Assisted Suicide

David Burrowes Excerpts

Tuesday 27th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Richard Ottaway]

Let me say to the hon. Gentleman—for whom I have the highest regard—that it would be slightly naïve to think that the House will focus precisely on assisted suicide for five hours. One or two Members may stray on to the subject of assisted dying or voluntary euthanasia, if only within the scope of the amendment on palliative care, with which I shall deal shortly.

[Mr David Burrowes (Enfield, Southgate) (Con)]

My hon. Friend opened the debate by saying, quite properly, that this was an issue not just for courts but for Parliament. To what extent is the discretion of the DPP to prosecute an issue for Parliament?

[Richard Ottaway]

The guidelines—about which I shall say more in a moment—are a model of clarity. They reflect the way in which the DPP is applying the existing law. I hope that, if a majority in Parliament endorses the guidelines today, they will be strengthened because the debate has taken place.

Until the Suicide Act 1961, suicide was a criminal offence, and some of those who attempted suicide were prosecuted. Most were discharged, but the records show that in 1956 some 33 were sent to prison. In 1961, Parliament caught up with public sentiment, and both suicide and attempted suicide were decriminalised. That was done not to condone suicide, but to recognise that it was primarily a medical rather than a legal issue, and therefore better dealt with by healthcare professionals than by the police. Assisted suicide was a new offence, designed to protect against abuse. It created a unique legal precedent in that this was a criminal offence of being an accessory to a non-criminal act. It carries a sentence of up to 14 years in prison.

What our predecessors did not do, however, was to distinguish between the types of assistance—between the person who irresponsibly and maliciously encourages a suicidal person, and the loving spouse who fulfils a dying partner’s request for help to die. This is the question we are addressing today: should both actions be treated equally under the law?

The problem was, in part, recognised by the 1961 Act, which gave the DPP discretion, so that even when sufficient evidence existed, prosecution would not automatically occur. That recognises the delicate balance that needs to be struck in respect of motive, compassion, coercion and circumstance.