Parliamentary Scrutiny of Leaving the EU
Debate between David Jones and Angela Eagle(8 years, 1 month ago)
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Mr Jones
I will not because I have very little time.
The referendum held on 23 June was one of the biggest democratic exercises in British history. The turnout was high, at 72%, with over 33 million people participating. Over 1 million more people voted to leave than to remain. The turnout was bigger than at any general election since 1992. No single party or Prime Minister has achieved more votes in our history than did the vote to leave in June. This was a once-in-a-generation vote, and that decision must be respected. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) said, we now all have a duty as Members of this House to respect, and not to seek to frustrate, the will of the people of the United Kingdom. I am pleased to observe that most hon. Members who have participated today have agreed with that proposition.
The Government recognise that Parliament must play a full part in the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, and we will of course observe in full all legal and constitutional obligations that apply during the course of withdrawal. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said, we are committed to working with Parliament as we seek to obtain the best deal for Britain in that process of withdrawal. Let me be absolutely clear, however, that triggering the article 50 procedure is a matter for the royal prerogative.
We will take fully into account the views of all Members in our parliamentary engagement, which has already, in the short life of my Department, been extensive. Debates such as today’s are part of the process whereby Parliament will hold the Government to account. So far, in the two and a half working weeks since the summer recess, my right hon. Friend has made two oral statements and appeared before two Select Committees. In his opening speech, he listed the parliamentary engagements that Ministers from his Department have attended and will continue to attend. This Government welcome and encourage such participation.
The restoration of parliamentary sovereignty is at the very core of why we are leaving the European Union. Once we have left, the primacy of the United Kingdom Parliament will no longer be in doubt. As my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) said, that is what the great repeal Bill will secure.
English Votes for English Laws
Debate between David Jones and Angela Eagle(9 years, 4 months ago)
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Ms Eagle
The hon. Gentleman uses his usual charm. He can take it now that I will not be giving way to him again for the rest of my speech. Part of coming to cross-party agreement is that one does not have a completely developed plan that one wishes to force on everybody else—it is called compromise. Obviously, the hon. Gentleman does not understand how that works, but that is not a surprising given his antics in the debate today.
Ms Eagle
No.
There was particular concern expressed during last week’s emergency debate that the so-called Barnett consequentials had not been properly taken into account in the very prescriptive definition of what an “English only” Bill, or part of a Bill, actually is. It is not clear to me whether the changes to the draft Standing Orders adequately address that problem. The Government have not seen fit to address the point about cross-border effects short of Barnett consequentials made by the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) in last week’s debate.
There are some dangers inherent in the Government’s proposals, which they would have been wise to avoid. Badly designed proposals on English votes for English laws risk not only legislative gridlock but making England, or the UK, ungovernable in some circumstances. As the proposals are currently drafted, there are three areas that give particular cause for concern, and I wish to deal with each of them in turn.
First, the proposals create an English veto, not just a voice, with all of the complications for our constitution that that entails. Secondly, the proposals apply not only to English laws but, much more problematically, to parts of Bills, statutory instruments, regulations, commencement orders and ministerial administrative actions, which, in our current system, are often achieved by statutory instruments. Thirdly, even more controversially and entirely without any consultation outside of the Government, these proposals have been widened so that they apply to Finance Bills.
The McKay commission ruled out a veto for English MPs. The Government have gone far beyond the proposals set out by McKay and have instead created a veto rather than strengthening the English voice. Not only do the proposals grant a veto on the UK Government in the Commons, but English MPs would be able to veto Lords amendments on English matters, curtailing the Lords’ ability to revise legislation.
The McKay commission recommended that the views of English MPs needed to be strengthened. In particular, it recommended the adoption of a principle that
“decisions at the United Kingdom level with a separate and distinct effect for England (or for England-and-Wales) should normally be taken only with the consent of a majority of MPs for constituencies in England (or England-and-Wales).”
That convention, along with the approach that the Opposition have suggested of considering an English Committee stage for English matters, is a much more proportionate response to the West Lothian question, and it would strengthen the voice of England.
Why, apart from to advance their own perceived partisan interests, have the Government chosen to go so much further? The proposed system for legislation is much more complex than our current system, as has already been pointed out, and it could quickly gum up the parliamentary works for a Government who lacked an English majority. It would also weaken considerably the accountability of any Government to the electorate for the delivery of their manifesto and their overall administrative record. It means that a majority of English MPs could stop a Government Bill in its tracks. The Government would then have to negotiate with them if they wanted to get the legislation through.
Secondly, the scope of the Government’s proposed English veto is very much wider than that envisaged by McKay. It appears to extend to secondary legislation of all kinds, including commencement orders, regulations and regular administrative actions such as the distribution of the English local government grant—an example that the Government have themselves chosen to highlight. The difficulty with that arrangement is that it would allow English MPs to exercise the powers of the Executive without being at all responsible for the consequences. If the Government’s proposed local government grant allocation is not passed, no money at all can be distributed. This could create an opportunity for English MPs to initiate a local government shutdown of the kind that intermittently strikes the US Executive, or to demand changes in the distribution that satisfy them at the expense of other areas.