Private Members’ Bills: Money Resolutions

Debate between Chris Philp and Alex Norris

Monday 21st May 2018 Commons Chamber

[Chris Philp (Croydon South) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), who was unusually succinct.

I will concentrate my comments on the question of money resolutions, which is the topic of this Standing Order No. 24 debate. I must say that my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper) put this very well. The nub of this question is whether the right to initiate public expenditure should sit with the House as a whole or with the Government. By requiring Government consent before a money resolution is tabled, we are in effect saying that it is the prerogative of the Government to initiate public expenditure, not the prerogative of the House as the whole. It is the role of the House as a whole to consent to expenditure, but not to initiate it.

The reason for that is twofold. The first reason why it is important to do it that way is that the Government, in their general duties, have to balance the demands of spending and raising taxes. If the House as a whole seeks to introduce measures that require significant expenditure without at the same time raising the revenue to do so, we quite quickly head towards national bankruptcy. That is why we have a Budget each year in which the Government, with an even hand, balance those things. If we simply allowed the House as a whole to initiate unfunded expenditure, we would rapidly go bust.

[Alex Norris]

The hon. Gentleman makes a very compelling case for voting against a money resolution, but does he understand that that is not an argument for not tabling a money resolution?

[Chris Philp]

Perhaps I should elaborate further on the distinction I was drawing about the power to initiate expenditure. The Government rightly have the power to initiate debates and votes on expenditure. In this case, the Government are choosing—this may change, but at the moment they are choosing—not to do so.

The second reason why it is reasonable for the Government rather than the House as a whole to have the power to initiate significant expenditure is that if the House as a whole took that power on itself, the House as a whole would in effect become the Government or the Executive, and rather than having a system of Cabinet Government, the whole House would in effect become the Cabinet and the established system of Government would fundamentally cease to exist. Although this seems like quite an arcane point, there is in fact a profound constitutional principle underpinning it. The whole role of Parliament would fundamentally alter if we took the step being contemplated.