(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberYes, it is. It was changed two or three years later, but in the Nasseri case before the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, their lordships upheld, as a matter of law, the deeming of countries to be safe and within the law. Indeed, they went on to say—Lord Hoffmann being one of them, I think—that while Parliament deemed it such, there were plainly risks if the Home Office did not keep an eye on the state and conditions in the countries that were thus deemed, but otherwise it complied with the law and the courts would respect Parliament’s decision.
What is being said in this case is that a Supreme Court decision has already held Rwanda not to be a safe country for the purposes of the guarantee against refoulement. It is said that for this House to overrule the decision of the Supreme Court in such an individual case is constitutionally undesirable and contrary to fundamental constitutional principle. I do not agree with that analysis. First, it is open to this Parliament at any point to take steps to reverse the effect of a judicial ruling—that is the consequence of parliamentary supremacy. It is clear that Parliament should be restrained in doing so in cases, for example, where individual rights in a case to reverse a determination made in favour of an individual would plainly be contrary to fundamental constitutional principle, but that is not what we are doing here. We are seeking to do precisely what the Labour Government did in 2004. We are saying that Parliament, legitimately weighing the evidence, has concluded that Rwanda will not engage in the refoulement of those sent to it. That is something the courts have already accepted. It is something that it is open to this House to do, and it is something that, in my judgment, it is perfectly legitimate for Parliament to undertake. It would be different if it were to reverse a decision against an individual.
But even if I am wrong about that, and even if as a matter of constitutional convention it were undesirable for this House to reverse the effect on a question of principle—namely, whether Rwanda is safe for the purposes of refoulement—the facts have changed. There is now a binding treaty, and it is binding not only in international law but in domestic Rwandan law. My hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) has rightly analysed the situation of international law. In this country we have a dualist jurisdiction where treaties are not self-executing, but in Rwanda the treaty is self-executing, so it will be binding on the Rwandan Government not only as a matter of international law, but as a matter of their own law.
That treaty contains a range of important safeguards, including, as a longstop, the fact that no individual removed to Rwanda from this country can be removed to a third country without the consent of the United Kingdom. If that longstop is in place, if the treaty is binding in Rwandan law and if it is binding, as it is, in international law, then I would suggest that there is simply no credible risk of refoulement if treaties and legal rules mean anything in the United Kingdom and in Rwanda. If the risk of refoulement has been removed, then there is nothing inappropriate in this House determining, as the Labour Government did in 2004, that Rwanda is safe for the purposes of refoulement. So I say to the House that this is appropriate, and it is a judgment that we can make as a House to take the step that we are now taking.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is stand part that I am addressing, Mr Evans.
This Bill should warmly commend itself to those on both sides of the Committee. My only caution—my only plea—is: let this not be the last word we say upon the British constitution.
It is a delight to follow that Third Reading speech.
I have enjoyed today, not least because it is such a delight to be vindicated. I feel as if I have been saying the same things for 20 years. Some of what the Minister said today, if we put the word “not” in, was what she said 10 years ago, which is kind of entertaining but rather irritating.
I am not going to speak at length, but we have to go back to fundamental principles when we are talking about the constitution. I like Parliament sitting. It is good for Governments to face the scrutiny of the Commons elected. Long interruptions are a bad thing. We take a long time to get a Parliament going after a general election, and now, with a long general election, as the right hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller) referred to, it can be several months that parliamentary scrutiny is effectively out of action, before Select Committees are fully set up and all the rest of it.
The Executive and the Parliament need to be in balance with one other. There is a real danger that we are moving in the direction of what I call an over-mighty Executive. The Leader of the House in particular has what I call a high theological understanding of government—the Government are always right, by definition. In our system, the Government have considerable power. That is why some have called it an elected dictatorship.
The constitution should always stand the test of time and the test of bad actors. We always presume we will have a good monarch. We have had bad monarchs in the past. We presume we will always have an honourable and good Prime Minister. We might have a bad Prime Minister, who might choose to—[Interruption.] I am being ironic here. We might have a Prime Minister who deliberately chose to subvert the constitution and use it to subvert democracy.
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberMay I ask about extradition? Obviously we in this country rely on being able to extradite people from other countries in Europe to face justice in this country. We have relied on the European arrest warrant but, as I understand it, four or five countries in the European Union have now stated categorically that, if there is no deal, they will not extradite to the UK. How will we make sure that we get people to face justice in this country?
The hon. Gentleman is quite right; there are some countries that will not extradite their own citizens. In those cases it is a case of bilateral discussion with them. There is the existing Extradition Act 2003, but if they will not extradite citizens, there is of course the option of trying them in that country. That is generally the option that those countries offer in connection with their own citizens.
Exactly, and that presents considerable difficulty, as the hon. Gentleman points out. However, we will be having bilateral discussions with those countries to seek to agree specific arrangements with them.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My right hon. Friend is asking me to look into a crystal ball. Far be it from me to fathom the inscrutable minds of their lordships in the Supreme Court as to why they chose not to dissent if they were minded to dissent, or to agree if they were minded not to agree.
I for one am delighted that we are sitting, but the Attorney General is absolutely right about one thing: the result of yesterday’s ruling is that all future Prorogations will be justiciable by the courts. The only answer to that, frankly, is legislation by this House. My gentle suggestion is that it might be a good idea if, in the future, Prorogation were only allowed to proceed if there had been a vote in this House in favour of it.
Well, if I may say to the hon. Gentleman, that is as I would expect from him, particularly in his new guise as an aspirant to even higher office—it is constructive, helpful, impartial and a model to us all.
(5 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to my hon. Friend for the question. He knows that I am acutely conscious of his desire to have the maximum transparency upon the legal advice I give to the Government. He also knows that I am bound by a long-standing convention relating to Law Officers’ advice to disclose neither the fact nor the content of it. Within those constraints, I consider constantly to what extent I can make available to the House all the information it needs to take the important decisions that theses times require.
Whatever happens with regard to trade, the economy and so on, one of the most important elements in ensuring that we can still secure justice in this country is maintaining some form of extradition with other European Union countries. What will we do if the European arrest warrant is not available to us?
As the hon. Gentleman knows, the Government are committed to a close and special relationship with the EU in relation to security. The question of our participation in a system relating to European arrest warrants will be close to our hearts in the negotiations that are to follow. But if we were not able to avail ourselves of what it is in the interests of both sides to agree, of course we would fall back on the 1957 extradition legislation and its provisions, and the preparations are at an advanced stage, in conjunction with the possibility that still exists of there being no deal between us.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI must make progress, but I will give way, particularly to the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant).
The reason for the motion today, and for the form of the motion, is that it enables the House to secure this legal right. It is the case that the Government make that the agreement is required in any event. Members on the other side do not dispute the requirement for the agreement to be passed, so we invite the House to secure the certainty of the extension; to continue the process of the political declaration reconsiderations; to enable us, by 22 May, to ratify the domestic implementing legislation; and to conclude discussions on the political declaration.
The Attorney General’s argument is basically that this is a way to guarantee certainty for business in the country. However, if today’s motion is carried, there will be no certainty. The Government will not be able to ratify the treaty—I think that he accepts that they will not be able to do so—and a proper motion will still have to be introduced in this House, and the other House, including both sides. There will still have to be a Bill, which will be the subject of contentious dispute. There is no certainty—if anything, today throws more uncertainty into the process.
There will certainly have to be a Bill. There will have to be a process of ratification in the House, which is why, if it votes for the withdrawal agreement today, it would be surprising if it did not vote to implement the withdrawal agreement. This is the step that we need to take.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI think I had better just say that I agree with that one.
The Attorney General’s argument seems to hinge on this matter of “highly unlikely”. I do not know whether this is his reading of recent history, but it seems to me that everything that I thought was highly unlikely five, six or seven years ago has now come to pass. Should we not be worrying about what may be likely over the next few years? After all, many of the Governments in Europe may change and the European Commission President will certainly change, so the highly unlikely may indeed come to pass. I have a sneaking memory of a conversation that the Attorney General and I had once in the Lobby, around three years ago. I asked him, “Wouldn’t it be a good idea if you should become Attorney General?”, and he said, “Oh no, that’s highly unlikely.” [Laughter.]
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI will give way in a moment. I intend to take many interventions in the course of this speech.
We are playing with people’s lives. We are debating the effects of legal continuity. Forty-five years of legal integration have brought our two legal systems into a situation where they are organically linked. To appeal to those who have a medical background, it is the same as if we were to separate from a living organism, with all its arteries and veins, a living organ—a central part from this body politic. We cannot underestimate the complexity of what we are embarked upon doing.
The Attorney General, as per usual, is addressing the House with a remarkable combination of the intellect of Einstein and the eloquence of Demosthenes. We are all enjoying it enormously— [Interruption.] Well, I am certainly enjoying it, but I hope he will not cavil if I gently remind him that 71 Members wish to contribute. I know he will tailor his contribution to take account of that important fact.
The Attorney General is making a good point, which a lot of us agree with—legal uncertainty is the worst possible outcome. That is why some of us are so angry that the vote was taken away from us in December. There is not a single chance of the Government getting the necessary legislation through by 29 March, even if the Attorney General were to get his way today. Can he confirm that if the vote is not won tonight, the Government will have to defer leaving the European Union on 29 March?
The hon. Gentleman knows the affection that I hold for him. It is not “my way”. I understand the heartfelt, passionate and sincere views held on both sides. I listened all last night to the speeches from Members on the Opposition and Government Benches. We must come together now, as mature legislators, to ask ourselves: what are the fundamental objections, if there are any, to this withdrawal agreement? Whether or not it can be done by 29 March does not affect the decision we have to take today, which is: do we opt for order, or do we choose chaos?
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberThere is a formula in the agreement for the calculation of our obligations, but it depends on others’ contributions, what particular programmes there are and whether they spend particular sums of money. There is a series of variable factors, which is why we cannot give a firm, clear and precise figure. If my hon. Friend is referring to what may be due after no deal, that would depend on a series of arguments that would be untested except in a court.
Oddly, I had more sympathy for the Attorney General before today, because he has pushed the House into this situation. He knows perfectly well that the Government chose not to oppose the motion; they accepted it. It is the will of the House. He is, in effect, pushing us to say that he is in contempt of Parliament, because at some point, surely even a Government have to bow the knee to Parliament.
Suppose there was advice, and suppose the advice contained—this is a hypothetical situation—[Interruption.] Well, the same principle applies. Suppose the advice contained information, facts or considerations of the most acute significance for the national interests of this country.
But one might lose the vote. What then? No Minister could go ahead and harm the nation merely because of a resolution, when the House had not seen the document. In court, there is a mechanism for weighing this, but the House has not seen the document. The motion for a return was traditionally always confined to public and official documents.
That is because this procedure has been reinvented recently. The truth of the matter is that the House has no power to command documents that are not public and official. That is the constitutional question that the House needs to grapple with.
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberOn a point of order, Mr Speaker. This is a completely different issue.
(6 years ago)
Commons ChamberThe Government are currently in dialogue with all countries where EU citizens are living. The Government are making certain that the case is being made to those Governments for reciprocity, but this Government will none the less, whatever the position, ensure that those living in this country from the European Union are treated fairly and generously. That is what this country would expect, and it is consistent with the character of the people of this country. Their rights will be protected and guaranteed.
The Foreign Secretary yesterday told the Foreign Affairs Committee that the Foreign Office is doing work on what will happen if UK citizens are trapped after Brexit in other parts of Europe because there are no flights. Can the Attorney General tell us how many people that will affect and which circle of hell they will be in?
I am not able to give the hon. Gentleman that detail. It is not my sphere of ministerial responsibility. Much as I would like to answer for every aspect and part of the Government, I cannot answer that question, but if he wishes an answer, I will write to him about it.
(11 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. and learned Gentleman is always very persuasive and clever, so I hope he will be able to help me. Which persons, using his definition, would be required to register in a situation where, for instance, News Corp wanted to buy out the whole of BSkyB? It would not be any member of News Corp. It would not be the company itself, anybody it employed full-time, its lawyers or any of its consultancy companies, unless they were predominantly engaged in lobbying. Am I right to say that not a single person in that process would have to register?
Let me come on to that question, because I want to tackle it, if it is appropriate to do so, in connection with clause 1. First, let me make it clear that the Opposition Front Bench spokesman, the hon. Member for Hemsworth, asserted in this Committee that the intention of Government amendment 76 was to exclude companies and employers. That is simply not right: that is a misconception. If the Opposition pour a torrent of misconceptions on the drafting of the Bill, their criticisms will not be listened to. I am anxious, as is the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), that some criticisms should be listened to.
The word “person” in clause 1, as proposed, would mean that anybody carrying on the business of consultant lobbying, whether they represented a partnership or a company, would have to register if they came within the definition of consultant lobbying. The problem the hon. Gentleman refers to is not a problem in clause 1; it is a problem in clause 2, to which I expect we are about to come. The problem in clause 2 is the definition of consultant lobbying, but clause 1 would cover employers and people who carry on a business of consultant lobbying through their employees. A company cannot carry on business in any way unless it be through human beings—their employees. Therefore, if a human being goes to lobby and is lobbying on behalf of a consultant lobbyist, as defined, then that consultant lobbyist, his employer, will have to register. There is no doubt about that—that is a fact.
I will not give way, because I want to be quite short if I can.
The hon. Gentleman asked me a question and he made a legitimate point. What concerns me, although it may not be a point on clause 1; it may be a point on clause 2—I look with diffidence at the occupant of the Chair—is that an in-house lobbyist would not necessarily be caught by this definition. My suggestion and submission to those on the Government Front Bench is that in larger firms—for example, in major City law firms—it is now not uncommon for there to be specialist departments that deal with lobbying activities. It strikes me, with the greatest of respect to those on the Government Front Bench, that there is a strong case, where such a specialist department exists, for that department to have to register as a lobbyist.
No, I will not give way at this stage. The hon. Gentleman must forgive me. I want to be short, and there is much to cover.
It may be argued that that position will encapsulate too wide a net. What concerns me is that that will offer the opportunity for the construction or the engineering of the structure of a business, so that what is a specialist lobbying company can become part of a larger business and thus avoid the need to register. That would be a regrettable element of manipulation, and bring into disrepute the passage of the Bill.
I hope that those on my Front Bench, in considering this question, will answer it at leisure and not straight away on the hoof. It cannot be right that specialist departments—set up, it may be, in larger entities—that are often the product not so much of caprice, but of chance accident in the evolution of companies and their structures, should elude capture by this Bill.
No.
I hope that those on the Front Bench will consider what I hope they will believe is a constructive point. Let me say again that it is quite wrong of the hon. Member for Hemsworth to launch a tirade against those on our Front Bench by saying that clause 1 is being mischievously amended by the deletion of subsection (1)(b).
I will give way first to the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan), and then to the hon. and learned Member for Torridge and West Devon, although he was unkind enough not to give way to me a second time.
I think that that would be slightly to treat the legislation with contempt—so I am right up there with the hon. Gentleman.
I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has seen the Leader of the House’s amendments 93 and 94, which have just been drawn to my attention. On the face of it, those important amendments would go a considerable way towards dealing with the problems that my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Tracey Crouch) and I have outlined. They would widen the scope, and would mean that only incidental lobbying activities would escape. That could not be said of any specialist department, so it seems clear that the Government are going some way towards responding to some of the concerns that have been expressed. If the hon. Gentleman has not read the amendments, he should have a look at them and think about how far they go.
Of course I have read the amendments on pages 658 and 659, but I think they would have exactly the opposite effect from what the hon. and learned Gentleman says. The concept of a non-lobbying activity is as interesting as the concept of a lobbying activity. That is why I think this Bill provides so many grey areas, and that, in turn, is why I can see that it would recommend itself to lawyers—to lawyers, I repeat.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI had not intended to speak, but a number of matters have been raised on which, it seems to me, some light might be thrown. The hon. Members for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) and for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) both questioned the effect of what we are doing, and it is on that point that I hope to shed some light.
This is a limited, practical measure, and one that I support, but I do not hold out an enormous degree of hope that it will have a substantive effect on the exercise of the courts’ discretion. Section 3 of the Immigration Act 1971 provides that the Home Secretary can amend the immigration rules, and it provides for the procedure, by way of negative resolution, by which those rules can be challenged. If they are challenged, the Act requires the Home Secretary simply to consider the points that have been made on the resolution that has disapproved them and alter, as she sees fit, the executive administrative guidance that those rules contain. Today, an attempt is being made to give some democratic force to the alteration of the immigration rules, which the Home Secretary could otherwise have done simply by an Executive act, in the hope that it will communicate to the courts the fact that there has been some consideration by Parliament.
I take the view that that might well have some effect on the courts beyond the fact that they will attach a degree of weight to the Home Secretary’s opinion in any event. It is well established in the human rights jurisprudence that a decision maturely taken by the Executive—in this case a Secretary of State who has a wide range of advice available to her and who can consult experts in the field—to change the existing immigration rules would already be accorded a degree of weight by the courts when they are considering what is a proportionate decision in the application of a specific human right. What the Home Secretary is doing today, which, I submit, the House should applaud, is giving the House an opportunity to voice its opinion on the changes she has decided to make.
The key point, as I think the Clerks have already made clear, is that we are not deciding on the totality of the changes; we are deciding only on the basis of what is in the motion being debated today. I would not want the hon. and learned Gentleman to conflate the two by mistake.
The courts are more than capable of appreciating that what we are dealing with here is not primary legislation. Primary legislation will be accorded a much greater degree of weight—some people use the word “deference”, but the courts have disapproved it—because there is usually a period of consultation, a Bill might have been scrutinised before it was even brought to the House and a wide range of interests will have been taken into account in the process of scrutiny. A court is more than able to distinguish between a piece of primary legislation and a motion such as the one before us and to see the scope that the motion considers. That is why I say that this process is likely to produce a degree—probably a very modest degree—of additional weight to be accorded to the Home Secretary’s discretion. Her discretion would normally be accorded a degree of weight by the courts, and the motion might add a little more to the changes to the immigration rules than they would already have been accorded.
It is not difficult to interpret what is being done here. It is perfectly valid. The courts will not be deceived or hoodwinked. They will see what we are doing. They will no doubt read, if they take the trouble to go that far down the pages of Hansard, the profoundly principled position that the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington took when he held up his hands and, with a cry of horror, said, “Not with my assent.” But the reality is that the motion will lend some modest substance to the already substantial decision that the Executive and the Home Secretary have taken. She should be applauded for, and congratulated on, giving the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire the opportunity to mount that—one hon. Member described it as a “rant”; I should never be so impolite—extraordinary, eloquent and passionate diatribe, to which he treated the entire House from his position on the Opposition Benches, representing the Scottish National party.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberNo, I do not think that. Intense pressure is precisely what an independent judiciary is set up to resist. One would expect and hope for that from a senior judge. We are fortunate in the judiciary we have in this country. I hope that hon. Members will reflect carefully on some of the language that we have used in this debate today. It is not the case that the judiciary have an appetite to assume the powers of this House. Indeed, in my experience the preponderance in the judiciary is to be careful and scrupulous in the way they observe the parameters of judicial power.
The problem is—if I can extend this parenthesis as briefly as I may—that we have invited the judiciary into the territory time after time, since the European Communities Act 1972, which fundamentally altered the constitutional arrangements in this country. It essentially meant that there was a higher constitutional court, namely the European Court of Justice—we already have it—which presupposes and believes it is capable of trumping domestic law. That ultimately led to a decision in a case called Factortame, in which an Act of Parliament was set aside by the House of Lords, on the basis of the seniority—or superiority—of the European Union’s law. Then we had the Human Rights Act 1998, which preserves—or attempts to preserve—a careful balance. Nevertheless, it invites the courts into consideration of the policies and legislative objectives—almost on the basis of their merits—that this House has always considered to be its prerogative and to fall within its exclusive sphere. The courts are careful, but they themselves acknowledge that the Human Rights Act has invited them further into that territory.
The hon. and learned Gentleman is making an important contribution, and he is right about the reluctance of the courts, for the most part, to intervene and tread on our toes, as it were. However, the truth is that those elements of parliamentary privilege that attach because of not wishing to interfere with proceedings in Parliament get very fuzzy at the edges. Indeed, there are areas where others want the courts to express a view. My anxiety is not that there would be a challenge when the Speaker had issued a certificate, but that a challenge would be far more likely when the Speaker had decided not to do so.
I have heard that observation made, and I hope that the Minister will be able to address it. I do not feel quite as concerned as hon. Members who have expressed their views on that point, and I will say why. A court would very soon see through an argument that went: “The Speaker has not issued a certificate in circumstances where we”—the party bringing the application to the court—“think he should have done.” The reason is that if a certificate is conclusive for all purposes, so must the absence of a certificate be. I do not believe for a moment that a court would see the matter any other way when the Speaker had chosen not to make a certificate. Otherwise, we would have to have a provision in the Bill saying that if the Speaker chooses not to certify, that should not be challenged either. It must be implied that if a Speaker made a deliberate and conscious choice not to certify, the absence of the certificate—that choice—must equally be conclusive, and I think that most courts would see it that way. One could argue that that should be explicit in the Bill, but for my purposes, I would not have thought a court would find impressive an argument that said that a Speaker who decided not to certify could be judicially reviewed, whereas if he had certified—let us say, in the negative—he could not be. That would be pointless.
What is the point of a certificate? It is not going to be challenged in a court, because the Government and this House will instruct the courts not to look at it. The point of the certificate is merely to express in writing the Speaker’s view that something had been a motion of confidence. If he does not issue a certificate, it is plainly the case that he has reached the view that it is not a motion of confidence. However, it is highly unlikely that the mere fact that a Speaker had produced that view but not committed it to a piece of paper would induce the courts to enter that territory and issue what used to be called a writ of mandamus—it is now called a mandatory order—to force him to do so. I find that improbable and implausible. I hope that the Minister will draw some comfort from that, but he should not draw complete comfort from it, because the mere fact that we are considering whether the courts would or would not be able to enter this territory will induce litigants, lobby groups and political groups to bring these very applications before the courts to test out the territory. It will not be long before the courts start to consider the extent to which the Bill allows them in, and the extent to which it does not. That is where the hon. Gentleman of whose constituency I am shamefully ignorant—
The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Tristram Hunt) quoted the recent judgment of Lord Phillips, and that is important because Lord Phillips made it plain that the courts will reserve the power to define the parameters of parliamentary prerogative and privilege. If the Bill remains enacted in the law of this country for a long period, which I rather doubt, there will inevitably be a point at which the courts are invited in and at which they will start to examine the extent to which they can and cannot become involved. Their view might not entirely coincide with that of the Government. For example, the question of whether a certificate is valid might arise. The Bill states:
“A certificate under this section is conclusive for all purposes.”
A court might well feel entitled to consider whether, as a matter of law, it is in fact a certificate. In the past, that is the way in which ouster clauses have been outflanked.
I am asking the Minister to consider this matter, and I am asking from the heart. I have noticed that, from time to time, he has found many of the interventions by Members not altogether to his taste. Perhaps the smile of the Cheshire cat is always seated on his face during these debates simply because of his serene command of his brief and his sublime confidence in the merits of this legislation. However, I ask him to address the consciences of many of the Members on his own side who have deep and sincere concerns. My hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) is among them, and when he rises to speak on matters of the constitution, he must always be listened to with respect. He may not be a lawyer but, by Jove, his instincts on the constitution are proud and honoured by a long tradition in this House. I pay tribute to him for standing up with such integrity and for such a long time for the traditional view of the constitution in this House. It is not a bad thing to stand up for tradition. It is not wrong to honour the way in which our forefathers constructed the constitution, the wisdom of it and the value that it has conveyed down the ages to the inhabitants of this country.
Will the Minister address this matter? I hope that I have expressed myself modestly by saying that I do not endorse or adopt many of the more exaggerated flights of fantasy that have occasionally been bandied about the Floor of the House. However, it surely cannot be denied that there is some risk and some legitimate cause for concern, when this matter seems to prey on the minds and the consciences of so many Members of this House who are motivated by entirely sincere reasons, rather than merely by the need to hear the sound of their own voice. I ask the Minister to address those concerns with the sincerity with which they have been expressed.