(8 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I thank my right hon. Friend for his question. He is very knowledgeable about matters naval. He is right to draw attention to the fact that the introduction of a new and lighter class of frigate raises the prospect not only of more surface platforms for the Royal Navy, but of more exports. As far as I am aware, there has not been a complex warship exported from Clyde yards to other navies around the world for some decades. This provides us with the opportunity, through the general purpose frigate and the additional offshore patrol vessels, to give the Royal Navy, in due course, a larger physical presence and therefore to reverse the decades of decline.
I am sure that those watching will be disappointed that this urgent question descended so quickly into a Tory-Labour bun fight. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Douglas Chapman), whose question exposed the revised timetable. The reply he received confirmed what we have suspected ever since the strategic defence and security review was published last year: that this Government are creating the conditions in which to betray workers on the Clyde once again. Earlier today, Scotland’s First Minister met the unions at BAE Systems, and they expressed their grave concern that the UK Government are set to renege on the promise they made, along with the Labour party, before the independence referendum, that there would be a steady stream of work coming to the yards on the Clyde, guaranteeing employment. Just three years ago, the Prime Minister said:
“Scottish defence jobs are more secure as part of the United Kingdom.”
Given that, can the Minister confirm today that there will be no redundancies at BAE Systems in Glasgow, and will he confirm that the Ministry of Defence will stick to the timeline that has been agreed and set out?
What I can confirm to the hon. Gentleman is that, had the independence vote gone the way that he and his colleagues would have liked, no warships would have been built on the Clyde, because the United Kingdom Government would not have chosen to build them there; we made that very clear. As it is, as I have just confirmed to the House, we will be proceeding with the construction of eight complex Type 26 warships on the Clyde as and when the programme is ready.
(9 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI am about to respond to some of the comments that have been made today. Before I answer the hon. Gentleman’s question, I want to deal with the fantasy figures presented by the SNP’s defence spokesman, the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O’Hara), who had conjured up from nowhere the idea that if the nuclear deterrent ceased to exist, Scotland would benefit by some £15 billion as a result of not spending money on it. The cost of replacing the Vanguard class with the Successor class is, as identified clearly in yesterday’s document, £31 billion spread over decades—over some 30 years—so the idea of a much larger figure is not correct.
No, I am afraid I will not give way.
I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s apparent admission that in the event that the deterrent was to be decommissioned, Scotland would take its share of the nuclear decommissioning risk and location of nuclear material. That is very welcome indeed and is in stark contrast to the responses we have had from the Scottish Government to the disposal project currently in consultation.
The hon. Gentleman also indicated no willingness to acknowledge there is any potential threat from nuclear-empowered nations. He was challenged and signally failed to provide an answer as to what the potential threat might be from Russia, despite the fact that every time there is an incursion into either air or sea space approximate to our national territorial waters SNP Members are the first to jump up and ask what we are doing about it. It seems that they have, as so often, double standards. Finally, I point out to the hon. Gentleman that there has been no increase in nuclear weaponry in this country—far from it; nuclear weapons numbers have declined.
The hon. Member for Chesterfield gave a thoughtful speech from a somewhat confused party position. On the governance of implementing a delivery organisation to make sure we deliver the Successor programme on time and to budget over the years to come, I can confirm that this will remain subject to oversight by the MOD. We are in the process of working out how we best learn the lessons of delivering major procurement projects like Aircraft Carrier Alliance to get the industry properly aligned, and the Ministry and the delivery organisations currently within DE&S properly aligned, to work in partnership to deliver this vital programme.
(9 years, 1 month ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Thank you for chairing these proceedings, Ms Buck. I congratulate the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O’Hara) on securing the debate, and I thank him for giving me an opportunity to address this issue, which I agree is important. It is appropriate that we have an opportunity to discuss it in the House.
I appreciate that the safety of nuclear-powered submarines has been and continues to be a subject of interest not just in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency in the immediate proximity of our submarine base, but to everyone in the United Kingdom. The Vanguard-class strategic ballistic missile submarines, along with the majority of the Royal Navy’s attack submarines, are based at Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde, in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency, and the whole operating Royal Navy submarine fleet will be based there by 2020. Clyde is one of the largest employment sites in Scotland, with about 6,800 military and civilian jobs, which will increase to about 8,200 by 2022. I pay tribute to the hard-working people who man and maintain Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde to support the Royal Navy submarine fleet based there.
The hon. Gentleman expressed the concern that the workforce have about their jobs at the site. What I have just said reinforces the decisions taken under the previous Government. The primary threat to the jobs of those working at HMNB Clyde is from the proposals of the hon. Gentleman’s party and the Scottish Government, rather than from this Government and the work that we intend to place there. However, I listened carefully to his speech and will endeavour to address the points that he raised.
I am sure the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that, despite his suspicions to the contrary—I know he knows this privately—there are certain aspects of the operation of submarine nuclear reactors that I cannot discuss owing to security considerations. That is not a fig leaf; it is real. I am sure that no hon. Members would wish the security of the fleet to be compromised. Having said that, I will provide as full a response as I am able to on the issues that he raised. Before I do so, I would like briefly to set in context the Government’s policy for the safe and secure operation of nuclear-powered submarines.
The protection and defence of the whole of the United Kingdom and our dependent territories and citizens is the primary responsibility of Government. In a world that is becoming more uncertain, as we have seen in the actions of a resurgent Russia, the Government are committed to maintaining a strong and capable fleet of attack and strategic ballistic missile submarines and the continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence that provides the ultimate guarantee of our national security. In speaking today of our submarine fleet, I would like to take the opportunity—I am sure that all hon. Members would echo this, whatever their personal views on the merits of the nuclear deterrent—to thank the crews of all our submarines, their families and the wider community for their continued dedication and commitment to delivering the mission.
I turn to the points raised by the hon. Gentleman. I want to make it absolutely clear that safety is our priority. Although operating a nuclear reactor in the submarine environment provides unique challenges compared with doing so in the civil sector, the rigorous safety measures that we adopt ensure that submarine reactors remain safe at all times. The safety of reactors is rigorously assessed at every stage of their life, from design and build to operation and disposal. Safety is independently regulated in accordance with the law and by our own Ministry of Defence independent nuclear regulator. Together, those regulators impose robust controls that are at least as stringent as those in the civil sector. We are also held to account by external regulators and, ultimately, here in Parliament.
In Scotland, radioactive substances are regulated by the Scottish Environment Protection Agency. A memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of Defence and the SEPA includes provisions that enable the agency to carry out its regulatory role effectively while ensuring that sensitive information is properly protected. Similar arrangements are in place with the Office for Nuclear Regulation.
I trust that what I have said will reassure hon. Members that our submarine nuclear reactor operations are subject to independent, impartial and robust regulation. Any suggestion to the contrary is, quite frankly, wrong. As I have said, I am constrained by security considerations in the details that I can discuss, but I can say that the Ministry of Defence regularly and routinely reviews the procedures regulating the operation and maintenance of submarine nuclear reactors. That process naturally includes consultation with industry partners and regulators, but no change can be implemented until it is proved to be safe and, where applicable, has been approved by the relevant regulatory authorities.
Regarding the hon. Gentleman’s specific concern, it may be helpful if I explain that submarine reactors have a diverse range of cooling systems, including a dedicated system that is not dependent on electrical supplies. As I have previously informed the House in answer to a question from the right hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson), there have been only four events in the past 20 years involving the loss of electrical power to a submarine reactor cooling system when in port. In all four events, there was no disruption to reactor cooling as a result of the loss of electrical supplies.
That is the measure of the safety of our submarine nuclear reactors. It is simply not the case that a disruption of the electrical shore supply to a submarine will inevitably and rapidly lead to the submarine’s reactor becoming unsafe. It is quite wrong, and indeed alarmist, to suggest otherwise. Any proposals to change reactor operating procedures must be seen in that context. The Ministry of Defence would never propose a change that could lead to a reduction in reactor safety. Were we to do so, any such change would simply not pass regulatory scrutiny.
What I have said may raise in the minds of some hon. Members the question of why submarines require a shore electrical supply and why, if the loss of that supply poses no immediate threat to reactor safety, its restoration is subject to strict regulatory control. That question is simply answered. Once the reactor has shut down, the submarine continues to require a supply of electricity to operate its internal systems, such as lighting to allow sailors to get around the submarine. Although those requirements can be met from other sources, in the longer term a shore supply is required. As I have said, however, reactor cooling can rely on a diverse range of systems, not all of which depend on electrical supplies.
I fully understand that nuclear-powered submarines are a contentious issue for some hon. Members, and that they are likely to remain so. I want to address the question asked by the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute about whether the proposed changes have been inspired by Babcock, and in particular by the savings required in the company. My answer to that is we have made no assessment, in the review of procedures, of the impact on Babcock. This is a Royal Navy-initiated activity with the MOD’s support. Proposed changes to shift patterns have nothing to do with why we are undertaking this exercise. That was one of his concerns, and I hope that I have set it to rest.
I genuinely thank the Minister for his answers, but can he understand my frustration that all my previous questions were grouped together and given one stock answer? Does he agree with me that the Ministry does itself no favours by doing that, because it leads to suspicion and conjecture? Would it not have been an awful lot better if the MOD had answered each of my questions on merit, in which case we would not have needed this debate?
I can understand why the hon. Gentleman might have been somewhat frustrated by the reply that he got. I have to say that it is not unusual for Departments—across a range of activities, not purely the MOD—to find themselves not always capable of delivering the kinds of answers that the Members who pose them might like to receive. Many of the questions that the hon. Gentleman asked got into topics that were covered by security concerns, which was why he received the answers that he did. I hope that during this debate, I have managed to allay some of his concerns.
In closing, I can only reiterate that the Ministry of Defence operates its submarine nuclear reactors with the highest regard for safety. As in the civil sector, appropriate and targeted assessments of operating processes and procedures are undertaken to ensure that our robust arrangements remain valid. The process involves not only the independent regulator but our industry partners and independent nuclear safety advisers, who play a significant role in ensuring that those processes and procedures are as robust as they need to be to ensure the safe operation of our submarine nuclear reactors. Only when a positive consensus of advice has been reached to the effect that reactor safety will not be compromised, and that there is a clear benefit, are changes to operating processes and procedures undertaken. As I have said, the process includes our independent regulator and, where necessary, external regulators.
The Royal Navy’s attack and strategic ballistic missile submarines are an essential capability for the defence of the whole United Kingdom, and I hope that what I have said goes some way towards reassuring hon. Members that our submarines are operated with the highest regard for the safety of their crews and the public. Through our nuclear-powered submarine programme and the independent nuclear deterrent that it supports, we ultimately guarantee our national security and the freedoms that we continue to enjoy in a democratic society.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House has considered restoration of electrical shore supplies to nuclear-powered submarines.
(9 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberMay I get clarification on something? The Minister said that this would lead to £1 million of savings for the MOD, but the knock-on effect to the local economy will be that the fishing boats will be cleared out of the new extended range. There will therefore be a devastating effect on the local economy while the MOD is saving £1 million per annum.
I shall come on to deal with the hon. Gentleman’s comments about the impact on the fishing industry, because that is the thrust of the argument being made by Scottish National party Members. In short, that vision is not shared by the MOD, and I will come on to explain why. We believe that this investment will sustain the activity in Applecross and the Kyle of Lochalsh, and in the Inner Sound, which will have an enduring future in terms of maintaining economic prosperity in the area.
Relocating the in-water acoustic measurement equipment away from Rona will mean extending the current Ministry of Defence byelaws for the BUTEC protected water space by some 28 sq km. The current byelaw covers 82 sq km, which is currently divided into two areas. The first is an outer area of approximately 56 sq km, which prohibits the fishing by any method involving the use of a net or dredge. There is also an inner area of around 26 sq km within which all fishing, whether by line, net, trawl or creel, as well as the anchoring of vessels, dredging and dumping of rubbish are prohibited.
Under the proposed changes for the BUTEC water space, there would be a single water space provided for all range activities covering an area of approximately 110 sq km. This relatively modest increase in water area would be offset by removing the fishing restrictions currently in place in the area of water around the Island of Rona.
Let me assure the hon. Gentlemen that the Ministry of Defence takes very seriously its obligations to ensure the continued and sustainable use of waters that are used for defence purposes by other users. We already work closely with the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and with Marine Scotland to establish a sound informal consultation process in respect of the national marine plan development.
As part of the work to implement QinetiQ’s proposal for BUTEC, it will be necessary to revise the current byelaws. Part of that revision process involves the need for public consultation. It is intended that this formal public consultation will commence later this summer as part of a separate strand of work to review all current byelaws at some 200 defence sites. The consultation is in relation to byelaws, the timing of which is not determined solely by this site. It is affected by proposals across a range of defence sites, not exclusively in Scotland—most of them are in fact outside Scotland.
All I will say to the hon. Gentleman is that I think it behoves him to act responsibly as a Member of Parliament and not to foment his constituents into getting overexcited about something until he is well informed about the situation. We all have to deal with contentious issues in our constituencies, and having been a Member of Parliament for 10 years, I think that it is always better to adopt an informed position before reaching for the panic button. Therefore, I hope that this debate has helped reassure the hon. Gentleman on how we propose to conduct ourselves and the extent of the consultation we are looking to undertake, because we will take into account the legitimate views of his constituents who might be inadvertently affected.
I would like to answer some of the hon. Gentleman’s questions. He asked who will be responsible for the consultation. The byelaw consultation will be undertaken by the Defence Infrastructure Organisation’s byelaw review team. The consultation with the fishermen will be undertaken primarily by QinetiQ, as it has the direct relationship with them. He asked whether the depth of the water would have an impact on what we are proposing, and the answer is no; the extension of the range would be in water of a similar depth, rather than shallower water. He asked whether we have any expectations of an adverse impact on the fishing community, which I think I have already addressed. The answer is that we do not think so, but we are keen to explore any concerns there might be.
On the question asked by the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O'Hara), I do not think that there is a question of undue secrecy by the MOD. As I have said, we have been very clear with his colleagues in the Scottish Parliament about what we are seeking to undertake, and we will do a consultation. However, we will maintain secrecy over the precise nature of some of the equipment and the capability it delivers, because that has a clear defence purpose. I do not think that he would expect us to be as transparent about that.
The hon. Member for Argyll and Bute also raised in a traditional way his concerns about whether this might be some underhand way of encouraging Trident renewal. I do not think that is a relevant concern here. This is about providing capability that is used for a wide variety of submarine testing, including the strategic deterrent, but it is by no means exclusively in relation to it.
Can I be absolutely clear that the extension of the range has absolutely nothing to do with the proposed renewal of Trident? I find it difficult to comprehend that such an investment would be made in an underwater submarine test facility when the Government are clearly on record as supporting Trident renewal. Is this not just under-the-line spending, by which we have seen billions spent preparing for Trident renewal before this House has had a chance to debate it?
As I tried to make clear at the outset, this is about improving the efficiency of the facilities that exist at the moment in the Inner Sound. We are, in essence, taking two separate locations under the water and combining them into one. The functionality of what happens under the water is being improved because of technological advances. This has to do with seeking to upgrade the existing facilities to make them fit for purpose for the future; it has no specific relationship to the strategic deterrent.
I think I have sought to address all the points that hon. Members have raised. I hope that the House will understand why the changes I have outlined for the BUTEC water space are required. Put simply, they are key to sustaining the continuing operation of this vital facility, which happens to be one of the largest employers in that part of the constituency of the hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber. I hope that he will come to recognise that this is something that he should support.
Question put and agreed to.