Charter for Budget Responsibility

Debate between Chris Ruane and Kerry McCarthy

Wednesday 11th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Kerry McCarthy]

I shall come in a few moments to some of the Government’s measures that have done precisely the opposite of what the hon. Lady claims. Will the Minister explain why thousands of people with disabilities—people in wheelchairs, people with chronic illnesses and so forth—were protesting outside Parliament today under the banner of the Hardest Hit campaign, supported by reputable charities? Is she saying that being hit by what the Government are doing is a figment of their imagination?

[Chris Ruane (Vale of Clwyd) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend think that those blind people and deaf people and the people in wheelchairs who were protesting today are ungrateful to the Tory Government for what they have done?

[Kerry McCarthy]

That certainly seems to be the suggestion. For some, it seems that they should be thankful as they do not realise how well off they are. The Minister has come close to saying that they have “never had it so good” under this coalition Government.

We talked in Committee about the Child Poverty Act 2010, and the Government have since published the child poverty strategy. We pressed for a wider remit for the Office for Budget Responsibility to include scrutinising the Government’s progress under the Act. Although the Government rejected our amendment in Committee, I hope that the Office for Budget Responsibility will consider the proposals again in due course, as tackling child poverty is a crucial element of inter-generational fairness. It is disappointing that the Government do not seem to recognise that. I hope that the OBR will be afforded the necessary discretion to include this aspect in defining its role.

It is highly disputable whether the Government have any mandate from the country for their fiscal policy, especially given that the Deputy Prime Minister led his party into the general election on an entirely different approach. Although setting out fiscal objectives has its advantages, it is clear that the Government are bringing in their targets far too early and cutting spending far too fast, as is demonstrated in the forecast that they will need to borrow £46 billion more than was planned last year because of their failure to promote economic growth successfully. That should prove to the Government that their fiscal mandate is not appropriate to the current economic climate and that a different approach is needed to secure the economy on a sustainable footing. That explains why it is key for the OBR to make wider reference to still fundamentally important economic determinants such as employment and growth.

Ensuring a responsible fiscal policy is clearly beyond the OBR’s remit; instead, it is this House’s responsibility to try to make the Government take heed of its advice. For that reason, the charter’s assertion that the Government

“retains the right to disagree with the OBR’s forecasts”

is a serious concern, especially when reliable forecasts will be so crucial to the forward-looking targets. The Government have made a great song and dance about how the OBR will enhance the credibility of fiscal forecasting because of its independence from the Treasury, and the charter itself states:

“The OBR is designed to address past weaknesses in the credibility of economic and fiscal forecasting and, consequently, fiscal policy”.

However, enabling the Treasury to disregard independent official forecasts would make a mockery of the fundamental purpose of the OBR. It would also lead to dangerous uncertainty about which official forecasts we can and cannot believe, and which should inform fiscal policy. That is relevant to a point raised earlier by the right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood). I urge the Minister to clarify the status of the OBR and its forecasts.

According to chapter 4 of the charter, the role of the OBR is to

“examine and report on the sustainability of the public finances.”

During the passage of the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act, a number of attempts were made to secure a broad definition of sustainability, and to persuade the Government to acknowledge that it was not enough to focus on the deficit in an insular way while ignoring the impact on economic growth, employment, inflation, and other factors that are central to sustainable finances and responsible fiscal policy.

Although the Government rejected our amendment which sought to guarantee a multi-dimensional approach to sustainability, arguing that the OBR should be able to define the concept, the Minister reassured the Public Bill Committee that she intended

“to amend the charter to require the OBR to set out how it will approach sustainability in each of its reports.”––[Official Report, Budget Responsibility and National Audit Public Bill Committee, 1 March 2011; c. 48.]

We therefore welcome the addition of paragraph 4.7 in the final charter, which confirms that

“The OBR will consider a wide range of factors and dimensions relating to the sustainability of the public finances and will be transparent in its approach. More generally, in each report published under its main duty, the OBR will explain the factors taken into account when preparing the report, including the main assumptions and risks.”

That reflects many of the concerns raised in both Houses. The reference to risks is important, given that the Government appear to be blinkered when it comes to the risks that are inherent in their deficit reduction plan.

We are also pleased that chapter 4 refers to projections of GDP, inflation and the labour market. However, the absence of any complementary references in chapter 3 to the Government’s role, or indeed the Act, remains highly disconcerting. It suggests that the Government do not consider such fundamental considerations to be part of their role. I assure the Minister that promoting employment and growth are part of the Government’s responsibilities. Perhaps, in time, the OBR will help them to understand that. More positively, we welcome the inclusion of paragraph 4.13, which confirms the Office’s access to Government information, and the omission of the definitions of “objectively”, “transparently” and “impartiality”, which are terms that the OBR is best placed to define.

We are slightly concerned about the inclusion of paragraph 4.12, which is an additional provision and which states:

“The OBR should not provide normative commentary on the particular merits of Government policies.”

There is a fine line between giving an impartial and informed assessment of the effectiveness of Government policies in achieving the declared objectives, and being seen to pass judgment on their merits. How does the Minister think that such a provision will be policed, and who will be the arbiter of whether the OBR has overstepped the mark?

There is no reference in the charter or the memorandum to the funding of the OBR, which we argued in Committee was critical to its independence, but the charter does refer to the office’s discretion in regard to the timing of its publications, although that seems to be weakened by the requirement for

“a regular and predictable timetable”.

The fact that there have already been doubts about whether reports have been published in time for Prime Minister’s Question Time reinforces the need not only to ensure that the wording of the charter is sufficient but, more important, to ensure that it is followed in both the letter and the spirit.

Our key reservation is that neither the Act nor the charter includes any means of ensuring enforceability. I have already mentioned the get-out clause that allows the Chancellor to ignore the OBR’s reports, but there is also no indication of the consequences of the Chancellor’s failing to meet his obligations under the charter. Will the Minister commit the Chancellor to reporting to Parliament following OBR publications? Most important, will she commit the Treasury to listening and responding to OBR reports in its actions as well as its words?

It is not enough for the Office for Budget Responsibility to tell us whether the Chancellor is acting responsibly—we know that he is not—and it is certainly not responsible to disregard its advice or forecasts, but neither the OBR nor the charter can do anything about that. Only the Chancellor can, and he must realise that a charter that proclaims the credibility of economic forecasting does not remedy the damage caused by the Government’s policies, and does not automatically translate into credible policy.