(2 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank my—I was about to say hon. Friend. I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that point. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle will elaborate.
The reality of the academic community in higher education is that their areas of work are fluid. They do not see themselves as necessarily specialists in one field or another. As we heard in our evidence session, a statistician is a mathematician, but a mathematician could become a specialist or well versed in issues such as migration or epidemiology—medical science, in essence. How does one define “their area of expertise”? We have to be extremely careful. The right hon. Gentleman’s suggestion may well be in the right area, but much more consideration is needed, and for the purposes of the Bill we have to remove these words.
I will not expand on what Professor Nigel Biggar said. That has been done already.
On amendment 27, I am interested in what form of words other than
“within their field of expertise”
could be used to act as a safeguard, because we might see cases in which academics are picked up for use of their freedom of speech more widely, but there is a distinction between freedom of speech and academic freedom.
My hon. Friend is quite right. We have not proposed anything that necessarily refines that. At this stage, I think, it is important to remove the words, and minds greater than mine—perhaps in the House of Lords—may come up with an alternative. It is a really important area that needs to be defined.
I thank my hon. Friend for that really important contribution. As we have heard from a number of witnesses, holocaust denial—as I said, I am sure that everyone present finds it objectionable—is, in fact, lawful free speech that could be protected under the regulations currently in the Bill, unless we ensure that the limitations of free speech and academic freedom are spelled out explicitly on the face of the Bill.
As we have talked about a lot over the past couple of days, it is really important that speakers, academics and students have academic freedom. Clearly, other pieces of legislation that are in place—not least libel law, the limits that are set out in the Prevent duties that universities have to abide by, and the limits set out in the Equality Act 2010—must be read alongside the Bill, but none of those is sufficient to prevent holocaust denial. I am particularly keen to expand the definition of holocaust denial to genocide denial. Just as we not only commemorate the Nazi holocaust of Jews, disabled people, Roma and Sinti, LGBT people, trade unionists and other minority groups within Europe on Holocaust Memorial Day every year, we also commemorate the subsequent genocides in Rwanda, Darfur, Cambodia and Bosnia.
We have spoken about universities trying to appeal not only to a market within the UK, but to a global market. If there are no limitations on free speech, what message would it send to students from places such as Rwanda, Darfur, Cambodia and Bosnia? What would it say to students from Germany, where they have much more robust laws in place to ensure that holocaust denial and denial of other genocides—which is of course a disgusting desecration of all those who lost their lives and who suffered in those genocides—is not perpetuated within higher education institutions? The duty of care that institutions have towards their students is incredibly important, and it is something that we need to ensure is not lost as a result of the unforeseen consequences of passing a Bill that does not have the limitations that I have set out in amendment 32. The following amendments, which are in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington, clarify some of the technical points throughout the Bill to ensure that amendment 32 can stand.
I think that any right-minded person would want to ensure that protections are in place. It is something in which there is a clear public interest, because it is objectionable that universities might have to spend money to fight legal cases against genocide deniers who demand a right to a platform on their campuses. There is also a really important public order point, because when people from the far right are invited to speak on university campuses, there is often, naturally, a reaction from the student body, who protest their presence. Nick Griffin turning up on various campuses over the years has meant skirmishes. Sometimes, such people bring along heavies with them, who will cause problems, start fights with students and make students on that campus fundamentally less safe while they are there. Of course, they are there to radicalise people and bring them round to their far-right cause. They are there to recruit, so the idea that it is an academic exercise is for the birds—these are people coming on to campuses to radicalise young people.
We expect a vote shortly and we want to discuss a lot of other things, but I want to ensure that the amendment is given proper consideration and that those safeguards are put in the Bill to make sure that the well-meaning, I am sure, assurances of the Government do not turn out to be meaningless in effect.
Briefly, I thank my hon. Friend for her clear and considered speech in support of the amendments, some of which are in my name, given that we were not entirely sure how they would fall over the four days of the Committee.
In the evidence sessions and on Second Reading, we heard just how concerned people are. My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle mentioned the evidence given by Sunder Katwala, but I am think too of the moving comments by my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds North West (Alex Sobel) about his experience at Leeds University and the prospect of having the likes of David Irving or Nick Griffin coming on to campus to speak. I will also just pick up on the point made by Professor Whittle:
“If, for example, somebody who clearly denies the holocaust wishes to speak at a university, I would think that was not acceptable. There are certain historical facts that are sacrosanct and you cannot say that they do not exist, unless you have extremely good evidence to the alternative.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2021; c. 39, Q73.]
The amendment seeks to draw a line under the question, what constitutes reprehensible but lawful speech that is inimical to academic freedom? I cannot see any academic benefit to denying any genocide, and it would do great harm to an academic were such views espoused on campus, as well as to the wider academy, let alone damaging student welfare.
(2 years, 12 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Dr Ahmed: There is no evidence that I am aware of that there would be any problems with the appointments process.
Q
Dr Ahmed: One thing would be that we could do self-reported self-censorship. That would be something that one could measure and that has been credibly measured. One could work out whether that was declining. The second thing would be that since the Joint Committee on Human Rights report in 2018, which has been cited I believe by members of the Opposition, I could think of about 45 cases that have come up since then—documented cases—of disciplinary action against harassment of students, staff and so on for things that they have said that were legal and those are all public, so a second measure of success would be a decline in those cases.
(2 years, 12 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ He would be responsible for the appointment of the director of free speech. Would you have absolute faith in that?
Dr Ahmed: There is no evidence that I am aware of that there would be any problems with the appointments process.
Q If the Bill goes through, what would the measure of success be? You have talked about academic freedom, the chilling effect and self-censorship; these are things that exist in a very abstract way. You have referred to the UCU research. What would success look like to you?
Dr Ahmed: One thing would be that we could do self-reported self-censorship. That would be something that one could measure and that has been credibly measured. One could work out whether that was declining. The second thing would be that since the Joint Committee on Human Rights report in 2018, which has been cited I believe by members of the Opposition, I could think of about 45 cases that have come up since then—documented cases—of disciplinary action against harassment of students, staff and so on for things that they have said that were legal and those are all public, so a second measure of success would be a decline in those cases.
(4 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Nick Ashton-Hart: We are, as you know, one of the world’s powerhouses in services. Part of the reason we are a powerhouse in services is because, in the digital realm, we are also a great power in terms of innovation and firms that have had a lot of international success. Something like 60-plus per cent. of UK trade is underpinned in one way or another by digitalisation, so we are highly sensitive to any barriers to services through regulation, as well as through things such as the free flow of data and data protection.
We know that the agreements will not be duplications, because they are already not exactly the same. To the extent that we can, we should try to ensure that there are liberalising measures associated with at least the fundamentals of digital trade—some arrangements on data protection and on mutual recognition. Of course, that would also require us to stay quite close to the EU regime on data protection, which I and the industry have strongly argued in favour of. It is difficult, because if you are a negotiator and say, “I want to replicate this agreement, but I want to change one thing,” the other side is quite naturally incentivised to say, “Okay, then I want to change another thing.” The reality is that everyone will come to this with some changes, because—for many reasons, only one of which I covered—you cannot just copy and paste.
To the extent that we can put in digital measures, we should. It should be a part of the negotiating mandate for those agreements. It may be; I speak to DIT people quite frequently and have not heard whether it is, so I would not like to say whether it is, one way or the other.
Q
Nick Ashton-Hart: I would say that, at the level of principle, it probably should be. This is an example of an area of regulation that is not only economically consequential, but social and politically consequential. It is also not understood very well. The issues around platforms relate to business-to-consumer platforms, and particularly to social media. Those platforms are a tiny minority of the actual economic value of platforms as a whole. Business-to-consumer traffic represents about 10% of a platform’s value vis-à-vis the 90%, which is business-to-business traffic.
It is important at a level of principle to recognise that there are sensitivities, but it is also important to recognise that economic policy does not solve social problems and that the hooks need to be there to allow for exceptions, so that social problems can be anticipated and dealt with by the competent authorities that are responsible for them. In economic policy, however, the default is that platforms are a public good in the same way that markets are a public good. We want to facilitate innovation in the platform space, and our economy is a huge beneficiary of that.