(11 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberThat is a telling question. I tabled the Bill as a Member of Parliament and a law-maker, in relation to the laws of the land. Whether we remain signatories to the convention is a matter of royal prerogative, and a matter for the Privy Council and the Executive of the day. I drafted the Bill in such a way as to leave it open to the Executive to decide whether they wished to remain party to the convention or to withdraw from it altogether. I have sought to establish the cornerstones and foundation blocks of a uniquely British settlement, and to provide optionality in regard to whether we remain a signatory to the convention. I myself have grave doubts about the convention, but I nevertheless wanted to keep that optionality, just in case the Government of the day were not prepared to go as far as that.
I wholly agree with everything that my hon. Friend has said so far, but may I take up the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall)? Surely, even if the Bill were passed, unless we withdrew from the European convention, we would merely be replacing perverse rulings in the United Kingdom courts by even more perverse rulings in the European Court of Human Rights. The Bill might introduce an extra barrier, but it would not stop the perverse rulings that both my hon. Friend and I object to so much.
That is a fair point. The European Court in Strasbourg does make an awful lot of rulings that right-thinking British people would consider entirely perverse. What I have sought to do with the settlement proposed in the Bill is take the European convention out of the UK legal system so that it is not directly effective, and need not be applied by UK judges day in, day out. As my hon. Friend says, if we remain party to the convention, on a case-by-case basis—I think that there are about 10 cases a year—there would potentially be rulings against the UK, and the Executive would then have to consider putting provisions before Parliament to change that, or not. My hon. Friend is right to draw attention to the potential risks, difficulties and challenges.
(13 years ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend makes a good point. According to the document I have with me, Greece’s tax freedom day is 12 June. Whether that was simply an academic exercise rather than a real one, I am not entirely sure. I probably share my hon. Friend’s implied view that, for far too many Greeks, tax freedom day was 1 January. I am not advocating that this Government aim for a 1 January tax freedom day, but I am sure they can do better than they are at the moment—on the best analysis I have seen, the middle of May or what we think is actually the end of May.
Is not a central point about tax freedom days in relation to Greece the need to avoid the risk of creative accounting? We must be sure that accounts are accurate, especially where there has been a change of Government. I believe that the Labour party has so far spent its bank tax nine or 10 times over. We must ensure that, whatever happens, there will be no creative accounting; we must be able to trust the figures.
My hon. Friend is right, and I believe that the Bill will provide a good safeguard against Governments exercising sleight of hand in their presentation of figures. If we have an independent body—I do not really care whether it is the Office for National Statistics, which is mentioned in the Bill, or the Office for Budget Responsibility—and a set of figures that can be trusted, no matter how many times the Government announce the same tax increases or tax cuts, we would at least know where we stood as we would have trusted figures that overrode the spin. I think that the Bill is a particularly good safeguard against that.
The Adam Smith Institute has been on to this for quite some time, and has helpfully informed people when tax freedom day falls in this country. Although the transparency element is important, what I find most striking is the fact that British people must work for 149 days just to pay their taxes. I was also interested by the regional variations mentioned by my hon. Friend. The Welsh, for instance, spend 35 days paying their income tax, while people in London spend 51 days paying theirs.
I do not understand why the Government do not want to make people aware of how difficult the Government’s financial position is. The Adam Smith Institute used a tax freedom day-style mechanism to illustrate the extent of the United Kingdom’s debt problem. It calculated that our burden of debt was so great that UK taxpayers would need to work for nearly a year and a half, with their entire wage packet going to the Government and not a penny being spent on public services, just to pay off the national debt.
When the Government talks of our being heavily in debt, whether they are telling us that we are adding £150 billion a year to our debt or that the debt burden is more than £1 trillion, it is difficult for people to get their heads around the figures. Millions used to sound like a lot of money, but nowadays no one is interested unless it is billions. Explaining to people in simple terms that they would have to pay tax for a year and a half without any of it being spent on public services would make the extent of the debt clear to them.
We could also be shown a way out of our financial problems. Sam Bowman, head of research at the Adam Smith Institute, says:
“Tax Freedom Day underlines the huge burden of government on working people’s lives. For five months of the year, we are slaves to the state. No wonder growth is so slow—we need robust tax reform now, bringing lower, simpler, flatter taxes. The government should resolve to make Tax Freedom Day something we can celebrate earlier and earlier each year.”
I think that Sam Bowman is on to something. When we can see the facts for ourselves, when we worry about where growth in the economy will come from and conclude that it depends on people having more and more disposable income so that they can go to the shops and buy things—thus helping businesses—and when we are made aware of how long people are having to work just to pay their taxes without even having a disposable income, the way out of our debt problem begins to become clear. If we can indeed make tax freedom day arrive earlier and earlier, people will have more and more disposable income that they can use to try to get the economy going. I think that that would help the Government to see a way towards economic growth, which is what will solve our debt problem—together with, I hope, a cut in Government expenditure at some point. They do not seem to have been able to manage that so far.
Let me draw my hon. Friend’s attention to the position in other parts of the world, particularly America. Traditionally, America has been far better at generating economic growth than the wretched European Union ever has. This year, tax freedom day in the United States will arrive on 12 April, well over a month before it arrives in this country. Whereas in this country people must work for 149 days just to pay their taxes, in America they need work for only 102. Many of my constituents would much rather work for 102 days than 149.
The great recession has reduced tax collections even faster than it has reduced income. After a long debate, President Obama and the Congress extended the Bush-era tax cuts for two additional years, which is very welcome. Despite those tax reductions, Americans will pay more in taxes in 2011 than they will spend on groceries, clothing and shelter combined, despite the fact that tax freedom day falls much earlier in America.
The statistics in America are calculated by state—my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering gave figures for different parts of the UK—and they are very revealing. Mississippi has the lowest average tax burden of all the states, and its tax freedom day falls as early as 26 March, whereas in Connecticut it falls on 2 May and in New Jersey it falls on 29 April. There are massive regional variations, therefore, and drawing comparisons can serve to promote competition between states. If voters in America can see how their state compares with other states, they might be encouraged to say, for instance, “Well, hold on a minute; if Mississippi can have tax freedom day on 26 March, why can’t we have that in Connecticut, too?”
One of the best ways to get Governments to reduce the tax burden is to introduce an element of competition. That is why I want the Bill’s provisions to be strengthened so that we encourage the Government to set out in the calculations how the UK compares with other countries in respect of a tax freedom day, and in particular how we compare with countries such as America whose economic growth has traditionally been stronger than ours. After all, if we want to grow the economy, we should want to adopt best practice. Any business that wants to improve its performance will look at what its competitors do. That is how most organisations seek to improve; they benchmark their own performance against that of similar organisations to see what they might do better. I would like the Government to start doing that in respect of taxation rates. If they are forced both to show that lower taxes can be delivered in other parts of the world and to consider how those countries achieve that, they might then try to introduce a similar discipline and focus to this country.
(14 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend is right. One of the things that I have learned in my short time in Parliament is that those on the Labour Benches tend to be very intolerant of anybody who holds a different opinion from theirs. I do not think that is particularly sensible in a parliamentary democracy.
It is a great pleasure to follow my hon. Friends the Members for Dover and for Bury North (Mr Nuttall), who both made tremendous contributions to this debate. I particularly want to commend my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North on his bravura performance in filleting the Bill and pointing out its many flaws, which hon. Members on both sides of the House were perhaps not aware of until he made his contribution. When I was first elected to this place, my mentor in Parliament was the late, great Eric Forth, the former Member for Bromley and Chislehurst. It is fair to say that he will be smiling down on us after the performance that my hon. Friend has given today, in the knowledge that his memory lives on in another guise. My hon. Friend should be extremely proud of the contribution that he has made to this debate.
As it happens, I perfectly understand the frustration felt by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington and his motivation for bringing the Bill forward. On the face of it, I understand why some trade unionists in the cases that he identified—he quoted a couple of cases that were illuminating, and I want to touch on that later—felt that although a substantial majority were in favour of strike action, they had been thwarted by their employers through the courts on a technicality. His Bill is an attempt to deal with that problem, and I certainly understand his motivation. However, I think that he is misguided, for a number of reasons, and I want to explain why.
I want to start by simply looking at the Bill from the hon. Gentleman’s perspective of wanting to do the best for his friends in the trade unions, by trying to enable them to pursue strike action more readily when they feel that it is in their interests to do so. The first reason is the one that my hon. Friends the Members for Dover and for Bury North both mentioned, which is the fact that we are now getting some clarity in the original law. Given that the hon. Gentleman has received a favourable verdict from the Court of Appeal, it seems bizarre that he should want to rip up the law that delivered that favourable judgment and start all over again. I hope that, when he sums up the debate, he will explain why he does not accept the favourable judgment of the Court of Appeal, and why he wants to start all over again, with all the uncertainty that that brings. I cannot see any logical reason for doing that. Perhaps his decision to introduce this private Member’s Bill was made before the Court of Appeal’s verdict, in which case perhaps he might wish to reflect on whether it is now surplus to his requirements.
I do not believe that the Bill addresses the frustrations of the trade unions. The problem in some previous cases has been the wording of the law, and its interpretation, but the law does not need to be completely ripped up. It simply needs clarification or very minor tweaking. My hon. Friend the Member for Bury North pointed out that the current legislation requires unions to provide employers with notice of ballots on industrial action, and to provide exact numbers, workplaces and categories of those to be balloted and their addresses. It also states that any errors must be
“accidental and taken together are on a scale which is unlikely to affect the result of the ballot”.
That is the law as it stands.
As we have rather helpfully teased out in the debate, the existing law does not state that the errors should be accidental or on a scale unlikely to affect the result of the ballot. I think that this is the point that the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington was trying to make. He and the unions seem not to like the fact that the existing legislation provides for the fact that the errors must also be accidental. All the focus has been on the fact that mistakes were on a scale unlikely to affect the result of the ballot and that the strike action should have been allowed to continue on that basis alone. He did not seem to like the fact that court was also including the test of whether the mistakes were accidental, as the law currently requires. We can argue about whether that is a good idea, but I suggest that he would be far better off simply making a small amendment to the existing law, replacing the word “and” with the word “or”. That would appear to solve his problem.
I do not particularly agree that we should change the law in that way, because I believe that the current provision is a good one, but from the hon. Gentleman’s perspective, he needs only to make a very small change to deliver what he and his trade union want. It would be much more sensible and simple for him to go down that route.
Picking up on that point, I would not want the House to think that I intended any personal disrespect to the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell), who has brought the Bill to the House with the noblest of intentions. My frustration, as a new Member, is that we might lose the rest of today’s business because we cannot vote against this measure in the way that should be possible. I put it to my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) that the previous Government did not always listen to the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington or give him the respect that he deserves, and I hope that the new Government will listen to his proposals in greater detail, and not simply knock them out of court, so that they can be adopted and bring new clarity and certainty to trade union law.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention. Anyone who knows him will know that he would never intend any discourtesy to anyone, and I had certainly taken that as read, but I am sure that the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington will be grateful to him for that clarification. My hon. Friend certainly did not need to explain that to me, however; knowing him as I do, I know that he would never be discourteous to anyone on either side of the House.
There are simpler ways for the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington to pursue his campaign, although I would not necessarily endorse them. Part of the hon. Gentleman’s frustration is not to do with the law as it stands. How could it be? As we have explored, the Court of Appeal agreed with his particular standpoint. He cannot therefore have any quibble with the law as it stands. I think the hon. Gentleman’s real quibble is with judges who grant injunctions and the basis on which they do so.
The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington certainly needs no advice from me—neither does anybody else for that matter—and I am sure that he will not take it, but I am certainly prepared to give it to him free of charge. My suggestion is that he start a campaign around the whole issue of judicial injunctions. What tends to happen when people seek an injunction from a judge—not just in this case, but in other cases, and we often see it in libel or privacy law—is that everything happens very quickly. That is why people seek an injunction—because something is about to happen very quickly. It might be a strike action within a day or two, or a story being printed in a newspaper that is going to have very damaging effects on somebody’s reputation. That is why an injunction is sought at very short notice.
On what basis should a judge be able to grant an injunction? That is the issue. Let me deal with what happens when people seek injunctions. I feel rather nervous about making these points when I am surrounded by so many esteemed people from the legal profession. As a non-lawyer, however, let me clarify my observation of what happens. Because something is going to happen that could have a devastating effect—on a business, on customers or on somebody’s reputation—judges are, in effect, risk-averse. If something is about to happen—an article to be published, a strike to take place—and there is some uncertainty over the law, a judge cannot go back and change the law to stop it happening. What judges quite understandably do is to take a risk-averse view. They feel that the law might need some clarification and it is not entirely clear whether something is legal or illegal, so they adopt the risk-averse option of granting an injunction on the basis that a court can overturn the injunction later. If an injunction is not granted, something cannot be stopped from happening after it has happened. That is why I think the hon. Gentleman might want to pursue the whole area of injunctions and the level of proof or certainty judges need before they can grant them. I believe that that would help his side of the argument; it would certainly be more helpful than promoting this Bill.
I am sure that my hon. Friend is right. He got rather technical during the course of that intervention, at which point it went beyond my capabilities. The bit that I understood, however, I certainly agreed with. Knowing my hon. Friend as I do, I am sure that I would have agreed with the bits that I did not understand. I therefore commend whatever my hon. Friend said to the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington who, having a greater intellectual capacity than me, will have understood everything that my hon. Friend said.
One oddity about injunctions is their application to Members of Parliament. They are very hard to enforce, given the freedom from civil arrest that we enjoy. Does my hon. Friend agree?
I am being tempted by people who are more expert in the law than I am to comment on matters that they know far more about than I do. My hon. Friends can take it as read that I agree with them on any matter with regard to the law, because they are in a far better position to argue their case than I would be.
I am still warming to my theme of how the intentions of the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington can better be advanced. His supporters in the trade union movement also take exception to the definition in legislation of “accidental”. We can all probably accept the definition of making a difference to the result. If a certain number of ballot papers were affected, all of which voted one way, but the result would not have changed, the wording in the current law of,
“on a scale unlikely to affect the result of the ballot”
is perfectly clear. From that starts the frustration.
The issue is the “accidental” point. If the hon. Gentleman attacked that problem, as he sees it, by instilling some definition of “accidental” in the Bill, his supporters might find that a more fruitful way forward. In the case of BA, which he quoted most during his speech, the judge, summing up his ruling to grant an injunction, said:
“I do not consider that there is evidence capable either of establishing that UNITE held a reasonable belief in the entitlement to vote of all its members, or enabling it to rely on an ‘accidental failure’ within section 232B.”
The point that Unite was making was that any failings in its ballot were unintentional, and that that met the definition of “accidental”. The judge said in his conclusion:
“In my judgment, an unintentional failure, as it was categorised by”—
Unite—
“in the circumstances of this case, cannot be regarded as an accidental failure within the meaning of that section, even applying a purposive construction to its provisions.”
Therefore, the problem for Unite was that it did not get over the first hurdle of “accidental”. The problem was not, as the hon. Gentleman said, in relation to the test of
“on a scale unlikely to affect the result of the ballot”—
the judge did not even get to that—but that, as far as the judge was concerned, Unite had not got over the “accidental” hurdle. The hon. Gentleman’s unhappiness with the existing legislation can be only with the definition of “accidental”. If he wishes to move things forward, from his perspective, I suggest that he do so by instilling a definition of “accidental” that meets his requirements.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I hope that I shall have the pleasure of listening to his own speech today, because I enjoy his speeches immensely.
I intend to develop this point further, but my direct answer to my hon. Friend’s question is that I believe we should vote against the Bill. I do not think that any of my suggested alternatives could be incorporated into an amendment, because the Bill goes off at a tangent to them.
At the beginning of his speech, the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington said that, although others might perceive flaws in the Bill, it should proceed straight to Committee, where any such flaws could be ironed out. That strikes me as an argument for never giving a Bill a Second Reading. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North helpfully pointed out, the Bill has two clauses, and given that both appear to contain flaws, I do not think that amending them in Committee is an option. We should try to vote them down and start again from scratch. The fact that I have given advice to the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington does not mean that I would agree with any of the amendments that I have suggested should he introduce them; I merely think that they would help him to deliver what he wants to achieve.
In deciding whether to approve the Bill, we must also decide whether it is necessary. It was, I think, my hon. Friend the Member for Dover who suggested that it was a solution looking for a problem. I hope that when he sums up his argument, the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington—with his court verdicts in the bag—will tell us what problems the Bill solves, because all the evidence that he gave earlier involved problems that have now been cleared up by the Court of Appeal. It would be helpful if he told us about any current problems of which he is aware, because it seems to me that the Bill is wholly unnecessary.
Does my hon. Friend agree that the errors in the Bill, although themselves minor, prevent us from supporting it today, and that we should enjoin the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington to work positively with the Government to find a way of dealing with his concerns? That would enable the trade unions’ own concerns to be taken on board properly, would enable us to vote on them properly if it were found that the law needed to be changed, in Government time, and would ensure that account was taken of any merits in the hon. Gentleman’s argument. His Bill might then actually hit the statute book.
I am sure that my hon. Friend is right. As it happens, I am content with the law as it stands. I shall be interested to hear what the Minister has to say. I do not know what he will say and I do not want to pre-empt it, but I hope he will say that the Government have no intention of changing the current law, because, as the court has ruled, it is perfectly adequate. I am sure that the Government will always work closely with any Member if they feel that an injustice needs to be corrected, but I am not sure that that is the case in this instance.