Online Safety Bill

Debate between Damian Collins and Alex Davies-Jones

Report stage
Tuesday 17th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I am aware of that case, which is truly appalling and shocking. That is exactly why we need such protections in the Bill: to stop those cases proliferating online, to stop the platforms from choosing their own terms of service, and to give Ofcom real teeth, as a regulator, to take on those challenges.

[Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)]

Does the hon. Lady accept that the Bill does give Ofcom the power to set minimum safety standards based on the priority legal offences written into the Bill? That would cover almost all the worst kinds of offences, including child sexual exploitation, inciting violence and racial hatred, and so on. Those are the minimum safety standards that are set, and the Bill guarantees them.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

What is not in those minimum safety standards is all the horrendous and harmful content that I have described: covid disinformation, harmful content from state actors, self-harm promotion, antisemitism, misogyny and the incel culture, all of which is proliferating online and being amplified by the algorithms. This set of minimum safety standards can be changed overnight.

[Damian Collins]

As the hon. Lady knows, foreign-state disinformation is covered because it is part of the priority offences listed in the National Security Bill, so those accounts can be disabled. Everything that meets the criminal threshold is in this Bill because it is in the National Security Bill, as she knows. The criminal threshold for all the offences she lists are set in schedule 7 of this Bill.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

That is just the problem, though, isn’t it? A lot of those issues would not be covered by the minimum standards—that is why we have tabled new clause 4—because they do not currently meet the legal threshold. That is the problem. There is a grey area of incredibly harmful but legal content, which is proliferating online, being amplified by algorithms and by influencers—for want of a better word—and being fed to everybody online. That content is then shared incredibly widely, and that is what is causing harm and disinformation.

[Damian Collins]

Will the hon. Lady give way one more time?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

No, I will not. I need to make progress; we have a lot to cover and a lot of amendments, as I have outlined.

Under the terms of the Bill, platforms can issue whatever minimum standards they wish and then simply change them at will overnight. In tabling new clause 4, our intention is to ensure that the platforms are not able to avoid safety duties by changing their terms and conditions. As I have said, this group of amendments will give Ofcom the relevant teeth to act and keep everybody safe online.

We all recognise that there will be a learning curve for everyone involved once the legislation is enacted. We want to get that right, and the new clauses will ensure that platforms have specific duties to keep us safe. That is an important point, and I will continue to make it clear at every opportunity, because the platforms and providers have, for far too long, got away with zero regulation—nothing whatsoever—and enough is enough.

During the last Report stage, I made it clear that Labour considers individual liability essential to ensuring that online safety is taken seriously by online platforms. We have been calling for stronger criminal sanctions for months, and although we welcome some movement from the Government on that issue today, enforcement is now ultimately a narrower set of measures because the Government gutted much of the Bill before Christmas. That last minute U-turn is another one to add to a long list, but to be frank, very little surprises me when it comes to this Government’s approach to law-making.

ONLINE SAFETY BILL (Third sitting)

Debate between Damian Collins and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage (re-committed clauses and schedules)
Thursday 15th December 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I rise briefly to support everything the hon. Member for Aberdeen North just said. We have long called for the Bill to take a harm-led approach; indeed, the Government initially agreed with us, as when it was in its first iteration it was called the Online Harms Bill rather than the Online Safety Bill. Addressing harm must be a central focus of the Bill, as we know extremist content is perpetuated on smaller, high-harm platforms; this is something that the Antisemitism Policy Trust and Hope not Hate have long called for with regards to the Bill.

I want to put on the record our huge support for the amendment. Should the hon. Lady be willing to push it to a vote—I recognise that we are small in number—we will absolutely support her.

[Damian Collins]

I want to speak briefly to the amendment. I totally understand the reasons that the hon. Member for Aberdeen North has tabled it, but in reality, the kinds of activities she describes would be captured anyway, because most would fall within the remit of the priority illegal harms that all platforms and user-to-user services have to follow. If there were occasions when they did not, being included in category 1 would mean that they would be subject to the additional transparency of terms of service, but the smaller platforms that allow extremist behaviour are likely to have extremely limited terms of service. We would be relying on the priority illegal activity to set the minimum safety standards, which Ofcom would be able to do.

It would also be an area where we would want to move at pace. Even if we wanted to bring in extra risk assessments on terms of service that barely exist, the time it would take to do that would not give a speedy resolution. It is important that in the way Ofcom exercises its duties, it does not just focus on the biggest category 1 platforms but looks at how risk assessments for illegal activity are conducted across a wide range of services in scope, and that it has the resources needed to do that.

Even within category 1, it is important that is done. We often cite TikTok, Instagram and Facebook as the biggest platforms, but I recently spoke to a teacher in a larger secondary school who said that by far the worst platform they have to deal with in terms of abuse, bullying, intimidation, and even sharing of intimate images between children, is Snapchat. We need to ensure that those services get the full scrutiny they should have, because they are operating at the moment well below their stated terms of service, and in contravention of the priority illegal areas of harm.

Online Harms

Debate between Damian Collins and Alex Davies-Jones

Wednesday 26th October 2022 Westminster Hall

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Damian Collins)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Dowd. This is my first appearance as a Minister in Westminster Hall, and your first appearance in the Chair, so we are both making our debuts. I hope we have long and successful reigns in our respective roles.

It is a great pleasure to respond to the debate secured by my right hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds) and to his excellent opening speech. He feels strongly about these issues—as he did both in Government and previously as a member of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee—and he has spoken up about them. I enjoyed working with him when he was a Minister at the Home Office and I chaired the prelegislative scrutiny Committee, which discussed many important features of the Online Safety Bill. One feature of the Bill, of course, is the inclusion of measures on fraud and scam advertising, which was a recommendation of the Joint Committee. It made my life easier that, by the time I became a Minister in the Department, the Government had already accepted that recommendation and introduced the exemption, and I will come on to talk about that in more detail.

My right hon. Friend, the hon. Member for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones) and other Members raised the case of Molly Russell, and it is important to reflect on that case. I share the sentiments expressed about the tragedy of Molly’s death, its avoidable nature and the tireless work of the Russell family, and particularly her father, Ian Russell, whom I have met several times to discuss this. The Russell family pursued a very difficult and complicated case, which required a huge release of evidence from the social media companies, particularly Instagram and Pinterest, to demonstrate the sort of content to which Molly Russell was exposed.

One of the things Ian Russell talks about is the work done by the investigating officers in the coroner’s inquest. Tellingly, the inquest restricted the amount of time that people could be exposed to the content that Molly was exposed to, and ensured that police officers who were investigating were not doing so on their own. Yet that was content that a vulnerable teenage girl saw repeatedly, on her own, in isolation from those who could have helped her.

When online safety issues are raised with social media companies, they say things like, “We make this stuff very hard to find.” The lived experience of most teenagers is not searching for such material; it is such material being selected by the platforms and targeted at the user. When someone opens TikTok, their first exposure is not to content that they have searched for; it is to content recommended to them by TikTok, which data-profiles the user and chooses things that will engage them. Those engagement-based business models are at the heart of the way the Online Safety Bill works and has to work. If platforms choose to recommend content to users to increase their engagement with the platform, they make a business decision. They are selecting content that they think will make a user want to return more frequently and stay on the platform for longer. That is how free apps make money from advertising: by driving engagement.

It is a fair criticism that, at times, the platforms are not effective enough at recognising the kinds of engagement tools they are using, the content that is used to engage people and the harm that that can do. For a vulnerable person, the sad truth is that their vulnerability will probably be detected by the AI that drives the recommendation tools. That person is far more likely to be exposed to content that will make their vulnerabilities worse. That is how a vulnerable teenage girl can be held by the hand—by an app’s AI recommendation tools—and walked from depression to self-harm and worse. That is why regulating online safety is so important and why the protection of children is so fundamental to the Bill. As hon. Members have rightly said, we must also ensure that we protect adults from some of the illegal and harmful activity on the platforms and hold those platforms to account for the business model they have created.

I take exception to the suggestion from the hon. Member for Pontypridd that this is a content-moderation Bill. It is not; it is a systems Bill. The content that we use, and often refer to, is an exemplar of the problem; it is an exemplar of things going wrong. On all the different areas of harm that are listed in the Bill, particularly the priority legal offences in schedule 7, our challenge to the companies is: “You have to demonstrate to the regulator that you have appropriate systems in place to identify this content, to ensure that you are not amplifying or recommending it and to mitigate it.” Mitigation could be suppressing the content—not letting it be amplified by their tools—removing it altogether or taking action against the accounts that post it. It is the regulator’s job to work with the companies, assess the risk, create codes of practice and then hold the companies to account for how they work.

There is criminal liability for the companies if they refuse to co-operate with the regulator. If they refuse to share information or evidence asked for by the regulator, a named company director will be criminally liable. That was in the original Bill. The recommendation in the Joint Committee report was that that should be commenced within months of the Bill being live; originally it was going to be two years. That is in the Bill today, and it is important that it is there so that companies know they have to comply with requests.

The hon. Member for Pontypridd is right to say that the Bill is world-leading, in the sense that it goes further than other people’s Bills, but other Bills have been enacted elsewhere in the world. That is why it is important that we get on with this.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

The Minister is right to say that we need to get on with this. I appreciate that he is not responsible for the business of this House, but his party and his Government are, so will he explain why the Bill has been pulled from the timetable next week, if it is such an important piece of legislation?

[Damian Collins]

As the hon. Lady knows, I can speak to the Bill; I cannot speak to the business of the House—that is a matter for the business managers in the usual way. Department officials—some here and some back at the Department—have been working tirelessly on the Bill to ensure we can get it in a timely fashion. I want to see it complete its Commons stages and go to the House of Lords as quickly as possible. Our target is to ensure that it receives safe passage in this Session of Parliament. Obviously, I cannot talk to the business of the House, which may alter as a consequence of the changes to Government.

Online Safety Bill

Debate between Damian Collins and Alex Davies-Jones

Report stage
Tuesday 12th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[Damian Collins]

That is entirely right, and in closing I say that the Bill does what we have always asked for it to do: it gives absolute clarity that illegal things offline must be illegal online as well, and be regulated online. It establishes clear responsibilities and liabilities for the platforms to do that proactively. It enables a regulator to hold the platforms to account on their ability to tackle those priority illegal harms and provide transparency on other areas of harmful content. At present we simply do not know about the policy decisions that companies choose to make: we have no say in it; it is not transparent; we do not know whether they do it. The Bill will deliver in those important regards. If we are serious about tackling issues such as fraud and abuse online, and other criminal offences, we require a regulatory system to do that and proper legal accountability and liability for the companies. That is what the Bill and the further amendments deliver.

[Alex Davies-Jones (Pontypridd) (Lab)]

It is an honour to respond on the first group of amendments on behalf of the Opposition.

For those of us who have been working on this Bill for some time now, it has been extremely frustrating to see the Government take such a siloed approach in navigating this complex legislation. I remind colleagues that in Committee Labour tabled a number of hugely important amendments that sought to make the online space safer for us all, but the Government responded by voting against each and every one of them. I certainly hope the new Minister—I very much welcome him to his post—has a more open-minded approach than his predecessor and indeed the Secretary of State; I look forward to what I hope will be a more collaborative approach to getting this legislation right.

With that in mind, it must be said that time and again this Government claim that the legislation is world-leading but that is far from the truth. Instead, once again the Government have proposed hugely significant and contentious amendments only after line-by-line scrutiny in Committee; it is not the first time this has happened in this Parliament, and it is extremely frustrating for those of us who have debated this Bill for more than 50 hours over the past month.

I will begin by touching on Labour’s broader concerns around the Bill. As the Minister will be aware, we believe that the Government have made a fundamental mistake in their approach to categorisation, which undermines the very structure of the Bill. We are not alone in this view and have the backing of many advocacy and campaign groups including the Carnegie UK Trust, Hope Not Hate and the Antisemitism Policy Trust. Categorisation of services based on size rather than risk of harm will mean that the Bill will fail to address some of the most extreme harms on the internet.

We all know that smaller platforms such as 4chan and BitChute have significant numbers of users who are highly motivated to promote very dangerous content. Their aim is to promote radicalisation and to spread hate and harm.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and has touched on elements that I will address later in my speech. I will look at cross-platform harm and breadcrumbing; the Government have taken action to address that issue, but they need to go further.

[Damian Collins]

I am sorry to intervene so early in the hon. Lady’s speech, and thank her for her kind words. I personally agree that the question of categorisation needs to be looked at again, and the Government have agreed to do so. We will hopefully discuss it next week during consideration of the third group of amendments.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I welcome the Minister’s commitment, which is something that the previous Minister, the hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp) also committed to in Committee. However, it should have been in the Bill to begin with, or been tabled as an amendment today so that we could discuss it on the Floor of the House. We should not have to wait until the Bill goes to the other place to discuss this fundamental, important point that I know colleagues on the Minister’s own Back Benches have been calling for. Here we are, weeks down the line, with nothing having been done to fix that problem, which we know will be a persistent problem unless action is taken. It is beyond frustrating that no indication was given in Committee of these changes, because they have wide-ranging consequences for the effects of the Bill. Clearly, the Government are distracted with other matters, but I remind the Minister that Labour has long called for a safer internet, and we are keen to get the Bill right.

Let us start with new clause 14, which provides clarification about how online services should determine whether content should be considered illegal, and therefore how the illegal safety duty should apply. The new clause is deeply problematic, and is likely to reduce significantly the amount of illegal content and fraudulent advertising that is correctly identified and acted on. First, companies will be expected to determine whether content is illegal or fraudulently based on information that is

“reasonably available to a provider”,

with reasonableness determined in part by the size and capacity of the provider. That entrenches the problems I have outlined with smaller, high-risk companies being subject to fewer duties despite the acute risks they pose. Having less onerous applications of the illegal safety duties will encourage malign actors to migrate illegal activity on to smaller sites that have less pronounced regulatory expectations placed on them. That has particularly concerning ramifications for children’s protections, which I will come on to shortly. On the other end of the scale, larger sites could use new clause 14 to argue that their size and capacity, and the corresponding volumes of material they are moderating, makes it impractical for them reliably and consistently to identify illegal content.

The second problem arises from the fact that the platforms will need to have

“reasonable grounds to infer that all elements necessary for the commission of the offence, including mental elements, are present or satisfied”.

That significantly raises the threshold at which companies are likely to determine that content is illegal. In practice, companies have routinely failed to remove content where there is clear evidence of illegal intent. That has been the case in instances of child abuse breadcrumbing, where platforms use their own definitions of what constitutes a child abuse image for moderation purposes. Charities believe it is inevitable that companies will look to use this clause to minimise their regulatory obligations to act.

Finally, new clause 14 and its resulting amendments do not appear to be adequately future-proofed. The new clause sets out that judgments should be made

“on the basis of all relevant information that is reasonably available to a provider.”

However, on Meta’s first metaverse device, the Oculus Quest product, that company records only two minutes of footage on a rolling basis. That makes it virtually impossible to detect evidence of grooming, and companies can therefore argue that they cannot detect illegal content because the information is not reasonably available to them. The new clause undermines and weakens the safety mechanisms that the Minister, his team, the previous Minister, and all members of the Joint Committee and the Public Bill Committee have worked so hard to get right. I urge the Minister to reconsider these amendments and withdraw them.

I will now move on to improving the children’s protection measures in the Bill. In Committee, it was clear that one thing we all agreed on, cross-party and across the House, was trying to get the Bill to work for children. With colleagues in the Scottish National party, Labour Members tabled many amendments and new clauses in an attempt to achieve that goal. However, despite their having the backing of numerous children’s charities, including the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 5Rights, Save the Children, Barnardo’s, The Children’s Society and many more, the Government sadly did not accept them. We are grateful to those organisations for their insights and support throughout the Bill’s passage.

We know that children face significant risks online, from bullying and sexist trolling to the most extreme grooming and child abuse. Our amendments focus in particular on preventing grooming and child abuse, but before I speak to them, I associate myself with the amendments tabled by our colleagues in the Scottish National party, the hon. Members for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman) and for Ochil and South Perthshire (John Nicolson). In particular, I associate myself with the sensible changes they have suggested to the Bill at this stage, including a change to children’s access assessments through amendment 162 and a strengthening of duties to prevent harm to children caused by habit-forming features through amendment 190.

Since the Bill was first promised in 2017, the number of online grooming crimes reported to the police has increased by more than 80%. Last year, around 120 sexual communication with children offences were committed every single week, and those are only the reported cases. The NSPCC has warned that that amounts to a

“tsunami of online child abuse”.

We now have the first ever opportunity to legislate for a safer world online for our children.

However, as currently drafted, the Bill falls short by failing to grasp the dynamics of online child abuse and grooming, which rarely occurs on one single platform or app, as mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams). In well-established grooming pathways, abusers exploit the design features of open social networks to contact children, then move their communication across to other, more encrypted platforms, including livestreaming sites and encrypted messaging services. For instance, perpetrators manipulate features such as Facebook’s algorithmic friend suggestions to make initial contact with large numbers of children, who they then groom through direct messages before moving to encrypted services such as WhatsApp, where they coerce children into sending sexual images. That range of techniques is often referred to as child abuse breadcrumbing, and is a significant enabler of online child abuse.

I will give a sense of how easy it is for abusers to exploit children by recounting the words and experiences of a survivor, a 15-year-old girl who was groomed on multiple sites:

“I’ve been chatting with this guy online who’s…twice my age. This all started on Instagram but lately all our chats have been on WhatsApp. He seemed really nice to begin with, but then he started making me do these things to ‘prove my trust’ to him, like doing video chats with my chest exposed. Every time I did these things for him, he would ask for more and I felt like it was too late to back out. This whole thing has been slowly destroying me and I’ve been having thoughts of hurting myself.”

I appreciate that it is difficult listening, but that experience is being shared by thousands of other children every year, and we need to be clear about the urgency that is needed to change that.

It will come as a relief to parents and children that, through amendments 58 to 61, the Government have finally agreed to close the loophole that allowed for breadcrumbing to continue. However, I still wish to speak to our amendments 15, 16, and 17 to 19, which were tabled before the Government changed their mind. Together with the Government’s amendments, these changes will bring into scope tens of millions of interactions with accounts that actively enable the discovery and sharing of child abuse material.

Amendment 15 would ensure that platforms have to include in their illegal content risk assessment content that

“reasonably foreseeably facilitates or aids the discovery or dissemination of CSEA content.”

Amendment 16 would ensure that platforms have to maintain proportionate systems and processes to minimise the presence of such content on their sites. The wording of our amendments is tighter and includes aiding the discovery or dissemination of content, whereas the Government’s amendments cover only “commission or facilitation”. Can the Minister tell me why the Government chose that specific wording and opposed the amendments that we tabled in Committee, which would have done the exact same thing? I hope that in the spirit of collaboration that we have fostered throughout the passage of the Bill with the new Minister and his predecessor, the Minister will consider the merit of our amendments 15 and 16.

Labour is extremely concerned about the significant powers that the Bill in its current form gives to the Secretary of State. We see that approach to the Bill as nothing short of a shameless attempt at power-grabbing from a Government whose so-called world-leading Bill is already failing in its most basic duty of keeping people safe online. Two interlinked issues arise from the myriad of powers granted to the Secretary of State throughout the Bill: the first is the unjustified intrusion of the Secretary of State into decisions that are about the regulation of speech, and the second is the unnecessary levels of interference and threats to the independence of Ofcom that arise from the powers of direction to Ofcom in its day-to-day matters and operations. That is not good governance, and it is why Labour has tabled a range of important amendments that the Minister must carefully consider. None of us wants the Bill to place undue powers in the hands of only one individual. That is not a normal approach to regulation, so I fail to see why the Government have chosen to go down that route in this case.

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Collins]

I think we would all agree that when we look at the priority harms set out in the Bill, women and girls are disproportionately the victims of those offences. The groups in society that the Bill will most help are women and girls in our community. I am happy to work with the hon. Lady and all hon. Members to look at what more we can do on this point, both during the passage of the Bill and in future, but as it stands the Bill is the biggest step forward in protecting women and girls, and all users online, that we have ever seen.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I am grateful to the Minister for the offer to work on that further, but we have an opportunity now to make real and lasting change. We talk about how we tackle this issue going forward. How can we solve the problem of violence against women and girls in our community? Three women a week are murdered at the hands of men in this country—that is shocking. How can we truly begin to tackle a culture change? This is how it starts. We have had enough of words. We have had enough of Ministers standing at the Dispatch Box saying, “This is how we are going to tackle violence against women and girls; this is our new plan to do it.” They have an opportunity to create a new law that makes it a priority harm, and that makes women and girls feel like they are being listened to, finally. I urge the Minister and Members in all parts of the House, who know that this is a chance for us finally to take that first step, to vote for new clause 3 today and make women and girls a priority by showing understanding that they receive a disproportionate level of abuse and harm online, and by making them a key component of the Bill.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

I join everybody else in welcoming the Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Damian Collins), to the Front Bench. He is astonishingly unusual in that he is both well-intentioned and well-informed, a combination we do not always find among Ministers.

I will speak to my amendments to the Bill. I am perfectly willing to be in a minority of one—one of my normal positions in this House. To be in a minority of one on the issue of free speech is an honourable place to be. I will start by saying that I think the Bill is fundamentally mis-designed. It should have been several Bills, not one. It is so complex that it is very difficult to forecast the consequences of what it sets out to do. It has the most fabulously virtuous aims, but unfortunately the way things will be done under it, with the use of Government organisations to make decisions that, properly, should be taken on the Floor of the House, is in my view misconceived.

We all want the internet to be safe. Right now, there are too many dangers online—we have been hearing about some of them from the hon. Member for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones), who made a fabulous speech from the Opposition Front Bench—from videos propagating terror to posts promoting self-harm and suicide. But in its well-intentioned attempts to address those very real threats, the Bill could actually end up being the biggest accidental curtailment of free speech in modern history.

There are many reasons to be concerned about the Bill. Not all of them are to be dealt with in this part of the Report stage—some will be dealt with later—and I do not have time to mention them all. I will make one criticism of the handling of the Bill at this point. I have seen much smaller Bills have five days on Report in the past. This Bill demands more than two days. That was part of what I said in my point of order at the beginning.

One of the biggest problems is the “duties of care” that the Bill seeks to impose on social media firms to protect users from harmful content. That is a more subtle issue than the tabloid press have suggested. My hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), the previous Minister, made that point and I have some sympathy with him. I have spoken to representatives of many of the big social media firms, some of which cancelled me after speeches that I made at the Conservative party conference on vaccine passports. I was cancelled for 24 hours, which was an amusing process, and they put me back up as soon as they found out what they had done. Nevertheless, that demonstrated how delicate and sensitive this issue is. That was a clear suppression of free speech without any of the pressures that are addressed in the Bill.

When I spoke to the firms, they made it plain that they did not want the role of online policemen, and I sympathise with them, but that is what the Government are making them do. With the threat of huge fines and even prison sentences if they consistently fail to abide by any of the duties in the Bill—I am using words from the Bill—they will inevitably err on the side of censorship whenever they are in doubt. That is the side they will fall on.

Worryingly, the Bill targets not only illegal content, which we all want to tackle—indeed, some of the practice raised by the Opposition Front Bencher, the hon. Member for Pontypridd should simply be illegal full stop—but so-called “legal but harmful” content. Through clause 13, the Bill imposes duties on companies with respect to legal content that is “harmful to adults”. It is true that the Government have avoided using the phrase “legal but harmful” in the Bill, preferring “priority content”, but we should be clear about what that is.

The Bill’s factsheet, which is still on the Government’s website, states on page 1:

“The largest, highest-risk platforms will have to address named categories of legal but harmful material”.

This is not just a question of transparency—they will “have to” address that. It is simply unacceptable to target lawful speech in this way. The “Legal to Say, Legal to Type” campaign, led by Index on Censorship, sums up this point: it is both perverse and dangerous to allow speech in print but not online.