Chinese Embassy

Chris Philp Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Chris Philp (Croydon South) (Con)]

Let us be in no doubt about the threat that China poses: MI5 has warned that Chinese intelligence is actively trying to disrupt our democracy; bounties have been placed on the heads of Hong Kong campaigners; Members of this House have been directly spied on by China; China actively supports Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine; and China is infiltrating universities and businesses to acquire sensitive technology, as well as stealing it directly. Yet this Government have failed again and again to take the action needed.

This Government failed to place China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. This Government failed to properly support the case against two men accused of spying for China on MPs in this House. And now this Government have shamefully approved plans for a Chinese super-embassy. Despite everything China has done on our soil, China has been rewarded with exactly what it wants: a super-embassy that will be a base for espionage, not just in the UK but likely across Europe as well.

The Government have capitulated to Chinese demands. The Prime Minister himself said to President Xi at the G20 in November 2024,

“You raised the Chinese embassy building in London when we spoke on the telephone and we have since taken action by calling in that application.”

In other words, the Prime Minister did precisely what President Xi told him to do and then he faithfully reported back afterwards.

The decision has serious implications. Last week, The Telegraph published plans showing 208 secret rooms and a hidden chamber just 1 metre from critical data cables. Our economy depends on those cables, so what assurance can the Minister give that those cables will be secure from Chinese interference?

In paragraph 97 of his decision notice, the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, who made the decision, admits that he had not even seen unredacted plans before making his decision. How can he possibly have assessed the risk, as the decision maker, without having seen those plans? He also admits in paragraph 13 that he did not follow our suggestion to hold section 321 closed hearings to take evidence. Once again, how can the Secretary of State possibly have taken the decision in an informed way without having personally assessed the risk? It gets worse, because paragraph 8.63 onwards of the inspector’s report admits that China can legally refuse to allow UK authorities to inspect the building during or after construction—so we are going to have no idea what is being built in there in any event.

The Minister referred to the ISC. He said that someone in Government has seen unredacted plans, although we know that that was not the decision maker, the Secretary of State. Has the ISC seen those unredacted plans? It has been suggested to me that it has not. The ISC says that the risks can be mitigated, but mere mitigation is not enough. Mitigation entails only a partial exclusion of risk, and nothing is said about how to manage future developments in China’s capabilities—developments that we cannot anticipate today. The Minister for some reason forgot to quote this, but the ISC also says that the Government process was not robust enough. It says that it lacked clarity on national security, that the key reports lacked the necessary detail and that the Government do not have the “dexterity” required to handle China. Does the Minister accept those elements of the ISC report?

Others share those concerns. A US Government source was recently quoted as saying that the UK had “downplayed” the risks. Last week, the White House was reported to be “deeply concerned”, and the chair of the US House of Representatives China committee says that he opposes the plans on the grounds that Americans’ data may be “at risk”. Does the Minister agree with our American allies?

It is clear that this decision is timed to be shortly before a planned trip by the Prime Minister to China. He apparently intends to seek some kind of economic deal with China to fix the mess he and the Chancellor have created here, with jobs down and unemployment up since the election. From its timing and from President Xi’s clear demands, this planning consent appears to be linked to the Prime Minister’s imminent visit and to the economic deal. It seems clear to me that the Government are trading national security for economic links, and that this is a shameless capitulation to China’s demands.

China is spying on us. It is subverting our democracy, it is repressing people on our soil and it is stealing our technology. Is the truth not this? In those circumstances, giving them what they want is simply the wrong thing to do.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. Before I call the Minister, I gently remind shadow Ministers and spokesmen that there is a time limit, which the right hon. Gentleman exceeded somewhat.