Net Zero Emissions Target

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Wednesday 12th June 2019 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We have set out a global ambition, and it would be absurd if we were divided within this United Kingdom on how we achieve it. We will work together to take advantage of all the opportunities, including in Scotland, to achieve the transition we need.

[Mr Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Change UK)]

This is an important commitment, but will the Secretary of State make sure he publishes the impact assessment and the cost-benefit analysis so that, if we want to bring this forward to 2045, we can continue to review it and do so? Is it not a glaring omission that Brexit is not mentioned at all in this statement? There are a number of ways in which the European Union helps us to reduce carbon emissions. Will the EU emissions trading scheme continue? What will happen to the EU funding for low-carbon projects? Many of us believe that we should remain in the European Union if we want to leverage our impact on carbon reduction.

[Greg Clark]

Sometimes I agree strongly with the hon. Gentleman, and on climate matters we have a record of leading in the European Union. The legislation that was passed and the achievements we have made are in advance of other European countries. It is within the capacity of this Parliament and this Government to make the necessary changes. I want us to lead Europe, as well as leading the world.

Leaving the EU: Airbus Risk Assessment

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Monday 25th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

Apparently it was at a Foreign Office reception in honour of the Queen’s birthday that the Foreign Secretary applied his four-letter expletive to the concerns of Airbus and business about leaving the single market. I can think of a few suggestions myself, but what four-letter word comes to mind for the Secretary of State when he thinks about the Foreign Secretary?

[Greg Clark]

For all of us, it is “jobs” that we want to secure from our negotiations—good jobs—and we are determined to do so.

Living Standards

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Wednesday 4th September 2013 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. Of course, it was the ordinary working people who were struggling to get by who were penalised by that change. We have not had an apology for that. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) talks about raising VAT. It would be interesting to hear from him whether the Labour party would reverse the rise in VAT.

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman explain how much the rise in VAT has cost the typical family?

[Greg Clark]

It is 20 months before the election and the Labour party cannot say whether it would keep or reverse the rise in VAT.

The Labour party established the beer duty escalator, the council tax escalator, the fuel duty escalator and the biggest escalator of them all—the deficit escalator. The deficit trebled in its last two terms in office and that all has to be repaid by the hard-working people of this country. The facts are stark: the deficit that we inherited equates to about £6,000 per household every year. Of course it is painful to find an average of £6,000 per household in revenues and savings, but that is the effect of the previous Government’s profligacy.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Tuesday 9th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

I am happy to take that forward. The hon. Lady will be aware that we have liberalised the rules for credit unions, but if problems are being caused, not least in East Sussex, I would be happy if she dropped me a line or came to see me.

We have great enthusiasm for the proposals that the hon. Lady makes, but what is required is not a study, but action. I make this commitment to her, and to any hon. Member who is interested in helping to establish a new regional bank in their area, that I will help them to do so. I hope that they will allow me to do that.

New clause 10 would require the Government to lay a report before Parliament before selling any banking assets. All hon. Members are aware of what the Chancellor said in his Mansion House speech about the next steps for Lloyds and RBS. For Lloyds, the Government are actively considering the options for how its shareholding can be returned to the private sector. Value for money for the taxpayer will be the overriding consideration, and there is no pre-determined time scale. Indeed, the disposal process may involve multiple stages over time, rather than a single moment.

For RBS, share sales are some way off. In line with the recommendation of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, the Chancellor has announced a review, to conclude in the autumn, into whether a bad bank should be set up for risky assets from RBS. Following the criteria suggested in the commission’s report, the review will assess whether creating a bad bank would accelerate the path back to private ownership, deliver benefits for the wider economy and be in the interest of taxpayers.

As I have mentioned, the OFT is looking specifically at the impact that new challenger banks created by the Lloyds and RBS divestments will have on competition in small business banking. UK Financial Investments has a remit to provide value for money in executing its requirement to devise the means of selling the Government’s shareholdings in the banks, and, in doing so, to pay due regard to maintaining financial stability and to act in a way that promotes competition. In doing so, UKFI and the Treasury must follow the value-for-money principles set out in the Green Book, and they will be accountable, through the Accounting Officer, to the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee, as well as to the House and the Treasury Select Committee.

[Chris Leslie]

The Minister is talking about the edifice of propriety, in relation to UKFI and so forth, but it is as plain as day that the Chancellor made the decision that he did not want that particular chief executive of RBS, so out went Stephen Hester. Will the Minister at least put on record what the plan is for settling the future leadership of RBS? When will the new chief executive be appointed?

[Greg Clark]

The hon. Gentleman knows full well that that is a matter for the board of RBS, not for the Government.

Returning to new clause 10, it is not clear that a new mandatory reporting requirement would add anything to the arrangements that are already in place. In the previous regulatory regime, promoting competition did not play a prominent enough role in ensuring that the banking industry operated in the interests of consumers. The strengthening of the role of competition through the reforms in the Bill will go a long way towards correcting that. The further recommendations of the PCBS underline the role of competition more prominently still, and I thank the commission for its contribution in that regard.

I should also mention new clause 1, which introduces a new schedule of amendments to correct a series of minor and technical points in connection with the Financial Services Act 2012. I was asked some questions about this earlier. It refers to the complaints scheme covering the Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Bank of England. The scope of the complaints scheme in relation to the PRA and the FCA was widened to cover all their functions under any legislation, and the current scope includes functions such as those relating to the Data Protection Act and the Freedom of Information Act, which already have their own complaints mechanisms. The new clause will correct that.

I hope that the House will accept that the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards and the Government are as one in their intention of promoting competition. We totally agree that placing a high value on competition in pursuing all our objectives for the banking sector in order to make it more competitive, more responsive to the needs of consumers and more resilient is very much in the interests of the country.

[Chris Leslie]

We have had a long, well-informed debate, and I pay tribute to Members on both sides of the House, particularly the members of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, for their contributions. I am disappointed, however, that the Government are still saying simply that they will think about these things and look into them. The Bill will leave this House in the same thin state in which it arrived. In protecting taxpayers’ best interests, it should not be viewed as asking for the moon on a stick to request a proper report and an options appraisal of what to do with state-owned assets. It is very important that, at the very least, we have a thorough appraisal.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Monday 8th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

Of course, and today and tomorrow we will go into some further detail on that point. Let me mention one such finding, however: the Government do not agree with the proposal to abolish UK Financial Investments. I will mention various others later. We brought forward the publication of the response, which, just before the report was published, was intended to take place just before the summer recess, because I thought it was germane to the discussions in the House and I encouraged my officials to work their best to try to make it available for today and tomorrow. It has been sent to Members.

Giving a Government response to an 11-month long, 571-page commission report in just 13 working days is, I think, quite an achievement and I thank my officials for losing a nice weekend watching the tennis to do that. I had hoped that it would help the debate.

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

This is a very interesting situation. The Minister talks about the 13-day deadline and said that we had to get this done. Correct me if I am wrong, Mr Speaker, but I thought that the Government decided when the Report stage of a Bill was to be held, so the deadline was rather self-imposed. Why on earth are we wasting this Commons consideration of the Bill in Committee and on Report when he could not get his act together either to table amendments or to get a response together in time for us to properly use our time on Report?

[Greg Clark]

The hon. Gentleman is perfectly aware that the standard response time for a Command Paper responding to a report is two calendar months. That would have taken us into the recess, which clearly is not possible, so we would have had to respond after the recess. I think he is being churlish when I have asked my officials to move at great speed to respond in a very short space of time—13 working days—to make the response available. I thought it was better for us to have it for these debates than to have it next week or in September. I am grateful to my officials for their alacrity, even if he is not.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Clark]

My hon. Friend’s ingenious intervention allows me to pay tribute to the excellent event he hosted in Gateshead at which there was palpable enthusiasm for challenger banks entering the market, especially ones with a regional focus. He and I share an ambition that the north-east should be the home of such a bank, which would do wonders for the region’s economy, with its strong, vibrant business culture. The area would benefit from the local knowledge of such an institution. The PRA and the FCA were represented at the discussion, and he is right to reflect that everyone who was present on that Friday was enthusiastic about the steps the PRA is taking to make it easier for challenger banks to come forward.

[Chris Leslie]

If the Government are so enthusiastic about the concept of regional banking, will the Minister explain to the hon. Member for Hexham (Guy Opperman) why their report, which came out at lunchtime, explicitly rules out any review of a structural arrangement involving regional banking for the Royal Bank of Scotland?

[Chris Leslie]

Perhaps the hon. Gentleman did not hear me first time round. I am tempted to repeat myself, but it is important that he realises that his right hon. Friend the Minister has ruled out such an arrangement for RBS.

[Greg Clark]

The right way to approach this is to make it possible for regional banks to enter the market across the board, which is precisely what the PRA is doing. It has reduced the demands that entrant banks must satisfy to establish themselves as a business and speeded up the authorisation process, which is all to the good.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Clark]

As I have said, I shall hear from my hon. Friend. I do not think there is any difference of intent between us; we have accepted the commission’s recommendation. We have taken the period of five years because that is the standard time for the disposal of assets when they are required through competition law proceedings.

I am certainly concerned, however, that the banks should be given a chance to address the concerns, and that chance would be lost if amendment (k) were followed. If amendment (p) were followed, we would deny banks the five-year period for divestments to be made that is typical under competition law. But as I have said, I remain open to considering these matters further during the Bill’s passage. I am confident that it can be improved to meet the concern, as I know that there is no disagreement in principle between me and my hon. Friend on the issue.

The requirement for Treasury consent follows from the commission’s own recommendation, without which the regulator could, on its own initiative, instigate radical structural reforms.

Amendment 19 is retabled as an alternative to Government amendment 6, providing for the specific full separation power. As I explained in Committee when the amendment was previously debated—when the hon. Member for Nottingham East was channelling my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester, as he frequently did—it suffers from technical flaws. That is why I committed to introducing a Government amendment to deliver its objectives.

Specifically, amendment 19 is rather vague, giving the regulator power to require a group to take steps to separate without specifying what those steps are. It also lacks provision for a minimum period over which groups must execute a separation, leaving the risk of the regulator’s ordering a rushed disposal that could be destabilising to the system.

The Government amendment is intended to address those technical problems, although I have signalled our willingness to make any further improvements that may be necessary as the Bill progresses. I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester will be able to withdraw his amendment at this stage, pending further consideration.

[Chris Leslie]

It is characteristic of the Minister, with his emollient tones, sometimes to give the impression of smoothing over all these issues. He is ever the swan on the surface, yet beneath the water line the chaotic paddling is evident from the Government’s response to the work of the parliamentary commission. That response was rushed out today, in accordance with the Government’s own artificial deadline of a debate on Report, which they could have scheduled so that we had time to consider where the Government stood on some of these issues.

Even the Minister’s hon. Friends did not seem to realise what he was recommending today on RBS—ruling out a review that might consider a regional banking network, for example. The message did not get through to the Government’s own Back Benchers. I do not know whether that is a whipping issue or whether other channels need to be reviewed, but something is not quite right. It would be remiss of me to pass over the fact that we are debating this Bill on Report having had in Committee no consideration of all the hard effort undertaken by the poor souls who had to serve on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. Hours, days, weeks and months of their lives went by, never necessarily to be regained. There was no response to that in Committee and there has been barely a nod in its direction on Report.

[Greg Clark]

This is uncharacteristically ungenerous of the hon. Gentleman, as in Committee he tabled a whole set of amendments drafted by the parliamentary commission, saving him, I dare say, a lot of weekend drafting work. I think he might want to thank members of the commission and note that the recommendations from its first report were exhaustively considered in Committee.

[Chris Leslie]

The right hon. Gentleman is right. Of course I thank them, but it is my sympathy for them that now requires us to speak in their favour. The Government ignored all those amendments. It is true: I have been channelling the wishes of the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) and, indeed, the rest of the commission. They dutifully drafted all those amendments and they were then totally ignored by the Government. The Government set up the parliamentary commission. They did not want to go for a broader independent inquiry; they wanted to take this route. They set up all the members to do all the work and have all the hearings. Their final report was more than a ream of paper— 570 pages. Not a jot of those amendments was accepted by the Government in Committee, and, significantly, the same applies on Report.

Let us be clear about this. House of Commons consideration of this Bill is not worth anything; all the business is to be done in the other place by members of the commission who are there. It will go to them in October, presumably they will consider it in October and November, and then we will get a little chunk of time at the end of the process for Commons consideration of Lords amendments. I hope that the Minister will allow us a little more latitude to have a look at what is put into the Bill at that time.

[Greg Clark]

I think the hon. Gentleman is labouring under a misapprehension. The amendments in this group are a response to the commission’s first report. The essence of this Bill is the ring-fencing of the banking system. This is a response to the independent commission to which the parliamentary commission responded. The amendments implement these changes. The Government always made it clear that the final report on standards and culture would be taken on board during the Bill’s passage through the House of Lords. The situation is exactly as envisaged and perfectly orderly. He is not seeing the wood for the trees. This is about the ring-fencing of banks.

[Chris Leslie]

Well, pardon me for daring to suggest that the Government have got this totally upside down and the wrong way round. They set up the commission and asked its members to come forward with recommendations, as they dutifully did, for which I thank them, and then ignored them in the Commons Committee and Report stages. That means that it is all to be debated in the detail that is required when the Bill reaches the House of Lords.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Clark]

It is a pleasure to respond to this important debate. First, I should like to correct a grievous omission in my previous remarks. During my paean to the members of the parliamentary commission, I neglected to include my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), who was behind me and therefore was invisible to me. He has been in the Chamber throughout this debate and his contribution is no less sterling and distinguished than those of the other parliamentary commission members whom I did mention. I apologise.

The new clause requires the Treasury to set a leverage target for the

“overall leverage of the…financial system”.

I welcome what I think is the spirit of the new clause. Problems with risk weights clearly contributed to the financial crisis; the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) made that point. Those problems must be addressed if risk weights are to have a place in the regulatory regime of the future.

I also share the concerns raised by the parliamentary commission about the importance of having a robust minimum leverage ratio required by the regulator. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) said, there is clearly support among Members on both sides of the House for that notion. We have consistently argued for a binding minimum leverage ratio to be implemented internationally, to supplement the risk-weighting requirements.

As has been said, the Basel III standard of 3% will come into force in 2018, following an observation period beforehand and a final calibration of the leverage ratio in 2017. Of course, national supervisors must be equipped to respond to new risks as they emerge in banks and financial markets. The PRA, in this country, is empowered to ensure that banks’ risk models are appropriately conservative and, where necessary, to set higher capital requirements.

As every hon. Member will be aware, the PRA has recently announced that major UK banks need to set out and implement plans to improve their leverage ratios and so to migrate further towards the new Basel III standard even now. The FPC has already been given a number of directive powers, including a counter-cyclical capital buffer and the power to set time-varying sectoral capital requirements. The Government have also made clear their intention to give the FPC the power to vary through time the baseline leverage ratio requirement, always subject to its never being below the requirement determined by Basel III.

Let me address the new clause, in whose support the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) spoke. The first thing to say is that it requires the Treasury to give the Bank of England a target for the overall leverage of the UK’s financial system; I think I understand the hon. Gentleman correctly when I see an allusion to the inflation target perhaps given to the Bank of England. I have to say, though, that that pulls in the opposite direction to the parliamentary commission’s recommendation, which calls for the FPC—in other words, the Bank of England—to be given the power to determine leverage ratios. In its first and final reports, it noted that

“the leverage ratio is a complex and technical decision best made by the regulator and it certainly should not be made by politicians.”

The new clause cuts across the views of the parliamentary commission, if delivering that recommendation were its intention.

Moreover, the new clause would require a target for the overall leverage of the UK’s financial system. Again, this is not quite the right approach. Banks should certainly be subject to individual leverage requirements to ensure that they have sufficient capital to absorb losses, but an average leverage ratio for the entire financial sector could serve to conceal the risks in particular institutions. It would seem perverse to require the Treasury to set a target for overall leverage and so create an onus on the FPC to allow some banks to remain highly leveraged as long as this is offset by smaller or more conservative institutions running with less leverage. A system-wide average, or net, leverage ratio might be of little value in tackling excesses of leverage, and it could be positively counter-productive.

Another feature of the new clause would be dangerous. The proposal for a target requires the FPC to pursue action to meet the target. It is suggested that the FPC take action to increase leverage in the system when it is less than the target level that the Government are required to set. I am not clear how or why the FPC would want to do that. The target approach seems to me to be wrong. Financial stability is not like price stability; it cannot be boiled down to a single, symmetrical target. As a recent Bank of England paper concluded:

“No single set of indicators can ever provide a perfect guide to systemic risks, or to the appropriate policy responses…Judgement will, therefore, play a material role in all FPC decisions and policy will not be mechanically tied to any specific set of indicators.”

We need to apply caution in any consideration of enshrining in law a system that focuses on one target for systematic financial stability. Goodhart’s law is relevant in these circumstances:

“When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.”

I therefore hope that on reflection the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his new clause.

[Chris Leslie]

I am grateful for the quality of the debate that has taken place in the short time we have had.

I am glad that we tabled this new clause on leverage, because otherwise we would not have had the opportunity to start to focus on the issue. I understand what the right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) said about getting the balance right and the care and caution that are needed as we move towards what we want, which is a better, safer level of leverage within the overall system. It is worth reiterating that we want to do this only to make sure that banks do not over-extend themselves and become so lopsided that when they topple over they are not able to absorb the losses should things take a turn for the worse.

I am particularly grateful for the contribution from my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), who rightly pointed out that saying that we need action either on leverage or on getting lending going into the real economy does not represent opposite poles of the argument. It is not as clear as that. Some are arguing not only that the extra capital could be lent out but, as he said, that compensation ratios, as they are sometimes known—the remuneration levels within banks—could also be tackled. Given that we are the major financial centre worldwide, we should not just be leaving this to international regulators. We certainly should not be leaving it to the European Union completely to decide these things for us. We have a duty in the UK to make sure that we think these things through properly and spend much more time on them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Leslie]

When?

[Greg Clark]

This summer.

New clause 11 concerns the new criminal offence of reckless misconduct recommended by the parliamentary commissioner. As we have already announced, we agree with the commission’s recommendations and will over the summer draft amendments to create such a legally watertight criminal offence, including compliance with the European convention on human rights. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford suggested, the commission did not recommend retrospectivity, and these provisions are intended to enact its recommendations. I hope that he will understand that.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds (Mr Ruffley) was absolutely right to point out that it was of course this Government who first raised the possibility of criminal sanctions for managerial misconduct in July last year. We are grateful to the commission for its extensive work. We will follow its advice on misconduct committed by persons covered by the regime that is being set up. The commission noted the legal challenges involved in mounting a successful prosecution, but we absolutely agree that the creation of this offence should be justified by the signal that it sends and the potential deterrent effects it can have. We have to make it clear that reckless behaviour by those in charge of our banks cannot be tolerated.

New clause 13 proposes to create a new financial services crime unit. A similar amendment was discussed at some length in Committee. I can assure hon. Members that the Government fully recognise the importance of tackling financial crime. There is to be a dedicated command within the new National Crime Agency responsible for directing the national response to economic and financial crimes. The economic crime command will have a clear remit to reduce the threat from economic and financial crimes, working collaboratively across the different sectors. Substantial progress has already been made in establishing the National Crime Agency and driving early operational success against criminals who seek to engage in economic and financial crimes.

The Government accept the broad recommendations of the parliamentary commission on each of these matters. We will be acting quickly to take the opportunity afforded by this Bill to make amendments that are legally watertight and likely to pass into law in the early part of next year, just six months after the parliamentary commission’s extensive report. In acting in this way, we are keeping faith not only with the recommendations of the parliamentary commission but with the urgency of the need to enact these reforms, which I commend to the House.

Finance Bill

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Tuesday 2nd July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

This has been an astonishing debate. I have a lot of time for the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie), but he must have been pretty dozy in recent months if he thinks that this is a Budget measure that has emerged by stealth having hitherto been hidden from view, because it was given considerable prominence in the Chancellor’s Budget speech. The Chancellor said, in the Chamber,

“I also want Britain to be the place where people raise money and invest. Financial services are about much more than banking. In places such as Edinburgh and London we have a world-beating asset management industry, but they are losing business to other places in Europe. We act now with a package of measures to reverse that decline, and we will abolish the schedule 19 tax, which is payable only by UK-domiciled funds.”—[Official Report, 20 March 2013; Vol. 560, c. 939.]

However, the measure did not only feature in the Chancellor’s Budget speech. It was the subject of a press conference, and received quite a lot of publicity on the money pages. I should have thought that the shadow Financial Secretary would be aware of that, and would know what a good reception the proposal was given in the very important financial services industry.

Many misconceptions need to be cleared up. The hon. Member for Swansea West (Geraint Davies) talked about banking, but this measure has nothing whatever to do with banking. A regrettable consequence of what has happened in recent years is that the financial services sector as a whole has too often been equated with the banking industry and associated with its frequently catastrophic misjudgments and regulatory failures, and people have been tainted unfairly by that association. Just as there are hundreds of thousands of ordinary working people employed by banks who bear no responsibility for—indeed, are sickened by—some of the misdeeds that were committed by those at the top before and during the crisis, there are people who work hard for a living elsewhere in financial services, who contribute to our national income, the taxes that pay for our public services and our foreign exchange earnings, and who have certainly not put taxpayers' funds at risk in the way that characterised the worst excesses of the banking industry.

The investment management industry in this country is a case in point. It employs 30,000 people across the United Kingdom, mostly in areas such as administration, IT and legal services. At least 10,000 of these people, who are directly employed in the sector—I am not talking about those who are ancillary to it—are based outside London and the south-east. A large number of them are concentrated in Scotland—I should have thought that the hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway (Mr Brown) would be aware of that—and in the north-west and the north midlands. In fact, 12% of the asset management industry is in Scotland. I am amazed that the hon. Member for Nottingham East—not just as shadow Financial Secretary, but as a Nottingham Member of Parliament—did not recognise the important contribution made by investment management in his city. He should be aware that the professional services sector in Nottingham is an important component of the city’s economy.

[Chris Leslie]

The Financial Secretary is characterising the Opposition as if we were somehow denigrating the investment management community. Far from it. We are simply asking this question: where is the hardship that justifies £150 million of generosity from the taxpayer at this point in time?

[Greg Clark]

I shall come to that. The hon. Gentleman professed not to recognise the problem that existed. As I have said, given the position that he enjoys, I would expect him to be aware of the long-standing damage to the competitiveness of an industry that employs people in his constituency. There are some very distinguished firms in his constituency. The Nottingham office of Brewin Dolphin has been there for 150 years, and I think that it is a vital component of our regional economy. These are valuable jobs, and they exist throughout the country.

The British investment management industry has a strong reputation internationally, yet—here we come to the reason for the reform—since 2000, countries such as Luxembourg and Ireland have increased their market share of domiciled funds dramatically in comparison with the United Kingdom. In fact, the UK’s share of EU domiciled funds has dwindled to less than half that of Luxembourg and has been overtaken by Ireland.

What is the reason for that? It cannot be because the reputation of British fund management has declined, as many of the funds domiciled elsewhere in Europe are in fact managed remotely by fund managers within the UK. It cannot be because the fundamental competitiveness of UK financial services has declined, because we have maintained, and very often increased, our market share in other parts of the financial services industry. For example, twice as many euros are traded in the UK than in the entire eurozone. One of the principal reasons for this competitive decline is a consequence—unintended, I am sure—of a change in the tax system that was made in 1999, and whose effect everyone agrees has been deleterious.

Schedule 19 to the Finance Act 1999 imposed a special stamp duty reserve tax—SDRT—on the investment management industry when fund managers match investors leaving a fund and surrendering their units with those joining the fund and purchasing the units. Because the fund manager is not buying any UK shares, no stamp duty reserve tax is payable, but schedule 19 imposes a tax of 0.5% on the fund manager, as if the shares have been bought. Of course, whenever a fund manager buys UK shares within a fund, full stamp duty is paid. As well as being complex and burdensome—requiring frequent tax calculations and returns to be sent to HMRC—there is a major flaw with schedule 19. Anyone who does not wish to pay schedule 19 can simply invest in otherwise identical funds, have them managed by a UK fund manager, but have them domiciled elsewhere, and that is what has happened in recent years. Such a non-UK fund could hold exactly the same equities as a UK fund, and that is happening in large numbers. It could be managed by a UK fund manager, but the investor would—by investing in a fund in Luxembourg or Ireland, for instance—not need to pay schedule 19.

Why should this matter? [Interruption.] I think the shadow Chief Secretary should take an interest, since he was not aware of the problem to which this is the solution. What are the advantages of having funds domiciled in the UK? First, there are advantages in terms of jobs, particularly in the regional economy. While fund managers can operate from anywhere, most jobs in fund management come from ancillary services and the professional services associated with them. These are high-value jobs in IT, legal services and accountancy support, and they are typically in the jurisdictions in which the funds are domiciled.

Secondly, there are advantages in terms of tax revenue. Although schedule 19 imposes SDRT on fund managers matching investors for UK funds, the Exchequer would be advantaged by having more funds domiciled in the UK, as that would involve the paying of income tax, national insurance, VAT, business rates and other taxes by people who would be employed here, rather than in Luxembourg, Ireland and other countries, and corporation tax by the companies supplying ancillary services.

Finally, who pays? It is pensioners who pay. Schedule 19 does not come out of the pay of fund managers. It is a cost of business that is invariably passed on to UK investors. It comes out of the returns and lessens the funds that are otherwise available.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Clark]

I want to conclude now. I hope that the House will welcome, as commentators universally have, a significant boost to the competitiveness of a very important sector for jobs in every part of the United Kingdom. I hope that, having had the explanation, the hon. Member for Nottingham East will feel willing to withdraw the new clause and await the formal consultation, which will accompany next year’s Finance Bill.

[Chris Leslie]

You have to hand it to the Financial Secretary, because he managed to keep a straight face throughout that, but I can almost hear the thumping of those trading desks across the City of London as people are delighted at the largesse of a £150 million tax giveaway to those poor, downtrodden investment managers, who really need that helping hand just now. That £150 million is the same amount as the Government saved when they abolished the health in pregnancy grant—that was not a priority; making sure that they abolish stamp duty reserve tax on unit trust transactions is where that £150 million had to go. That is completely crazy. They cannot even agree to a distributional analysis because they know that it is the wealthiest in the society who benefit from this. Therefore, we shall be pushing new clause 11 to a Division.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Finance Bill

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Monday 1st July 2013 Commons Chamber

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Greg Clark)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 6 is a technical amendment designed to give a belt-and-braces protection to prevent any possible attempt to avoid the incidence of the bank levy on the part of banks in a particular respect. Paragraph 70 of schedule 19 of the Finance Act 2011 specifies that high-quality liquid assets held by banks are not liable for the levy. This is to make sure that there is no disincentive for banks to hold assets that give liquidity protection in the event of a crisis. By their nature, the return on such assets is small, and without relief the bank levy would reduce the margins, making it uneconomic to hold such assets. It was always envisaged that the definition of assets covered would be the same as that of the high-quality liquid assets recognised by the regulator —now the Prudential Regulation Authority.

It has come to the attention of HMRC that some banks were contemplating arguing that a wider definition of assets might apply, against the intention of the original legislation. In fact, the Government do not believe that the current legislation can be interpreted in this wider way, and HMRC could and would make a legal challenge against any bank engaging in this. However, such a challenge would take some time to be heard, and in the meantime other banks could follow suit and attempt to use a wider interpretation. I hope that the House will agree that the most straightforward way to proceed is to amend the relevant Act to put the matter beyond doubt by defining high-quality liquid assets explicitly as

“assets that are eligible for inclusion in a firm’s regulatory liquid assets buffer”.

It is right that the new clause should be applicable from the introduction of the bank levy in 2011, as the Government have been clear from the outset that this was the intention. For example, the Government’s consultation document in October 2010 stated that the deduction would be for those assets

“which meet the FSA definition of high quality liquid assets for the purposes of inclusion in the liquidity buffer”.

I hope that the House will agree that it is right to move quickly to close the scintilla of a possibility that ingenious lawyers could help any bank to avoid paying its full contribution to the levy.

[Chris Leslie]

It is good to see the Minister popping up in the debates on the Finance Bill for the first time, at the eleventh hour. [Interruption.] That is not true; I apologise. He took part in Committee of the whole House, although he did not do the heavy lifting in Committee upstairs. Perhaps it seems now as though it never happened.

This is an interesting little Government new clause. Because of the hour, it would not be surprising if hon. Members’ eyes glazed over and they did not necessarily spot what is going on, but this is an admission from the Government that their bank levy has not been successful. In fact, they are having retrospectively to adjust the rules around the bank levy to make sure that they can net in the supposed £2.5 billion of revenue that the Prime Minister, no less, promised it would yield.

Let us recall the facts about the bank levy. In the last financial year, 2012-13, the bank levy did not bring in £2.5 billion, it did not even bring in £2 billion—it brought in a pathetic £1.6 billion. We should not forget that that does not include the cut in corporation tax that the Chief Secretary and others collaborating in the coalition gave away to the banks at that time. In other words, it raised a net £1.4 billion—a shortfall of over £1 billion on the amount that the Government said that it was supposed to produce. My hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann), and others in the Chamber, could certainly think of ways in which £1 billion of revenue could be put to good use. That was the giveaway that the design of the bank levy set in train for the banks. It raised not £2.5 billion but just £1.4 billion in the last financial year.

It is worse than that, because in the previous financial year, 2011-12, the bank levy raised just £1.8 billion. Deducting from that the £100 million in corporation tax, it raised a net £1.7 billion. The levy has not brought in the money it should have. The Government said that it would raise £2.5 billion, but in total it has brought in £1.9 billion—nearly £2 billion—which is less than they said it would raise.

If any other Department promised to bring in £5 billion over those two financial years but raised only £3 billion, there should and would be outrage. However, given that the Treasury hide a lot of these issues in the complex lexicon of bank taxation, many would be forgiven for not spotting that this is an absolute scandal.

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[Greg Clark]

I am glad to respond to this short debate.

I do not think that the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) listened to my remarks earlier, in which I said that the purpose of the new clause was not to raise additional revenue, but to protect the assumptions that were there from the outset. It was always envisaged, going right back to the consultation documents that the Government published before introducing the levy, that the deduction had to be in line with the regulatory requirement. It was a rumour that legal advice was being taken on whether liquid assets could be deducted that went beyond that regulatory buffer which caused us, in anticipation, to close off that possibility and to emphasise that this definition was always what was intended and that there should be no possibility of wriggling out of it. I hope he would acknowledge that that is sensible.

The new clause is not one of the measures that we are taking to increase the yield of the levy. That is dealt with elsewhere. It will protect the yield that was always assumed would be made by the levy. As the hon. Gentleman raises the question of the yield, he will recall our debates in Committee of the whole House on the new clauses that I moved to increase the rate of the bank levy, reflecting our commitment to raise £2.5 billion from it. He will know that in the Budget earlier this year, the Office for Budget Responsibility made its assessments on the basis of the proposed increase in the levy that we have set out. This year, rather than raising £2.5 billion, the OBR forecasts that we will raise £2.7 billion. Next year and for every subsequent year, the OBR estimates that the levy will raise £2.9 billion. That means that we will recoup the under-collection of the bank levy. It is a new levy and it is not always possible to know exactly what such a levy will raise. It has always been clear that the Government intend it to raise at least £2.5 billion. The OBR’s central estimate is that we will more than recoup the requirement that we set out.

[Chris Leslie]

The Minister has said that there will be a £200 million increase above the £2.5 billion for this financial year. However, we have established that the Government are £2 billion behind the curve. There is £2 billion to be recouped. The Minister is culpable for the loss of significant sums of money. He has not given any commitments on that. It would be wrong if he did not go back to the drawing board and think again about this issue.

[Greg Clark]

Our commitment is clear that we will raise £2.5 billion a year. The amendments that we have made to the Bill will do precisely that. We have introduced a permanent bank levy, in contrast to the one-off tax that the Labour party imposed on the banks. During 13 years in government, the only bank levy that the Labour party introduced was, in effect, a levy by the banks on the taxpayer. This levy is the opposite of that: the taxpayer is benefiting from revenue from the banks.

It is right that we target the £2.5 billion yield that we have always had in mind. In addition, when we spot opportunities that might be taken to avoid the levy, we should close them. That is what the new clause does.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 6 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 12

Anti-abuse measures

‘(1) Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs shall review the possibility of bringing forward measures as part of the GAAR to work in conjunction with other G8 countries to require multi-national companies to publish a single easily comparable statement of the amount of corporation tax they pay in the UK.

(2) The Chancellor of the Exchequer shall review the effect of incorporating a global standard for public registration of ownership of companies and trusts via a convention on tax transparency, including a requirement on companies to publish a single easily comparable statement of the amount of corporation tax they pay in the UK, on Treasury tax receipts.

(3) The Chancellor of the Exchequer shall consider, when counteracting tax advantages arising from tax arrangements that are abusive, what steps HM Government could take, working alongside developing country governments, to assess how UK companies could report their use of tax schemes that have an impact on developing countries, and how the UK could assist in the recovery of that tax.

(4) Within six months of the passage of Royal Assent, the Chancellor of the Exchequer shall place copies of the review in the House of Commons Library, and consult with G8 countries on their effectiveness.’.—(Catherine McKinnell.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

The House divided: Ayes 231, Noes 300.

Financial Transaction Tax and Economic and Monetary Union

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Tuesday 18th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

As the hon. Lady helpfully points out, we, unlike many other European countries, have a bank levy. The levy is targeted to raise £2.5 billion a year, but it will raise more than that this year, because we said we would increase it to ensure that it raised the amount it was targeted to raise. It is rather higher than the French and German levies.

The CBI has said that the FTT proposal “discourages important business activities” and

“undermines the ability of the financial sector to promote economic recovery”.

The European fund managers association, which is responsible for the welfare of millions of pensioners throughout Europe, has described the FTT—again, very explicitly—as a tax on savers, which will threaten the operation of capital markets and have a damaging impact. I am interested to note that the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) appears to be sanguine about the effects on savers. I should have thought that the views of pensioners and others with an interest in a prosperous retirement would concern us all.

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

I am not entirely clear about the Government’s policy. I think that, once upon a time, the Chancellor said that he was in favour of the principle of a financial transaction tax. Is that no longer the case?

[Greg Clark]

In fact, we already have a financial transaction tax. It is called stamp duty, and it has existed for a long time.

Let me say something about the opinions of markets outside the European Union. Representatives of other jurisdictions are appalled by the plans, particularly our major trading partners. In the United States, the Investment Company Institute says that the tax would “crash across borders”, and that

“All investors would be hit.”

The US Government also have serious misgivings: the Treasury Secretary, Jack Lew, has said that, despite objections from financial and non-financial trade associations and Government officials in the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, Korea and other countries regarding the global reach and negative impact of the proposal, their concerns remain unanswered.[Official Report, 20 June 2013, Vol. 564, c. 5MC.]

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Leslie]

The Minister was talking about the European variant of the FTT, but of course he was forced then to admit that we have already got a partial FTT of sorts—the stamp duty that is in place. I will discuss that in a moment, but it was very instructive that he was vehemently against the extra-territoriality aspects of the European version. Of course the EU version does need to change, and I am not saying in any way that it is perfect. His argument is, “They should stop extra-territoriality aspects in their financial transaction tax”, but our stamp duty contains many of those characteristics, and individuals—those trading UK shares and UK equities—are liable wherever that trade takes place in the world. So the Government clearly have not thought through their position on these things.

[Greg Clark]

The hon. Gentleman will know that stamp duty follows the issuance principle—in other words, the tax follows where the instrument is originated. The proposed FTT contains that and a residence principle, so it captures a far wider range of transactions, as well as this cascade point which stacks up and racks up the impact. So it is a very different FTT from, and a very much inferior FTT to, the stamp duty.

[Chris Leslie]

Why on earth then does the Minister not engage in the process, change people’s minds, get a better design, deal with this residence principle properly and let us have a financial transaction tax that is in all of our best interests, particularly across those global centres?

The Minister talked about not having objections to an FTT on equities, but he did not say anything about bonds or derivatives in that context. So I challenge him again on the principle: is he absolutely against any sort of FTT on bonds or derivatives? It sounded as though he was, but I say to him that he has to start waking up and engaging with other jurisdictions on these particular points rather than trying to stop it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Leslie]

Oh dear, oh dear, oh dear! The hon. Gentleman cannot seriously be suggesting that he is going to vote against the amendment because we have to leave out the reference to further noting that there is a Court challenge. I would have been quite happy to have tabled an amendment that did not leave out that bit of terminology, but—I am sure that you can confirm this, Mr Deputy Speaker—we did not do so because the Clerks tell me that a motion can only have 250 words. Of course, the Government use up their 250 words in the motion, so we needed to find space to insert the reference to the principle of the financial transaction tax. The hon. Gentleman should trust me: I have been considering the point and I did not want to leave anything out of the motion, but we wanted to put that reference in. I hope that with that assurance, he will think again, because the amendment is eminently supportable.

[Greg Clark]

Well, of all the ingenious ways to concoct a rationale. It is very instructive that out of all the 250 words, he chose to leave out the reference to the challenge to the European version of the financial transaction tax. He could have chosen many others. It is revealing that that is the part of the motion that he thought should be removed.

[Chris Leslie]

It is a sentence that takes note of something self-evident. Of course there is a challenge—we all know that there is a challenge and that the Minister’s agenda is to try to throw a spanner in the works and do what he can to stop that European variant of the FTT. He should consider what is in the motion; we did not particularly want to remove any of those other aspects of it. Taking note of the challenge was quite a good bit to leave out. Let me restate the case on which we must focus.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Leslie]

I think that any financial institution that could have a systemic impact on our economy and UK financial services needs to be regulated from within the Bank of England and by our regulatory structures. I hope that there will be a match between our arrangements and the European arrangements. That has been part of my anxiety about the Government’s design of the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority in the context of the Bank of England and how they fit together with the supervisory structures in Europe. We have had that debate and I think it will continue to be played out over the longer term.

For the time being—for today—the time has come for the Government to get serious about a financial transaction tax. Doing whatever they can to put a spanner in the works and turning their back on the idea is just not good enough. At a time when deficits are persistently high because of rock-bottom growth, leading economies, including those of Britain and the United States, need alternative revenue measures from continuing financial market speculation to relieve pressures on lower and middle-income households and the public services they use.

There are many lessons from the banking crisis, the most obvious of which is that the sheer globalised might of financial trading can overpower the plans and defences of individual nation states. Governments should not just shrug and accept that fate, which is why the Opposition urge Conservatives and Liberal Democrats actively to champion a financial transaction tax and the reform agenda to harness international financial markets so that they serve our societies and our economies.

If ever there was a time to seek international consensus on a financial transaction tax it is now, as countries continue to deal with the aftermath of the global financial crisis and the large deficits it created. Deducting a tiny fraction of 1% of the value of trades in equities, bonds and derivatives could raise significant sums if introduced in a concerted way across the principal world financial centres.

The House of Commons Library has considered what would happen if we applied the EU variant of the tax in the UK and says that it would yield some £10 billion annually. I do not stand by that figure—I do not think that it is necessarily convincing or viable—but it prompts the question of what could be achieved in the UK by a tax with a more modest and sensible design.

I do not decry the 11 EU countries for forging ahead on the issue—it is a brave decision for those EU countries to go it alone. Even with the participation of Germany, France and Italy, there are still risks involved, and although we are not participating at present we should not withdraw from the debate, not least given the size and importance of the City of London.

[Greg Clark]

I am intrigued by what the hon. Gentleman has just said. He cites the House of Commons Library, which has said that the tax could raise £10 billion, and says that that would be useful. Is he arguing that such a financial transaction tax would be in addition to stamp duty? Is he proposing such a tax?

[Chris Leslie]

I think that we need to have a financial transaction tax, ideally in concert with other international centres, in addition to stamp duty. That would be a sensible and modest reaction to the modern circumstances of the financial services sector. As I said to the Minister earlier, he has got to snap out of his “no can do” attitude and to wake up and realise that the public want alternatives. They want different ideas, and the financial transaction tax could offer a good way forward.

Opposition Members support the principle of a financial transaction tax with the widest global participation. London and New York City are the two largest global financial centres. Our view is that enforcement of the FTT needs both to move in concert. The Government ought to support our amendment, which is totally unobjectionable. We should not have to wait for a change of Government to move this agenda forward. We should be building those alliances, especially with the United States. That is a very important task.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Clark]

In the couple of minutes available to me, I will attempt to respond to what has been a spirited debate on both sides. It has been so spirited that the speech of the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) rather startled the hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer), who did not expect to hear anything so—

[Chris Leslie]

Good.

[Greg Clark]

It was fainter praise than good.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) for his kind words. I am glad that we were able to accommodate the two debates that he was keen to have. I welcome the contribution of the hon. Member for Brent North (Barry Gardiner), the characteristic tour de force on Waterloo day from my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) and the flinty contribution of the hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk (Michael Connarty), who shares many of the views of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone on the primacy of this place.

This has been a fascinating and enlightening debate. We have discovered that the policy of the Opposition in calling for a financial transaction tax turns out to be to call for an additional financial transaction tax. As has been clear from the exchanges across the House, we already have a financial transaction tax in this country; it is called stamp duty. The hon. Member for Nottingham East made it very clear that he proposes an additional tax on British savers, pensioners, mortgage holders and business of up to £10 billion. He said that that would come not from the magic—

[Chris Leslie]

Will the Minister give way?

[Greg Clark]

No, I only have a couple of minutes.

[Chris Leslie]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. It is important that the Minister’s misinterpretation of what I said should not be allowed—

Section 5 of the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Monday 22nd April 2013 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

The IMF is considering its view, and we will see what it has to say in the months ahead, when it issues its review. We have always been clear that, as we have advised all EU member states, keeping control of finances is an important precondition for growth. That is an important matter.

As I said, we have been parsimonious in not generating excess quantities of paper. Members will be aware—certainly my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) will be—that we did not follow the advice that other countries followed and align our financial year to fit in with the norm in Europe. We think it right to stick with our financial year and make use of the documents presented.

With the Budget announcement having taken place on 20 March, shortly before Easter, I appreciate that the timetable was tight, but we made every effort to provide early copies of the convergence programme to the House and the other place in advance of this debate.

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

What was going on with the Order Paper before the debate? I think that the Leader of the House, or perhaps the Minister, tabled a motion not to have this debate, but to kick it up to a Delegated Legislation Committee. I understand that some hon. Members, including the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash), objected, and now we are not debating whether to have the debate upstairs. What was going on? Why did the Government try to shove this out of the line of sight?

[Greg Clark]

The hon. Gentleman is aware that I am always happy to debate with him, especially on the Floor of the House, which I very much prefer. He will know that at this time in the parliamentary Session, as we approach the end of the Parliament, the business managers—the Leader of the House is here—are particularly jealous of the Chamber’s time, including in respect of the sorts of debate we have had today. They had the foresight, however, to anticipate being fortunate enough to have some time today on the Floor of the House. It was right, therefore, that we agreed with the proposal, and here we are today.

As I said, we have economically re-versioned the Budget 2013 document to set out the Government’s assessment of the UK’s medium-term economic and budgetary position. As confirmed by the independent OBR, the UK economy is still recovering from the biggest financial crisis in generations, one of the deepest recessions suffered by any major economy and a decade of hollow growth built on unsustainable debt levels. In June 2010, the Government set out a comprehensive strategy to deal with the deficit, protect the economy and provide for the foundations of recovery. This economic plan combines monetary activism with fiscal responsibility and supply side reform.

The Government are making progress. We have restored fiscal credibility, thus enabling an activist monetarist policy and the automatic stabilisers to support the economy. The deficit has been cut by a third over three years and is projected to fall in every year of the forecast. The OBR has judged that the Government remain on track to meet the fiscal mandate one year early, while 1.25 million private sector jobs have been created. Employment is just below record levels and we have kept interest rates at near-record levels, helping families and businesses.

However, there is much more to do. It is important that we understand why the road to recovery has been more difficult than was first anticipated. Although Opposition Front Benchers profess an internationalist outlook, they sometimes debate economic policy as though Britain’s economy was closed off from the rest of the world and invulnerable to other countries.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Leslie]

Unfortunately, we are not likely to have a general election until 2015. I would be grateful if hon. Members did whatever they could to bring that forward a little, but heaven knows what state the economy will be in—even by the time we get to 26 June, which I believe encompasses the spending review period. I am sure that yet further revisions of these figures, which keep changing like shifting sands before us, will be made. We simply do not know what a future Labour Government will inherit—hopefully in 2015. I will get back to the right hon. Gentleman nearer the time. One thing seems clear to me: we have to take some bold action to stimulate the economy, rather than adopt this laissez-faire, arms-folded, non-interventionist approach. Even the Financial Secretary used to disparage that, but he has now signed up wholly to it.

[Greg Clark]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree with the right hon. Member for Morley and Outwood (Ed Balls), who said:

“Long-term interest rates are the simplest measure of monetary and fiscal…credibility”?

[Chris Leslie]

Long-term interest rates reflect a number of factors. Government Members would like to think that low bond yields were a reflection of fiscal policy measures alone—[Interruption.] The Minister should hear me out. He likes to think that that is the one test. As I say, it used to be retention of the triple A credit rating, but that has gone, so something else has had to be found. Long-term bond yields, however, are also a reflection of who is purchasing them. I do not know whether the Minister can help us out by elaborating on who exactly is purchasing the Government bond yields, because the Bank of England seems to be doing an awful lot. One branch of the UK Government institutions is helping out the other branch of Government institutions—depressing, of course, that yield. The Minister should not be too proud of market expectations that things are going to be so bad for so long that our interest rates are at the ultra-low level. It is not a reflection of fiscal policy; it is a reflection of expectations of future economic performance and of the interventions in monetary policy by the Bank of England.

[Chris Leslie]

That is why some in the bond markets in the City and even the IMF and other economic commentators and business leaders are increasingly saying—as PIMCO did today in its intervention on these issues—that we have to do something about this. Demand in the economy is cripplingly bad; we have to do something to take a different course. The Chancellor’s plan is not just failing; it is adding to our problems with the public finances. We will see the state of the deficit reduction plan and what is happening with this trajectory when we see the figures tomorrow. We hear of blaming the snow, blaming the royal wedding, blaming all sorts of other players including the European Union; it is amazing how we never hear that it is the fault of those who currently occupy the Treasury.

[Greg Clark]

I have a genuine question for the hon. Gentleman again. Was the shadow Chancellor wrong when he said:

“Long-term interests are the simplest measure of monetary and fiscal policy credibility”?

When he said that, interest rates were at 4.75%. Was he wrong?

[Chris Leslie]

The Minister can ask me the same question as many times as he likes, but I will give him exactly the same answer. There are a number of reflections and metrics for judging economic performance, but in these particularly stagnant economic circumstances, I do not think that he should wear as a badge of honour those ultra-low bond yields because they actually reflect low and depressed expectations about the future performance of the economy. He knows that that is true. It is also a reason why not just Moody’s but Fitch have taken out the legs from beneath the UK’s triple A credit rating after three years of stagnation, rising unemployment and billions more borrowing to pay for economic failure. It is time that the Treasury woke up and realised that its plan is causing long-term damage not just to the public finances, but to British families and businesses as they pay the price. When even their biggest allies—the IMF and the credit rating agencies—abandon the Government, it is time to put political pride aside and finally act to kick-start the economy.

Most independent forecasts suggest that on Thursday the GDP figures will show small positive growth, but growth of just 0.3% would simply mean that the economy was back to where it was six months ago. After three years of stagnation, we need to see decisive evidence this week that a strong and sustained recovery is finally under way—otherwise the Chancellor will definitely be in real trouble. We cannot seriously be expected to ratify this Budget Red Book as our representation to the European Union, or anyone else, of how our economy is performing.

Are we supposed to ignore the double downgrading of the UK’s credit rating, first by Moody’s and then by Fitch? Are we supposed to skim over the new figures from the Office for National Statistics, which show that the average weekly pay packet was £464 in February and £480 in the same month last year? That is the worst set of data since the ONS started recording such facts. Are we supposed to turn a blind eye to the fact that youth unemployment rose by more than 20,000 last month? The total figure is now just under 1 million. Should we just forget about the risks of that lost generation?

The Red Book is a staggering work of deception wrapped in the heroic conceit of a Government who are trying to fool people into thinking that they are on track. They are losing control of the public finances because they have lost the plot when it comes to the relationship between economic growth, jobs, the economy, and the revenues that we need in order to get the deficit down. It would be far simpler for the House to reject the motion and return the Government to the drawing board to get their act together and work on an alternative plan that might actually give us the bold action that we need, rather than the stagnation that we are suffering.

Finance (No. 2) Bill

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Wednesday 17th April 2013 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

That is an option, and we certainly need to go back to the drawing board and make sure that we design the bank levy in a way that actually works. The proposition we have made in the amendment is to repeat the bank bonus tax that worked very successfully in 2009. That could be incorporated into the bank levy process—that is one option—to ensure that we get a fair share for the taxpayer, who has suffered as a consequence of the requirement to bail out the banks.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Greg Clark)]

Will the hon. Gentleman clarify whether his policy is for a one-off payroll tax or a permanent one?

[Chris Leslie]

This is where we need to look at the interplay with the bank levy. Clearly the levy should be a permanent way of ensuring that we net the right level of resource for the Treasury in recompense for the deficit that the banks created. It is possible to have a bank bonus tax that is more sustainable, but I am open to discussion with the Treasury about how that might work. Even if we netted less than the £3.5 billion that the first bank bonus tax brought in, it would still be considerably more on top of the bank levy, which clearly needs to be topped up. It is important that we look at that—

[Greg Clark]

Given that the hon. Gentleman clearly does not know whether it would be permanent or temporary, can he at least give an assurance to the Committee that he will not commit any spending to be funded by that levy that goes beyond any particular year?

[Chris Leslie]

I can tell the Minister that in this financial year it would be necessary for us to repeat that bank bonus tax. We will set out our tax and spending proposals when we write the manifesto for the general election. Heaven knows what kind of mess we will have to untangle after a further two years. It would be invidious to make decisions at this point in the cycle when the Minister will not tell us what is in the spending review in just two months’ time. We will make an assessment in two years’ time. I can certainly tell him that, from our point of view—this is a serious policy distinction—a bank bonus tax would be necessary now, particularly to help fund a compulsory jobs guarantee for young people. That is a necessity, given the unemployment figures we saw earlier today.

[Chris Leslie]

We feel that £2 billion could be raised this year from a repetition of the bank bonus tax. That would be an important contribution from those who are doing particularly well. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman moves in those circles and whether he has seen, as though nothing much has changed in the world, how high bonuses continue to be. Yes, changes from the European Union and elsewhere are being forced on to the bonus culture, but bonuses are still excessively generous to the very lucky few. There are a number of reasons why the bank bonus tax would be good not just for the taxpayer, but in changing the culture in the sector itself. The tax raised £3.5 billion when it was last tried in 2009.

[Greg Clark]

At what rate would the bonus tax be to raise that amount of money this year?

[Chris Leslie]

I was anticipating that question from the Minister. This is the Minister who has tweaked and changed the rate, I think, five or six times in various Finance Bills, all to fit the £2.5 billion figure that he has totally failed to address. We need to go back to the drawing board on the bank levy and find a way of calculating it so that it properly yields the sums that we envisage. Of course, the bank levy has to be thought through, so that we get that resource in. It is totally unacceptable to have lost nearly £2 billion for the taxpayer in the past two financial years. Just think what that £2 billion could have achieved in that period. This is not small money. There is the classic chancellorial phrase, “A billion here, a billion there and very soon it starts to add up to real money”, but this is significant resource. It is to the great shame of Ministers that they have allowed that money to slip away from them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Leslie]

The study commissioned by the Financial Times which showed the massive impact of the extreme austerity being pursued by the Government will bring home to many communities where some of the poorest people live the fact that that money and those resources are being taken out of their local economies.

[Greg Clark]

I am sorry to press the hon. Gentleman on this point, but can he answer a conundrum for me? He has helpfully said that he wants to raise £2 billion this year through his payroll tax. The Centre for Economics and Business Research estimates that this year’s bonus pool would be £1.6 billion in total. How will he raise £2 billion from that?

[Chris Leslie]

I do not recognise that figure. [Interruption.] The Minister is making various projections about the bonus pool, but even if the changes meant that we did not manage in years to come to yield what we now feel we can yield—he could equally make the argument that said, “Well, the European Union is making changes to limit bonuses,” which would obviously mean changes to salaries and elsewhere—what we are proposing would add considerably to the bank levy revenues that he has managed to generate. As we have set out in the amendment before the Committee, we need to incorporate a repeat of the bank payroll tax. It is important to recognise that, although I am happy for the Treasury to commission further research on the issue. If the Government are interested in this agenda and are starting to move in that direction, that might be useful.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Clark]

rose—

[Chris Leslie]

I want to move on, but I will give way to the Minister first.

[Greg Clark]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way; he said earlier that he would do so.

The hon. Gentleman said that he had based his assumption on calculations. The authoritative source on these matters is the CBI, which has published figures consistently over time. It says that the bonus pool was £6.5 billion in 2010 and is £1.6 billion in 2013. Will he share with the Committee the calculations on which he has based his assumption about the bonus pool, and the source that he used? If he cannot do that, I hope he will desist, both in this debate and in future, from making any spending commitments that rely on a source that is fanciful.

[Chris Leslie]

I would be happy to enter into correspondence with the Minister about the matter. However, we feel that, according to a conservative estimate —I use the term, on this occasion, in a relatively pleasant way—£2 billion could be netted for the Exchequer, as opposed to the £3.5 billion that was netted in 2009.

Our amendment would require the Chancellor to

“review the possibility of incorporating a bank payroll tax within the bank levy”.

I am delighted that the Treasury has conceded that it wishes to engage in such a review. I am delighted that there has been a bit of movement in that regard. I would quite like to ask where the Liberal Democrats are on the issue, but then I would quite like to ask where the Liberal Democrats are generally—although I shall not dwell on that.

[Greg Clark]

I would like the hon. Gentleman to be more precise about the figures. He said that last time the payroll tax raised £3.4 billion—

[Chris Leslie]

I said £3.5 billion.

[Greg Clark]

The hon. Gentleman says that it was £3.5 billion. I am sure he will confirm that he has read the analysis published last year by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, which clearly states that £3.4 billion is a gross receipts figure and that the net yield was £2.3 billion. He will agree with that, I am sure.

[Chris Leslie]

No. The figures given in the HMRC study were estimates—and, incidentally, it was not a study by the Office for Budget Responsibility. For “HMRC”, read “Ministers”. They may well pooh-pooh the payroll levy and the bank bonus tax, but we feel that there is ample evidence to demonstrate how it operated before and how it could and should operate again. If only Ministers would adopt a more “can do” attitude, rather than trying to deflect attention from the massive embarrassment of having promised to raise £2.5 billion from a bank levy and having brought in only £1.6 billion in the last financial year. Although we said year after year that the levy would not be strong enough, they turned a blind eye, and indeed they have turned a blind eye to their banker friends for far too long.

The Government have provided tax cuts amounting to £19 million in the last week by reducing the 50p rate to 45p. A massive number of bank executives are earning more than £1 million this year. A cursory study of the annual reports and accounts of some of the banks concerned—Opposition Members may wish to listen to this rather than talking among themselves—reveals that this year’s bonus results created a staggering number of millionaires. In the Royal Bank of Scotland, 93 bankers were given bonuses of more than £1 million. Given the tax cut, they will benefit to the tune of more than £6 million in the current financial year. Barclays originally reported that it had 428 millionaires, given bonuses. I have been told that only a third are UK-based, but that would still mean that 140 Barclays executives are benefiting from nearly £23 million in tax cuts granted by the Minister because of the reduction in the top band of income tax. Seventy-eight millionaires at HSBC have received a combined tax cut of £3.3 million. Nineteen individuals at Santander are receiving a giveaway of more than £800,000. Twenty-five millionaires at Lloyds are receiving from the Treasury a combined tax giveaway in this financial year of £1.3 million. So they are doing very well, thank you very much, from this Government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Clark]

I am grateful to you, Ms Primarolo, for allowing me to get a word in edgeways in this debate. It has been a most illuminating debate. We have discovered that it is the policy of the Opposition to raise £2 billion from a bank bonus tax when the pool of bank bonuses this year is forecast to be £1.6 billion. The Opposition Front-Bench team was commended for proposing an imaginative measure. It certainly is imaginative. Indeed, it is the stuff of fantasy that more could be raised in revenue through a tax than is contained in the tax base to which it applies.

The Opposition have done this before, as I shall say later, and this is a familiar debate. We had this debate in 2011 and in 2012, and now the Opposition have tabled a more or less identical amendment on a policy that was introduced in the dying days of the last Labour Government for one year only—a payroll tax on banks. When the then Chancellor introduced it in December 2009, he insisted that it would be a one-off tax. Indeed, it was not even for a full year, but from December 2009 to April 2010. But in the Finance Bill Committee of the whole House almost exactly a year ago, the hon. Member for Pontypridd (Owen Smith) revealed:

“If Labour had won the election, it may have changed its view and continued the bank bonus tax.”

On reflection, he said,

“I think a Labour Government would have continued it”.—[Official Report, 18 April 2012; Vol. 543, c. 391.]

The annual reappearance of this temporary Labour tax should remind us all that whenever Labour proposes a temporary tax, it is best to assume that it is for life—

[Chris Leslie]

Will the Minister give way?

[Greg Clark]

The hon. Gentleman spoke for 45 minutes and I have about seven or eight minutes. I shall make some progress and try to give him an opportunity later.

The bonus tax raised a net amount of £2.3 billion for the Exchequer, and that was supposed to be that. Amazingly, the Labour party had no other plans to make the banks make any further contribution to the costs they imposed on taxpayers. I agree with the hon. Member for East Antrim (Sammy Wilson) on that point. After that £2.3 billion, it appeared that the banks had discharged their responsibility to the taxpayers. To be fair and to acknowledge the consistency of the Labour Government, they showed no indication during their 13 years in office that they wanted to extract a contribution from the banks, even when the Centre for Economics and Business Research estimated that bonuses amounted to £11.5 billion in 2007.

As we know, the Labour party was “intensely relaxed” about people getting filthy rich. We have taken a different view. We believed from the outset that it was right for banks to contribute more to the taxpayer than other companies which did not pose a risk to the Exchequer and to the taxpayer. We agree with the point about fairness, and that is why the Government introduced a permanent levy—not a one-off—on the balance sheets of banks in the first Finance Bill of the new Government.

As we intended that it should be permanent, rather than—as Labour preferred—for a single year, it was important to design it in a way that would raise money every year. The trouble with a bonus tax, as the former Chancellor eloquently put it, was that

“frankly, the very people you are after here are very good at getting out of these things and...will find all sorts of imaginative ways of avoiding it.”

That was why it could work only for a single year.

[Greg Clark]

I will come on to that point, and the hon. Gentleman will be satisfied with my answer, as I hope he will acknowledge.

Balance sheets, unlike bonuses, cannot be hidden. They are more stable than bonus pools and so offer a far better way to collect a levy to benefit the public. Moreover, balance sheets are a better reflection of the risks, to the banking sector and to taxpayers, than remuneration, as set out by the International Monetary Fund in its 2010 report to the G20. That is why France and Germany quickly joined us in applying bank levies. They have subsequently been joined by Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and others. It is fair to say that those countries have not chosen to charge as much as we have. Relative to the size of our financial sector, our levy raises five times that raised by the French levy and two and a half times that raised by the German levy, but not one of these countries has thought fit to introduce a permanent bonus tax.

A permanent bonus tax would, of course, have been a catastrophically unreliable source of revenue, which is why I am very concerned that the spending commitments proposed by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) seem to be based on it. When the Labour tax was imposed, the Centre for Economics and Business Research estimated that the total pool of City bonuses was £6.7 billion. As I said earlier, it estimated that last year bonuses were £1.6 billion—less than a quarter of the 2010 level. With regard to the proposals from Europe, there might be some expectation that the levels will fall further.

A balance sheet tax is obviously a more stable, sustainable and sensible revenue base. However, to address the points made by the hon. Member for Nottingham East, balance sheets are not entirely invariable, which is why we have introduced a second element to the policy. We have specified that the bank levy should raise at least £2.5 billion a year, which is why we have clauses 200 and 201. The clauses increase the bank levy from 0.088% to 0.142% from 5 January 2014. The reason for these increases is simple: the forecast published by the independent Office for Budget Responsibility in December implied that without amendment receipts for future years would fall short of the £2.5 billion required and to which we are committed.

We announced in the autumn statement, as soon as these forecasts were published, an increase in the rate, which the Bill implements, to correct the shortfall. The March 2013 forecasts made by the OBR show that the levy is now forecast to raise more than £2.5 billion this year, and in all subsequent years. When the bank levy was first set, in Budget 2010, it took account of the planned reductions to corporation tax that were announced at the same time. Since then, as hon. Members know, the Government have been able to make further cuts to corporation tax. We have taken the view that this should not be passed on to the banks. Accordingly, clause 201 increases the bank levy to recover the benefit that would have been received from the cut in corporation tax.

To answer the point made by the hon. Member for Ogmore (Huw Irranca-Davies), the effect of these changes would be to cause the bank levy to yield not £2.5 billion in future, but £2.7 billion this year, and £2.9 billion for every year into the future. This extra revenue more than makes up for the shortfall in revenues experienced during the first two years.

Let me say something about clause 202, the other measure in the Bill relating to the bank levy. The clause removes an anomaly that would have been exploited, whereby banks could have claimed both a tax credit and a deduction for the same foreign bank levy. The view of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs is that the existing corporate tax rules prevent such a deduction, but the case law is old and we saw fit to put the matter beyond doubt.

I fear the Opposition have made a mistake in preferring a payroll tax to a bank levy. As countries across the world demonstrate, a bank levy is a better reflection of systemic risk: it is permanent, it raises more money and it is sustainable, not being undermined by avoidance. If the Opposition persist in basing their spending plans on such a flimsy source of revenue as the bonus tax, which actually exceeds what is paid in bonuses this year, then I fear that they have not learned the lesson that they surely must: jeopardising our public finances would take this country back to the edge of ruin from which this Government have hauled it back. If the hon. Member for Nottingham East had any embarrassment or rigour, he would withdraw this ridiculous amendment. I commend clauses 200, 201 and 202.

[Chris Leslie]

The Minister’s smile could not be stifled by the ridiculousness of his last comments. This is déjà vu all over again. We have heard it before from this Minister time after time, year after year. “Our bank levy,” he said, and the Prime Minister has said from the Dispatch Box, “will always raise £2.5 billion.” Last year, however, it was £1.6 billion; this year it is £1.8 billion. The amount of money lost is staggering. We will, therefore, want to test the view of the Committee. The Minister has to get a grip on this issue. He has been haemorrhaging money, and the £2 billion that has been lost should have been put to the better purpose of helping young people get off the dole and back into work. That is what we on the Labour Benches believe.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Cyprus

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Monday 18th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

The terms of the Cypriot bank bail-out are extremely concerning, and the market reaction today may be only the beginning of the fallout. While it is, of course, important for the Cypriot banks to be put on a secure footing, it is extremely dangerous to wider economic confidence for the fundamental trust of retail depositors to be undermined in such a way. This was a very risky decision, and we would expect the British Government to caution against such a sequestering of the funds of ordinary bank customers.

The so-called bail-in of banks in jeopardy does not always need to punish savers and depositors in this way. It is essential that the trust and confidence of ordinary bank customers across the European Union is immediately restored, with guarantees that no future bail-in arrangements will operate in this way. Surely one of the lessons from recent history is that rock-solid guarantees for depositors are a prerequisite to stability and recovery. EU Finance Ministers would not have countenanced a move such as this in larger members of the EU, yet somehow it is acceptable for smaller ones. It is never a good message to send to the public in any country that they would have been better off keeping their life savings under a mattress than in a bank.

It is particularly concerning that international institutions with UK input, including the EU and the International Monetary Fund, have adopted this precarious strategy, so I have to ask the Minister some specific questions. First, were the UK Government made aware of this proposal beforehand and, if so, when? Was the Chancellor consulted and, if so, what view was expressed? The UK may not be able to attend the meetings of the Eurogroup of Finance Ministers in a non-voting, observer capacity, but any informal decisions taken there still need referring to ECOFIN, so would it not be sensible, in future, to secure a right for observers, including the UK, to attend such crucial decision-making meetings, given the ramifications of eurozone decisions for the whole of the EU?

The Opposition welcome the decision to compensate UK armed forces personnel stationed in Cyprus who are affected, but can the Minister set out the estimated cost to the Exchequer of that policy? Are British consular officials providing assistance to other affected UK nationals? What is the Government’s estimate of the number of UK nationals affected by this decision in Cyprus? What will happen if the Cypriot Government and Parliament do not actually go along with this proposal? They are obviously between a rock and a hard place, as the further two days of impromptu bank holidays go to show, but surely such public brinkmanship by the EU and the IMF just creates even more uncertainty. What is the extent of British banking exposure and British business exposure to the Cypriot banks? How much does the Treasury estimate that UK investors will lose under this arrangement?

Many EU citizens expected that their deposits were guaranteed up to €100,000, or £85,000, under the deposit guarantee scheme directive, but we now learn that there was a caveat excluding special taxes such as this one. Should consumers be aware of any other aspects of the small print in the deposit guarantee scheme? Does this whole episode not show that we should clarify our own banking bail-in rules in this country as soon as possible, rather than, as Ministers are saying in the Banking Reform Bill process, waiting for the European Union to draw up the bail-in directive in several years’ time? Waiting years for the EU to tell us how a bail-in arrangement might operate suddenly looks like an unwise course to take. Surely we should get these issues sorted out here at home as soon as possible. This is not a matter where the UK Government can just sit on the sidelines, because issues that could fundamentally affect our own stability, growth and prosperity are involved, and we expect Ministers to take firm steps within the EU to reduce these risks now.

[Greg Clark]

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s points and questions. Let me say at the outset that we will have the chance to discuss these things in more detail, but the situation is very fluid; we understand that tonight there will be a meeting of the Eurogroup members—a video conference—to discuss some aspects of it, and the Cypriot Parliament is meeting tomorrow, so I think it would be unwise to assume that the information that has come out over the weekend will necessarily represent the shape of things to come. However, I will make sure that the hon. Gentleman and, indeed, all hon. Members are kept abreast of things.

The hon. Gentleman’s point about fundamental trust needing to be established in the banking system goes to the heart of the matter. It is crucial that that applies not just in this country, but across the eurozone. It is one of the reasons why we have been supportive of the efforts being made by the eurozone to stabilise the financial system there, including by the introduction of a single supervisory mechanism. Cyprus, as I think he would acknowledge, is in a particularly acute situation, as a very large proportion of its GDP is exposed to international financial transactions and its domestic fiscal situation also leaves a lot to be desired. I think all hon. Members would recognise that the importance of maintaining fiscal discipline as well as adequate supervision of the banking system is exemplified by what has happened.

In terms of the negotiations so far and the parties to them, the hon. Gentleman should know and is, I think, aware that the discussions are among the members of the eurozone, who bear financial responsibility for bailing out Cyprus, and the Cypriot Government. They have negotiated with each other and the plan can be approved only if the Cypriot Parliament endorses it. The UK understands and has intelligence about what went on in those discussions, but was not part of them and had no influence and no votes. Ultimately, this is a matter for the Cypriots and the eurozone.

The cost of the protection that my right hon. Friends have offered to UK serving servicemen and women will depend on the final state of the arrangements, which, as I say, are not certain at this stage. I mentioned in my statement that about 3,000 UK military personnel and their support staff are employed, which gives us a limited ability to estimate the context.

On the question of the supervision of UK banks and any potential exposure, the Bank of England, as the hon. Gentleman would expect, maintains close involvement and is supervising all the banks that might have any exposure to the Cypriot authorities. The hon. Gentleman is quite right that it is necessary at both a European and domestic level to agree a means of bailing in the contributions of holders of capital so that the banks can be resolved without the types of problems we are seeing in Cyprus. We have been very clear that we want to see that and the Irish presidency is making good progress with the recovery and resolution directive. We have said that if that progress does not proceed at the pace we hope and expect to see, we can use the banking Bill to make the necessary amendments.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Monday 11th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

I am disappointed that my presence here does not satisfy the hon. Lady. The Chancellor trusts his Financial Secretary to speak at the Dispatch Box. I do not know how it is in the Opposition.

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will the Minister at least tell us where the Chancellor is? Is he watching on television? Is he doing some shopping or knitting? What is going on? Where is the Chancellor right now?

[Greg Clark]

I should have thought that the hon. Gentleman would reflect on the fact that the Chancellor has many serious responsibilities and he is discharging them at the moment.

Let me talk about the process that we have followed, then I will address in some detail the particular aspects of content. The process that we have followed has sought to come up with the best possible way to address the dilemma that I described, and to do so by building, as far as possible, a broad consensus. That may not be there—yet—on every particular, but I think most Members would concede that Sir John Vickers’ commission has come closer to achieving that than many people thought possible.

The Independent Commission on Banking was established as soon as possible after the general election, in June 2010. It took extensive evidence before publishing an issues paper in September 2010 and an interim report in April 2011, on which it consulted, before publishing its final report in September 2011. The Government gave, and consulted on, an initial response in December 2011, before issuing a White Paper for consultation in June 2012. In the light of the responses to the consultation, a draft Bill was published last October and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards was asked to subject it to pre-legislative scrutiny. The parliamentary commission’s report was published on 21 December last year and many of its recommendations were accepted in the Bill published in February and laid before the House.

At the time of introduction, I made it clear from the Dispatch Box that we would table further amendments in response to the commission’s future recommendations as the Bill proceeds through both Houses. I hope that Members on all sides would agree that this has been an exceptionally extensive process of both policy development and scrutiny of emerging proposals, and I repeat what I said to the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) last month, that I will personally insist on taking a constructive and open-minded approach to the views of this House throughout the Bill’s passage. To the extent that the Bill reflects the unanimous views of Parliament, it is immeasurably strengthened.

[Greg Clark]

That was not a set of particular recommendations in the reports that were commissioned, but I know that it is of some interest to members of the parliamentary commission and, as I will go on to say, we stand ready to consider their further recommendations, and I dare say they might have something to say in that respect.

[Chris Leslie]

I want to pick up on the Minister’s statement that he wants to take this parliamentary process seriously and listen to the debates. If that is the case, why on earth has he ignored the clear recommendation of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards that there should be a three-month gap between the publication of the Bill and the Committee stage in the House of Commons? We will not have a Committee stage at a time when we can fully take account of the final recommendations of the commission. Is that not totally contemptuous of the Commons parliamentary procedures? Perhaps that is why the Chancellor has not turned up for the debate.

[Greg Clark]

I just said that I intend to be constructive and to pursue the approach that we have taken. If the hon. Gentleman will be patient, I will respond shortly to that particular recommendation.

Let me summarise the principal contents of the Bill where they reflect the advice of one or both of the commissions, before I set out the areas in which we take a different view. One of the central recommendations of the Independent Commission on Banking is that the UK banks should ring-fence

“those banking activities where continuous provision of service is vital to the economy and to a bank’s customers.”

That recommendation has attracted widespread support, and the Bill creates the basic architecture of the ring fence by making it an objective of the regulator—the Prudential Regulation Authority and, if necessary, the Financial Conduct Authority—to secure the continuity of core services by preventing ring-fenced bodies from exposing themselves to excessive risks, by protecting them from external risks, and by ensuring that, in the event of failure, core activities can carry on uninterrupted, the so-called resolution objective. The core activities are defined, as recommended by Vickers, as the taking of retail and small and medium-sized enterprise deposits and overdrafts, but they can be added to if required through secondary legislation.

In response to the parliamentary commission’s recommendations, the Bill is now clear that to be ring-fenced means that the five so-called Haldane principles of separation should be followed, namely that the ring-fenced bodies should have separate governances, including boards; remuneration arrangements; treasury and balance sheet management; risk management; and human resource management. As the parliamentary commission has also recommended, directors of banks will be held personally responsible for ensuring that the ring-fence rules are obeyed. The parliamentary commission also made a recommendation that the ring fence should be electrified. That is to say that, if the rules are breached, the banks should be forcibly split.

While the Bill is before the House, the Government will bring forward amendments to provide a power to require the full separation of a banking group, where, in the opinion of the regulator and the Government, such separation is required to ensure the independence of the ring-fenced bank. As hon. Members know, the parliamentary commission made a further recommendation for a power to trigger separation of the entire system, which I will come to shortly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Clark]

I cannot do that, but I repeat my commitment that this House will have the opportunity fully to consider the amendments proposed by my hon. Friend’s commission. He has not yet produced his report, so we do not know what he has in mind, but I have been as clear as I can at the Dispatch Box that there is no intent to avoid scrutiny; quite the opposite.

[Chris Leslie]

The Minister talks in very emollient tones, because he likes to sound moderate, but this is a series of instances of contempt for the House of Commons’ powers and our ability to scrutinise the Bill. The Government ignore the recommendation of the parliamentary commission, they then try to whisk the thing out of Committee before we have even had a chance to consider the recommendations of the commission, and now, when asked for a mere two days on Report, the Minister will not even give that commitment. The Chancellor is not here, either. In what seriousness do the Government hold this Bill? There is a sense that it is just part of a rubber-stamping exercise for them.

[Greg Clark]

The hon. Gentleman will discover that through our debates in Committee he will have plenty of opportunity to scrutinise the Bill. When we have the commission’s recommendations, if we think that they need more than a day on Report then I will make the case for that. Whatever happens, I will ensure that this House has the opportunity fully to consider these matters.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Leslie]

Hindsight is a wonderful thing. All I say to the Father of the House is that we are now in a situation where we have a new Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Financial Policy Committee and the Monetary Policy Committee. The Bank of England is of course still involved, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer will still have a number of powers. He may not have realised it, but the Government’s changes have not exactly simplified the regulatory environment. I digress. That was the Financial Services Act 2012, but we are addressing the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill in 2013.

[Greg Clark]

When I took over my role, I read the Hansard report of the November 1997 debate. I commend it to the hon. Gentleman because it makes it absolutely clear that we opposed the creation of the FSA in the form proposed because we predicted it would be a mess. The then shadow Chancellor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr Lilley), said:

“The process of setting up the FSA may cause regulators to take their eye off the ball, while spivs and crooks have a field day.”—[Official Report, 11 November 1997; Vol. 300, c. 732.]

That is exactly what happened.

[Chris Leslie]

Conservatives have a tendency to try and rewrite history, but this really takes the biscuit. If the Minister is seriously saying that he would have preferred to have stayed with a non-statutory regulatory arrangement, which was the option available, he should stand up and admit it. He often asks where the apologies are, but we have accepted that we should have adopted a more prudential approach to regulation than the arrangements in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. It is now equally important, however, that Conservative Members recognise that regulation is a good thing, that we need regulation of the financial services sector and that they were wrong to prefer a self-regulatory, non-statutory environment. Until they do that, they will never really confront the demons that still exist within the Conservative party’s philosophy.

Financial Services and Markets

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Wednesday 27th February 2013 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

As my hon. Friend knows, that has been a matter of much debate in the Treasury Committee and the Banking Commission, both of which he chairs. It is appropriate to have regard to the international debate on this. There is a difference between the debate on the leverage ratio and the two other tools that we will move on to talk about, the sectoral capital requirements and the counter-cyclical buffer, over which, it has been established internationally, there should be domestic discretion. We are not at that stage with the leverage ratio, as he will know, but I can certainly confirm to the House that the Government’s intention is to provide the FPC with a time-varying leverage ratio by 2018, subject to a review by the European Banking Authority, which is planned for 2017.

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

I am intrigued by the Minister’s 2018 commitment, but would it not make good and prudent legislative sense to take the opportunity in the draft Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill, which will arrive in the House imminently, to insert provisions that would allow the leverage ratio to be triggered sooner if there is a delay in the international discussions?

[Greg Clark]

We do not expect such a delay. The discussions are continuing and are live, as we know, so we do not expect to need that, but of course it is open to the House as it debates the Bill, presumably at some length, to keep that under review as the discussions progress.

The statutory instrument we are debating today relates specifically to the ability to set sectoral capital requirements. I will deal with that tool first before briefly covering the others. The interim FPC recommended that the statutory FPC should have a power of direction to vary financial institutions’ capital requirements against exposures to specific sectors over time. It argued that the over-exuberance that precedes crises often begins in specific sectors before spreading further. The Government agree that this targeted approach would allow these risks to be managed more effectively and proportionately than raising capital requirements more generally. The FPC has stated that it would wish to avoid what it terms an

“overly activist, fine-tuning approach”,

which should limit this risk. However, there may be times when using the tools in a granular way may be necessary, so the Government will keep the use of this tool under review to ensure that it is being used effectively and proportionately. There is also a risk that imposing sector-specific requirements could displace excessive risk into other sectors, so the FPC will need to monitor carefully the impact of any policy interventions using this tool and perhaps consider adjusting more general capital requirements if displacement turns out to be a significant problem.

I should take this opportunity to bring to the House’s attention the one change that the Government have made to the order following the consultation that we undertook on the draft version that was made available for that purpose. The current order excludes investment firms that are not regulated by the PRA from the FPC’s power. This will ensure that systemically important firms are captured while smaller firms that are not systemically important will not be subject to additional requirements.

Let me discuss briefly the other macro-prudential tools that the Government intend to give the FPC: the role of setting the UK’s counter-cyclical capital buffer; and, as we have briefly discussed, the power to intervene to limit leverage ratios. These are not covered by the draft order, but it might be useful if I provide a bit of context to the debate. The counter-cyclical capital buffer is part of the Basel III agreement, and it will be implemented in Europe by the capital requirements directive, commonly known as CRD 4. The directive aims to ensure that banking sector capital requirements take account of the macro-financial environment in which banks operate. It will be deployed by national jurisdictions when excess aggregate credit growth is judged to be associated with a build-up of system-wide risk to ensure that the banking system has a buffer of capital to protect it against future losses. Banks, building societies and larger investment firms will be required to build up capital during upturns. This will help to increase the resilience of the financial system and might also dampen the credit cycle. Unwinding these requirements in the downturn once the threat has passed might help to mitigate contractions in the supply of lending.

It is clear that with its macro-prudential focus, the FPC will be the body best placed to determine the level of the counter-cyclical capital buffer. This was supported by the results of the Government’s consultation. As the counter-cyclical capital buffer is expected to be provided for in CRD 4, on which discussions are continuing, the simplest way to incorporate it into UK law is via regulations made under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 to transpose into UK law the provisions of CRD 4 which relate to the counter-cyclical capital buffer.

It is vital that the FPC’s decisions in relation to the counter-cyclical capital buffer should be subject to comparable procedural and reporting requirements to the FPC’s other tools. Therefore, in addition to the requirements imposed by the EU legislation, the Government intend to ensure that the counter-cyclical capital buffer will be subject to the same transparency requirements as other FPC decisions, with a summary of the FPC’s discussions when taking decisions on the buffer set out in the FPC’s meeting records, and the FPC’s use of the buffer covered in the biannual financial stability report. The Government will make any necessary changes to achieve this in the regulations that incorporate CRD 4 into UK law.

The interim FPC recommended that the statutory FPC should have a power of direction to set and vary a minimum leverage ratio. The Government think that a leverage ratio could indeed be a useful macro-prudential tool for the FPC. The unweighted nature of the measure would guard against risk weights underestimating the true riskiness of assets and provide a directly comparable figure across firms. Firms’ leverage ratios were a useful indicator of failure during the last crisis, and the period immediately preceding the crisis was characterised by sharp increases in leverage. The Government strongly support the inclusion of a backstop leverage ratio in the EU prudential toolkit and consider it an essential measure to ensure that leverage remains at sustainable levels. It is clear that there is some way to go, but the review in 2017 will address that, and it will not be implemented across the EU until 2018, so we have some time to consider it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Clark]

Let me go on to describe some of the other elements involved. I said that we had committed to bringing to the House particular measures that could be debated. The hon. Gentleman has anticipated one such possibility. He was correct in suggesting that, if we had been proposing a power over the loan-to-value rate, the House would have been substantially more occupied than it is at the moment, that such a matter would engage Members and that there would have been a fuller debate on the matter. However, this is not the only mechanism by which scrutiny can take place.

The secondary objective of the Financial Policy Committee has been mentioned. Through the scrutiny of the House and of the hon. Gentleman’s Committee, that objective has been set up, and it means that the FPC’s duty to support the court of the Bank of England in achieving its financial stability objective is subject to supporting the policy of Her Majesty’s Government, including their objectives for growth and employment. That is significant. That power is there for a reason, and we expect it to be used. It requires the Chancellor of the day to write annually to the FPC to set out what he expects it to have regard to in making its decisions. The House will have the ability through that mechanism to scrutinise and take a view on whether Ministers—in this case, the Chancellor—are giving the right directions to the Committee in terms of what it should understand the Government’s economic objectives to be. I believe that the mention of growth and employment will address one of the concerns that has been raised.

It is worth noting that the measures we are talking about relate to peacetime; they are not for use in a crisis. The Chancellor will retain the ability to give directions to the Bank in a time of financial crisis, for example, when that is in the public interest. The measures before us are for use in the normal course of events.

There will also be a requirement on the FPC to account for its decisions. It will appear before the Treasury Committee after it has held its meetings and published its reports, and it will have to explain the basis of its recommendations and directions. It has made a commitment to setting out in advance the types of indicators that it will bring to bear on those questions, so there will be no arbitrary use of discretionary powers. The committee will seek to be predictable in regard to the types of instrument that it will use.

On the format of statutory instruments, the parliamentary Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee will take a view on whether the choice of procedure is appropriate. I think that the hon. Gentleman will approve of the fact that the affirmative resolution procedure is to be used in these circumstances.

Let me address the hon. Gentleman’s point about residential property, which is of course a matter of interest to our constituents. It has been pointed out that all these matters have a bearing on our constituents. I think he would acknowledge that any review of the recent financial crisis—and, indeed, of financial crises around the world—would note that housing bubbles are often associated with the kind of over-exuberance and excess that contributes to financial instability, which the arrangements that we have in place are designed to address. It is appropriate for the powers to be there. These sectors have been debated at the European level, and this is one of a limited number of sectors for which it is anticipated that the national regulators should have a sectoral power.

I think it important to note that the power to make recommendations and give directions is available to the FPC, but that there is no requirement that it should get in the business of micro-managing these sectors. It seems to make sense, on the basis of history, for this initial set of sectors to be included. The powers are there, as I say, but there has been some debate about whether they should be more specific in respect of loan-to-value powers, which is not part of the proposals. It is no part of the Government’s purpose, as the hon. Gentleman rightly anticipates, to prevent what we hope will be an increase in home ownership and house building as a result of the order.

Let me deal with some points raised by the hon. Member for Nottingham East. He forcefully made the point that we need an explanation from the Financial Policy Committee of why it is using its powers. This should not take place in a vacuum or in secret. I completely agree, and this is provided for in the Financial Services Act, as the hon. Gentleman, a veteran of the Committee, knows. Section 9S requires the FPC to give an explanation of the reasons for its use of direction powers, and the explanation needs to be published in the financial stability report and it needs to account to Parliament for its use of the powers.

Let me pick up one of the hon. Gentleman’s earlier points, which was not quite right. He mentioned credit card repayments, for example. The powers provided for in the statutory instrument do not go into that level of detail, and the FPC will not have those powers and they are certainly not in this order—and neither are the loan-to-value powers available.

The secondary objective addresses the hon. Gentleman’s point about the necessary symmetry of these arrangements. Macro-prudential regulation is certainly about damping down excessive exuberance when it takes place, but on the other side of the cycle, by retreating from some of the provisions by varying requirements downwards, it also has the power to reverse the dampening of those sectors.

[Chris Leslie]

I am sorry, but as I read the order, I note that it says that UK firms can be required to maintain “additional” funds, but there seems to be no provision to dial it down the other way. Have I misread the order?

[Greg Clark]

What I am referring to is the fact that if the requirements have been dialled up, they can be dialled down. That will be required. The fact that they are time varying precisely reflects the different conditions that will apply from time to time.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned the exemption for small firms, and he was quite right to raise the issue of what proportion of mortgages might be covered. To be clear— when he sees my remarks, he will be clear—the exemption applies to small investment firms. It is still the case that all deposit takers and banks, including building societies, will be within the scope of the power. That contribution will be recognised.

As to whether we should take the power—either through the order or, more likely, through the Banking Reform Bill or previous legislation on the leverage ratio, which is a live issue—it is already possible by order under the Financial Services Act to make provisions to vary the leverage ratio. Such an order would, of course, be subject to prior parliamentary approval. There is no requirement for additional primary legislation; the powers will be there at the time we expect to bring the provisions into force.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the penalties for contravening the views of the Financial Policy Committee. The committee makes recommendations to the regulators, and it is the regulators—the PRA and the FCA—who are responsible for implementing them. The hon. Gentleman will know—again, from the Financial Services Act—that considerable powers are available to the FCA and the PRA, in the form of regulatory sanctions, constrictions on firms’ activities, and unlimited fines. That is why the sector regulators have the powers of direction.

The hon. Gentleman raised a geographical point, asking whether the sectoral powers could be used to specify a particular area. The answer is that they could, if there were evidence of a particular problem in a particular area. However, as he will recall, there is a general requirement for the FPC to act proportionately, and one of the principles that has been agreed is that it should not become involved in the micro-management of these matters or in close detail. I consider it unlikely that it would make recommendations on a narrow geographical basis.

I hope that I have responded adequately to the points that have been made this evening. I gather from the Whips that I may have done so to the satisfaction of the House, and I hope that it will agree to the recommendations.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the draft Bank of England Act 1998 (Macro-prudential Measures) Order 2013, which was laid before this House on 24 January, be approved.

Financial Services

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Wednesday 6th February 2013 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

This is a very serious setback for RBS on its road to recovery, and another stain on the reputation of UK banking. It is not just a case of excessive risk-taking by investment bankers; it is about the corrupt manipulation, until quite recently, of what should have been a trustworthy and independent index determining the inter-bank interest rate.

How much more evidence does the Chancellor need before he can agree to truly radical reforms for our banking system? Yet again, we have seen an appalling saga of interest rate fixing—not confined to one bank, but across the whole industry—but the Government still refuse to take a back-stop power for full separation in case ring-fencing does not work. Just what will it take for the penny to drop? Why will the Financial Secretary not accept fully what we have been saying since last year, namely that the Government must implement both the letter and the spirit of the Vickers recommendations and that we must see fundamental culture change? If that does not happen, the banks will need to be fully split up.

Those doing business with the banks will be astonished by these revelations. Will the Financial Secretary explain in simple terms how ordinary companies and customers with mortgages or savings linked to LIBOR will ever find out if they have been fleeced as a result of this fraudulent activity? If those customers have lost out because of LIBOR rate rigging, how and when will they get their money back?

Despite the Financial Secretary’s claim that the Government reacted swiftly, does he regret not getting ahead of the scandal as it emerged last year? On LIBOR, I asked his predecessor, the hon. Member for Fareham (Mr Hoban), during a Financial Services Bill Committee sitting last March whether the Government had a view about whether there was manipulation and whether changes needed to be made to the regulatory arrangements. He stood up and answered with the single word: no. The Treasury has, of course, come to regret that stance and, several months later, this tremendous scandal began to leak out.

Will the Financial Secretary update the House on the process for extricating the LIBOR setting process from the British Bankers Association and when an independent and more transparent arrangement will be secured? Was not the 2012 Act a missed opportunity, not just because it failed to widen the regulatory perimeter to cover LIBOR, but because it left doubt over whether regulators can prevent benchmark rigging in other trades, such as the gas and electricity markets, commodities, metals and oil? Rather than wait for Europe to legislate, the UK Government need to wake up and take preventive steps now. We will table amendments to the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill in the coming weeks.

Does the Financial Secretary agree that we also need new rules to protect whistleblowers who highlight failures inside the banks, and that we must ensure that offences created to punish misleading statements also properly cover the foreign operations of our UK banks? The Financial Secretary has said that the large fines for RBS will be clawed back in part from the bank’s bonus pots, but is it not now clear that fundamental changes are needed to the pay and bonus culture across the banking sector, including a repeat of the banker bonus tax to pay for opportunities for young people across the country? The Business Secretary said this morning that he has a plan for the RBS shares owned by the taxpayer. Does the Financial Secretary agree or disagree with that? What exactly is the Government’s policy on the future plans for the RBS shareholding?

Taxpayers and bank customers are growing sick and tired of being let down by the banks day after day. Does this not all boil down to a question of trust—a question not only of whether British customers can trust their banks, but of whether investors across the world continue to trust their money with the City of London more than with other financial centres? Britain’s financial services reputation is on the line. Our economy needs a healthy and sustainable banking sector, so we must rapidly clean up the system and put UK financial services on the path towards respectability, integrity and professionalism.

[Greg Clark]

It is, of course, right that we do that. I have been very clear that we are taking the steps that we are taking to restore the international reputation of the City and to make it pre-eminent in the world as a place in which people have confidence.

I would have thought that the hon. Gentleman would have taken this opportunity to reflect on the contribution that the previous Government made to the decline in the reputation of the City. It is not as if the chaotic regulatory regime was not foreseen. In November 1997, during the passage of the legislation that set up the flawed Financial Services Authority, my right hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr Lilley) said:

“The coverage of the FSA will be huge; its objectives will be many, and potentially in conflict with one another. The range of its activities will be so diverse that no one person in it will understand them all.”

He went on to say that the Government of the day

“may, almost casually, have bitten off more than they can chew. The process of setting up the FSA may cause regulators to take their eye off the ball, while spivs and crooks have a field day.”—[Official Report, 11 November 1997; Vol. 300, c. 732.]

That was the warning that the Conservative party gave the Government at that time, but it was ignored comprehensively for their 13 years in office.

We have moved quickly, as most reasonable people would concede. We already have a Financial Services Act on the statute book and we have set up an eminent commission chaired by Sir John Vickers to recommend far-reaching changes to the financial services system. The previous Government’s contribution to the eminence of the City was to knight Fred Goodwin, for heaven’s sake. The Opposition spokesman brags about the reforms to the regulatory system that he recommended in a Public Bill Committee, but it was the shadow Chancellor, when he had my job, who said that

“nothing should be done to put at risk a light touch, risk-based regulatory regime.”

We are making the reforms that it falls to us to make.

I will answer some of the specific points that the hon. Gentleman made. We will have discussions about the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill. Most reasonable people would conclude that the reforms that we are making, with the advice of the Vickers commission and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, lead the world in this area. The Liikanen report, which is being recommended at a European level, explicitly refers to the reforms that we are contemplating. It is right that we should be ahead on this.

The hon. Gentleman is right that the Financial Services Authority must investigate whether any individuals or firms lost out as a result of the attempted manipulation. I call it attempted manipulation because we are talking about the rates that were submitted and it is not necessarily the case that the LIBOR reference rate changed in response. However, it is right that the FSA should make that assessment.

The process that Martin Wheatley recommended to replace the BBA is under way. It will become a regulated activity as soon as the statutory instruments are passed. Baroness Hogg and her committee are setting up a process to invite tenders, which will not include the BBA, to administer that process. As Martin Wheatley said, it is necessary that that is done in a way that does not undermine confidence in the rate-setting process during the transition, because it is fundamental to many contracts, as the hon. Gentleman implied, including people’s mortgages.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned other benchmarks. The powers that we took in the amendments that we made to the Financial Services Act 2012 before Christmas allow us quickly to specify any other benchmarks that might be subject to such abuse. Our response has been co-ordinated with the international authorities and nobody regards the powers that we have as inadequate to the task of dealing with other abuses.

On whistleblowers, the hon. Gentleman is right that it is important that people within banks and financial services should have the confidence to report abuse. A very small number of people are responsible for something that is besmirching the reputation of many millions of people up and down the country who work hard, day and night, for banks. Those people have had reason, over the years, to be proud of their career. It is important, not least for those people, that the institutions for which they work recover their reputations.

On the shareholding in RBS, it is of course the Government’s intention to return it, at the appropriate time, to private ownership. It is not right that we should own such a significant stake of a high street bank. It was necessary for us to do so because of the crisis that the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues know all about. As soon as it can be returned to independence, the better.

Banking Reform

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Monday 4th February 2013 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

Urgent Question: To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will make a statement on the Government’s approach to banking reform.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Greg Clark)]

The Government have today laid before the House the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill and their response to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards report, which was published on 21 December 2012 following the commission’s pre-legislative scrutiny of a draft Bill.

I thank and pay tribute to the members of both the Independent Commission on Banking and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. The two commissions, whose membership comprises some of the most distinguished policy makers and formidable intellects in the world, have between them shaped a set of reforms to British banking that will lead the world and set an example to other countries in the seriousness, radicalism and meticulousness of the changes that are proposed.

The Bill published today reflects their painstaking work and the Government have accepted almost all their recommendations. The reforms address what the Chancellor has called the British dilemma—how Britain can be a leading global financial centre with more than its fair share of international trade in financial services while at the same time not exposing ordinary working people in this country to the catastrophic risks of banks failing.

The reforms were and are necessary because the previous regime was tested and failed. UK taxpayers had to bail out the banks with £65 billion of the hard-earned money of ordinary working people, while those who had taken a one-way bet with that money slunk away, losing nothing more than their jobs, and sometimes not even that. The anger that the country feels about what happened must be channelled into change to reset Britain’s banking system. The objective of the Bill—proposed by Vickers and endorsed by the commission—is that any failure of any bank in future should not impose a cost on the taxpayer and not interrupt for a second vital banking services. That is a high ambition, but one that is appropriate for a country with the reputation for financial stability and confidence, which has for centuries been one of Britain’s chief assets in the world.

As is well known, the Bill will erect a ring fence around the core operations of banks headquartered and regulated in the UK. Within that ring fence, banks must be completely insulated from activities such as using depositors’ funds to speculate for the banks’ own benefit in capital markets.

As a result of the commission’s recommendations, the Government are making a number of further changes to the Bill. First, in the acute phrase of my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), which will permanently enter the lexicon of banking, the ring fence will be “electrified”. The regulator will be given the power to order the full separation of any bank that attempts to undermine the ring fence. Directors of the banks will be personally responsible for ensuring that their banks comply with the ring-fencing rules, and the Prudential Regulatory Authority will conduct an annual review of the operation and adequacy of the ring-fence rules.

Secondly, there are explicit provisions on the face of the Bill for the principal aspects of ring-fencing, including that there should be separate boards of directors, remuneration arrangements, treasury management operations, balance sheet management and human resource management of ring-fenced banks.

Thirdly, the Bill gives us an opportunity to make an historic change in the competitive environment in UK banking. Competition is essential to ensure that customers benefit from innovation and from demanding customer service and efficiency from their banks. That has not always been customers’ experience in the past. As well as bringing in a seven-day automatic account switching service from September this year, the Government will take steps to tackle the cosy arrangement whereby the banks determine how payment systems will be run. Why should it be necessary in 2013 for a cheque to take six days to clear, with the banks and not the customers scooping up the interest on the balances during the delay? Why should a new bank have to beg an incumbent bank for permission to use their payment system? We will therefore require access to payment services that are fair, reasonable and transparent. The commission has rightly emphasised the importance of competition, and I am grateful to it for propelling that drive further, as I am to my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Andrea Leadsom) for what she has done on greater competition in banking, which has been a personal crusade of hers.

The fourth and final change is that more parliamentary scrutiny will be built into the secondary legislation that implements what is a high-level Bill. Drafts of the principal statutory instruments to be made will be made available to the House before Second Reading, and the Government accept the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee on the type of scrutiny each should receive.

These are historic reforms, but it is appropriate that, in our country—directly and indirectly, 2 million people work in the industry, it is our biggest export earner, and contributes £1 in every £8 of our tax revenue—we take the steps necessary to restore confidence in, and to, an industry that has fallen so far. There is much scrutiny of the Bill before us, both here and in the House of Lords, and I look forward very much to our discussions during the weeks and months ahead.

[Chris Leslie]

If the Government believed this issue was important, would the Chancellor have not made a statement to the House of Commons today? It should not take an urgent question for Parliament to hear why the Government are taking such a half-hearted approach to banking reform.

In a week when our national banks are facing record-breaking fines for LIBOR manipulation, when the Financial Services Authority is struggling to get a fair deal on payment protection insurance mis-selling for small businesses, whose customers have been mis-sold interest rate hedging products, when we see the bumper bonus season continuing to roll on and on for banking executives as if nothing had happened, and in a week when all this suggests we should be getting serious about real reform, what has the Chancellor said in his seaside speech today? He has fudged the tough stance recommended by the Vickers report, and has stopped short on backstop powers and legislation for the leverage ratio envisaged by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, a commission that the Chancellor himself agreed to set up last summer.

I have to ask the Minister: why then does it feel as though the Chancellor has to be dragged kicking and screaming towards serious reform? Is it because, despite all the rhetoric and feigned concern, the Government know they face certain defeat in the House of Lords on the sensible recommendations of the parliamentary commission, and so think it best to try to salvage something from what is in reality a strategic retreat? Why will the Minister not legislate for a full reserve power for total separation of retail and investment banking if ring-fencing does not work, something that we called for last year and the commission specifically recommended? Surely it would be sensible to legislate now, not just if one or two individual banks misbehave, but in case ring-fencing fails the sector as a whole. He may think he has found a cunning ploy, but stopping short with only half the backstop powers just means that they are unlikely to be used. Corporate lawyers across the City will be rubbing their hands with glee at the prospect of taking on the regulator on a case-by-case basis. Worse still, why is he ducking the main conclusion of the Vickers report? Specifically, why is he refusing to adopt the commission’s recommendations on the leverage ratio and rein in the over-exposure of banks whose excessive risk-taking caused the problems in the first place?

Should there not be a clause in the Bill so that regulators can restrain such hazardous behaviour? Does the Minister agree that the implementation of the Bill needs a full parliamentary review on a regular basis, with genuine scrutiny of detailed secondary legislation on exactly how ring-fencing will work in practice? If the commission recommends a tougher code of conduct for bankers, proper professional qualifications and a fiduciary duty of care for customers, together with stronger controls on bonuses and remuneration, will he accept its judgment in the Bill?

With the economy flatlining and no plan for growth, why is there nothing in the Bill to improve the funding for lending scheme? We should not still be seeing lending to businesses falling further and further, month after month. The Minister has to realise that the public, the taxpayers and Parliament want to tackle this issue once and for all. The Bill needs further amendment, and if the Government do not have the courage to radically reform the banks, we will.

[Greg Clark]

I had rather hoped for a serious response to a serious matter. When the Bill has its Committee stage, I hope the hon. Gentleman, with whom I am happy to work on the details, will be able to make some more substantial reflections than those he has offered the House today. Frankly, the idea that the Opposition should have the brass neck to table an urgent question on banking reform is almost unbelievable. At no point in 13 years of power did they show a scintilla of urgency in facing up to, never mind solving, the catastrophic absence of banking reform that led to the financial crisis being particularly damaging to this country. The failure of the botched regulatory system they introduced in 1997 has played a large part in the burden that the ordinary working people of this country are still having to shoulder today to bail out the banks. They were in office after the crisis, too. Even then they did nothing urgent apart from hurriedly plunge their heads in the sand to hope that the nightmare would pass.

It has fallen to this Government—as it regularly does, I am afraid—urgently to clear up the chaos in which Labour left the country. It should not have taken so long, but since the Government have been elected—from the beginning of our tenure in 2010—we have set up the Independent Commission on Banking, which has done a superb job, and we have created a separate conduct regulator and a prudential regulator that are now on the statute book. Why did we need to wait for this Government to be elected to do that? Why did Labour not set up a parliamentary commission on banking standards? [Interruption.] Of course, I will answer the pitifully few points that the hon. Gentleman made.

The hon. Gentleman asked, perfectly reasonably, why we had not given the Bank of England the power to split up the whole banking system. One of the principal reasons for not doing so was that the Governor of the Bank of England, in evidence to the commission, said that he did not want that power. It would seem odd to foist on the Governor a power that he does not want. The hon. Gentleman also asked why we did not adopt the higher backstop ratio. One concern expressed was by building societies worried about being disadvantaged by that. That was a concern we had.

The hon. Gentleman asked about a full review. If he had read closely the statement we published in response to the commission’s report, he would have known that the PRA would conduct a full annual review of the ring-fencing rules, and we will obviously act on any recommendations that it makes. He also asked about further recommendations that might come from the commission, which is chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester. The hon. Gentleman seems surprised that, having set up the commission, we might be interested in taking seriously its recommendations. I hope it is apparent from our response today that we take its recommendations very seriously, and I look forward to its further recommendations, particularly on competition, which have a great deal to offer. I greatly respect the commission’s work and look forward to making time available when the next report is published to make the necessary changes to the Bill to accommodate the recommendations.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Monday 10th December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

It is a pleasure to be muscling in at this late stage of our proceedings on the Bill, but I feel it is a bit of a cheek to do so given that many Members have laboured many hours over these clauses in Committee—

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

indicated assent.

[Greg Clark]

The hon. Gentleman was one such Member.

We are in agreement with all their lordships’ amendments, and this first group demonstrates that the Government have listened to Parliament’s concerns and have amended the Bill accordingly.

The governance of the Bank of England was one area of concern, and it was debated at length in this place and the other place. The Government agreed that the Bank’s expanded responsibilities warranted taking another look at its governance arrangements. The Treasury Committee produced an excellent report on this subject just over a year ago—I note that the Committee Chairman, my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), is present—recommending that the Bank’s non-executive directors be given a greater role in scrutinising the Bank’s work, including the ability to commission and publish reviews of the Bank’s performance.

The current version of the Bank of England Act 1998 does not actually describe the non-executive directors as non-executive, but various amendments before us in this group will finally clarify the terminology in respect of the Bank’s court of directors by distinguishing explicitly between the non-executive and executive members.

On more substantive governance matters, amendments 3, 6 to 9, 148, 149, 151, 152, 154, 155, 169, 172 and 173 fulfil the substance of the Treasury Committee’s recommendations in this area via the creation of a powerful new oversight committee made up of the non-executive directors of the Bank’s court of directors. The oversight committee’s remit covers the entirety of the Bank’s objectives and strategy. This remit is already broad enough to allow the oversight committee to look at any aspect of the Bank’s work it believes appropriate to examine, including the effectiveness of its crisis management co-ordination with the Treasury, as suggested in an amendment proposed by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie). I am sure he will comment on that.

The oversight committee will have a statutory right to access the meetings and papers of the Financial Policy Committee and the Monetary Policy Committee, and it will have the power to commission reviews of the Bank’s performance from external experts or from the Bank’s own policy makers, and publish the reviews and monitor the Bank’s response to them. In line with the Treasury Committee report, these performance reviews will be undertaken retrospectively. The Committee recommended that they should take place at least a year after the period to be reviewed, in order to avoid second-guessing at the time of the policy decision. Just to be absolutely clear, the oversight committee’s remit to review the Bank’s performance is limited to the Bank’s objectives and strategy only; it does not extend to the Prudential Regulation Authority. The only role of the oversight committee in respect of the PRA is to determine the remuneration of the members of the PRA board. Because the PRA will be operationally independent in carrying out its statutory functions of regulation, it will be directly accountable to Parliament. The Government expect that the Treasury Committee will wish to summon the senior PRA executives and, where necessary, the non-executives to account for the PRA’s actions.

Amendment 167 will require the court of directors to publish a record of each of its meetings, fulfilling another of the Treasury Committee’s recommendations from its report. We have also listened to concerns in respect of the Financial Policy Committee, which focused on the role of economic growth in its decision making and the balance of its membership. Amendment 10 gives the FPC a secondary objective to support the Government’s economic policies, including growth, which will sit alongside existing requirements, such as the brake on the FPC taking action that would damage long-term sustainable growth. Amendments 4, 5, 150, 156 and 157 aim to rebalance the FPC by removing one of the Bank members, leaving a voting membership of 10 people—five Bank members and five non-Bank members.

Amendments 16, 17 and 19 to 21 go further to increase the transparency and accountability of the FPC. The FPC will be required to prepare an explanation of each of its actions, setting out publicly the reasons for its decision to take the action and its reasons for believing that the action is compatible with the FPC’s objectives, including to contribute to economic growth, and the various factors to which it must have regard, including proportionality. The FPC is also required to include an estimate of the costs and benefits of the action, where it is reasonably practicable to do so.

Amendment 17 requires the FPC to review the decisions that it has already taken in order to consider whether the actions are still necessary, or whether they should be revoked or removed. That will help to ensure that the FPC’s directions and recommendations do not remain in place for any longer than is necessary. The FPC must publish the explanations of its actions and a summary of its reviews in the next financial stability report.

The remainder of the amendments in this group represent further agreements made in the House of Lords in response to points raised in debate. Amendment 168 makes it absolutely clear that the Chancellor must always appoint a non-executive member of the court to be its chair. Amendments 174 to 176 continue the immunities from liability for damages that the existing regulators have and extends them to the new regulators. The Government have made amendments in the House of Lords to ensure that if the PRA or FCA commissions the other regulator, or the Bank of England, to carry out an investigation or produce a formal report on its behalf, the body that has been commissioned is also covered by the immunity.

This group of amendments represents a significant package of changes to the legislative framework for the Bank and the FPC, in response to points raised both in this House and in the House of Lords, and I commend it to this House.

[Chris Leslie]

It is a great pleasure to welcome the new Minister to these rather long-winded proceedings. I believe we started on this Bill back in February, but he should not worry, as this is shortly to be followed by the banking reform Bill and possibly even a banking standards Bill—to be determined—so we will probably have plenty more opportunities to chew over these issues then. It is a little preposterous to have a knife coming down at 7 o’clock, by which time we have to put the Question on 150 or so of these Lords amendments. That gives us about 25 seconds per amendment [Interruption.] I will get on with it; I lost about a dozen amendments just then.

That is why we have tabled several amendments to those Lords amendments—you will be impressed with that, Mr Deputy Speaker—and I wish briefly to explain why we have done so. The first Lords amendment that we are seeking to amend is Lords amendment 3, which, as all hon. Members here know, deals with the creation of an oversight committee within the Bank of England as a sort of subset of the court of directors, where it is to have a reviewing and, supposedly, a scrutinising role. There is a problem: the oversight committee has a series of responsibilities, not one of which is set out, in overseeing what the Bank of England does. The committee has a set of responsibilities to monitor, to review procedures and to conduct performance reviews, but all of that is retrospective—it looks backwards, not forwards. May I gently suggest to the Minister that it might be more appropriate if he were to call this a “hindsight committee” rather than an oversight committee, because as things stand I do not think there is a sense in which this is a proper check and balance within the governance of the Bank of England?

Why does that matter? It matters because the Government are giving phenomenal new powers to the Bank of England within our economy as an overarching financial regulator. The Minister says that the PRA is independent and will report to Parliament, but let us be honest: this is a creature of the Bank of England and the Bank will control very much what happens in the regulatory framework. Although we welcome the concession that was made to create an oversight committee, people have misgivings—we will probably hear about some of them, perhaps from members of the Treasury Committee, in a moment—that there is still a very hierarchical and centralised set of governance structures in the Bank of England.

We therefore need to make sure that this crucial verb “oversee” is included in the oversight committee’s remit. That would help to shift the balance of power between non-executives and executives in the Bank of England framework just that bit more. These are important lessons of governance, certainly from the private sector. While we are moving towards that executive and non-executive balance, it is important that we recognise that the Bank of England is being dragged into the 21st century. If we are taking the opportunity to do that in legislation, making that particular change would be very welcome.

The other amendment we wish to make to Lords amendment 3 relates to crisis management. As I said, the Bill gives massive new powers to the Bank of England, but in a crisis there will be very little time to figure out and design standing orders, or to work out arrangements for who will meet whom and for how decisions can involve the right people. You will recall, Mr Deputy Speaker, how during the global financial crisis crucial decisions affecting billions of pounds of taxpayers’ money and whether people could access the cash machines were made in the space of hours over weekends. In hindsight, it would have been nice to have had a carefully planned set of arrangements, and this Bill needs to learn the lessons from that. We are concerned that the crisis management arrangements are still thin and inadequate. We have suggested that if there is going to be an oversight committee in the Bank of England, the Bill needs to set out explicitly that it is to have a duty to ensure the adequacy and effectiveness of arrangements with the Treasury for crisis management.

There is no role for the new financial conduct authority in the drafting of the arrangements. Apparently it does have a veto, but it is not part of the drafting of that memorandum of understanding. The Government are still resisting proposals to ensure that deputy governors and the chief executive of the FCA can consult directly with the Treasury in circumstances where there might be differences of opinion. Given the import and the size of the FCA, the PRA and the FPC within the Bank, it is important that the deputy governors have an ability and a right to talk to the Treasury, so that everything is not hidden and suppressed within one view of the Governor of the Bank of the England.

There is a very bizarre set of provisions excluding the ability of the memorandum of understanding to make provision about the relationship between the Bank of England and the PRA, which goes to prove that the PRA is very much a creature of the Bank. It also suggests that the Governor will have powers to suppress the voice of the PRA in a crisis. Shockingly, there is no parliamentary approval process for that MOU; no statutory instrument arrangement has been made, as I understand it. The crucial paragraph of the MOU that deals with what happens in the white heat of an emergency simply says, “Oh well, there will be ad hoc or standing committees just to sort these things out.”

That is not good enough. The whole of best practice in preparedness and in emergency and contingency planning would suggest that now is the time for Her Majesty’s Treasury and the Bank of England to sit down and calmly and methodically work through what would happen in those circumstances. There should be some draft standing orders to pre-empt those scenarios.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Clark]

The hon. Gentleman has more experience of questioning the Governor than I have. The Joint Committee on the draft Financial Services Bill, of which he was a member, volunteered to agree with the Governor on that assessment, at least. We followed the Committee’s advice on that, as was recognised in the other place.

[Chris Leslie]

I understand the Minister’s argument. However, we are talking about a lot of power in the hands of a single individual—the single point of potential institutional disruption, as the Chairman of the Treasury Committee called it. Surely the sun king is capable of responding to some internal questioning, scrutiny and challenge, and that would be a healthy thing to have. Some kind of more proactive oversight might therefore not be such a bad idea after all.

[Greg Clark]

All those things are provided for in the Bill; the question is whether the word that the hon. Gentleman seeks to introduce is a matter of semantics or would bring in scrutiny of current decisions. That is a point of difference between us. In the House of Lords there are many people with experience of being very effective non-executive directors, as I know from my distinguished constituent, Baroness Noakes. Most people would recognise that she is meticulous and robustly independent in the scrutiny that she brings to matters, and she regarded the wording of the Bill as entirely compatible with that. It is not right to go against what the Treasury Committee recommended and to have the second-guessing of immediate decisions.

Let me say something about the existing powers. The report by the Treasury Committee recommended that ex-post reviews of the Bank’s performance should be carried out, and those are provided for. In fact, the current wording of subsection (2) of new section 3A of the 1998 Act requires the oversight committee to

“keep under review the Bank's performance”,

and that is consistent with the Committee’s recommendations. We think that this wording strikes the right balance between ensuring effective retrospective scrutiny of the Bank’s policy performance and avoiding a situation whereby the non-executive members of the court would be constantly second-guessing the decisions taken by the Bank’s expert policy committees and executives.

Amendment (b), tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham East, would give the oversight committee an additional function to keep under review the adequacy and effectiveness of the Bank’s arrangements with the Treasury for crisis management. It is very important that that should be under review, for all the reasons he said. Subsection (2) of new section 3A gives the oversight committee a broad remit to keep under review the Bank’s performance in relation to all its objectives and strategy. It is absolutely clear—I would like to confirm this from the Dispatch Box—that the effectiveness of the Bank’s relationship and co-ordination with the Treasury in crisis management is fundamental to the Bank’s achievement of its objective to protect and enhance stability. As such, the oversight committee can already undertake or commission a review into the effectiveness of these arrangements if necessary. In fact, in January this year the Bank said in its response to the Treasury Committee that the oversight committee should, among other things, assess whether the Bank is fulfilling effectively its duty to notify the Treasury of risks to public funds at the appropriate time. There is no substantial difference between us that the amendment is seeking to expose.

[Chris Leslie]

The problem is the threadbare nature of the memorandum of understanding, particularly the infamous paragraph 20, which says:

“However, the Chancellor and the Governor may agree to establish ad hoc or standing committees.”

That is so thin that it is important for the oversight committee to make it a top priority to ensure that there is preparedness and that it is thinking through the circumstances in which a crisis may occur, and that needs to be placed explicitly in the Bill.

[Greg Clark]

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s clarification. We should bear it in mind that the Bill requires the Treasury to lay the MOU before Parliament and to publish it. It will be subject to full transparency. For example, I would be very surprised if my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester did not call the Chancellor or the Governor to explain it. The oversight committee will be responsible for overseeing the Bank’s performance and, clearly, the MOU is a key part of its work in bringing to bear the Bank’s financial stability work. The committee will, therefore, consider from time to time whether it is working well and Parliament will itself have every opportunity to address the issue.

Amendment (a) to Lords amendment 16 would require the Financial Policy Committee to produce explanations of its decisions to exercise its recommendation and direction powers. Proposed new section 9QA(1) of the Bank of England Act makes it clear that the FPC’s explanations must set out how its decisions are compatible with its objectives, including the new objective to support the Government’s objectives for growth. It is clear that it has an explicit responsibility to do that. The FPC’s explanations will have to set out publicly how it has considered the impact on economic growth when deciding to take action and its reasons for believing that the action is compatible with its obligations in relation to economic growth.

Lords amendment 16—specifically subsection (3) of proposed new section 9QA of the 1998 Act—already requires the FPC to produce estimates of the costs and benefits of the decisions, including those areas to which the hon. Member for Leeds East (Mr Mudie) has referred. This will cover the impact on financial stability, both directly and indirectly, and the impact, both positive and negative, on economic growth.

I reassure the House that the FPC is giving considerable care and thought to the impact of these tools. The Bill requires the committee to produce and maintain policy statements for its direction tools. The statements will discuss the likely impact on both financial stability and economic growth. The Bank is preparing a draft of the statements, to be published early next year, so that they can be considered alongside the secondary legislation that will set out the FPC’s direction powers. We do not, therefore, think that amendment (a) to Lords amendment 16 is necessary.

[Greg Clark]

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s point. I am not able to produce a novel parliamentary procedure, but I can certainly tell him and the Chairman of the Treasury Committee that when the time comes to publish the statutory instruments, if they or their Committee would like to consider and advise on the discharge of the commitments, I would be happy to engage with them in good faith and take on board any suggestions.

[Chris Leslie]

I am delighted to hear that concession from the Minister. We have suggested a super-affirmative procedure for some of the regulations. That would give the Treasury Committee and others more time to look at the issues and ask the other Select Committees about the effect on, for example, housing and communities and local government. If the Minister is willing to open that door, we would support him.

[Greg Clark]

I give the hon. Gentleman an inch and he takes a mile. I will not commit to a different procedure but, as I have said, I will certainly commit, in good faith, to considering personally any points that are made. [Interruption.]

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Clark]

The short answer to that is yes. The FCA’s powers will be broad, and defined by practice rather than activity. We have been clear that it might not be just the level of interest charged, but other practices associated with the lenders that come within the ambit of the regulator. It is clear that it will use those powers vigorously to promote the interests of all our constituents.

I will leave my introductory remarks on that point. I am sure that Members wish to contribute and I will seek to respond to any points raised when I make my winding-up speech.

[Chris Leslie]

There is a large number of amendments in this group, that focus on consumer credit and the best interests of consumers. I want to concentrate on two in particular—Lords amendments 25 and 78.

Lords amendment 25 was extracted from the Government and we are glad that they gave way on it. The amendment will henceforth make it clear that the new Financial Conduct Authority will have a requirement to ensure basic access to financial services particularly in deprived areas and neighbourhoods where some of our banks and financial institutions do not necessarily think that they can make millions and millions of pounds. That is the hope placed on the shoulders of the FCA. The key question is whether the regulator will roll up its sleeves and use the full extent of the powers that the Bill should provide. I, for one, will be seeking a very early meeting with the new chief executive of the FCA to extract commitments on how it intends to use the new powers.

It should not have taken months of persuading and cajoling Treasury Ministers for them to accede to the changes. Perhaps it was the fresh air provided by the new broom, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, sweeping clean with perhaps more of an open mind than his predecessor on some of these issues. If that is the case, I commend him for it. We need to begin to look at the detail, so I have a series of questions for him, starting with Lords amendment 25.

There are already what some people call lending deserts. In some communities, bank branches are not as readily available as they are in other, more affluent areas. In some deprived areas of the country, it is hard for consumers to access affordable credit. The key word—affordability—is of course now well known. If people want to be completely ripped off, they can pay for high-cost credit, often on a very short-term basis, with immense interest rate charges that can accumulate and get them into severe jeopardy. That will lead to further financial exclusion if they cannot keep up with the repayments, and to them being trapped in a spiral of poverty.

It is important to hold the big five banks to account. As large institutions, they are not just private companies with no obligations beyond and above those that rest on the shoulders of any other private company. In this day and age, they are a social utility and have a duty to the community to ensure that all parts of the country have access to basic banking facilities. The work of the financial inclusion taskforce, under the previous Administration, sought to ensure that basic bank account facilities were available. With the onset of universal credit in April 2014, it will be even more important for everybody to understand and have access to those facilities. However, I am increasingly worried about the fragile deal put together under the previous Administration to support and extend those basic services. There are signs of a creeping onset of charges. As banks come out from the era where the taxpayer was essentially keeping them going, they are now starting to look to the consumer to extract more charges. I do not want a situation where banks get together and think about introducing basic charges on current accounts, especially for those who are taking care to ensure that they are in credit. There are worrying signs that that might be in the air. Even the regulators have started to say, “Well, let’s start charging a little bit for in-credit current accounts. It might be a way of ensuring we don’t have to charge such high costs for unauthorised overdrafts.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Clark]

I come now to the Government’s implementation of the independent review of LIBOR conducted by Mr Martin Wheatley. I announced the Government’s response to the Wheatley review in mid-October and three sets of amendments to the Bill have been made to implement those recommendations that require legislation. The first is to enable activities in relation to benchmarks, such as LIBOR and potentially others, to be brought within the scope of regulation under FSMA. The second is to create criminal offences designed to tackle misconduct in the financial sector, including a new criminal offence for making false or misleading submissions in connection with the determination of a benchmark. The third is to provide the FCA with a rule-making power to require banks to submit to LIBOR and other benchmarks. Those amendments complement the market-led reforms to LIBOR as recommended by the Wheatley review. Martin Wheatley recommended that submission to, and the administration of, LIBOR become regulated activities, and amendments 59 to 62 create a framework to enable activities in relation to benchmarks to be specified as regulated activities under FSMA.

Amendment 60 defines “ benchmark” as an “index, rate or price”, defined from time to time by reference to the state of the market and used in relation to investments. A benchmark is capable of being regulated only if it meets that definition. The precise benchmarks that are subject to regulation will be specified by way of statutory instrument. The Government recently published a consultation paper on this legislation. Initially, the activities to become regulated will be LIBOR submission and administration, as recommended by the Wheatley review. However, further benchmarks can be added and the Government are considering and consulting on whether additional benchmarks should be brought within the regulatory perimeter. The types of benchmarks that could be eligible include equity or bond indices, derivatives and commodity or energy benchmarks. The definition of benchmark, as drafted, requires that it be used for one or more purposes that relate to section 22 of, and schedule 2 to, FSMA.

The hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) has tabled an amendment that would extend that definition to include commodities. Let me say first that I totally understand the requirement that we should be able to address some of the alleged abuses that have taken place and have the powers in statute to include those benchmarks that are relevant to some of the concerns that have been expressed recently. We do not believe that there is any requirement to extend the legislation on that. In fact, the Bill was drafted to anticipate the Wheatley review and the work going on in other benchmarks. Benchmarks can represent many things, including commodities or energies, provided that they are traded financially in the way we often see. Under the definition, regulation by the FCA extends to benchmarks that involve financial matters consistent with FSMA and the objectives of the FCA as the financial services regulator.

The Wheatley review also recommended that banks should be encouraged to participate in LIBOR—participation is currently voluntary. In the absence of such submissions, LIBOR would cease to be a representative benchmark and, in an extreme scenario, would not be published at all. Therefore, Lords amendment 79 allows the FCA to require firms to participate in particular benchmarks, while making reference to a “code or other document”. That allows the detail of the requirement to be determined by the benchmark administrator, not by the FCA. It might not be necessary for the FCA to use that power immediately, if at all, and it has recently opened a discussion on how and when the use of that power could be considered.

The Wheatley review also recommended the creation of a new criminal offence in relation to the manipulation of benchmarks such as LIBOR and the re-examination of the criminal sanctions for market manipulation under FSMA. Although such conduct could already be a criminal offence under legislation, this is a helpful clarification of some of the powers. There will be three criminal offences: first, we are re-creating the offence of making a false or misleading statement; secondly, we are widening the offence in section 397(3) to include creating a false or misleading impression as to the market in, or the price or value of, an investment for the purposes of making a profit or avoiding a loss; and thirdly, we are creating a new criminal offence related to misleading statements and impressions in respect of specified benchmarks.

The amendments also replicate the penalties for existing offences: a person found guilty might face a prison sentence of up to seven years and an unlimited fine. The detail of the investments, agreements and benchmarks for which those criminal offences apply will be set out in secondary legislation. That is included in the public consultation currently under way.

Under the current arrangements, where enforcement action results in a firm paying a financial penalty, that is applied as a discount to fees paid by other firms the following year. Without reform, unprecedented fines, such as those relating to the attempted manipulation of LIBOR, would have represented a significant windfall to regulated firms. In future, regulatory fines revenue in excess of enforcement case costs will go to the Consolidated Fund. The hon. Member for Nottingham East and I had an exchange about that earlier. The regulators will be able to net off enforcement case costs before handing over the penalties to the public purse. The new arrangements will apply to FSA fines received from 1 April 2012, so the measure will include the penalty imposed on Barclays in relation to the attempted manipulation of LIBOR.

The Government have announced that £35 million of fines imposed from attempted LIBOR manipulation and other unacceptable behaviour received this year will be used to support Britain’s armed forces community. In addition, £5 million will go to the creation of new, groundbreaking first world war galleries at the Imperial War museum. I hope that the House will agree to these amendments but, of course, I stand ready to respond to any points Members make.

[Chris Leslie]

We have moved on to another series of amendments that have arisen largely as a result of the scandal that was discovered this summer, when it was found that some of the largest banks—obviously, we have heard about the concerns in relation to Barclays—had been manipulating LIBOR, the benchmark from which flows billions, if not trillions, in financial services products and investments worldwide.

The scandal had massive ramifications across the banking sector. It was as though having gone through three or four years of attempted reform following the global financial crisis, after which it was clear that the risks that many in the banking sector had been taking were not properly understood or accounted for, the sector was again knocked sideways. It turns out that it was not just about exuberant risk-taking; it was, in fact, about corrupt manipulation of what people had thought was a trustworthy index. What is worse, it hit the reputation of the City of London in particular. It was all in the name: the London interbank offered rate. This was taken by many other international financial centres to be a moment of weakness for the UK financial services sector, and we saw several examples of other jurisdictions taking action swiftly to capitalise on the disarray in which many in the financial services sector found themselves. It was therefore important that the Government took urgent action and commissioned a review of what happened in the LIBOR scandal.

At the time, we felt that the matter was of such significance that we called for an independent judicial inquiry into the whole question of banking standards and ethics. As I am sure you will recall, Mr Deputy Speaker, we had a very heated debate in which the Government said, “We’ll have a parliamentary banking commission,” while we said, “Go for an independent judicial variant.” Of course, the Government won the day, and hence the Chairman of the Treasury Committee is now demonstrating his stewardship of that commission, which is due to report shortly. I hope that it has an opportunity to look into the wider issue of ethics and standards in banking. The Government have been keen that it starts to focus, almost in pre-legislative mode ahead of the banking reform Bill, on the Vickers reforms, but these questions of standards, ethics and culture also matter tremendously.

The Government made several amendments to the Bill in the House of Lords. In amendment 79, it is envisaged that there will be new provisions for a benchmark administrator, but it is not certain that a private sector organisation, even if it has a certain amount of experience, will be totally immune from conflicts of interest. Did the Government give any consideration to establishing a more independent body or entity for that administrative process? It is vital that the process of finding a new benchmark administrator is open and transparent. Will the Minister give more details about the process that he is undertaking and how the tender process is happening?

On amendment 115, it is important to ensure that the new criminal offences have a strong effect in respect of misleading statements on benchmarking and in general. In terms of its jurisdiction, is the amendment limited to British banking and financial services activities, or does it cover activities undertaken by UK organisations or UK-approved persons in operations in countries beyond our shores? Clearly, in a globalised world, that is relevant to how we see the behaviour of those in the sector.

The Government’s proposals to regulate benchmarking currently apply only to investments. We want to ensure that the regulatory net is also cast around commodities, including oil trading, gas market trading, silver, gold, foodstuffs, and so on. I am sure, Mr Deputy Speaker, that you can think of a range of potential commodities. Therefore, in the marvellous parliamentary way in which we do these things, we are seeking to amend a Lords amendment to ensure that the definition is focused not only on investment but, for clarity’s sake, puts commodities into the Bill. The Government say that they are consulting on this arrangement and might have the power to include those things later down the line but do not believe that there is a requirement to do so at this stage. However, it is time that we got ahead of these issues early on.

In the Public Bill Committee in March, after several hours of debate—it had been a bit of a long day—I asked the Minister’s predecessor, in relation to LIBOR and the benchmarking of these arrangements, “Do the Government have a view about whether there is manipulation and whether changes need to be made to the regulatory arrangements?” He stood up and answered with the single word, no. Of course, he came to regret that stance and several months later—I think it was in June—we learned that a tremendous scandal had taken place. If we have these legislative vehicles, it is important that we take the opportunity to deal with any potential issues.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Leslie]

I would have thought the Minister wanted to speak, as Lords amendment 98 is the lead amendment of a group relating to the extension of resolution schemes from banks and building societies to investment firms and in particular UK clearing houses. There is a wider set of issues, therefore.

UK clearing houses stand between two parties in a trade, ensuring that a deal goes through in the event of one party defaulting. Once a deal is agreed, the transaction is honoured even if one party goes bust.

The Government’s decision to extend a set of resolution arrangements to clearing houses is incredibly important, as the debates in the other place set out. Clearing houses are highly significant entities nowadays. After the 2009 G20 summit, it was clear that several hundred trillion dollars of market transactions, especially in over-the-counter derivative arrangements, were part of the clearing house ambit. Therefore, a failure in a clearing house could clearly mean a big problem—a series of problems—for the financial services sector more broadly.

I have a series of questions for the Minister, as I would be grateful for his help in respect of the provisions of this amendment and others in this group. First, I want to ask him about today’s Financial Times, the front page of which talks interestingly about the extension of resolution plan arrangements from covering just companies within the UK to an agreement between the United States and the UK that the Bank of England seems to have struck which will mean, for the first time, that there is a template for larger, serious, significant international financial institutions to have resolution arrangements that span borders. Clearly that is relevant to these amendments on clearing houses. [Interruption.] I can tell that hon. Members are very familiar with these arrangements. Clearing houses have a great deal of cross-border interoperability, they cut across jurisdictions and there is a need to co-ordinate their work. Will the Minister assure the House that steps will be taken to ensure that international efforts are made to promulgate resolution arrangements that also cut across borders for clearing houses?

Central counterparty clearing arrangements these days contain a requirement also to hold Government bonds as collateral. As we know, Government bonds are not what they once were; there have been some questions about their safety. The Minister needs to explain: are we guarding against the deterioration of standards in central counterparty collateral arrangements? If we are increasingly reliant on gilt-edged securities of an international variety, are we actually ensuring that there is sufficient strength behind our central counterparty clearing arrangements?

Finally, may I ask the Minister a further question? Basel III arrangements will be ensuring that banks that are members of clearing houses need to capitalise their exposure to central counterparty contingent liabilities. Can he just give us a sense of the impact on the UK banking system, particularly on its capital adequacy, of processes that will see a rapid change on central counterparty arrangements from an over-the-counter arrangement to an exchange-based arrangement? If the regulators are insisting more and more on exchange-traded arrangements in those clearing houses, there will be an imperative for those clearing houses to become more and more price sensitive and they will be more desirable for the market more generally. That is why we are seeing so many mergers and acquisitions of clearing houses. Are these costs eventually going to be finding their way on to customers and our constituents? I would be grateful if the Minister replied.

[Greg Clark]

Let me give a bit of context to amendments 98 and 225. Taken together, they make provision with regard to the Bank of England’s role in insolvency proceedings relating to a UK clearing house. The amendments will ensure that the Bank of England is put on notice of any application for administration in respect of a UK clearing house, of any petition for a winding-up order in respect of a UK clearing house, of any resolution for the voluntary winding up of a UK clearing house and of the proposed appointment of an administrator of a UK clearing house. That will give the Bank the opportunity to consider whether to exercise a stabilisation power provided for in part 1 of the Banking Act 2009 in order to minimise the impact of the clearing house’s failure on financial stability. Amendment 225 gives the Bank of England the power to direct insolvency practitioners appointed in relation to a company that is or has been a UK clearing house. The direction would operate without prejudice to the existing statutory requirements relating to company insolvency.

The financial crisis of 2008-09 highlighted many deficiencies in the regulation of the global financial system. Most importantly, we found that the disorderly failure of systemically important banks could have catastrophic effects on the stability of the UK and international financial markets.

The hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) mentioned the piece that featured in the Financial Times today, which was a joint paper, in effect, between the Bank of England and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on plans for resolving global systemically important financial institutions. The Bank of England and FDIC paper is a perfectly proper collaboration between brother regulators across the world and is exactly the sort of approach we would expect regulators to take to make the financial system safer. It should be seen as part of the wider international and European work to deliver a credible resolution regime for the biggest banks and for—

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Tuesday 6th November 2012 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. It is crucial that the right skills are there, but we have taken a role internationally in leading this. In fact, in Mexico, the Chancellor is leading the way across the world in making sure that we have a co-ordinated regime.

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

I do not quite understand why the Minister is reluctant to be straight with the House on the facts, particularly given the question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Tom Blenkinsop).

[Chris Leslie]

Absolutely. Perhaps it was inadvertent—I would not in any way wish to imply that the Minister was deliberately obfuscating on the facts. I wanted to pick up on a specific question. As I understand it, public sector borrowing in the first six-month period of the last financial year was £62.4 billion. It was £65.1 billion in the first six months of this financial year, so will he confirm that that is £2.6 billion higher, that borrowing has risen, and that the deficit has gone up?

[Greg Clark]

No, the numbers vary from month to month. The hon. Gentleman needs to wait until the end of the financial year. January is the key month for these things, as he knows, but if he is interested in getting matters straight on the facts, will he clarify the shadow Chancellor’s suggestion that there was no structural deficit before the recession, because according to the IMF not only was there a structural deficit but it was the worst in the G7?

[Chris Leslie]

As I understand it, Mr Speaker, we ask the questions—the Minister is supposed to answer them. Why will he not confirm that borrowing figures are higher and that the deficit has risen? Will he stop being so complacent, get a grip of our economy and public expenditure, and confirm that the Government will keep their promise? The Chancellor said that the coalition Government will take responsibility for balancing Britain’s books within five years, so will they keep that promise?

[Greg Clark]

The facts are as I set out, but if the hon. Gentleman is implying that in some way he is against a deficit, that he wants to pay down the deficit, can he explain why he can hold that position and simultaneously be in favour of increasing borrowing? The shadow Chancellor is on the record as saying that his plans mean a short-term increase in borrowing. Let him say by how much and when.

Multiannual Financial Framework

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Wednesday 31st October 2012 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

That is exactly what we are doing in this multiannual financial framework, and the opportunity we have to veto a settlement that we are not in favour of gives us leverage in that.

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

The amendment to the motion

“calls on the Government to strengthen its stance so that the next MFF is reduced in real terms.”

Does the Financial Secretary disagree with the amendment?

[Greg Clark]

The hon. Gentleman, characteristically, is playing games with the issue. Of course we want to see a reduction. His position is wholly incredible, because this week he has been calling for a cut in the EU budget, which we all want to see, but when asked whether he is prepared to veto the budget, as we have said clearly we are prepared to do, he refuses. How can he take that position if he does not will the means to enforce it?

[Chris Leslie]

rose—

[Greg Clark]

I will not give way, because I want to make progress.

We have touched on a number of themes in the debate already—shamelessness, wastefulness, hypocrisy and betrayal—which leads us neatly to the position of the Labour party. Those sitting on the Opposition Front Bench are the same men who gave away so much of our rebate and who would surely surrender the rest on demand to curry favour with Europe. It is the party that, the last time it was in power and had the opportunity to negotiate an MFF, agreed not to a cut or a freeze, but to an 8% real-terms increase. It is a party whose socialist comrades in the European Parliament declared that the Commission’s proposed 10% increase was

“not sufficient to finance all the EU’s objectives”.

It is a party that nearly bankrupted our country but now claims conversion to the rigours of fiscal rectitude. It is a party whose last act in office was to sign Britain up to the EU stabilisation mechanism when it did not ever have a mandate to govern. It is a party that is so caught up in its cynical political games that it calls for a cut in the budget but at the same time says we should not deploy our veto to secure Britain’s interests. It is not a party that deserves to be taken seriously, as its opportunistic posturing this week shows.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Leslie]

If the hon. Gentleman calms down, I will explain. No one should be fooled into thinking that a veto is cost-free. The hon. Gentleman and all other hon. Members should know that the way in which European Union rules work means that last year’s budget will be cut and pasted and become the new budget for 2014, plus the inflationary increase. In other words, if the Prime Minister flounces off again, an extra £310 million will go from the Exchequer to the 2014 budget. That is a fact and we need a negotiation strategy that is going to work.

[Greg Clark]

Will the hon. Gentleman answer a simple question? Would he back the use of the veto—yes or no?

[Chris Leslie]

We have three weeks of negotiations. There is a summit on 22 November. [Interruption.] If the Minister has decided today to use the veto, why even bother going to the summit on 22 November? What is the point of the Prime Minister even travelling there? Will he still attend the summit? Surely the path to be pursued is the one that is the best for the taxpayer. I have explained what will happen if the Prime Minister walks away from the talks—it will cost the taxpayer more. Members can look at the Library research paper, which makes it clear for all to see that it will cost £310 million in 2014.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Chris Leslie and Greg Clark

Thursday 10th June 2010 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s welcome for our policy, which enjoys a degree of consensus throughout the country, if not among some of his colleagues. It is important to recognise that when things are imposed from the centre, people tend to react against it. We need to provide incentives, including funding, so that the communities that host more housing get some of the funding that they need to provide infrastructure and other things associated with it.

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

With regional spatial strategies, did not local authorities at least have the chance to have some say about coming together on big strategic issues? Now, however, we presume that the hefty hand of the central controller at his expansive desk in Whitehall will be making all the decisions centrally.

[Greg Clark]

I will forgive the hon. Gentleman for that remark, because he has been absent from the House for the past five years, but if a central controller had been operating, they had been doing so from Whitehall under the previous Government. The fact is that we want to allow local communities to co-operate. Co-operation is something that people should do co-operatively, rather than by imposition. Although we will encourage co-operation, we will not tell communities what to do from the centre.