Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Debate between Chris Murray and Paul Holmes

Report stage
Monday 9th December 2024 Commons Chamber

[Paul Holmes]

I would like to say that I have given that great thought, but as hon. Members across the House will know, after we came back in July, my tenure as a shadow Home Affairs Minister was rather short—[Interruption.] I thank the Minister, who said, “Shame”. That was after being shadow Northern Ireland Minister, shadow Foreign Affairs Minister and other Ministers, too. But I took this piece of legislation very seriously. The Government should make that decision, but I hope that the SIA is properly resourced and that it conducts its duties in the right way. That is why I think new clause 1 should be accepted this evening.

I do not want to overstay my welcome, but I will speak briefly about one of the concerns that I raised on Second Reading about the responsible person element of the Bill. I remain seriously concerned about this, and it was also mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox). Although I accept the scope of the Bill and the impact that it will have on the statute book, many organisations, particularly during cost of living crises and at this time of year, rely on their volunteers, and if we place undue and burdensome regulations on them, volunteers will simply not come forward and be in the voluntary sector. Charities are going through a difficult time. I remain concerned that if we tip slightly too much towards being overburdensome on those very small organisations, we will see a dearth of people in the voluntary sector. No one wants to discourage people from volunteering—we do not, and I know the shadow Minister and the Minister do not—but I worry that the thresholds set out in the Bill will have unintended consequences. I ask the Minister to look seriously at new clause 1 and amendments 25 and 26, which were tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford.

Many will be happy to know that I am drawing my comments to a close. However, I am personally delighted that this Bill is before the House in record time, five months after the Government came into office. I hope that the Minister will see that the Opposition are working, and will continue to work, in a constructive way to get this on to the statute book. It is sad that, in order to have a relatively major piece of legislation changed so rapidly, we had to go through the atrocities that we saw in Manchester and terrorist attacks around the United Kingdom. However, I know that the legacy that Martyn leaves is one that his family will be greatly proud of, as this country should be. This is a mainstream, major piece of legislation, and I hope that by working together, we will ensure that people who go to venues for many years to come will be protected, and they will be protected in Martyn’s name.

[Chris Murray]

I welcome the fact that the discussion in the House today shows real cross-party support for the aims, principles and objectives of the Bill, and that the amendments focus only on nuances and more technical aspects. That shows that we are all united in trying to achieve this goal and in preventing tragedies such as that which happened in Manchester from happening again.

In trying to understand those nuances and where the more technical sides should be drawn, it is useful to reflect on the legislation’s key dimensions and advantages. First, obviously, it makes terrorist attacks less likely. The terrorist threat is substantial and we know that it is changing. It has gone from large-scale infrastructure and iconic sites to much more workaday, normal locations.

The most recent terrorist attack that we tragically saw in this country was an attack on a children’s dance class. It is clear that the terror threat is evolving and we must evolve with it, which is why the Bill is important, but it is also important because it minimises the death and destruction that result from a terrorist attack. Terrorist attacks may still happen despite our best efforts, and it is important for us to plan for that eventuality and make the right decisions in order to be ready when they do happen.

The former President Obama’s Under-Secretary of State for Homeland Security, the Harvard professor Juliette Kayyem, has talked of the “boom” of a terror moment or crisis, and divides planning into “pre-boom” and “post-boom”. Pre-boom is what must be done to prevent an event from taking place, but it is equally important to plan for the post-boom moment. We must ensure that even those running small venues have done some thinking in advance of an attack. What are the escape routes? Who needs to have the keys? What happens if they send people in this direction rather than that direction?

The Bill incorporates a distinction between enhanced and non-enhanced tiers, and that too is important. In my constituency we put on some of the biggest and best events in the world. I am utterly confident that those in the football and rugby stadiums and theatres who are in charge of security planning do all this thinking anyway, but there are many smaller venues where it has not occurred to people that that is necessarily their role, but which are now in the line of fire. It is important for people to recognise that responsibility, because the public have a right to expect it. The Bill codifies what should be happening anyway. We must bear that in mind as we decide where to set the thresholds, who falls in or outside scope, and what level of burden we expect organisations and venues to face.

In Committee, it was reassuring to hear several of my concerns being allayed. One of them has already been discussed, namely the impact on business and the potential for a burden. There is no denying that something of a burden will be placed on some organisations where no one has done any thinking or preparation for a potential terrorist or other attack, but the Bill contains very proportionate elements that do not impose much of an extra burden. Its requirements are intuitive, they are not onerous, they are straightforward and they are commonsensical. As I said in an intervention earlier, they are essentially prompts for organisations to do the kind of thinking that we would hope they were doing already to avoid an attack. That not only avoids attacks, but mitigates their impact.