BHS

Charlie Elphicke Excerpts

Thursday 20th October 2016 Commons Chamber

[Frank Field]

Sir Philip has threatened to sue me over my comments about that. I am still waiting for the writ to arrive. I long to be in court to have a trial by jury, but that will be for another day.

I return to what I see as the main findings. There was some pretty important engineering going on from the early years in respect of the profitability of the company. We were much amused in Committee when Sir Philip said that his business prowess extended to halving the cost of coat hangers. It would have been more interesting, of course, for him to have told us about his secret share dealing with one main supplier who during those early years, because they were party to BHS decisions, knew the costs of other orders for which tenders were coming in and was therefore able to bid accordingly.

I maintain that thanks to that measure, Sir Philip was able to get perhaps artificially low supply costs, boosting BHS profits during that period, so it looked even more profitable than it was. That individual shareholder, as I say, was involved in a secret share deal. When he came to sell his shares, he managed to sell them for £90 million. Going on from there, we know that this played a key part in allowing £400 million in dividends to be taken from BHS, which most observers would not necessarily have seen as anything extraordinary.

The next stage of this sorry saga—my second theme—is, what was Sir Philip able to achieve from that BHS base? Gaining ownership—control—of BHS allowed him to acquire the group of companies known as Arcadia. From Arcadia, he managed to sponsor a huge gearing operation. Was it £2.6 billion? Was it £2.9 billion? However, the key thing about the ownership of Arcadia, which came only from what appeared to be the adequate —or more than adequate—running of BHS, was that there were huge sums of money sloshing around Arcadia. All too soon, £1.3 billion of money geared—loans acquired—on Arcadia through a number of companies found its way up to Lady Green.

[Charlie Elphicke (Dover) (Con)]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way on this important point. Is that not the heart of the issue? The ability of corporate bandits to asset-strip in this way, leaving employees, pensioners and deferred pensioners in the lurch, is one of the key things that needs reform. It is one of the key reasons why people feel this country works for the Philip Greens of this world, rather than the working-class kids of Dover, Deal, Doncaster and Darlington.

[Frank Field]

Not for the first time, the hon. Gentleman reads my mind, because I wish to go on to that issue. Despite all the razzmatazz and so on, there was nothing that the Committee could find—no evidence of this was presented to the Committee—that showed that Sir Philip Green was king of the high street. He was, and is, a very successful traditional asset stripper, and I think that many people will want to develop that aspect of the debate.

Many of the workers in Arcadia must feel that they may stand ready to be pushed into the same hole as the BHS pensioners and workers. However, I think that a check has been put in place, and how that has happened is rather interesting. There was one of those wonderful moments during our hearings when one thinks, “Why is somebody telling me that?” Dominic Chappell—this triple bankrupt who was largely a creation of Sir Philip Green—told us that he had first refusal should the Arcadia group come up for sale, but that the only restraint was that Topshop would not be sold as part of that next sell-off. Of course, Topshop remains the crown jewels of Arcadia. It is the part of the Arcadia group that Sir Philip Green tried to take into America, and he succeeded. However, we now know that Sir Philip has had to sell part of his stake in Topshop to a company called Leonard Green—no relation whatsoever. It is inconceivable that that American financier would have agreed to buy into Arcadia without having the power to lock the tills, so the idea that the Arcadia companies, and particularly Topshop, will see moneys moving from them to the Green family has clearly been stopped.

Why, the House might ask, if that is the only part of Sir Philip’s empire that is making money, did he sell? It comes back to those mega-loans of between £2 billion and £3 billion. Recently, they have had to be refinanced. Given what our Select Committees have brought out, I think that Sir Philip had real difficulty finding a refinancing champion and had to give access to the crown jewels—Topshop—to refinance those loans, half of which probably went very quickly through a network of companies up to Lady Green and the Green family.

Let me move on to my third theme: the Greek tragedy that has unfolded before us. Sir Philip has many times made the criticism of me that I am biased and that in the very first interview that I gave on this issue on the “Today” programme, when I was asked the straight question of whether I thought he should lose his knighthood, I said yes. Now, perhaps I should not have been a politician—maybe I should have dissembled—but I actually answered based on what I then thought the evidence was, although I much wanted evidence to overthrow that original view. However, whether I had held that view either publicly or privately, as to the idea that the two Select Committees that this House selected to represent it on business and on work and pensions matters could somehow be manipulated by me—fine chance.

[Frank Field]

I do not have time to go down that road, but I am really grateful to my hon. Friend. He always emphasises how much we disagree when he is agreeing with me, but I hope that does not mean that we both have re-selection problems coming down the tracks.

However, let me get back to this theme of Greek tragedy. We are dealing with a man who has tremendous wealth—it is difficult to comprehend what wealth he has. Yet, we know that he could have paid up—paid a modest amount, compared with that wealth base of £3.5 billion or whatever it is—and walked away smelling of roses. Not only that, but he would have helped the House, through our Committee system, to begin to set the debate about how we face the whole challenge of pension deficits—that new era into which we have come. That would have helped to answer the question raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds): what lessons was Sir Philip drawing vis-à-vis corporate governance? In all those things, he could have been setting the debate. On pension deficits, and on the reform of private companies in particular, he has had nothing to say, but he could have helped us to lead the debate.

[Charlie Elphicke]

Is not that the heart of the issue? Philip Green says he is sorry, but it comes across as crocodile tears, because he will not put his money where his mouth is. He ought to make recompense.

[Frank Field]

Indeed. Whatever the legal issues, there is a mega, mega, mega-moral responsibility.

Let me conclude my third theme of this Greek tragedy. Here we see—we have seen him before us in this place—a man who has everything in life and risks losing everything important in life: his standing and how his friends regard him. He does so because he seems somehow unwilling to surrender a modest part of his mega-fortune, but that modest part would make such a difference to those pensioners who are still awaiting their fate.

I turn to my fourth theme: what is being tested through our report, starting with our debate today? First, Members will have a chance to comment on how two of their Committees have carried out their work. I really hope that Lord Pannick’s rather appropriately named report, which would begin the Americanisation of our Committee system in which we would have no role, because all the lawyers would just take over and we would sit there like puppets, will be strongly resisted. I know other Members will want to talk about this “judgment”, but Lord Pannick’s report has shown that if you pay a lawyer, and they are friends of yours, they will come up with the opinion you want. That report does nothing for the legal profession. It is interesting that within moments of publishing this supposed report, Lord Pannick had to admit that he was very close friends with two of the key players whom we examined in this undertaking.

There are clearly questions about the Pensions Regulator that people will touch on today and the Work and Pensions Committee will look at. Are the organisation’s legal powers up to the increasing challenge that it faces? Does it have the right staff? Is it run with the right culture, and if not, what needs to change? Of course, the latter would be much more difficult to deal with than changing legal powers or getting the right staff.

What are the lessons for the Government? My hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) has already mentioned one lesson, which I have now learned—perhaps I should have done so long ago. I had somehow thought that private companies govern the future destinies of only a few employees at a time. Wow, was I wrong about that, considering Sir Philip Green’s empire in BHS, with all those 11,000 jobs destroyed, and the jobs at stake in Arcadia? My hon. Friend’s point about corporate governance is mega. It is a theme that fits in with the Prime Minister’s wish that in trying better to protect the vulnerable, soft underbelly of British society, we must look at how capitalism behaves in this country.

I have two more brief points. First, how do we ensure the independence of the bodies that are put into operation to try to recover the assets of a company that has gone down like BHS? Very important questions have been raised in respect of the recovery operation for BHS. Secondly, if we needed to address the staffing, powers and approach of the Serious Fraud Office, given that we are still waiting to know how it is going to respond, how would the appropriate Committee, and then this House, do so in a non-threatening way?