United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973

David Burrowes Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

Nothing could demonstrate more eloquently the difference between the ill-conceived Iraq war and this operation than the overwhelming agreement on both sides of the Chamber, including the very eloquent and moving speech by the Leader of the Opposition. We now have a no-fly zone, the effect of which has been to neutralise the Libyan air force and take it out of the conflict. There is a naval blockade on Libya, which means that none of the coastal towns can be subject to bombardment. However, Gaddafi’s army remains, and it is legitimate to ask how the objectives of the Security Council resolution can be met, given those circumstances.

As the Prime Minister and others have pointed out, the Security Council resolution allowed us to do that because “all necessary measures” is a very well-known term. I was puzzled when Mr Amr Moussa expressed confusion on behalf of the Arab League about the action being taken, given that Lebanon, a member of the league, was a sponsor of the resolution. He must have known what it was intended to lead to, and I am relieved that he has moved on from that.

What we have seen already is the use of military power—the UN is entitled to do this—to attack artillery, heavy weapons and tanks on the roads of Libya where they might threaten civilian populations, but that is also relevant to the difficult question asked by one of my hon. Friends: what about Libyan regime forces that might have penetrated the towns and cities, where direct attack might be very dangerous? The need to protect civilians is of course paramount, but I believe that that matter will be addressed, because even the regime troops that have penetrated the towns and cities will need to have supplies of fuel and food renewed and other equipment provided, and that can now be blocked because any attempt to provide such reinforcements from outside the towns and cities can now be subject to the most precise destruction by coalition forces. That aspect of the resolution is very welcome.

There is another aspect to consider. Although we talk about a no-fly zone, the areas where civilian lives might be endangered or threatened have in fact become a no-combat zone. It is worth considering that the Security Council resolution stipulates not only “all necessary measures”, but

“all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970”,

which is the resolution that imposed the arms embargo. That must mean that it is now appropriate under the terms of the resolution to supply the insurgents in Libya with military supplies in order to protect the civilian populations in which those insurgents are to be found. I hope that the Foreign Secretary or whoever will be winding up the debate will confirm that.

[Mr David Burrowes (Enfield, Southgate) (Con)]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

We have such limited time that my hon. Friend will have to forgive me for not giving way.

The third factor, which is very significant, is the statement made by President Obama on behalf of all members of the coalition in which he said that this is not simply a question of a ceasefire, but that the Gaddafi authorities are required to withdraw from the various towns and cities they have been threatening. If they do not do so, under the cover of darkness or at some future moment we could face the same problem again. Those are the components available to the coalition and authorised by the United Nations, and I believe that that cannot be seriously disputed.

The second part of my remarks relates to the endgame. What will happen if Gaddafi not only announces a ceasefire, but is forced to respect it, as is likely in the next few days? Does that mean it is all over? I do not think that that would be an appropriate interpretation of the resolution. Even if he introduces a ceasefire that seems genuine for a few days or a couple of weeks, we would have to be satisfied that he was not going to break it as soon as a no-fly zone resolution is withdrawn, because it would be incredibly difficult to have it reinserted again. We would have to be satisfied that the Gaddafi regime, if it remained in power, would continue to be sincere about a ceasefire resolution. It might mean that bombing by coalition forces or raids that damage or destroy elements of the Libyan army are not required, but we would certainly be required to maintain the resolution in force so that it could be re-enacted with all severity, even if it appears that a real ceasefire has be conceded in a few days’ time.

What does that mean for the future of Libya? Well, we just do not know. We cannot pretend to predict what will happen, because so much could and ought to depend on the actions of the Libyans themselves. There might be an uprising in Tripoli, and there might need to be civilian protection in that area—in the capital city—as well. Gaddafi’s own cronies—his own generals and Ministers—might defect as they were doing just a few weeks ago when they realised the game was up, but the most important consideration, if we are to get rid of the Gaddafi regime, is for the Libyan people to liberate themselves.

If air power has now been removed from the Gaddafi regime, if the blockade prevents use of the Libyan navy, and if it is possible, as I have suggested, in certain circumstances for military supplies to be made available to some of the insurgents for the protection of civilians, then that provides an opportunity whereby, if the Libyan people themselves overwhelmingly, as they seem to, want to get rid of that noxious regime, they will have the military means, the support of the international community and the well wishes of the Arab League to do so. In that way, we can all be satisfied that a job will be truly well done.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Dai Havard (Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney) (Lab)]

I would like to say something about the resolution and the immediate deployments, and then perhaps something about the exit strategy, the context in which all this is happening and its domestic effects over time.

Like everyone else, I have struggled with the question of moral relativism. Sometimes, the right statement comes out of the wrong mouth, which is difficult to deal with. However, there has been an ambivalence—certainly on the left—about revolutionary dictators in different parts of the world. My internationalism, which comes from my ethical socialism, has trumped all that, so on this occasion, because the proposal has UN support—something we claimed we needed for other things in the past—I will support the motion. However, I need to be clear: I will be supporting the Libyan people, the United Nations and Parliament, as opposed to the Government. There is a question about the Government keeping Parliament involved in the process, to which we will come back a number of times.

I have had the privilege of meeting armed service personnel, some of whom are probably delivering some of the activity at the moment: people forget about the T-boats, but suddenly they are terribly important. There are questions about aircraft—it was a little ironic to see American Harriers hopping back to their carrier, whereas our jets had to go a long way. There are all sorts of ironies in these things.

The question of intelligence for targeting is hugely important. We know that we cannot alienate the people; we need to show them that we are there to support them, and to do so. The illustration yesterday of an intelligent targeting process was very welcome and will, I think, pay enormous dividends, but it must be maintained.

On the no-fly zone, the Americans say, “Well, we’ve done that now. It’s in place. Job done.” I hope it is not “Mission accomplished”, as the Americans claimed in the last exercise we saw. The truth is that it is not a done deal. There might be some form of no-fly zone and sea blockade in place, but I asked about the clarity of the mandates, from which comes the clarity—or not—of the missions that are undertaken, and there clearly is not just one mission.

I do not want to go into the dispute about whether a decapitation strategy is necessary for Gaddafi. We need to understand that Gaddafi is an Arab and an African—he does not think as I think. He will do all sorts of things; we know that and we need to respond. The hon. Member for Wyre and Preston North (Mr Wallace) made some interesting points that need to be pursued. We need clarity about the mandate.

It was suggested earlier that we could bend the arms embargo to arm certain groups of people. Let us be very clear: we cannot bend anything. If we start doing that, there will be moral relativism and we will lose the legitimacy we have just achieved through the endorsement of the United Nations and through the broader coalition of people coming to support us.

The point I am trying to make is that this is not just about Parliament talking to Arab leaders. It is not just about diplomacy among the leaderships—between the party leaders in this country or between Arab leaders—but about diplomacy and a conversation with, as everyone now calls it, the Arab street. Let us engage in that discussion and see some effort put in. We need people on the ground, not as an occupation force but to help conduct such activity. That is doubtless already happening, to some degree—men in black with beards are doing wonderful things, and they will need some more support. The burden of effort needs to shift to the diplomatic efforts, in their broader sense, to provide some sort of solution. There is no kinetic solution—there is an intelligence-led solution that needs to be—

[Mr Burrowes]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Havard]

No, I am sorry but time will not allow me to do so.

Let me say something about the exit strategy. We need to do all the things I have mentioned and a lot of other things that I do not have time to itemise now, but it is important to ask who we do them with and where we do them. Will we train people? Where will we train them? Who will help with the training? The Arab states’ involvement in the process is key. We need to internationalise it and to do so much more than we have in the past.

There is also a question of sustainability. We are still in Afghanistan. We need to get real about what we can and cannot do and we then need a conversation about the domestic effects of all this. There are domestic effects on the strategic defence and security review and other matters. Will we have the capability to operate in the littoral in the future? Discuss. The Defence Committee will discuss these matters but Parliament needs to do so too. We need to be very clear about the question of sustainability over time, because this is not just about the military—it is about the Department for International Development and about foreign policy. We need a clearer foreign policy, as was stated earlier. Unless we have an idea of what we are trying to do, we will not equip ourselves to do it.

I support the Libyan people, our armed forces and their families and this deployment, but—

--- Later in debate ---

[Jo Swinson (East Dunbartonshire) (LD)]

Eight years ago, this House discussed intervention in Iraq. I was not a Member of Parliament at the time. Instead, I was marching on the streets of Glasgow to protest against that war, along with more than 1 million other people across the United Kingdom. I deeply regret not only the UK’s role in Iraq but the legacy that it has left for UK foreign policy. As the hon. Member for Keighley (Kris Hopkins) so eloquently pointed out, it has undoubtedly made the role of our diplomats much harder in their negotiations with other countries around the world. It has undermined much of what they do. It has also, understandably, made the Government and the British public more sensitive about any UK military action, even when it has United Nations support.

Libya is no Iraq, however. The two are worlds apart. Not only is international action in this case legally justified, but I believe that it is morally right to act to protect Libyan civilians. The situation is very different. In Libya, people are demanding action and the regional neighbours support them. Indeed, the Arab League’s request for help is highly significant.

[Mr Burrowes]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is important not to pigeonhole the support from the Council of the League of Arab States? Its decision of 12 March called not only for a no-fly zone to be imposed, but for the establishment of

“safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”.

Does not that provide the important basis for United Nations resolution 1973 to take all necessary measures, including the bombardment, to protect civilians?

[Jo Swinson]

The hon. Gentleman is quite right, and the Arab League also made it clear that it did not want a foreign invasion force. It is important that that is explicitly outlined in UN Security Resolution 1973.

As has been discussed, a new principle has developed in the international community of the UN’s responsibility to protect. That was not in place eight years ago, and would not have applied in any way to the situation in Iraq. It is hugely positive that the Security Council is prepared to take action under its responsibility to protect, to make it a meaningful concept, and not just warm words. Turning to the scope of the resolution, it is incredibly helpful that it is not just about a narrow no-fly zone, and represents the need to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack. Indeed, it explicitly excludes a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.

This is the most serious type of decision that the House can ever be asked to make, and it is vital that we are well aware of the risks of the action, of which there are many, including the risks to our forces and those of other countries when carrying out the action. We are taking action against Libya’s air defences to try to minimise those risks, but they are always there. We, in the safety and security of the House, owe a huge amount to those troops whom we have asked to take action in the name of the United Kingdom and, indeed, of the United Nations, and we commend them for their bravery.

There may have been optimism in Libya as the news came through of the UN Security Council resolution, but a scenario in which Gaddafi concludes that the game is up, and the Libyan pro-democracy campaigners celebrate a smooth transition to a free society is just a welcome fantasy—it is hardly likely to be the outcome. Even if Gaddafi goes, the building of democracy will be far from easy and, as is more likely, if he does not do so, the endgame is not necessarily clear and we may end up with stalemate. There is a further risk, if there is not a swift conclusion or a clear path to a specific end point, that there will be increased pressure on the international coalition, and it will be difficult to hold the consensus together. Indeed, as has been pointed out, it is perhaps not as firm as it was initially.

There is the risk, too, that Gaddafi will use the implementation of the no-fly zone for propaganda, and will try to paint a picture of the west as imperialist and imposing something on the middle east. From the UK perspective, with our forces overstretched in Afghanistan, we may not be able to react easily with military might to developments that would require a further response. We need to have our eyes open when considering how we will vote on the motion.

Not acting is not a neutral position, as there are huge risks in inaction, too, not least the bloodbath in Benghazi. Indeed, in Gaddafi’s own words, we have heard exactly what would happen. He said that he would show no mercy, and that he would track the fighters down

“and search for them, alley by alley, road by road”,

and house by house. In making that broadcast on Libyan media, he made it clear that his aim was to terrorise his own people and make them cower in submission. As I said last week in Prime Minister’s questions, we must consider the risk of the message that we would send other oppressive regimes around the world—that they could do whatever they liked, and that under no circumstances would the international community act. In what other circumstances would we act? In this situation, there is regional consensus, there is public demand for action, and there is a clear legal position. If we did not act in this circumstance, in what circumstance would we act?

What about the message to other oppressed populations? We have seen the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, and now in Libya, and I am sure people are watching around the world. If we did not act, we would send the message that if populations asserted themselves and demanded their rights, asking the international community for help when peaceful protest was met with murder, their request for help would fall on deaf ears and a lack of international response. What hope in that circumstance could any population have? We would run the risk, if we did not act, of turning Libya into an isolated pariah state, where Gaddafi would have nothing to lose, and would be even more dangerous than before, like a wounded animal. We would run the risk, a few months from now, that we would repeat the collective hand wringing by the international community that we saw after the massacres in Rwanda.

It is not an easy decision for the House to make, and it is not something that we should do lightly. Indeed, it is one of the gravest decisions that we will ever be asked to take as Members of Parliament. It is absolutely right that we scrutinise the detail, but I believe that the House will come to the right conclusion. Action to protect Libyan civilians struggling for democracy is internationally supported, legally justified and morally right.