Covid-19: Response and Excess Deaths

Debate between Christopher Chope and Neale Hanvey

Thursday 18th April 2024 Commons Chamber

[Sir Christopher Chope]

The hon. Gentleman has put on record what he wanted to say in that intervention. All I am saying is that, as the chairman of the all-party parliamentary group on covid-19 vaccine damage, I receive a large number of letters, not just from my constituents but from across the country, from people who have been adversely affected. I do not think anybody is challenging the authenticity of their circumstances or the complaints they make.

I am going to close—I know a lot of other people want to participate in the debate—with one such letter that came not from one of my constituents, but somebody else. She gives her name, but I will not repeat it. She says:

“After receiving my covid-19 vaccination, I experienced severe adverse reactions that resulted in hospitalisation. These reactions encompassed stroke-like symptoms, including seizures, tremors, inability to work or talk, irregular heart palpitations, low oxygen levels, vertigo, brain fog, memory loss, balance issues, tingling, high blood pressure and more. Despite undergoing extensive examinations, a recent diagnosis of Functional Neurological Disorder has highlighted my ongoing struggles with headaches, declining eyesight, and daily seizures.

Before vaccination, I was a healthy 34-year-old; however, now I am severely disabled, unable to work, and filled with uncertainty about my future, especially with the imminent arrival of my baby. Unfortunately my situation is not unique; thousands of individuals are suffering similar consequences. Despite assurances of safety, many have been left with life-altering disabilities or worse. I am writing to urgently request an investigation into cases like mine to address the impact of vaccine-related injuries.”

She goes on to give the batch number, and to quote the rather lame response from the MHRA.

[Neale Hanvey (Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath) (Alba)]

The hon. Gentleman has just illustrated very clearly the fundamental difference between some of the points that have been made about prophylaxis and anaphylaxis. When people are given a drug that could precipitate or trigger an anaphylactic reaction, they are given prophylactic cover to prevent that. The hon. Gentleman is talking about the consequences—as described by the hon. Member for North West Leicestershire (Andrew Bridgen)—of spike protein embedding itself throughout the body, prompting a systemic inflammatory response that is not acute, as with anaphylaxis, but chronic. That reaction to the vaccine is very different from a normal allergic reaction that is anaphylactic and will be treated appropriately.

[Sir Christopher Chope]

I am most grateful to the hon. Gentleman for bringing his scientific expertise to the debate, because I am no scientist; I am a mere lawyer.

Conversion Practices (Prohibition) Bill

Debate between Christopher Chope and Neale Hanvey

2nd reading
Friday 1st March 2024 Commons Chamber

[Neale Hanvey]

I will—

[Sir Christopher Chope (Christchurch) (Con)]

Is the hon. Gentleman referring to clause 4 and line 10 on page 3 of the Bill, where there a specific reference:

“to suppress a sexual orientation”?

[Neale Hanvey]

Yes. As I was saying, the document points out that the use of the Sentencing Acts definitions is “problematic” because the definition of

“‘sex’…is not settled in law and a Supreme Court Case on the subject is pending. ‘Transgender Identity’ is similarly problematic because the concept of ‘identity’ is wider than the equivalent protected characteristic”

in the Equality Act.

The document moves on to the ineffectiveness of statutory defences, saying:

“While Clause 1(2) of the bill makes serious efforts to deal with concerns around prosecutions each defence raises serious issues in the following terms:

a. The religion defence is not a statutory defence at all because it cannot apply where a conversion practice has taken place. This means it is not an excusatory defence in criminal law.

b. The ‘approval/disapproval’ defence is vague and ‘disapproval’ is not defined

c. The ‘health practitioner’ defence is a complex three-part defence which places the ‘reverse burden’ on a Defendant. The definition of a ‘health practitioner’ at Clause 4 covers most but not all clinical roles, (unregulated therapists, counsellor, helpline operators or online forum moderators would not qualify). To rely on this defence, a health practitioner must also prove to the civil standard (i) they were complying with regulations (this term is not defined) (ii) that the action they took was reasonable and (iii) that there was no ‘predetermined outcome’. Placing reverse burdens on Defendants (particularly clinicians or similar) is generally considered to be undesirable because Defendants are not expected to prove their innocence. Legitimate clinical practice will sometimes have a predetermined outcome where a confident and clear diagnosis is made.”

I can think of examples where that would apply in clinical practice.

The document continues:

“d. The ‘assisting’ defence is unclear and undefined.

e. The ‘exploring or questioning’ defence suffers from the same flaw as the religion defence, it applies only where a conversion practice is not proved and so is not a statutory defence at all.

f. The ‘parental responsibility’ defence applies only where a person having parental responsibility (i) is exercising it and (ii) where they prove on reverse burden that the welfare of the child was their paramount consideration. As children get older parental responsibility in law is ‘exercised’ less and less. Requiring a parent to prove that welfare was not simply a consideration, but a ‘paramount’ consideration is onerous and likely impossible for a Defendant parent to prove.”

The Gay Men’s Network also addresses the human rights issues we heard about from the two KCs earlier:

“We take the view that the bill as drafted is not compliant with the Human Rights Act 1998 and would likely be declared incompatible with the convention for the following reasons:

Right to a Fair Trial (Article 6)

A prosecution alleging a parent supressed an identity by regulating clothing would require a parent to accept that such an identity exist. That is contrary to Article 6 which requires criminal tribunals be independent. It would also compel belief in the criminal sphere in such a concept while disbelief in such a concept is a protected characteristic in the civil sphere. That would create a serious inconsistency in law.”

That is very clear. The document continues:

“The bill leaves key terms undefined which is contrary to the Article 6 right that a Defendant understand the case against them in ordinary and clear language. The reverse burdens in clause 1(2) impose significant and onerous burdens on Defendants and in some cases do not amount to statutory defences at all.

Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8)

The bill makes significant incursions into family life by potentially criminalising parental guidance or regulation that touches on sexual orientation or ‘transgender identity’. Difficult conversations that parents have”—

as we spoke about some time ago—

“as a matter of course would potentially be criminalised. Further, a parent can only rely on the relevant defence as outlined above. This is highly likely to be viewed as significant state overreach by domestic and supra national courts.

Right to freedom of conscience (Article 9) and expression (Article 10)

This bill would significantly curtail both religious and political expression. A similar bill passed in Victoria, Australia, led to the domestic human rights body regulating public prayer. The fact that criminal liability can trigger from a single incident and the wide meaning of the term “supress” casts the net of criminal liability so widely the offence is likely to be declared incompatible with the convention.”

The document concludes:

“While the member for Brighton Kemptown has made significant efforts to deal with such concerns our position is that a bill based on the self-reported phenomenon of ‘identity’ and the wide term ‘supress’ might, despite best efforts, perversely fuel the very problem that it intends to solve.”

As I mentioned earlier, like section 28, the Bill would likely prevent a young person from securing an explorative conversation with even the most supportive and receptive trusted adult, due to its chilling effect. I have also raised the question of who would then provide the approved therapy.

Moving on to therapists, in a recent paper, educational psychologists Dr Claire McGuiggan, Dr Peter D’Lima and Lucy Robertson highlight the assumption that psychologists will be the ones who will guide the response and who have the skills to do so, but observe that psychologists are divided on this issue, too. They note the following:

“In response to the interim findings of the Cass review…the Association of Clinical Psychologists-United Kingdom…published a statement demanding a radical shift in the support for young people with gender concerns. They called for more comprehensive multi-disciplinary assessments and increased consideration of sociocultural factors, such as homophobia. The ACP-UK also strongly conveyed the uncertainty about how best to intervene related to the dearth of robust and high-quality data on the safety and effectiveness of medical transition, and the inability of clinicians to ascertain clearly who will persist or desist in their gender dysphoria…The ACP-UK statement was met with a rebuttal from a group of clinical psychologists in an open letter to the ACP-UK…They disassociated themselves from the ACP-UK response…Within educational psychology professions, however, only two educational psychologists have publicly referenced the concerns reflected in the Cass review.”

Apart from those two voices, the psychologists claim that there is silence, avoidance and suppression.

Silence: there is no response from the Association of Educational Psychologists or the Division of Educational and Child Psychology, and no guidance or caution, despite it being reported that educational psychologists are expertly placed to support trans-identified young people. Avoidance within the profession: it almost appears as if the Cass review did not happen at all, and that there is clear consensus on how best to support trans-identified youth. Their approach is affirmation, and that is the problem. Alongside that, there is suppression. That is being enacted on social media, where clear messages have been put out that if anyone asks a difficult questions, they are to be shut down and reported to the regulator and will face disciplinary action. That is the culture at the back of all of these pieces of legislation. That is the risk: professionals cannot become activists. That is happening in education and in educational psychology.

The paper led the authors to raise the fundamental position—I absolutely agree with it, and it applies to so many disciplines—that surely a healthy profession, a profession which prides itself on child-centred, evidence-based reflective practice, cannot continue to avoid, ignore or suppress the issue any longer. It must openly, explicitly and deeply engage with it. Disagreement must be tolerated and explored. The alternative is avoidance of the issue to protect educational psychologists from discomfort at the expense of the needs of children.

New Covid Variants: Government Preparedness

Debate between Christopher Chope and Neale Hanvey

Wednesday 28th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[Neale Hanvey (Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath) (Alba)]

I rise to address this Government’s preparedness for new covid-19 variants and other biological threats. Based on past experience, it is fair to say I am yet to be convinced that this Government are making the necessary progress in this regard. I will first address the Government’s culture before moving on to extant concerns specific to pandemic preparedness.

Hindsight is of value only if we are prepared to use the lessons it reveals to ensure that the same mistakes or misjudgments are not repeated. When it comes to calamity and loss, vindication brings only a bitter taste, not solace or comfort. For those of us in this place, and beyond, who voiced genuinely held concerns about the UK Government’s response to the pandemic, yesterday’s evidence to the covid inquiry from the former Health Secretary is unlikely to elicit any sense of schadenfreude—just a deep sense of despair and sadness.

The former Health Secretary’s testimony does not reflect well on those experts who allegedly gave him deeply flawed advice but, ultimately, he accepted that he alone carried ministerial responsibility for the “calamitous state of affairs” not only in his Department but in the agencies that reported to him, as Secretary of State. In short, he admitted that, when courage called, he failed to execute the responsibilities of his office. He is, of course, correct, but his apology rings hollow and does nothing to ameliorate the damage caused.

My abiding memory of the pandemic is the former Health Secretary’s all-too-frequent glib responses from the Dispatch Box to questions intended to be helpful and constructive. I could devote further commentary to his shocking testimony, but I suggest that might be better served by a Privileges Committee inquiry or other serious investigation.

The shutting down of dissenting voices was all too commonplace, and not just in this place. Innova, the beneficiary of lucrative lateral flow test contracts, put pressure on The Scotsman for daring to publish my valid criticism of the reliability of its tests. Despite scrupulously evidencing my assertions, with the support of esteemed academics, the editorial team could not withstand the very deep pockets that Innova had, on the back of billions of pounds of public money spent on its devices.

In addition, pressure was applied to academic and clinical staff who raised concerns about the adequacy of the UK Government’s pandemic response. Although I readily give my thanks to those staff for their ongoing encouragement and support, I am unable to name them, such is my concern that we are not yet out of the woods in terms of truth and reconciliation on these matters. That such a culture was allowed to flourish at a time of grave emergency is detestable.

Although it is clear that the UK Government must change, I see few earnest attempts to do so. I have asked too many questions on these matters to count, and I have led and contributed to multiple debates in this Chamber and in Westminster Hall, but much of that was for naught. Concerns went ignored and commitments were readily discarded, even by those few souls who maintained a position during the ministerial churn from Prime Minister to Prime Minister to Prime Minister. This may seem tangential to the matter at hand, but Government culture is central to organisational learning for future preparedness. In its basic form, the management of any infection is not rocket science, but each strand is necessarily interdependent and must be rigorous in both design and application. The continued failure to understand that fundamental relationship will fatally undermine any strategic future planning.

In essence, robust surveillance and detection should lead to prompt isolation of the threat, followed by the administration of safe and effective treatments, and supported measures, with further screening and surveillance repeated until the threat is managed. Get any step of that process wrong and the risk quickly spirals out of control. Relying on detection and isolation alone will not work. As we know only too well, an over-reliance on vaccination in the absence of robust surveillance is, similarly, a fool’s errand.

A recent briefing from the House of Commons Library set out the ambitions of the UK Health Security Agency and its Centre for Pandemic Preparedness. The CPP aims to ensure the UK’s future pandemic responses are effective and efficient, and that they reduce the negative impacts of health threats. The CCP aims to become the world-leading hub for all aspects of pandemic preparedness. In addition, the briefing notes that the HSA is working in partnership with the United States Centres for Disease Control and Prevention to turbocharge efforts to combat global pandemics and emerging health threats. Those are grand claims, grandiose perhaps, but the question remains: what does this mean in the practice of disease management and control?

In my Adjournment debate on the UK diagnostics industry in May last year, I voiced my concerns about the UK’s lack of preparedness for a future pandemic strategy, whereas economies the world over were developing 10-year strategies for the same. I applaud the efforts of the HSA in conceptualising a detailed report and a tentative timeline to execute a 10-year science strategy. It emphasises transforming surveillance through genomic identification and characterisation of new covid-19 variants, and promoting the use of innovative diagnostics, which are promising steps in the direction I indicated last year.

However, there are still clamant concerns to be addressed on the implementation of this plan and the efficacy of the HSA as an institution to deliver on those ambitions. First, the partnerships section on page 31 of the strategy report that a

“10-year strategic collaboration with Moderna will ensure we are better prepared against future pandemic threats, including through an onshore mRNA Innovation and Technology Centre.”

What is the basis of this “focused partnership” between the HSA and this single specific pharmaceutical company and a single specific vaccine technology? Recalling the Valneva vaccine production debacle and the adverse impact it had on the Scottish based company, may I ask what the rationale is behind such a partnership, as opposed to a more diffuse and cost-effective approach?

During a Westminster Hall debate in January 2022 I raised concerns about the UK Government’s overemphasis on vaccination as the sole plank of their policy, noting that even with the vaccine success delivered by Dame Kate Bingham, they had placed all their eggs in the mRNA basket. That was, and still is, short-sighted. The Valneva vaccine was the only adjuvanted, inactivated, whole-virus vaccine technology, yet the UK Government pulled the contract just before the phase 3 results were published. They demonstrated that the vaccine was highly effective and safe. That makes it abundantly clear that Scotland does have the potential to lead the way for the world in the domain of innovation and vaccine strategy for pandemic preparedness, yet we are continually and systematically impeded by the UK Government in that ambition.

[Sir Christopher Chope (Christchurch) (Con)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on his persistence in trying to hold the Government to account on this subject. He refers to the culture, particularly in the Department of Health and Social Care, of keeping things to themselves, playing cards close to their chest, not having regulatory impact assessments and, in effect, as he says, imposing good ideas on the basis of heroic assumptions that are not being tested. May I encourage him to carry on his good work?

[Neale Hanvey]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind intervention and warm words. I take them in good grace. He makes an important point. Assertations were made throughout the pandemic that things were one way and, despite interrogation, any understanding that they could not possibly be that way was continually denied. That was very frustrating, and I thank him for his encouragement.

In November 2021, Dame Kate Bingham called the decision to cancel the Valneva contract “inexplicable”. Do the UK Government still not get that? Why are they still not listening to the one person who came through the pandemic with their reputation enhanced, because she did the job she was tasked to do and did it well?

The British Society for Immunology has told me that it supports the use of all vaccine technologies where they have proved safe and effective in clinical trials, stating that a broad portfolio of vaccines is important as we move forward in providing protection against future variants. It also notes that mRNA vaccines were deployed first as they were the first vaccines to be approved. However, the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency has since approved the use of eight different covid-19 vaccines that utilise a variety of technologies, including mRNA, viral vector, whole virus and protein-based platforms. What is the Government’s strategy to harness the power of all technologies, considering their intended partnership with Moderna?