HM Naval Base Clyde

Brendan O'Hara Excerpts

Thursday 28th May 2015 Commons Chamber

[Brendan O'Hara (Argyll and Bute) (SNP)]

I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Gordon (Alex Salmond) for securing this important debate, and I am extremely grateful to him for ceding to me some of his allotted speaking time. I am also exceedingly grateful for the fact that he sought to add no further pressure on my second appearance in the Chamber. As I am sure he understands, this issue is of great concern to my constituents, as Faslane is situated in Argyll and Bute.

The dossier compiled by Mr McNeilly makes for very worrying reading indeed. I, too, am extremely disappointed that the Minister sought to dismiss in a 500-word statement absolutely everything contained in that extremely detailed 18-page dossier. I regard that written statement as absolutely inadequate. It goes nowhere near reassuring me or my constituents about the level of safety at Faslane or onboard the UK’s nuclear submarine fleet. As my right hon. Friend said, the dossier paints a disturbing picture of a lax attitude to safety and security both onshore and onboard our submarines. There are stories of people gaining access to meetings for which they do not have sufficient security clearance, bags being taken onboard submarines unchecked and the routine use of untested portable bluetooth electronic devices in missile compartments.

I would like to highlight, in particular, a number of specific allegations concerning both the nuclear missiles and the nuclear reactors on board the Vanguard-class submarines. On page 4 of the dossier, Mr McNeilly states that he was told by one of the instructors that they had found problems with the nuclear reactor onboard HMS Vanguard, suggesting that all Vanguard-class submarines might have to have their reactors replaced. Is the Minister aware of problems beyond those already known about the nuclear reactors on HMS Vanguard, and are they similar to the “trouser-leg” problems that affected the Resolution-class submarines?

As my right hon. Friend said, remembering the widely reported radioactive leak at the Vulcan reactor at Dounreay, and given the fact that it took two whole years for that to be made public, how can we as MPs hold the Ministry of Defence to account, and how can the public have confidence in the Minister’s investigations, when it appears that bad news is released only when it can no longer be concealed? The Ministry told us that it would cost £120 million to refuel HMS Vanguard. Should other submarines in the class require refuelling, can she confirm that that would cost about £500 million?

On page 11 of the dossier, Mr McNeilly alleges that the reader-worker procedure for removing the inverters from the missiles at the end of their patrol was not followed. The line-by-line reader-to-worker instructions were, according to Mr McNeilly, “completely ignored”, and the removal of the inverters from the missiles became a race between the starboard-side and port-side teams, to see who could finish the job quickest. If that is an indication of the general attitude onboard towards nuclear weapons-standard operating procedures, we should all be very concerned.

On page 14 of the dossier, Mr McNeilly alleges that while he was on patrol with HMS Victorious the nitrogen drench in the missile compartment fell below the minimum 3625 psi required. When he asked what could be done about it, he was told:

“There’s nothing we can do while on patrol”.

The nitrogen drench is what is used to put out fires in the missile compartment. Therefore, according to Mr McNeilly’s dossier, if a fire had broken out in the missile compartment and the nitrogen drench was not working, there would have been a real danger of one or all three of the solid-fuel rockets within any or all of the missiles onboard igniting and going off in a sympathetic detonation, with potentially disastrous consequences for everyone onboard. As I have said, those are just three of a catalogue of very serious and deeply troubling allegations, yet none of them was addressed in the Minister’s 500-word statement.

Mr McNeilly’s dossier points to concerns about staff training and high levels of staff turnover leading to a worrying lack of suitably qualified and experienced personnel available to the service. The Royal Navy has a proud tradition, and we recognise that people make great personal sacrifices in order to serve, for which we are very grateful, but the rate at which people are being pushed through the training pipeline due to manpower shortages leading to massive staff turnover is of grave concern. There is more than a suggestion in Mr McNeilly’s dossier that there is indeed a worrying shortage of highly trained and highly skilled professionals to fill those roles.

In any workplace, security and safety are paramount, but when dealing with nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered submarines, safety and security must be absolutely sacrosanct, because, to be frank, we are all just one mistake away from a catastrophe. I look forward to the Minister addressing all these points in detail, far beyond the 500 words on offer to us currently.

--- Later in debate ---

[Penny Mordaunt]

I will address all the points made by the right hon. Gentleman, but I must stress that he cannot have his cake and eat it. The allegations he has made are about the safety and security of this capability. I will answer as much as I can on the Floor of the House, but I absolutely stress the dedication of the Royal Navy in addressing those concerns—keeping the deterrent safe and ensuring the security of the capability—and any suggestion that somehow there is complacency is absolutely not correct. I am pleased that the right hon. Gentleman has acknowledged that this evening.

I can assure the House that the Navy’s investigation included an analysis of the service history of the boat and of the patrol report; a review of the ongoing programme of work to improve safety and security at Her Majesty’s naval bases of Clyde and Devonport; one-to-one interviews with McNeilly’s chain of command, his colleagues and McNeilly himself; and consultations with the regulatory and operating authorities. McNeilly’s concerns proved to be either factually incorrect or the result of misunderstanding or partial understanding. Some of his concerns drew on historical, previously known events, none of which had compromised our deterrent capability and from which, where appropriate, lessons had been learned to develop our procedures as part of a continuous improvement programme.

Only one of the allegations is yet to be fully examined—that e-cigarettes were used on the submarine. I must stress that no corroboration for that has been found. Nevertheless, the chain of command is considering what further steps should be taken to ensure that it does not happen.

On the specific comments about security at Her Majesty’s naval base Clyde, McNeilly’s observations focus on one limited aspect of the security jigsaw—access to one internal area. There was no reason why he should have been aware of the extensive security that is layered around the controls that he experienced. Taken as a whole, I am satisfied that the overall system for security within and around the base at the time was robust and fully effective in meeting its requirements.

We are, however, not complacent. There is an ongoing programme of work constantly to review and improve security at the base. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will send a clear message that he supports such work. He may not see the merits of the capability, but I hope that he would support its security and, where we identify the merits of further improvements to security, agree that they should be implemented.

Perhaps the most concerning aspect of this case is that McNeilly said he raised these matters while deployed, but was ignored. For his concerns, whether justified or not, to be ignored would be wholly incompatible with the leadership, the divisional system and the safety culture we expect from the Royal Navy. We have investigated this thoroughly, including through interviews with McNeilly’s former crew mates. We have not found any evidence, formal or informal, of his raising any safety concerns, even privately with those closest to him.

I will touch on the welfare of the able seaman, which I know is a concern of the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O'Hara). I congratulate the hon. Gentleman both on the two speeches he has made in close succession and on his appointment as his party’s defence spokesman. I updated him after Able Seaman McNeilly was arrested, and I spoke to the hon. Gentleman at the time about the welfare checks that were being done on him. He was arrested by the police in Scotland on 18 May as he landed at Edinburgh airport, because he was reported as a missing person, having failed to return to duty following a period of leave. He was released the following day and passed into the care of the Royal Navy. On 20 May, he was moved to HMS Nelson, a shore establishment in Portsmouth, while concerns that he had raised were investigated. He has at all times been afforded the duty of care we give to all our personnel. He has been in contact with his family, and the Royal Navy has offered additional support to them should they wish to visit him.

[Brendan O'Hara]

Has Mr McNeilly been charged with anything? What is his current legal status? Has he been given access to legal representation?

[Penny Mordaunt]

I was coming to that. Mr McNeilly remains on duty as a serving member of the Royal Navy. He is not under arrest or in custody. Any restrictions that were initially placed on him for his own welfare—namely, his having to seek permission before leaving base—were lifted as of Tuesday. He is not under arrest, in custody or charged. Our prime concern throughout the process has been his welfare.

The right hon. Member for Gordon raised wider issues regarding the fuel element breach at Vulcan. The issue with the reactor at the naval reactor test establishment was classed by the International Atomic Energy Agency as a level zero below scale incident, with no safety significance. Workers remain safe and the local community is not at risk. There was no leak outside the reactor circuit.

The MOD has made the Scottish Environment Protection Agency aware of the issue. The key point is this: had there been any safety issues, the MOD would have been the first to inform the Scottish Government and the local community. The right hon. Gentleman will be aware that the MOD works closely with SEPA, and continues to do so, given its responsibility for regulating environmental discharges from the site. Vulcan is subject to close monitoring by SEPA, and there is a robust and public formal agreement between the MOD and SEPA to ensure that we are compliant with the Radioactive Substances Act 1993.