Football Governance Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Damian Collins and Stephanie Peacock

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st May 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am pleased to be able to discuss part 6 of the Bill, which provides a backstop power in the event that certain thresholds are met and football is unable to resolve the issue of financial distribution. Before I begin to explore this clause, it is important to set out that, in an ideal situation, these powers would never be used. As the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford set out during the evidence sessions, based on her experience with the fan-led review, a football-led solution to the issue of distribution has always been and remains the preference. I hope that can be kept in mind when discussing this part. Indeed, I welcome the powers but my hope is that their enforcement will not actually be necessary.

Clause 55 broadly sets out the process under this part but most importantly defines what might count as “relevant revenue”, which is money to which the backstop will apply. Relevant revenue is broadly defined as revenue received as a result of broadcasting rights, with the Minister given the flexibility to change that if broadcasting is no longer the predominant source of income. There are a couple of things to clarify. First, it would be good if the Minister could confirm whether such broadcast revenue is meant to cover domestic competitions only. Secondly, it would be appreciated if the Minister could clarify whether broadcasting revenue will still be considered relevant if the funding model changes so that it is paid directly to clubs, rather than through competition organisers. Broadly, though, I think this scope is generally accepted as being the right one.

Issues have, however, been identified with clause 55(2)(b), which is the part of the Bill that excludes parachute payments from the definition of relevant revenue. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East tabled amendment 27, and I will speak primarily to amendment 31 in my name. First, I would like to set some background to the issue, as it stems from the fact that there is an ever-growing gap between the Premier League and the EFL. Indeed, 30 years ago, EFL revenues were 75% of those of the Premier League; today they are just 6%. In real figures, that means that 30 years ago the gap was £11 million, and today it is £3 billion.

The Premier League’s approach to mitigating that gap is the so-called parachute payments to clubs relegated from the Premier League for up to three seasons. Those payments help to ensure competitiveness in the Premier League by providing clubs with the confidence to invest on promotion in the knowledge that they will be supported if they are relegated. For example, parachute payments might give the club the confidence to sign players on multi-year contracts, and that is incredibly important to consider. The Premier League’s competitiveness and the fact that any team, no matter their size or experience, can compete on any given day is what makes it the most beloved and exciting league in the world.

However, while they help to boost competitiveness in the Premier League, parachute payments—by the White Paper’s own admission—can distort competition in the Championship. In each of the last six seasons, two of the three clubs promoted from the Championship to the Premier League have been in receipt of parachute payments. The knock-on effect of that is that owners of clubs not in receipt of parachute payments are compelled to put ever greater levels of funding into their clubs to try to remain competitive. That overreliance on increasing owner funding has deeply exposed clubs when the funding does not materialise, as we have seen for Wigan, Bolton and Bury.

Further, the size of parachute payments has increased in recent years. Between 2010 and 2020, they have risen from £30 million to £233 million. That is an eightfold increase in a period in which player wages have only doubled. That means that, of the total distributable revenue of the English and Welsh professional game, the top 25 clubs—those in the Premier League—and the five in receipt of parachute payments in the EFL received 92% last season. That is £3 billion for 25 clubs, and £245 million for the other 67 professional clubs. Given the scale of parachute payments, therefore, it is notable that the Bill has definitively excluded them from the definition of relevant revenue. That is why I have tabled amendment 31.

4.30 pm

I want to be absolutely clear that the amendment is not about abolishing parachute payments; I believe that they provide clubs with the confidence that they need to invest, and they are a crucial tool in ensuring the competitiveness of the best league in the world. The amendment would simply give the regulator discretion to decide that, if certain criteria are met, parachute payments need not be excluded from the revenue to be distributed under the backstop provision.

Certainly, there is no reason to single out parachute payments. Whether people are in favour of significant parachute payments or not, they agree that they have an impact on club finances. As such, they will have a significant impact on the regulator’s objectives of protecting and promoting the financial soundness of clubs and the resilience of English football. Given that that relates to the regulator’s core role, the regulator should have the ultimate say on whether parachute payments are considered as part of the backstop provision.

Further, solidarity payments are explicitly linked to parachute payments. Solidarity payments are worked out as a percentage of the value of a year-three parachute payment. Championship clubs receive 30%, League One clubs receive 4.5%, and League Two clubs receive 3% of the value. The regulator, therefore, might find it difficult to look at one without looking at the other.

I emphasise again that the amendment does not predetermine whether the regulator includes or excludes parachute payments. If the regulator has a case, based on its objective evidence base, that excluding parachute payments from relevant revenue is more likely to make clubs financially sound and promote the financial resilience of English football, they will remain excluded. The amendment simply recognises that it should be the regulator that makes the decision, independent from any vested interests.

When making that decision, the regulator will have to pay explicit regard to the fulfilment of its core objectives and its secondary purposes: financial sustainability, financial resilience, competitiveness and investment. Taken together, those are the principles that should decide whether parachute payments are included—not the leagues and not politicians. Only then will we ensure that the regulator can fulfil the purpose of the Bill.

[Damian Collins]

I will make a few points on parachute payments. It is fair to say that they are not part of the redistribution mechanism between the Premier League and the Football League. They can be set as an amount alongside the redistribution that takes place, but, of course, they are not fixed. They are a contractual arrangement that the Premier League enters into with clubs that are in the league or when they get promoted.

For reasons that hon. Members have rightly set out, if the income of a Premier League club drops by at least half after being relegated, even with parachute payments, that will be a severe challenge to its sustainability. It is anyway and it certainly would be if those payments did not exist. Of course, if a club is promoted straight back up, as Leicester City has been this year, the year-two and year-three parachute payments are not kept by the Football League—the money never goes to the Football League—but goes back to the Premier League. Therefore, in many ways, the payments have nothing to do with the Football League; they are made by the Premier League to its member clubs in the event that they go down.

The question is then whether the existence of parachute payments has such a market-distorting effect that the regulator would have to intervene. It is difficult to see why the regulator would need to intervene on the basis of the impact on the clubs that have been relegated; they clearly need that support. From all the evidence that we heard as a Committee—I have not heard anyone this afternoon say anything to the contrary—there needs to be some compensating mechanism for clubs that go down, otherwise the risks are too great.

It is not always about clubs that have gone up and come straight back down again; it is often about quite large clubs—it was Leicester and Southampton last year. Everton could easily have gone down last season and the impact of such a relegation would have been catastrophic. The regulator would therefore have to take a view as to whether the existence of those payments has a distorting effect on the Championship.

Given the remit of the regulator, I urge hon. Members tabling amendments to be careful what they wish for. The regulator may well take the view that its job is not to have an impact on the nature of competition in the Championship, or to make it easier for more clubs to get promoted. Its interest is to promote financial sustainability, so it could easily take the view that parachute payments should stay because they are necessary for the clubs that are relegated.

Alongside that, there must be effective financial controls on Championship clubs. The question of whether a Championship club feels the need to compete against parachute payments is not necessarily one for the regulator. The regulator’s role is to ensure the financial sustainability of the league, so it might say that it can do that through the checks that it can put in place now, and therefore ensure that the situation created before does not happen again.

One could ask whether it is fair for the Championship to be run such that Championship clubs must compete against Premier League clubs, and cannot cook the books or rely on director’s loans because the regulator will stop them. Of course, in some ways the Championship is not competing with the Premier League. It is a league of clubs seeking to get promoted to the Premier League, but it is also looking to develop its own talent. It can buy talent from the lower leagues and from Europe, as it effectively does already. The TV revenue for the Championship, as it stands today, is already greater than for the top division in the Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium or Denmark, all of which are highly-competitive football nations whose pedigree in major international tournaments has been somewhat better than the home nations over the last few decades.

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[Damian Collins]

One of the reasons why the Bill is important is that the biggest problem in the pyramid at the moment is the financial sustainability of Championship clubs. There are different pressures and the greatest financial risks are taken there; some of the biggest failures have been at that level. That is why it is important.

Parachute payments exist only because the Premier League wants a more competitive, more attractive league. It does not want a closed league where the same three clubs are going up and down all the time, and the clubs that come up are just cannon fodder for the teams that play in it regularly. It is incumbent on the regulator to take a view on the sustainability of the pyramid, but the Premier League would not wish for that outcome.

We can choose which seasons we want to pick, but I do not think it is proven that parachute payments are having that effect already. There is plenty of evidence of badly run clubs—Sunderland is a good example from not long ago—that have been relegated from the Championship while still in receipt of parachute payment money. A lot of clubs come down with players who are not worth what they are being paid, and are stuck with a Championship squad on Premier League money. That is a problem that many clubs face.

Many problems are about the poor decisions made by managers and owners in the Championship, and a lack of financial oversight. The regulator needs to fix that financial oversight first, alongside considering redistribution in the round. It is easier to do that if we do not confuse that with parachute payments, which as the hon. Gentleman says are a much bigger quantum than the amount of redistribution anyway. We need to get the financial oversight right and look at redistribution in that context. I am concerned that simply asking the regulator to recommend a transfer through the backstop of money from the Premier League to the EFL corporately without the right financial oversight will pour petrol on the fire and drive wage inflation in the Championship.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The hon. Gentleman is making a really comprehensive argument for parachute payments. I want to be clear that my amendment is not proposing to get rid of parachute payments; it simply says that they should not be ruled out. I appreciate that he is saying that we should get this right before we move on, but we are here now setting the regulation. Obviously, if they are excluded, they are excluded.

[Damian Collins]

I will draw my remarks to a conclusion. I appreciate that—the hon. Member for Sheffield South East makes a similar argument—it is not an argument for the abolition of parachute payments. My concern is that if we take that step, we would have to bring into scope all football money, not just the money that the Premier League pays in redistribution to clubs in the lower leagues and through parachute payments. That would be a much wider step and would require further consideration. If such recommendations are to be made in future, that should be done after the regulator is established and we have the state of the game report.

Football Governance Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Damian Collins and Stephanie Peacock

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st May 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Stephanie Peacock]

I appreciate my hon. Friend’s comments and his work with his local club. I have met its supporters, and that is one example, although not a lone one, because it has been confirmed, in another example, that both Bury FC’s owners, Stewart Day and Steve Dale, passed the EFL tests. The fan-led review took a number of such case studies into consideration, concluding that things needed to change.

Alongside other measures in the Bill, which will be vital in giving owners a better landscape in which to operate and invest, the review made some distinct suggestions regarding the owners and directors tests, such as: ensuring a consistent and independent approach across all men’s football; giving tests the backing of the regulator to enable access to information not otherwise available to competition organisers, such as that from the National Crime Agency; splitting the tests into two parts to recognise the difference in the obligations and duties of owners and directors; and strengthening the qualification criteria to ensure that prospective candidates have integrity and the intention of running a club sustainably. Overall, I think the clause and this part do a good job of achieving those aims and recommendations.

I have one brief question at this stage. The EFL has indicated that it will stop conducting its owners and directors tests once the regulator is running its tests. However, Richard Masters told the Committee that the Premier League would continue to run its tests alongside those of the regulator. Putting aside the issue of clubs paying twice for the same regulation and the lack of efficiency involved in duplicating structures, a dual system could pose a dilemma. If two tests yield different results, whose decision would ultimately be adhered to? That is difficult to tell from the Bill, and I hope that this is something that the Minister can confirm for us today, or that he will write to the Committee about.

[Damian Collins]

I asked Richard Masters that question when he gave evidence to the Committee and he was clear then that it would require two green lights, as he put it: a person has to pass the Premier League’s own test as well as the test set by the regulator.

[Stephanie Peacock]

That clarity is welcome, but I would still be interested to hear the Minister’s comments. Nevertheless, I am pleased to welcome the clause and I look forward to discussing it in detail.

Football Governance Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Damian Collins and Stephanie Peacock

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th May 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Stephanie Peacock]

Q Competition arrangements, such as the FA cup fixtures, do not fall within the scope of the Bill. Do you think that is the right choice, and why? Feel free to take this opportunity to add anything on the changes to FA cup replays and why they happened the way they did.

David Newton: The short answer is no, we do not believe that competition format matters should be an aspect for the regulator to consider. In Dame Tracey’s report summaries, competition format was not part of that, and I think we feel that competition format matters should remain the province of the football authorities, whether that be ourselves or the leagues. There are specific football-related matters that should remain in our ambit, and this is certainly one of those we feel quite strongly about.

[Damian Collins]

Q One of the comments on the Football Bill is that it does not particularly mention players, and that the scope of the regulator is purely financial and about financial sustainability. The clubs also, as part of their licensing agreement with the regulator, have to produce a corporate governance report. Do you think the Football Association would have any objection if, as part of that governance report, the regulator asked clubs to demonstrate not only how they are financially sustainable but how they met all their other obligations?

Football clubs are not only licensed by the regulator. They are licensed by the Football Association as well. There are articles of association of the Football Association, which place responsibilities on all clubs. Do you think it would be good and proper due diligence for clubs to have to demonstrate through their corporate governance reporting how they meet all their obligations within football—to the FA, to their players and to the welfare standards they are expected to follow?

David Newton: It is an interesting point. It is not one that we have necessarily considered in detail. I do not see any reason why, in good corporate governance practice, you would not refer to your corporate governance standards with all employees, whether they be players or not. From that perspective, on the face of it, it would seem a reasonable assessment.

Media Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Damian Collins and Stephanie Peacock

Committee stage
Tuesday 12th December 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Damian Collins]

That is why it was important that there is an exemption for media organisations from the regulatory powers that Ofcom will have through the Online Safety Act. The reason those exemptions were there was that newspapers already have liability for not only the copy printed, but the adverts they accept and run. The newspaper or magazine editor is legally liable for advertising as much as they are for the articles they commission. Those liabilities and that transparency just did not exist for a lot of online publications, and it could be difficult to see who was behind it.

The challenge with the Online Safety Act was to recognise that the platforms were acting as distributors and promoters of the content—even for a lot of the content that is spam-related or comes from misinformation networks and hostile foreign states. If companies like Facebook are actively promoting that content and highlighting its existence to its users, they should have a liability for it. Newspapers and magazines already had those liabilities because it was clear who was publishing them. In the Online Safety Act, to qualify for the media exemption, it has to be clear who they are, where they are based and who the editor is, and therefore the transparency, liability and risks exist already. They did not in the online world, where many of the publishers were hidden and used that anonymity to spread lies and disinformation.

With that, the onerous costs that lawfare brings to newspapers, and the hollowing out of their business model by the ad platforms that distribute their content for nothing, there is an urgent need to have some sort of compensation mechanism for news organisations, so that local newspapers, national newspapers and magazines get fair compensation for the free distribution of their content across the web. Those are the challenges we face now, and those were things that were never envisaged at the time of Leveson.

As the hon. Member for Aberdeen North has said many times in the debate, things move pretty fast between media Bills. This is another example of how things have moved fast again. This amendment to the law and removing section 40 from the statute books reflects the need for us to change the law to reflect the media world that exists today.

[Stephanie Peacock]

When Leveson produced his report over 10 years ago, he attempted to strike a careful balance between two important competing objectives: enforcing press standards and protecting the free press. As such, although the inquiry paved the way for the existence of an approved press regulator, it was decided that membership in such a regulator would be voluntary rather than mandatory for news publishers, with incentives put in place to encourage active take-up of membership. One of the major incentives to encourage membership was introduced in the form of section 40. Where papers had not signed up to an approved regulator, they would be vulnerable to paying their legal opponents’ costs where the judge considered it reasonable to do so, even if they were to win the wider case. If they were signed up to a recognised regulator, however, they would be protected from that.

Despite being introduced in the Crime and Courts Act 2013, section 40 has never been commenced and would be repealed by clause 50. We appreciate that section 40 is not a particularly well-drafted piece of legislation. Representatives from and of the press, including the NMA, have long argued that it is morally wrong to attempt to persuade them to sign up to external regulation on the basis that they would have to pay the legal fees of both sides, even when they had won the case. They say if the section was commenced, it would prove financially ruinous to them as on principle they would never sign up to such a regulator.

With over a decade passed, the media landscape has changed significantly since the Leveson report was published, as we have discussed. Almost every major press news outlet has introduced some form of regulation, whether individually or through the Independent Press Standards Organisation, which was not anticipated when the law was drafted. Publishers face significant new challenges that threaten the ability of the industry to carry out its vital work, from inflation and falls in advertising revenue to the rise of social media and the ability to share disinformation more easily online.

Amendment 41, tabled by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, acknowledges what we will do when section 40 is repealed. It remains important that we have a press that is accountable for its reporting and meets the highest ethical and journalistic standards, but given the poor drafting of section 40 and the fundamental imbalance of costs, I believe that those questions are best answered outside the matter of repeal itself. On that basis, I will not stand in the way of this Bill as a result of the Government’s decision to repeal section 40.

Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Damian Collins and Stephanie Peacock

Committee stage
Thursday 18th May 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Stephanie Peacock]

The clause defines key terms in this part of the Bill, such as business data, customer data and data holder, as well as data regulations, customer and trader. These are key to the regulation-making powers on smart data in part 3, and I have no specific concerns to raise about them at this point.

I note the clarification made by the Minister in his amendment to the example given. As he outlined, that will ensure there is consistency in the definition and understanding of business data. It is good to see areas such as that being cleaned up so that the Bill can be interpreted as easily as possible, given its complexity to many. I am therefore happy to proceed with the Bill.

[Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)]

I rise to ask the Minister a specific question about the use of smart data in this way. A lot of users will be giving away data a device level, rather than just accessing individual accounts. People are just going to a particular account they are signed into and making transactions, or doing whatever they are doing in that application, on a particular device, but there will be much more gathering of data at the device level. We know that many companies—certainly some of the bigger tech companies—use their apps to gather data not just about what their users do on their particular app, but across their whole device. One of the complaints of Facebook customers is that if they seek to remove their data from Facebook and get it back, the company’s policy is to give them back data only for things they have done while using its applications—Instagram, Facebook or whatever. It retains any device-level data that it has gathered, which could be quite significant, on the basis of privacy—it says that it does not know whether someone else was using the device, so it is not right to hand that data back. Companies are exploiting this anomaly to retain as much data as possible about things that people are doing across a whole range of apps, even when the customer has made a clear request for deletion.

I will be grateful if the Minister can say something about that. If he cannot do so now, will he write to me or say something in the future? When considering the way that these regulations work, particularly in the era of smart data when it will be far more likely that data is gathered across multiple applications, it should be clear what rights customers have to have all that data deleted if they request it.

Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Damian Collins and Stephanie Peacock

Committee stage
Wednesday 10th May 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Stephanie Peacock]

That is useful. Thank you.

[Damian Collins]

Q Continuing with that theme, the Bill uses a broader definition of “recognised legitimate interests” for data controllers. How do you think the Bill will change the regime for businesses? What sort of things might they argue they should be able to do under the Bill that they cannot do now?

John Edwards: There is an argument that there is nothing under the Bill that they cannot do now, but it does respond to a perception that there is a lack of clarity and certainty about the scope of legitimate interests, and it is a legitimate activity of lawmakers to respond to such perceptions. The provision will allow doubt to be taken out of the economy in respect of aspects such as, “Is maintaining the security of my system a legitimate interest in using this data?” Uncertainty in law is very inefficient—it causes people to seek legal opinions and expend resources away from their primary activity—so the more uncertainty we can take out of the legislation, the greater the efficiency of the regulation. We have a role in that at the Information Commissioner’s Office and you as lawmakers have just as important a role.

Data Protection and Digital Information (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Damian Collins and Stephanie Peacock

Committee stage
Wednesday 10th May 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Stephanie Peacock]

Q A final question: do you think that the definitions of “vexatious” and “excessive” are clear enough not to be abused by controllers who simply do not want to carry out subject access requests?

Alex Lawrence-Archer: The new definitions, particularly the list of factors to be taken into consideration in determining whether the test is met, provide a lot of breathing room for controllers, whether or not they have good intentions, to make arguments that they do not need to comply with the right of access. If you are looking not to comply or if you have an incentive not to, as many controllers do, that does not necessarily mean that you are acting in bad faith; you might just not want to hand over the data and think that you are entitled not to do so. If you are looking not to comply, you will look at the Act and see lots of hooks that you can hang arguments on. Ultimately, that will come back to individuals who are just trying to exercise their rights and who will be engaged in big arguments with big companies and their lawyers.

[Damian Collins]

Q The age-appropriate design code for children was mentioned in our session this morning. Do you have any thoughts on what the Bill could mean for the application of that design code, which was obviously prepared for an environment in which GDPR was enshrined in UK data law?

Alex Lawrence-Archer: The age-appropriate design code was a real success for the UK in terms of its regulation and its reputation internationally. It clarified the rights that children have in relation to the processing of their personal data. However, those rights are only helpful if you know what is happening to your personal data, and if and when you find out that you can exercise your rights in relation to that processing.

As I have said, what the Bill does—again, perhaps inadvertently—is undermine in a whole host of ways your ability to know what is happening with your personal data and to do something about it when you find out that things have gone wrong. It seems to me that on the back of a notable success in relation to the AADC, we are now, with this Bill, moving in rather a different direction in terms of that argument for protection of personal data.

Looking at the even longer term, there will be some slightly more nuanced changes if and when the AADC comes to be amended or redrafted, because of the role of the ICO and the factors that it has to take into account in its independence, which again you have already heard about. So you could, in the long term, see a new version of the AADC that is more business-friendly, potentially, because of this Bill.