Criminal Justice Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Chris Philp and Carolyn Harris

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Chris Philp]

I will do my best to conclude prior to 11.25, when the Committee might consider adjourning.

Clause 20 and schedule 3 create a new power for UK law enforcement and other investigative agencies to suspend IP addresses and domain names that are being used in serious crime. Under the power, law enforcement will be able to apply for a court order requiring the organisation responsible for providing the IP address or domain name to prevent access. Sadly, we have all too often seen that criminal actors use domain names and/or IP addresses to carry out crime including fraud and malware dissemination, targeting the vulnerable. When IP addresses and domain names are being used to conduct criminal activities, law enforcement agencies need to be able to block access, preventing the crime occurring.

In the UK, the police and other law enforcement agencies currently use public and private partnerships, and industry will, in the majority of cases, voluntarily suspend domain and IP addresses used for criminal purposes. This has led to the UK being generally one of the safest jurisdictions in the world. However, voluntary suspension is not an option in all cases. In particular, the majority of cyber-crime emanates from outside the UK, where the same voluntary arrangements are not available. Quite often, internet infrastructure providers based overseas will only take action when a court order is handed down. This measure will provide for such a court order to be obtained. Overseas infrastructure providers are much more likely to comply with a court order than a simple request made by the police without a court order.

We reviewed the Computer Misuse Act 1990 in 2021. As part of that, we invited views from stakeholders. Responses indicated that although much of the 1990 Act remains effective, more could be done in cases where the UK wants to take action against offences committed from overseas. The main function of these provisions is to ensure that UK law enforcement and certain investigative agencies can act to suspend IP addresses and domain names where they are being used for criminal activity with a link to the UK. Schedule 3 enables UK law enforcement agencies listed in paragraph 12 of the schedule to apply for a court order, which they can serve on entities based outside the UK.

[Carolyn Harris (Swansea East) (Lab)]

Will this apply to illegal gambling sites and crypto casinos? Will the Gambling Commission have the authority to have these addresses pulled down?

[Chris Philp]

If illegal activity were taking place, which would include illegal gambling, then the provisions of the clause would apply. As to whether the Gambling Commission can make the application or whether it would have to be the police, to answer that question we will have to refer to schedule 3 on page 91 and look at the list of entities. The hon. Member will see that paragraph 12(2)(e) does include

“a member of staff of the Gambling Commission of at least the grade of executive director.”

Indeed, paragraph 12(1)(a)(v) also expressly references the Gambling Commission, so I hope that answers the question about the Gambling Commission’s powers. I obviously prepared that in advance, anticipating her question—as Members of the Committee could surely see!

That is very helpful and will strengthen our hand with overseas entities that might not respond to a polite request but are willing to act when there is a court order. I hope that is something that we can all get behind. It will help protect our constituents from online crime, particularly fraud, but other forms of illegal activity, including illegal gambling. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Swansea East for her work combating gambling harm, which I saw at first hand during my time as Minister for technology and gambling a couple of years ago.

Criminal Justice Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Chris Philp and Carolyn Harris

Committee stage
Thursday 11th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Chris Philp]

The hon. Member raises a concern that inventive criminals might exploit the defences we set out in clause 5(3), on lines 37 to 40 at the bottom of page 3, which he was quoting from. He is concerned that criminals might find a way of pretending or purporting to offer, for example, legitimate broadcasting services when in fact they do not. I think that a court would take a view on legitimate broadcasting services. If there was a prosecution and a criminal advanced that defence, it would be up to the jury to decide whether the broadcasting services really were legitimate.

Since the hon. Member has raised the point, I will happily take it away and see whether there are any concerns that the clause might inadvertently provide a loophole for ingenious or inventive criminals. I will seek to satisfy myself that that is not the case, but if he has identified a problem or potential loophole, I will happily come back to the Committee. I will take that away as a point to double check. We can probably rely on juries, or magistrates in a magistrates court trial, to apply common sense to those defences, but it is good that he raised the question and I will certainly look into it.

[Carolyn Harris (Swansea East) (Lab)]

On that point, it is possible for scammers to intercept texts that come from a credible bank, so they can slot in a text in the line of communication between a person and their credible bank. Have the Government given any thought as to how we can stop that happening? I feel it makes us even more vulnerable.

[Chris Philp]

That sort of interception and insertion is not addressed by this clause, which is about SIM farms and the almost industrial-scale transmission of thousands of messages. What the hon. Lady is describing is a little different. It can happen to emails as well. For example, if someone is about to buy a house, they may be corresponding with their solicitor. When the solicitor tells them to transfer the funds to X bank account, a criminal can insert themselves into the email chain, pretending to be the solicitor, and put in a message telling the client to send the funds to their own bank instead of the solicitor’s client account. Inserting messages into an email chain happens quite a bit, but that is not what this clause is designed to address. The Security Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), is very aware of the issue because it falls into his portfolio rather than mine. Perhaps I could ask his officials to write to the hon. Lady to update her on the work he is doing with law enforcement on that point, because this clause just does not address it.

Turning back to the group of clauses, it is worth saying that these offences will make it difficult—I hope impossible—for criminals to access and use SIM farms for the purposes of fraud, and the police will be given the tools that they need to disrupt them. Clauses 5 and 6 ban the possession and supply of a SIM farm. However, as I have already said in response to the hon. Member for Bootle, if a person has good reason or lawful authority, obviously that is not criminalised. We have talked a bit about the legitimate use issue already, and there are some examples provided in clause 5, as we have discussed.

I will turn to amendment 47 to schedule 1. Schedule 1 confers powers of entry, search and seizure in relation to these offences. There is an offence of intentionally obstructing a constable when they are carrying out a search—the search is to be unimpeded, obviously . That offence also needs to apply in the case of people who are exercising the power of a constable, such as designated National Crime Agency officers, who are not necessarily constables. Amendment 47 to schedule 1 is a technical amendment that makes sure that all the relevant people can exercise this power of search: not just constables, but any person who is exercising the power of a constable. It is a technical amendment, making sure that it applies to everybody undertaking those searches to hopefully find and prosecute criminals who are using SIM farms. On that basis, I commend these provisions to the Committee.

Criminal Justice Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Chris Philp and Carolyn Harris

Committee stage
Thursday 11th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Chris Philp]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for setting out his amendment and his views, as he did this morning in such a thoughtful and considered way.

I turn first to the substance of the clause. It increases the maximum penalty from six months’ to two years’ imprisonment for the offences of possessing, importing, manufacturing, selling or supplying prohibited offensive weapons when they are sold to those under the age of 18. We take seriously the sale of knives to under-18s, so the increase in the penalty from six months to two years is important.

We do not want people under 18 to be sold knives; we have heard about all kinds of tragic examples of them using knives to commit homicide. On 27 September, a tragic case in my own borough, Croydon, involved a 15-year-old schoolgirl, Elianne Andam, who was brutally murdered with a knife at 8.30 in the morning. The alleged perpetrator was himself only 17 years old. Preventing such knives from getting into the hands of young people is critical. That is the purpose behind the clause.

The clause relates to selling knives to those under 18, but the amendment speaks to a slightly different point: delivering knives to those under 18. Delivering something is obviously different from selling it. If someone is selling it, they are a shop, a retailer, and the person responsible for the transaction. Acting as a delivery agent—whether the Post Office, FedEx, UPS or some such—means delivering a parcel on behalf of someone else, which is a slightly different responsibility. That is why the law as it stands sets out in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 some measures to address the issue. The delivery company must have arrangements in place, together with the seller, to ensure that the items are not delivered into the hands of someone under 18. The penalty for delivery is an unlimited fine.

Some new guidelines have been set out by the Sentencing Council. They came into force on 1 April 2023. Organisations now face fines with a starting point of between £500 and £1 million. That is a starting point, so they can be very substantial fines indeed when applied to a corporate body. Individuals can, of course, be fined as well. It is important to make it clear that corporate bodies can be liable for such fines, as I said a second ago, because they are obviously capable of paying much larger amounts of money than an individual.

Amendment 54 raises an important issue. The case that the hon. Member for Nottingham North referred to is relevant—I completely accept that—but I think that the changes made in the Offensive Weapons Act and the Sentencing Council guidelines that came into effect less than a year ago strike the right balance on the delivery of such items. For the sale of items, however, we are increasing the custodial maximum up to two years.

In addition, the provisions of the Online Safety Act, which will be commenced into full force once the various codes of practice are published by Ofcom, will place duties on things such as online marketplaces, which historically have not been regulated. Online marketplaces have been facilitating, for example, the sale of knives to young people or the sale of illegal knives—the kind of knives that we are banning. Those online marketplaces will fall into the remit of the Online Safety Act, so the online space will get clamped down on a great deal.

[Carolyn Harris (Swansea East) (Lab)]

For the sake of clarity, will the Minister confirm that if a shop owner sells offensive weapons, the shop owner will be liable and not the person who works on the premises—obviously, they should not be held accountable for a shop owner’s decision to sell the weapon.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Chris Philp and Carolyn Harris

Thursday 18th November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Carolyn Harris (Swansea East) (Lab)]

5. Whether she plans to publish a White Paper on the gambling review.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Chris Philp)]

I thank and commend the hon. Member for her energetic campaigning and leadership on this issue over many years as chair of the all-party parliamentary group for gambling related harm. We had a constructive meeting, along with my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) and a Member for a fine constituency in Scotland—the hon. Member for Inverclyde (Ronnie Cowan)—just yesterday. We are in the process of preparing a White Paper that will set out our vision for gambling regulation in the coming months. I look forward to working closely with members of the APPG on this issue in the weeks ahead.

[Carolyn Harris]

The recent Public Health England report into the impact of gambling harm found that at-risk gamblers were twice as likely to gamble online than the rest of the general gambling population, so can we be assured that the forthcoming gambling White Paper will protect those most vulnerable to gambling harm by ensuring that restrictions to online stakes are introduced at the same level as those to on-land stakes?

Protection of Retail Workers

Debate between Chris Philp and Carolyn Harris

Monday 7th June 2021 Westminster Hall

[Chris Philp]

I will now come to that critical point, which the shadow Minister also raised. I hope I have demonstrated in my foregoing remarks that, first, the criminal offences to prosecute assaults on emergency workers are already on the statute book, and secondly, that where prosecutions are secured, a longer sentence will already be given owing to the aggravating factors I have just read out. Creating a new offence does not answer the question, because the offence exists already. The aggravating factor exists already. The issue is prosecutions, as the shadow Minister and the hon. Lady have raised.

I have some data. I am not sure whether it came from the USDAW survey or another source. I got it through the Home Affairs Committee’s survey. I am not sure whether that is the same one or a different one.

[Carolyn Harris]

It’s a different one.

[Chris Philp]

Thank you. The Committee surveyed 8,742 people, whom I believe were retail workers, asking if they had been assaulted, and many had been. They were asked whether they had reported the offence, and 87%—not quite 100%—of respondents reported it to the employer. The Committee then asked whether they had reported the offence to the police, and only 53%—half of those retail workers who suffered an assault—had done so. In 12% of cases there was an investigation and arrest. That 12% figure is clearly too low, as the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Blaydon pointed out. Putting a new criminal offence on the statute book does not fill the gap. It is about investigation and prosecution, and that has to start with reporting.