Elections Bill (Second sitting)

Brendan O'Hara Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 15th September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Cat Smith (Lancaster and Fleetwood) (Lab)]

Q My question for both witnesses is about the accountability of the Electoral Commission and the part of the legislation we are looking at on that issue. It is a balance between parliamentary accountability for the commission but also independence of the commission to be able to do its job. As it stands, the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission has an in-built Government majority, with five Members from the governing party and three Opposition MPs—I declare an interest as a member of that committee. Do you feel that is effective and what do you think will be the impact of adding another Government MP to that committee? Do you think the Electoral Commission is currently suitably held to account by Parliamentarians?

Professor Howarth: Perhaps I should answer that more than Fraser. I do not think there should be any circumstances in which there is a Government majority on the Speaker’s Committee. It was set up not to have that, but the balance in the House that determines which party gets which Chair of which Select Committee has an effect. I think the legislation has to be adjusted to ensure that the definition of who is on the Speaker’s Committee is not affected by those sorts of changes. The whole idea is for there to be consensus on electoral matters across the parties. That is the main objection to having ministerial guidance in the first place—a Minister from any particular party might be seen to say something in the interest of the party. Similarly, the Speaker’s Committee should never have a single-party majority. The legislation should make that clear.

Fraser Campbell: I agree with what Professor Howarth says about majorities on the committee. Members have to bear in mind the distinction between accountability and direction. It is one thing for the Electoral Commission to be accountable to Parliament, through the Speaker’s Committee and potentially through other mechanisms, in terms of explaining itself and being questioned about decisions it has made or its performance. It is another thing for it to be directed to do particular things.

That is the concern that arises in terms of the statement of principles. One example of that is that it envisages the ministerial statement and directing priorities. One can easily think of examples where it might be quite improper for particular priorities to be set; for example, if there was a hypothetical party that drew disproportionate amounts of support from older people as opposed to students. One can imagine why that hypothetical party might wish to make it a priority for the Electoral Commission to assist in increasing turnout among the elderly, and on whatever grounds it came up with, deprioritise facilitating students living in multiple households to register to vote. If that was a direction given to the commission, that would not really be accountability at all but interference. It would be much better for the commission to be allowed to get on with what are very well established and understood statutory objectives, and for Parliament through whatever means to hold it to account on its performance.

[Brendan O’Hara (Argyll and Bute) (SNP)]

Q My question is in two parts. On the plan to give Ministers more control of the Electoral Commission, David, were these plans ever discussed or floated when you were a commissioner between 2008 and 2018? To both of you, why do you think they have now appeared in the Bill?

Professor Howarth: To answer the first question, this would have been unthinkable in my time as an electoral commissioner, and also that was during a time when there had been a Conservative Prime Minister for the whole time. I do not think anyone would have ever imagined this was a good idea. It is an open goal for the opponents of western democracy. If you are President Xi, you might think this is the kind of thing you want—all the institutions of the state lined up behind the governing party—but not in this country. It is completely unthinkable.

As to where it has come from, it is beyond my time in office. All I can say is it looks as if it has arisen out of certain resentments in certain quarters about decisions the commission has made that people disagree with, and the Government must have been scrambling around for ways of satisfying that desire for revenge and come up with possibly the mildest version they can think of, but even this version is outrageous.

Fraser Campbell: I would not wish to make a window into the Minister’s soul, but I think all Members on all sides would want to bear in mind that if they are in Government, they will one day be out of Government, and one would not want to have a position where whatever party happens to be in Government is able to take advantage of an opportunity to influence or exert pressure on the commission while the sun is shining, only to see the boot on the other foot when they are out of power.

One sees this, for example, in the United States where it is very nice for the governing party to be able to nominate justices to the Supreme Court, but it feels much less promising when they happen to be out of power. In my position, it is much better to have a properly independent process, which we have in the courts here. We do not have the same business of political nomination of judges. We would lose something of value were we to have, in any sense, a politicised, oscillating Electoral Commission, whose priorities change depending on who is setting the direction from time to time. That would not be in the long-term interests of any party.

[Fleur Anderson (Putney) (Lab)]

Q The Bill seeks to address the integrity of elections. Would you say this is the biggest problem we face in our elections currently? Are there any other concerns you think the Bill should address or any other proposals or measures you think should be included? Do you have any other concerns about the Bill that you have not been able to address?

Fraser Campbell: Shall I go first this time? I am grateful it is a broad invitation. I think the integrity of elections is not an overwhelming concern in UK electoral law. There have been pockets of extremely bad practice that have been exposed and investigated, and have obtained a high profile, but generally the UK happily leads the world in this respect and should not be shy about that. There are problems though, which are along the themes of needing to encourage broader and freer participation, because that is the best prophylactic against domination by particular vested interests. The explanatory notes rightly draw attention to some dangers of foreign interference or interference by the very wealthy, but one of the things one can do to discourage or balance that out is to have as broad a plurality of participation as possible.

It worries me that certain provisions of the Bill are potentially apt to have a chilling effect on participation by small parties, or those who are not parties at all but are legitimate pressure groups, charities, NGOs, trade unions and so on. An example of that is the power to be given under clause 23 to a Minister, albeit subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, to effectively proscribe the types of organisations that can become registered third parties. That is important because, if an organisation is not a registered third party it is subject to a much lower spending limit. The pre-legislative material that I have seen does not give any explanation as to why there needs to be a power to limit the types of organisation that can become registered third parties. I can see why there might need to be some sort of power to quickly expand the list, if it turns out someone is inadvertently excluded.

The only rationale I have seen for this provision, generally, is to clamp down on foreign interference. If that is the case, it does not provide any justification for Ministers to have the power to exclude numbers of categories from that list, which includes trade unions, charities, UK companies and unincorporated associations. It would be of benefit to the process if this Committee were to examine, with the Government, the rationale for that procedure.

There is a tension between that procedure and a general desire, which is expressed by some parties, to avoid lawyers being too involved in the political process. I can tell you, as a matter of simple law, that if a decision to exclude an organisation was made under such a power, it would be more susceptible to challenge by judicial review than if such a decision was made under primary legislation. As a matter of basic law, judges are naturally much less deferential to secondary legislation, because it has not gone through the rigmarole and process that we are engaged in today. It would be a jamboree for lawyers—in a selfish, personal sense I would welcome that—but it has not been explained and it could have a chilling effect. Even if the power was not actively used, people would be participating as registered third parties not knowing what the situation might be in the future. I think that would disincentivise the plurality of participation that can balance out foreign interference and other less welcome vested interests.

Professor Howarth: I agree with Fraser on clause 23; the delegated powers memorandum—[Inaudible.]

--- Later in debate ---

[Brendan O’Hara]

Q Thank you very much for joining us. This morning, Richard Mawrey talked about the widescale postal vote fraud in Birmingham. What have you done to tackle that? What in the Bill helps you to further tackle that wide-scale postal vote fraud, and is anything missing from the Bill that would help you were it to be added?

Rob Connelly: I am not sure that something is missing from the Bill. What always surprises me is the number of postal votes that we get handed in on the day. We are talking perhaps 3,000 to 4,000 at a parliamentary election. We also recorded, as part of what happened, how many people brought the postal votes and in what numbers, and we often asked for names and addresses. There is no legal obligation to tell us, but in case there was a follow-up we tried to address that problem.

After the problems we had in Birmingham, the law was changed to deal with some of the issues that arose. To be honest, I am not aware that we have had major wide-scale problems in Birmingham, but it is not something that we can be overly confident can never happen again; it may do. We just have to be extra vigilant. That is where the joint working comes into play.

Restricting the number of postal votes that you can bring into a polling station may help, but we need to understand in a bit more detail the reasons behind it, because one of my concerns with the Bill is that you might be restricted to bringing in two postal votes into a polling station, but what is stopping you going to another polling station in the constituency and handing in another two? I also worry that by limiting it to such a small number we are potentially disenfranchising the honest person as opposed to your determined fraudster. A bit of work could be done around that.

[Brendan O’Hara]

Q Would it be safe to say that your biggest headache would be around postal voting, and being able to police how postal votes are managed and handled?

Rob Connelly: No, because with postal voting at the moment—I always put that qualification in—we have not had any issues. This is where we work closely with political parties, because we share information on how many we are getting back by ward and by constituency, so that they can spot any potential areas. We have always had a system in place that, if we have more than six new postal applications from a particular household, that would be flagged up and we would have a closer look. We have always put in measures to raise red flags. Individual registration and having to supply, for newer registers, national insurance numbers and dates of birth is helpful. We have the IT equipment whereby we do the signature checking, which is, again, very helpful. IT has moved on a lot since 2004.

[Brendan O’Hara]

Q Finally, how widespread have you found personation at polling booths since you joined the council in the early 2000s?

Rob Connelly: It is not a major issue that has been raised with me by either electors or political parties. We did keep some stats in polling stations as part of how to restore confidence in Birmingham. We would record, when someone came in, why they could not vote—for example, it could be that they come in and their surname is already marked off on the register. We have to do a number of years of research into that, looking, checking the numbers.

The two biggest reasons are, first, it was a simple error on the part of the poll clerk—often, it was a big family and they have just put the mark against the wrong person—and, sometimes, they came in but were marked as a postal voter. Again, it was a simple case of forgetting that they had applied for a postal vote. When we got that information back, we undertook that we would look at those cases, to establish whether there was any possible personation or other types of fraud. However, as I say, we have not picked that up and it has not come through to me from any source that personation has been a major problem. We cannot say that it has never happened or does not happen, because we do not know, but I am fairly confident that if it were widespread at a local level, it would have been picked up by party activists who would report it to us and to West Midlands police.

[The Chair]

Louise, do you have anything to add to that?

Louise Round: Just to echo what Rob said: the incidents of personation in all the years that I have been doing this have been zero—at least, that we have known about. There is a question about whether the cost and extra administrative burden of voter ID is strictly speaking necessary. As Rob said, it does not mean that it does not happen; we just do not know whether it has ever happened.