parliament in a generic sense, rather than to the 1972 Act in particular.

[Mr Cash]

I thought that my right hon. Friend would give way at that point, because he could see that I could not resist making a point. The status of EU law provision—the stand-alone arrangement that is unnecessary in its present form and achieves nothing—refers to the entire gamut of European legislation. If I may say so, it is exceedingly disingenuous of him to trot out the argument given to him by his lawyers that there is a comparison with the Chiropractors Act 1994.

[Mr Lidington]

We wanted to be certain that the clause caught every piece of legislation that it can be argued gives effect to European Union legislation in this country. My hon. Friend would have been the first Member of this House on his feet to criticise me had I left the loophole of legislation other than the 1972 Act that it can be argued has such an effect.

I shall turn to the specific amendments, starting with amendment 41, which was tabled by my hon. Friend. The amendment seeks to affirm the overall principle of parliamentary sovereignty in relation to EU law. I maintain that there is the difficulty that there is no existing statutory definition of sovereignty. The clause deals with one specific practical expression of parliamentary sovereignty. To introduce the word sovereignty more generally would invite speculative consideration by exactly the kind of ambitious judges whom he fears.

It is clear from the evidence to the Select Committee that there are differences of opinion on the nature of parliamentary sovereignty. Professor Wade is quoted as saying that

“the sovereignty of Parliament is ultimately a judicially recognised ‘political fact’. And when the judges recognise that the political facts have changed, the meaning of sovereignty changes accordingly.”

Professor Allan is quoted as disputing that:

“sovereignty should be seen, not as judicial recognition of political fact, but as a rule of the common law based on reason just like any other rule of the common law.”

Something based on reason is self-evidently subject to change. Therefore, I do not believe that passing the amendment would provide the safeguards that my hon. Friends seek. I do not think that it would achieve the purpose as successfully as the Government’s wording in the clause.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

My right hon. Friend is doing a grand job and has already persuaded me that I should not refuse to vote for clause stand part, but he has not persuaded me not to vote for amendment 41, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash). Why, if that amendment is defective in the way that the Minister describes, did our Front Benchers approach my hon. Friend when we were in opposition, take over an identical amendment that he had drafted and run with it extensively in both Houses?

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend is ingenious and teasing in his question, but I am here to represent the policies of the Government, not to account for what our party said a few years ago in opposition.

My fear is that the impact of the amendment could be the opposite of what my hon. Friends who support it hope for. My hon. Friend the Member for Stone and Professor Tomkins have warned of a new trend of judicial activism, and my hon. Friend argued that powerful elements in the judiciary were seeking as a matter of policy to challenge the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. I find unpersuasive the argument that to introduce the word “sovereignty” into the Bill would quell that ambition. The word lacks a clear definition—we have found about 30 statutes that include it, and they all refer to territorial sovereignty, not to constitutional authority. There is no existing accepted definition, and I fear that the lack of a clear definition would encourage the very judges against whom my hon. Friends warn me to interpret the substance, scope and limits of sovereignty through judicial activism.

[David Morris (Morecambe and Lunesdale) (Con)]

I wish to pose a question. Let us say, for argument’s sake, that the nationalists in Scotland imposed the euro. What powers would we have to defend our sovereignty and economy without the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash)?

[Mr Lidington]

Parliament has the right, which the courts would be obliged to uphold, to repeal or amend the European Communities Act 1972 or any part of it. It also has the constitutional power to disapply a particular piece of EU law, although that would provoke the sort of political crisis in our relations with the EU that I alluded to earlier.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am incredulous about this argument about the word “sovereignty”. Is my right hon. Friend seriously suggesting that if Parliament put into statute the fact that it was sovereign, that would be a come-on to the judges to come and get it? I think if he reflects on that for a short time, he will realise that he has been given a lawyer’s excuse for rejecting the amendment, not a proper reason.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

If one follows the logic that my hon. Friend and others have adduced this evening about the ambitions and activism of certain members of the senior judiciary, and if one considers the arguments that would be made by counsel and parties on both sides if a case were pleaded before a court—they would inevitably draw attention to the absence of any definition of parliamentary sovereignty—one sees that my hon. Friend underestimates the risk that the amendment would encourage judicial activism rather than provide an antidote to it. The concerns about definition apply to other amendments and new clauses, as well.

I wish to say a brief word about the explanatory notes, which have been mentioned in a number of speeches. I note that the European Scrutiny Committee’s report recommended that they should reflect the balance of opinion on the matter. As my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said on Second Reading, references to the common law are meant simply as a contradistinction to statute, given that the principle of parliamentary sovereignty is defined nowhere in statute. They are not meant to be determinative of the origin of the principle, which goes far beyond the scope of the Bill.

Although I do not believe that one phrase in seven substantial paragraphs of the explanatory notes bears the weight that some of my hon. Friends have placed upon it, I will respond to the concerns that have been addressed. The coalition will amend the explanatory notes before the Bill enters the Lords, to address satisfactorily the concerns that the European Scrutiny Committee has raised. That will in no sense change the effect of the clause, which is couched in terms of the status of EU law in the UK legal order, and does not refer explicitly to parliamentary sovereignty or take a position on the origins of that principle.

[Mr David]

Given that the Minister had clearly agreed to change the explanatory notes before the debate, would not it have been courteous to tell the Opposition about his decision?

[Mr Lidington]

I have had no private conversations with my hon. Friend the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee—the hon. Member who expressed concern. The hon. Gentleman is in his place. Like every other hon. Member, he has had the opportunity to hear about the proposed change.

New clause 1 deals with section 3(1) of the European Communities Act 1972. By virtue of that Act, jurisdiction has been conferred on our courts to determine and adjudicate on disputes arising under EU law. That jurisdiction does not arise from the treaties, nor have the courts conferred it on themselves. Courts here possess that power because Parliament has determined that it is appropriate for them to do so and has legislated accordingly.

Section 3(1) of the European Communities Act provides that, for the purposes of legal proceedings in the UK courts, any question about the meaning or effect of the treaties is to be treated as a matter of law and requires the UK courts to take judicial notice of the treaties, the Official Journal and any decision of the European Court of Justice. Together with section 2, it is a cornerstone of the European Communities Act and, like the rest of the measure, subject to appeal or amendment by Parliament if we choose.

New clause 1 would restrict the exercise by the courts of their jurisdiction to interpret and address issues of EU law by ensuring that it does not extend to construction or interpretation by the courts of the nature or legal effect of parliamentary sovereignty.

[Mr Redwood]

Will the Minister tell the House that he wishes to assert parliamentary sovereignty and resist judicial incursions, even if he will not put that in the Bill?

[Mr Lidington]

Yes. I am an elected Member of Parliament. I did not campaign for many years to come here to hand over the powers and privileges of the House of Commons to unelected groups of any sort.

New clause 1 is ambiguous because the lack of a definition of parliamentary sovereignty may encourage the courts to intervene rather than discourage them from doing that. I also think that it is mistaken because the primacy of EU law in the UK legal system does not flow from section 3(1) but is addressed under section 2(4) of the European Communities Act. If the intention is to guard against any risk of our courts using European Court jurisprudence to undermine parliamentary sovereignty, I do not think that it would achieve its desired objective given its drafting.

New clause 4 refers to part 3, but its primary focus is clearly clause 18. In one sense, I support the new clause’s aim. We have made it clear that clause 18 is declaratory and does not alter the existing relationship between European and UK law, and that the rights and obligations assumed by this country on becoming a member of the EU remain intact. However, I am afraid that the Government cannot support the new clause, which implies that something in clause 18 could adversely affect the existing constitutional law on the sovereignty of Parliament in relation to European law. That is not the case. As hon. Members can imagine, we examined the matter carefully and took legal advice from the Foreign Office and elsewhere in Government. I therefore urge my hon. Friends not to press new clause 4.

Amendment 52, tabled by the official Opposition, need not detain us for too long. It is misleading because it implies that the ECJ has a role in determining how European law takes effect in this country. When the hon. Member for Caerphilly next refreshes his memory by reading the treaty, he might see that this is not a matter that falls within the ECJ’s jurisdiction. It is a matter for the UK courts, and no less a figure than Jean-Claude Piris, recently retired as head of the Council’s Legal Service, said in his evidence to the Committee that it is for each member state to determine the constitutional mechanisms through which it gives effect to the legal obligations arising from membership of the European Union.

The Government think that this amendment is not necessary. It is not necessary to take up additional parliamentary time through the process that the Opposition propose. In the event that there were to be a serious challenge to the authority and sovereignty of Parliament, I would expect that hon. Members, on both sides, would want an immediate statement from the Minister and an urgent debate, instead of waiting 12 months for an annual report, which is the only remedy that the hon. Gentleman proposes.

In the coalition’s programme for government, we said that we would examine the case for a United Kingdom sovereignty Bill, to make it clear that in terms of European law ultimate authority remains with Parliament. Through clause 18, we are affirming and confirming that the status of European law in our legal order is dependent on a continuing statutory basis. That is a commitment that the Government believe it is right to put beyond any future speculation. The place where future UK law and future decisions about the authority of European law should be determined is in Parliament and nowhere else. I commend the clause to the House.

[Mr Cash]

I am very glad to see that the Prime Minister is in his place for these final moments. He and I have had some interesting correspondence. I thank all hon. Members who have participated in this debate, which included some brilliant speeches from my hon. Friends the Members for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin), for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison), for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) and others.

In the brief time that I have left, I confirm that I will press amendment 41 and I would be astonished if anybody voted against it. However, I am certain that they will. The difficulty that they will then be in is that, although I will not move the other amendments because of a lack of time and because the issues have been encapsulated in the debate, I have demolished the argument put up against the amendment that the status clause should not be by virtue of a common law principle, both in respect of the academic arguments and of those that have been put forward by the Foreign Office in the explanatory notes. I have, I believe, demolished the argument relating to the question of parliamentary sovereignty, and I refer the Minister to the State Immunity Act 1978, which clearly deals with the question of the sovereign or other head of state in his public capacity. It is already in an Act of Parliament and, by the way, it is not defined, any more than “the rule of law” is defined in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. It does not need definition: the statement and the principle stand.

The sovereignty of Parliament is inviolate, but requires to be reaffirmed, as the Prime Minister has repeatedly told us in the past, but unfortunately will not do through this Bill. With respect to the question about section 3, it eliminates the impact of the courts seeking to use the European Communities Act 1972 to achieve their objectives in relation to parliamentary sovereignty. The other provision in new clause 4 reaffirms the existing constitutional law on the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament in relation to EU law, and I am glad that the Minister has said that he agrees with the sentiments, which I believe are justified.

Having said all that, I believe that we have had a thoroughly good debate, and that, above all else, we have proved our point. We know that we are not going to win the vote. The Labour party has completely reneged on its principles, as expressed by the leader of the party when he said that their rubbish amendment was a matter of principle in defending parliamentary sovereignty. He must be joking! The fact is that clause 18 does not defend parliamentary sovereignty either.