United Kingdom Internal Market

Chris Heaton-Harris Excerpts

Thursday 1st February 2024 Commons Chamber

[Sammy Wilson]

I will not go over the wide range of what is in the Command Paper or the SI, but will focus on some particular points in the SI. It is well known that I do not support this deal or agreement, and I have given reasons why not. It is important that we have the opportunity to examine the detail of it, and the way that this legislation has been hurried through today has not allowed that examination. That is one reason why I will focus just on one particular aspect of it.

When my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) was speaking, he talked about the need to get rid of the debris or litter that was still around. The first point I want to make—perhaps the Minister can answer this in summing up—is that a lot of legislative litter is still around as a result of the arrangements put in place for the red lane and the green lane. We have statutory instruments on which I have spoken in Committee on a number of occasions, and EU regulations, including regulation 2023/1231, which gives the EU the right to make the final decision to suspend goods going through the green lane—and, I suspect, the internal market lane —and make the red lane the default position. I wonder when we will see the removal of all the infrastructure around the previous arrangements in the protocol and the Windsor framework. That would indicate that the UK Government were totally in command of goods flowing into Northern Ireland, rather than, as the EU legislation and indeed the withdrawal agreement state at present, the EU having the final say.

Secondly, my hon. Friend indicated that the movement of goods between Northern Ireland and GB was an issue of concern. It is, and indeed it is likely to be an issue of concern in the future, especially since the Windsor Framework (Constitutional Status of Northern Ireland) Regulations 2024 make it clear that legislation could be introduced in the House that would impact on trade between Northern Ireland and GB—for example, if the Government decide to change some retained EU law. The only assurance given is that a Minister would have to make an assessment of the impact and report it to the House. But at the end of the day—this is clear in proposed new section 13C of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018—he could make a decision to proceed nevertheless, even though that would likely have an impact on trade.

EU law could be another reason for divergence. We could find decisions made or practices allowed in the EU that put the GB market at risk. That is why we will be introducing the border operating model. The danger is that Northern Ireland goods could get caught in that. I imagine hearing people, including the Minister, saying, “But the legislation prevents that.” It does—on the face of it, we cannot have any border checks for what are called Northern Ireland qualifying goods going into GB. Indeed, local authorities will be informed that trade cannot be restricted, that no barriers can be put up to that trade and that Northern Ireland qualifying goods should have free access. Of course, all the export declarations previously required are to be dropped. However, perhaps the Minister can tell us what is meant in proposed new section 45B of the UK Internal Market Act 2020, which indicates that if goods fall into one of five categories, they will require export declarations.

Leaving that aside, let us look at the situation—actually, it is provided for in this legislation—whereby it is quite clear that the freedoms given for Northern Ireland qualifying goods to sail through into GB are being abused by exporters from the Republic, who bring goods through Northern Ireland and declare them as qualifying goods. By the way, it appears that no evidence has to be given; it will simply be taken on trust when goods are declared to be qualifying goods. I see the Minister is nodding.

[The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Chris Heaton-Harris)]

indicated dissent.

[Sammy Wilson]

Perhaps the Minister can tell us what proof companies will have to give and how onerous that proof will be. What will happen where it becomes clear that there is abuse in goods moving through Northern Ireland into GB? It appears—again, if I am misreading this, perhaps the Minister can explain it to me—that proposed new section 45C indicates that guidance will be given to local authorities, probably through bodies and so on, as to what needs to be done to keep the free flow of goods between Northern Ireland and GB, but proposed new section 46A states:

“The Secretary of State may revise or revoke (in whole or in part) any guidance issued under this section.”

In what circumstances would that guidance be given? If it were given, what would the impact be on the free flow of goods from Northern Ireland to GB, which is more than 60% of our market? It is about those details.

When we have this kind of seal of an agreement, with all the wide-ranging and broad-brush aspects, we sometimes find that when we get down to the detail it falls apart, as happened in the Windsor framework—let us not forget that it fell apart within about two days of the Prime Minister giving the assurances. It is important that we understand all the various scenarios that are being painted in such a detailed SI as this.

First, will the Minister give us an assurance about what is happening to the green lane infrastructure—will the SIs and the EU regulations be removed, or will they stay in place, as part of the Windsor framework, the protocol and the withdrawal agreement? Secondly, what are the five categories of goods that will require export declarations? People need to know. Thirdly, when it comes to the goods flowing into GB, under what circumstances will the border operating model be applied to them? The final point I want to make is this—