(12 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am aware of that and if I my hon. Friend will allow me, I will discuss extensively the EU accession point in just a minute.
The past 10 years have seen a shift in Turkey’s balance of power. It has moved from the Ataturk-style, secular military regime that suppressed Islamist political groups to a much more healthy partnership, involving an army that can live with a moderate Islamic Government under the Justice and Development party—sometimes known as the AKP—led by Prime Minister Erdogan. Now, Turkey is a good example of a secular democracy in a predominantly Muslim country, and the Foreign Office is quite right to treat it as an inspiration. It is an example that can be followed in the emerging democracies in north Africa and the middle east, and no more so than in Egypt, which has just elected its first non-military leader since 1952. Both countries have Sunni majorities and a long history of military dominance, and we can now welcome Mohamed Morsi, from the Freedom and Justice party, as Egypt’s new President. In conducting its parallel inquiry into the Arab spring, my Committee had the privilege of meeting Dr Morsi, and we wish him well in his task of continuing the transition towards democracy in Egypt. The closer we work with both Egypt and Turkey, the better for Britain and the west.
The current climate presents a great opportunity for Turkey to lead by example in the middle east. Western responses to Prime Minister Erdogan’s Government have often mistakenly been influenced by his party’s so-called Islamist roots. However, we were quite struck by the situation when we visited Turkey last autumn, and our doubts were removed. There was very little evidence that the AKP Government were seeking to Islamicise the Turkish state. The AKP is best seen as akin to a socially conservative Christian Democrat party continuing to govern within a secular state. Furthermore, there was no evidence that Turkey has made an overarching foreign policy realignment away from the west. We should not underestimate the extent to which the increased independence and regional focus of Turkish foreign policy may generate differences between Turkish and UK perspectives and policies. However, as long as its foreign policy efforts are directed towards the same ultimate goals, Turkey can add value as a foreign policy partner precisely because it is distinct from the UK.
The Government are right to continue to support the case for Turkey’s membership of the EU. Turkey’s accession would boost the EU’s economic growth and international weight, and at a time of long-term change across the Arab world, its influence could be invaluable. However, Turkey’s application to join the EU has had a troubled history, as my hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Mr Jackson) has just pointed out. Progress is slow, but the problems can be overcome. Two major stumbling blocks exist: the opposition of other EU countries, predominantly France, and the continued lack of a settlement on Cyprus.
Given that Cyprus has assumed the EU presidency this week, is it not extraordinary that Turkey continues not to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and, in practical terms, does not abide by the customs union by continuing to refuse to allow ships and planes from Cyprus to enter its ports and airspace? Surely, at this time, Turkey needs to show in a practical way that it wants to enter the club by recognising that important agreement.
I am grateful for that intervention. In truth, the argument cuts both ways, and I will come to just that point shortly.
Former President Sarkozy was unequivocal in his opposition to Turkish membership. There are signs that President Hollande might be more open than his predecessor to the idea. Turkey’s ambassador to the EU has hinted that France will lift its block on the talks, and I also understand that President Hollande met Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan on the sidelines of the Rio+20 summit last month. Prime Minister Erdogan described the meeting as very good, and President Hollande has agreed to visit Turkey. The omens are promising, although a note of caution should perhaps be struck before we get too enthusiastic.
What sort of Europe would Turkey be joining? My Committee’s impression was that our Turkish partners felt that they could not contribute to discussions about the EU’s future direction unless and until they join it. In my opinion, Turkey should be involved in the discussion of matters that will affect it intimately. The Minister for Europe, who will reply to this debate, told the Committee, when he gave evidence to us, that Turkey was unlikely to join the EU before 2020, and Turkey has made it clear that it would like to be a member by the centenary of the republic in 2023. However, all bets are off on exactly what the EU will look like in 2023. I would be grateful if, in responding to this debate, the Minister gave us his assessment of the extent to which the change of leadership in France is likely to make any difference to Turkey’s accession process.
Let me say to the hon. Gentleman—for whom I have the highest regard—that it would be slightly naïve to think that the House will focus precisely on assisted suicide for five hours. One or two Members may stray on to the subject of assisted dying or voluntary euthanasia, if only within the scope of the amendment on palliative care, with which I shall deal shortly.
My hon. Friend opened the debate by saying, quite properly, that this was an issue not just for courts but for Parliament. To what extent is the discretion of the DPP to prosecute an issue for Parliament?
The guidelines—about which I shall say more in a moment—are a model of clarity. They reflect the way in which the DPP is applying the existing law. I hope that, if a majority in Parliament endorses the guidelines today, they will be strengthened because the debate has taken place.
Until the Suicide Act 1961, suicide was a criminal offence, and some of those who attempted suicide were prosecuted. Most were discharged, but the records show that in 1956 some 33 were sent to prison. In 1961, Parliament caught up with public sentiment, and both suicide and attempted suicide were decriminalised. That was done not to condone suicide, but to recognise that it was primarily a medical rather than a legal issue, and therefore better dealt with by healthcare professionals than by the police. Assisted suicide was a new offence, designed to protect against abuse. It created a unique legal precedent in that this was a criminal offence of being an accessory to a non-criminal act. It carries a sentence of up to 14 years in prison.
What our predecessors did not do, however, was to distinguish between the types of assistance—between the person who irresponsibly and maliciously encourages a suicidal person, and the loving spouse who fulfils a dying partner’s request for help to die. This is the question we are addressing today: should both actions be treated equally under the law?
The problem was, in part, recognised by the 1961 Act, which gave the DPP discretion, so that even when sufficient evidence existed, prosecution would not automatically occur. That recognises the delicate balance that needs to be struck in respect of motive, compassion, coercion and circumstance.
(14 years ago)
Commons Chamber4. What assessment he has made of the effect of the outcomes of the strategic defence and security review on mental health care provision for service personnel.
5. What assessment he has made of the effect of the outcomes of the strategic defence and security review on mental health care provision for service personnel.