Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill

Damian Collins Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons & Programme motion
Wednesday 22nd January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Matt Warman]

The hon. Member is absolutely right. My point about teachers was that when they send pupils home to do their homework, pupils must of course have to have the tools to do it. The pencil is now digital, shall we say?

On that point, the universal service obligation will give people in the UK the legal right to request a decent and affordable broadband connection if they cannot get 10 megabits per second, and we intend to invest £5 billion to ensure gigabit-capable networks are delivered without delay to every area of the country. We are proud of the work that we have done, and continue to do, to support deployment across the United Kingdom, from the Scottish highlands to Cornwall, from Armagh to Anglesey, but the digital revolution is far from finished.

[Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Matt Warman]

I give way to the former Chair of the Select Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport.

[Damian Collins]

And I am standing for re-election, as the Minister knows.

The Bill gets rid of unnecessary delays in rolling out superfast broadband, which is what consumers want. He will know that in some areas of the country, particularly rural, notspot areas, one of the problems is that alternative providers—say, to Openreach—will not come in and provide superfast broadband because they are concerned that it will be overbuilt by another operator. Are there things we can do beyond the scope of the Bill—things he is working on now—to give more certainty to people who want to invest in the network, but want to make sure that they get a fair return if they do?

[Matt Warman]

Absolutely. My hon. Friend will know that the single greatest barrier to rolling out in the final 20% of the country is the risk of overbuild, which makes roll-out uneconomic and potentially makes using public funds even harder. We are absolutely working hand in glove with Ofcom on that, and to ensure that the system that we design ensures that the money—as my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest West (Sir Desmond Swayne) said, it is a significant amount—is spent in the best possible way.

Those gigabit-capable connections, by which I mean 1,000 megabits per second and above, will ensure that British businesses can retain their global reach. They will be a catalyst for entrepreneurs in areas such as cyber-security, big data and artificial intelligence, and will support innovation in operations that use cloud services and blockchain technologies. They will transform how and where people work and collaborate.

Perhaps the most exciting promise of gigabit broadband is for consumers, because as we all know, poor internet connections hold people back. They prevent children from doing their homework, the ill from arranging appointments to see their doctors and those who need it most from saving money online. It was superfast broadband that facilitated the rise of Netflix, Spotify and the iPlayer; gigabit broadband, with its improved reliability, resilience and speed, will herald the era of the internet of things, the connected home, integrated transport networks and personalised healthcare, and that is why this Government are committed to investing in it across the country.

Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill

Damian Collins Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 10th March 2020 Commons Chamber

[Bob Seely]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. Huawei seems to have two business models. It either undercuts by 30% to 40%, or it simply supplies 115% of the credit needed to buy an entire system. Either way, it undercuts and drives others out of business. I look forward to addressing that point in a moment.

The true voice of GCHQ, without the spin, is found in the Huawei oversight reports, which have become increasingly disturbing. I repeat: we hear the true voice of GCHQ not in the words of Ministers, but in those of the Huawei oversight board. For any colleagues who wish to access the details, if they join our WhatsApp group, which has well over 40 members, I will happily pass them on.

The board found that it could

“only provide limited assurance that all risks to UK national security from Huawei’s involvement in the UK’s critical networks can be sufficiently mitigated”

over time. In other words, the board is saying, “We can no longer give assurance.” This is the board speaking—it is not political spin. It added that, “as reported in 2018”, its work

“has continued to identify concerning issues in Huawei’s approach to software development…No material progress has been made on the issues raised in the previous 2018 report”.

It also stated:

“The Oversight Board advises that it will be difficult to appropriately risk-manage future products in the context of UK deployments, until the underlying defects in Huawei’s software engineering and”—

critically—

“cyber security processes are remediated

At present, the Oversight Board has not yet seen anything to give it confidence in Huawei’s capacity to successfully complete the elements of its transformation programme”.

If I received that as a bill of health, I would be extremely worried. That is the true voice of GCHQ.

[Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)]

My hon. Friend makes a very important point. A lot of this is about trust: who do we trust? Given that the oversight board has identified cyber-security risks in Huawei’s system and that it has no credible plan to put them right, why should we trust such an organisation and give it yet more work?

[Bob Seely]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. If Huawei was bending over backwards to fix its system, all credit to it—but it is not doing that. It is building a flawed system. After eight years, I have been informed that we still do not know whether the source codes that Huawei gives us are the same as those in the system it is establishing. That should cause concern.

Are the security services content? In the report we wrote last summer, Sir Richard Dearlove said that it was “deeply worrying” and

“a risk…we simply do not need to take”.

There are three additional factors that I am concerned about. First, Cheltenham was given a very narrow remit. It was not asked to give Huawei a clean bill of health or, “What do you think in a perfect world?” Cheltenham was given a specific, narrow, technical question. It did not go near the politics of fair and free trade and espionage. Secondly, and probably most worrying—