Nagorno-Karabakh: Armenian Refugees

David Duguid Excerpts

Tuesday 19th March 2024 Westminster Hall

[Carol Monaghan]

I think it is important that we are not critical of the support that has been given, and £1 million is a good starting place, but I agree with the hon. Member. I ask the Minister what further financial and humanitarian support the UK will provide for the Armenian Government to support the refugees and their hosts in Armenia. Aside from providing aid, the UK Government have a moral responsibility to show leadership in the region. They must undertake all diplomatic efforts to foster dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan and help to create the conditions for a true sustainable peace that will allow displaced Armenians to return home.

In October 2023, the UK Government argued:

“It is vital that international humanitarian organisations have independent access…We therefore welcome Azerbaijan’s decision last week to allow UN agencies into Nagorno-Karabakh, to complement ongoing efforts by the ICRC”—

the International Committee of the Red Cross. However, given that the Armenian population had been ethnically cleansed a month earlier, that seems rather futile.

In January 2024, the UK Government stated:

“We welcomed the two countries’ historic joint statement of 7 December, in which important confidence-building measures were announced, aimed at reaching an historic agreement and securing lasting peace for the region.”

However, there is little confidence that that peace agreement will be sustained.

[David Duguid (Banff and Buchan) (Con)]

The hon. Member mentions a lack of confidence that the progress towards peace will be sustained. I have a couple of questions. First, does she welcome the bilateral agreements and discussions between the leaders and Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia towards that end? Secondly, can she explain why, or from whom, the lack of confidence is coming?

[Carol Monaghan]

First, any agreement that is reached has to be welcomed. Any steps forward have to be welcomed. As for who is concerned, the people we spoke to in the border towns who see Azeri incursions—who see the troops coming over the border—are the ones who are telling us that they do not have confidence in the agreement. That is because they are not seeing it being played out in real time in front of them.

Given the events of the past six months, I was concerned to read that in November 2023 Foreign Office officials were encouraging British business leaders to capitalise on lucrative commercial opportunities in Nagorno-Karabakh to support President Aliyev’s rebuilding agenda. That is quite simply an abdication of the UK Government’s moral and ethical responsibilities. It is also hypocritical. How can the UK Government condemn Azerbaijan’s “unacceptable use of force” in Nagorno-Karabakh in September and then, six weeks later, encourage British commercial involvement in the region? Can the Minister provide clarity on the reasons for encouraging British businesses to exploit the tragic situation?

Despite limited attention from international media, the situation on the ground in Armenia remains critical. Urgent assistance is required for the refugees and for those supporting them. When we asked the refugees about their hope for the future, they responded that they simply wished to return home. The International Court of Justice has issued an order requiring Azerbaijan to

“ensure that persons who have left…and who wish to return to Nagorno-Karabakh are able to do so in a safe, unimpeded and expeditious manner…free from the use of force or intimidation.”

Although the Azeri Government state that return is safe, the refugees were clear that this is impossible. They were starved, they were bombed and they were killed, so their hope to return cannot be realised, certainly not at the present time. My final question to the Minister is this: what representations has he made to the Azeri Government on the treatment of the refugees and on their safe passage back to their homes in Nagorno-Karabakh?

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[David Duguid (Banff and Buchan) (Con)]

I will bear that in mind, Ms Elliott. I will start by drawing the House’s attention to my entry in the Register of Member’s Financial Interests, which includes my role as an officer in the all-party parliamentary group for Azerbaijan. My wife is from Azerbaijan, and I wish all my family and friends there who might be watching this debate a very happy Nowruz for tomorrow.

The history of the Karabakh region is a long and complicated one, as other hon. and right hon. Members have already said. It predates the formation of the Soviet Union, but for most observers and commentators—and for the purposes of today’s debate—the history since the fall of the Soviet Union is most relevant. However, the stated history of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, including that stated in today’s debate, does not always go right back to the start of recent hostilities that predated the fall of the Soviet Union. Separatist demonstrations, confrontations and skirmishes, as well as failed interventions by the Soviet leadership, took place at various times between 1988 and 1991. During that time, Azerbaijanis living in Armenia were also forced to flee from that country.

The conflict escalated into all-out war after Armenia and Azerbaijan attained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Often, when the history of this period is presented, it only goes back to when Armenian-backed forces were already in full occupation of the region, even though it was internationally recognised as the sovereign territory of Azerbaijan. However, what is not often reported—it has not been mentioned by hon. Members today, at least not yet—is that as a result of the occupation of Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region, over 800,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis from that region also became displaced.

Jumping ahead, in 1994 a ceasefire was reached through Russian mediation, but skirmishes continued along what became known as the line of contact. During that time of ceasefire, there were a number of international resolutions. In January 2005, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe condemned ethnic cleansing against Azerbaijanis. In May 2007, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation adopted a resolution considering the occupation of Azerbaijani territory as the aggression of Armenia against Azerbaijan, recognising the actions against Azerbaijani civilians as a crime against humanity and condemning the destruction of archaeological, cultural and religious monuments in the occupied territories.

In March 2008, an OIC resolution further condemned the occupation of Azerbaijani lands by Armenian forces and Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan, ethnic cleansing against the Azeri population, etc. Also in March 2008, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 62/243, which demanded the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Finally—although this is not by any means an exhaustive list of the resolutions that were made—in May 2010, the European Parliament in Strasbourg adopted the resolution that the occupied Azerbaijani regions around Nagorno-Karabakh must be cleared as soon as possible.

In September 2020, a new war erupted in Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories, in response to which the United Nations called on both sides to de-escalate tensions and resume meaningful negotiations. That war ended in November 2020, when a trilateral ceasefire agreement between Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia was signed, according to which Azerbaijan regained all of the occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh as well as one third of Nagorno-Karabakh proper, including Shusha and Hadrut.

Unfortunately, an identifying feature of this conflict has been the extensive use of landmines throughout the area, particularly along the contact line, as well as in the form of booby traps that were left behind by departing Armenian occupying forces. According to the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action, as a result of a survey that is still ongoing, it was initially estimated that over 1 million hectares of land in that area could be contaminated by approximately 1.5 million landmines.

From 1991 until the ceasefire in 2020, over 3,000 people —I think it was almost 3,500 people—were injured or killed by landmines in this area. However, even since that ceasefire in 2020, a further 346 people have been added to that number, as of 5 March this year. With landmine contamination accounting for some 12% of Azerbaijan territories, coupled with reports that Armenia was failing to provide reliable maps, the threats emanating from the mines will continue to disrupt the life and economic wellbeing of Azerbaijani displaced persons for decades to come.

I welcome the assistance that the United Kingdom Government have given up to now, not just to the specific mine-clearing efforts in Azerbaijan but towards the learning of valuable lessons during that operation, which will no doubt prove invaluable in other areas of conflict where landmines are being used.

Others have discussed the events of 2022 to 2023, which culminated in the return of occupied territories to Azerbaijan. At that time, there was an exodus of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians from the area, mostly to Armenia itself, which is the core subject of this debate. There is no doubt that the conflict itself and the return of occupied territories to Azerbaijan must have been distressing and destabilising for the people living in Karabakh. In some way, the desire to flee may be understandable, particularly given some of the propaganda and fearmongering that might have taken place with regard to the intentions of the Azerbaijani authorities. However, Azerbaijan refutes any accusation of ethnic Armenians being forcibly removed.

Various UN missions, including experts from UNICEF, the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organisation and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, visited the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan twice in October 2023 and did not come across any reports of mistreatment with respect to ethnic Armenians or civilian infrastructure, including cultural objects.

Similarly, the UNHCR and the Red Cross, present on the ground throughout, have not—

[Julie Elliott (in the Chair)]

Order. I did say that we had until 3.28 pm, and we have one more speaker.

[David Duguid]

You said nine and a half minutes.

[Julie Elliott (in the Chair)]

Yes, between two people.

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[David Duguid]

I apologise—I misheard. I will skip ahead to my conclusions, in that case.

Azerbaijani authorities have repeatedly and unambiguously confirmed their commitment to create conditions for Armenians to stay and reintegrate and to ensure the right to return for those Armenians who can apply for Azerbaijani citizenship. Their return should of course be respectful of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. As Azerbaijan sees it, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is over. With the exception of a few local incidents, the past five months have been the calmest period in the history of the former conflict going back to the late 1980s.

Azerbaijan and Armenia have never been this close to peace since they were neighbouring Soviet republics. I will not repeat the full extent of what has been done, but, as part of the confidence-building measures, Armenia supported Azerbaijan’s bid to host COP29, while Azerbaijan supports Armenia’s candidacy for COP Bureau membership. Both sides have been working continuously on the draft peace agreement throughout the past five months.

As I mentioned earlier, Azerbaijani and Armenian Foreign Ministers have met, as have their countries’ respective leaders. All those meetings have appeared to be positive and constructive, and I would welcome the Minister’s comments on how he and the UK Government view the progression of those talks. As Azerbaijan and Armenia engage in direct negotiations to reach sustainable peace, it is important that the progress of those negotiations, and therefore the future of the whole region, is not undermined by domestic or international political interference.