Strategic Defence and Security Review

Debate between Dai Havard and Alison Seabeck

Monday 21st June 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dai Havard (Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your weather eye, Madam Deputy Speaker—a new dawn, if not a red dawn.

Anyway, let me turn to the question at hand, which concerns the strategic defence and security review. I do not want to deal with some of the things that ought to be in the review; I would like to return to the discussion about how we are going to conduct it. It seems to me that we are talking about a collection of reviews. There has been much talk about, for example, the discussions that we have had in the past about the strategic nuclear deterrent and other things. As far as the strategic nuclear deterrent and the last discussion that we had on it are concerned, I can say as a member of the Defence Committee at the time—there are other members in the Chamber today—that we had to fight to have that discussion in the first place. We produced three reports—in order to do what? To inform a discussion; so there must be scrutiny.

We have heard about scrutiny of the current nuclear deterrent review. As I understood it—there are people here who can correct me on this—the coalition document says that it has been agreed, quite rightly, that

“the renewal of Trident should be scrutinised to ensure value for money.”

I thought that that would mean scrutiny of the process as it went along, but it appears today that it means a one-off shot. I am sure that there are Liberal Democrat Members who will be somewhat surprised, as I was, that this scrutiny will not form part of an ongoing process of deciding where we are. I thought that the debate about whether we should have a strategic defence review was a debate about possibly having one at the start of every Parliament. Over the past 10 years, we have effectively been having a series of strategic defence reviews, but in an ad hoc and piecemeal way, without taking a strategic approach.

In “On War”, Clausewitz said that strategy is more like an art than anything else. What is the art? It is the art of timing. Knowing what to do and how to do it can be the science; knowing when to do it is the question, and that is what we should address. In doing that, we also have to open the process up to some form of scrutiny. We are talking about a strategic review, apparently of both security and defence, and it was the Secretary of State who talked about the MOD’s contribution to that discussion. That assumes that we will therefore have a Foreign Office contribution and a Home Office contribution as well, with all the different elements coming together. I hope so, and I hope someone is going to explain to me the sequence of events by which we can scrutinise not only the strategic nuclear deterrent, but all the elements that make up what counts as strategic or otherwise.

[Alison Seabeck]

My hon. Friend is making entirely appropriate points, but does he share my concern about the time scale and the fact that the SDSR and the comprehensive spending review seem to be on top of each other? Which will take priority—the MOD or the Treasury?

[Mr Havard]

I could give my answer, but it is not mine that is important, is it? What is important is the question, and as I understand it, based on published coalition documents, the position is this:

“The parties commit to holding a full Strategic Security and Defence Review… alongside the Spending Review with strong involvement of the Treasury”.

[Alison Seabeck]

Strong.

[Mr Havard]

I bet there will be strong involvement from the Treasury, but is that involvement just about the costs, or will it also consider other things? The statement I quoted refers to a review conducted “alongside”; it does not say that the parties commit to “having a review of the nuclear deterrent by July” and it does not actually say that they commit to “determining the whole of the strategic defence review before the comprehensive spending review”, but that seems to be precisely what is said in the agreement. I am most confused about what the exact sequence of all these events will be, because if proper scrutiny is not allowed for, there will be a democratic deficit. After all, legislative change could be required. One would have thought that it was a good idea to have pre-legislative scrutiny—we agreed that in the past, but now it has apparently been forgotten. One would have thought that it was a good idea for the various Select Committees to be involved. That was supposed to happen in the new Parliament.

This was supposed to be the new dawn, if I may use the pun again, whereby Parliament, and not just the Front-Bench team, would have an important role in the process. [Interruption.] I am asked, “Where are the speakers?” A good question. I have been in this Parliament for a number of years and taken a strong interest in defence, yet there are some defence debates that I have not bothered to attend. Let me explain why—because I was not going to sit here for six hours to get three minutes to speak. We debated the whole matter of the replacement of the nuclear deterrent in six hours, and two hours of that were taken up with a ping-pong Punch and Judy show at the front. Back Benchers who had an interest in the matter were not allowed to speak because the great and the good came in for that debate and they were given priority in the pecking order. What we need to do is to look at the process: it is not just process in the Ministry of Defence that needs looking at, but the processes here. We need to scrutinise them, and having the McKinsey book of boys consultancy, or whatever, applied in the MOD is not going to hack that. Well, the Foreign Secretary was trained by that book, so presumably he can make a contribution to it all, but that is not going to be important for the public’s understanding.

If we are truly committed to taking people with us when it comes to a serious set of choices, we have to address the public, and we have to provide them with information—ground truth, that is what we need here. This is not a party issue. It is about information, reality and understanding. The Government are effectively claiming that, at last, we have an integrated and coherent process that deals with the issues and lays out the involvement of all the different Departments—but they should do it, not just claim it. From what I have heard today and from how I see the sequencing of events, they will not, in fact, be doing that. It will still be a case, as mentioned earlier, of working in silos, with each individual service doing its bit. The rubber heels at the MOD will do their bit, and everyone else will do their bit—and it will be in bits, and no matter how high they are piled up, bits do not make a strategy.

This issue is too important for such an approach. We are at the beginning of a period of change. The Government are setting an agenda for a generation and committing money that will be spent in 30 years’ time. The Government know that: they know it intellectually, but they do not seem to know it in terms of how process works. They can deny it as much as they like, but the strategic nuclear deterrent will have to become part of a review. Put it in; do it properly; do it comprehensively. That sort of thing happens with DFID and when we go into Afghanistan—the comprehensive approach. Well, this is a comprehensive approach with large parts missing; that is what this SDSR is about.

I plead with the Front-Bench team to look back—or, rather, to step back—and consider the timing of events. It was argued earlier that we do not have to do all of this by a week next Wednesday; and we do not have to do it in a six-hour discussion, in which most of the people here, who represent the real people outside, will not be able to participate. That shows the dysfunctional level to which this Parliament has got to, and I thought that that was exactly the sort of dysfunctional activity that we were meant to be changing. Government Members have that opportunity, because they govern the debate; there are no Back-Bench opportunities to influence that yet. Perhaps that is something that those engaged in the discussion over Back Benchers and Parliament should try to change. Unless and until that debate takes place, whether it is prompted by the Government Front-Bench team or whether it is forced on them by those in others parts of the House, it will not be a real one.