Reservists

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd April 2013 Westminster Hall

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

It is a real pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr McCrea. I start by saying happy St George’s Day to all, and in particular, to the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers—it is their day, too.

Reservists combine a military role with their civilian job. They are not normally kept under arms, and their traditional military task has been to fight when the country mobilises for war, or to defend against invasion. Reserve troops are not normally considered part of the nation’s standing body of military forces, although now it appears that that might change.

Reservists can be used in many ways. Most urgently, they can be BCRs—battle casualty replacements—for combat losses in front-line units during a conflict, as they were in both world wars and in more recent conflicts, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. In both world wars, they were also used to form complete units. They can be used for more static activities, such as guarding, security patrols or for manning prisoner of war camps. Most certainly, their expertise enhances military intelligence, communications and medical facilities. Reservists give the nation an immediate increase in soldiers, without the months of training that it would take to build up such combat power. They are usually less expensive than maintaining a standing force, as they are used only when required.

The quality of reservists is often very high. Many have expert civilian skills that are transferable to and improve the professional efficiency of the military. For instance, some reservists involved in cyber-security are second to none, and without the Territorial Army and reservists serving in our military medical services, we would definitely have fewer survivors from the current firefights in Afghanistan. Many in the TA see military service as an integral part of their life. It may be a hobby, but it is a very serious one, about which they are normally extremely enthusiastic. That enthusiasm can often be turned to military advantage. Calling out reserves can also be a visible and deliberate signal of determined escalation during a mounting crisis.

Yet too often in the past, the TA has become the repository for weapons and equipment no longer used by the Regular Army. Selection may be neither as rigorous nor as well funded as that of regular soldiers. Members of the TA obviously do not have the same amount of time to sharpen or maintain their military skills, as they normally hold down full-time jobs as well. TA or reserve service is an add-on to their lives and it is one that sometimes has to be squeezed. Employers, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, are always concerned that a key member of their team might, just might, be mobilised, leaving them with a gaping and difficult gap in their companies for up to a year.

I accept that the Ministry of Defence fully recognises those problems and is trying to take steps to mitigate them. I agree, too, that a fix is perfectly possible for some of the points I have outlined, but I find it difficult to see how the worries of SMEs, which may lose a vital worker, can be overcome.

Reservists serving on the front line is a subject that has interested me for some time. In 2007, I wrote and presented a television programme on the TA’s involvement in Iraq. In doing so, I interviewed a number of TA and reservist soldiers on the job at the coalition air base near Basra. I was surprised to find that about 14% of the personnel in the British forces there were TA or reservists. In truth, I was very impressed by the TA soldiers and reservists I found there. They were clearly professional and up to the job. In my time in Northern Ireland and Bosnia, I, too, had excellent TA soldiers under my command. They did very well. Today, I gather that routinely about 10% of any force that the UK deploys will be made up of TA and reservists. Since 2003, more than 28,000 TA soldiers and reservists have been deployed on operations. That is a tremendous record of service, which is a great credit to the TA and reservists.

The “Future Reserves 2020” public consultation exercise ended on Friday 18 January. Comments on it have been sought from reservists, their families and employers, as well as members of the regular forces. That feedback is being used by the Ministry of Defence to help shape the White Paper, which is due to be published at any moment. Once that happens, we will have a much better idea about what the future reserves will look like. However, one thing is clear already: the Ministry of Defence wants reserve forces to be an integral and integrated element of the UK’s armed forces, and I support that fully.

A major proposal is to increase the number of trained soldiers in the TA, or what seems likely to be called the “Army Reserve”, to 30,000 by 2018. Apparently, future reservists will be better resourced, better equipped, and better trained than the current TA. They are also expected to take on a broader range of roles to meet the changing security challenges that the UK will face in future. However, all that has to be managed with very little change in man training days—envisaged to be 35 days a year per soldier, I think. Many in the Regular Army, as well as the TA, think that that is too little and, based on my experience, I agree with them.

I understand that the Ministry of Defence is designing Army Reserve units to deploy and operate intact. That has happened in the recent past: for example, the 3rd (Volunteer) Battalion the Cheshire Regiment took on United Nations duties in Cyprus for six months, although at reduced strength. However, to do an operation at full strength when we are not in a total war would be very difficult.

I accept that the Government will maintain that we are in a totally new ball game, but over recent years, the TA has consistently shrunk. In 1997, the 4th (Volunteer) Battalion the King’s Own Royal Border Regiment went on its annual two-week camp with more than 400 soldiers. Last year, its successor battalion, the 4th Battalion the Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment, which is, in fact, an amalgamation of three 1997 volunteer battalions—from the King’s Regiment and the Queen’s Lancashire Regiment, as well as the Kings Own Royal Border Regiment—went on its annual camp with just 250 soldiers. That is worrying.

The trained strength of the TA this month apparently stands at 19,000 and its total strength is 26,640. I presume that the figure of 19,000 must be based on TA soldiers who have passed stage two of their training and have picked up their bounty for doing their full annual commitment. However, to be honest, I do not believe that 19,000 TA soldiers are readily available for operational deployment if required.

In 2007, when I researched the programme about TA soldiers deployed in Iraq, my investigations suggested that, from a total TA strength of in excess of 30,000 then, only about 7,000 to 8,000 were prepared to deploy, could be released from their jobs, or indeed, were medically fit enough to fight. A considerable number of TA officers and soldiers seemed to be classified sick or, at least, lacked the required FE medical category—FE meaning “fit for everywhere”. Therefore, I am cagey about believing that the current TA really has 19,000 soldiers ready to fight. I bet that the figure is much lower, and if that is the case, the idea that we will have 30,000 deployable Army Reservists by 2018 stretches belief.

According to Defence Analytical Services and Advice, in the nine months between 1 April 2012 and 1 January this year, the TA actually reduced by 600 trained soldiers. That is hardly a good omen as we start the drive to recruit 30,000 deployable and trained soldiers. I suspect that considerably less than 50% of the current 19,000 trained TA personnel could actually do the business. Even the Defence Secretary, when questioned by the Defence Committee, suggested that that figure was considerably lower—as I recall, about 14,000. I know that disquiet about the exact number of fully trained TA soldiers is also widely shared by current Army officers, both regular and TA.

Two days ago, I spoke to Nicholas Watkis, who has recently retired from the TA after 40 years and, during that time, very often completed specialist operational service in support of deployments overseas. He told me that, to get 30,000 deployable soldiers, our Army Reserve would need to fish for them in a pool in excess of 80,000. He says that he repeatedly made this point when serving and had sent a letter stressing this requirement to the Chief of the General Staff last July. If I am right, getting 30,000 trained and deployable soldiers by 2018 may be something of a pipe dream, and, if so, this will have a dramatic impact on the post-2020 assumption that our Army could reach a total strength of 112,000 trained personnel quickly with mobilisation.

An old military maxim—and a great one—is that soldiers who train together should fight together. Indeed, this was what gave the famous pals battalions of the first world war such strength in battle. They all knew each other well and were determined not to let down their mates. I know that the Ministry of Defence is devising cunning plans to try to ensure that Army Reserve units deploy complete, but getting a large number of people released from their normal jobs simultaneously and with agreement from the individuals, families and employers would be very difficult. Undoubtedly, it would require an incredible amount of staff work and effort, unless, of course, the nation is fighting for its life, as it was from 1939 to 1945. So I am intrigued to see how the forthcoming White Paper will address this difficult problem.

There really is not much recruiting and training time until 2018, and yet we still have no idea about where Reserve Army units will be based, especially as it is suggested that many TA centres will be sold off. If local TA centres go, I think there is far less chance that Army Reserve soldiers will travel long distances from home for training, presumably in Regular Army bases. Not having their parent unit close to their families is hardly an Army Reserve recruiting incentive. On that point, local TA centres will often be the only evidence available to local people that we actually have an Army, as the regulars all seem to be being grouped in regional super-garrisons.

As the Army Reserve expands, the Government plan to cut the number of regulars in the British Army by about 20,000 to 82,000. If that happens, one in three of our soldiers will be civilians in uniform. To me that seems a high percentage and a gamble with our nation’s defences. Ministers have told me that they are confident we will reach that target of 30,000 available Army Reservists by 2018. I truly hope they are right, but I remain to be convinced. I am also a little worried that identifying, training, deploying and retaining such individuals will really be a saving on the costs of maintaining regular soldiers when all other factors are considered, including the difficulties of getting people mobilised, up to speed militarily and then looking after them and their families when their specific operation ends.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this debate and on his excellent speech. There is a further danger that he has not yet described. If this grand plan works, all will be fine and dandy, but there is a huge problem of timing. The redundancies in the Regular Army are happening now, but we will not know until 2020 whether recruiting the TA to replace them has been successful. If it is not successful, we as a nation are scuppered.

[Bob Stewart]

I thank my hon. and gallant Friend for that intervention. I totally agree with it.

[Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for securing the debate and for giving way. I can agree with much of what he has said because when I worked in industry many years ago, it bothered me that people always had difficulty getting time off for the TA, or civic duties, as we used to call them then. We are reducing the numbers of regular soldiers at the expense of some famous regiments. The matter has not been resolved yet. That bothers me, particularly in the case of regiments such as the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. What we will get is a substitute for a Regular Army if we are not careful. History tells us that we cannot have that substitute.

[Bob Stewart]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman and I will expand on that subject in a few minutes.

There is a serious need to address reservists’ and their families’ support requirements, which are different from those of regulars. Findings by the King’s Centre for Military Health Research indicate that, after operations, reservists are at greater risk of suffering mental health-related problems than regular soldiers. A 10-year study on the health and well-being of UK Gulf war veterans concluded that reservists were twice as likely to have mental health problems as their regular counterparts. The reasons behind this increased risk are not fully known, but the issue may in part be because of the differences between support networks for regulars and reservists. Unlike their colleagues in the regular forces, reservists do not have an extended period of time surrounded by their peers when they return home from duty. They often swiftly revert to their civilian job, without the opportunity to share experiences with others who have served alongside them. Support networks are hugely important for the soldiers themselves, and indeed their families, who often feel isolated when their loved one is away.

Perhaps my greatest worry about providing more than 30% of the British Army’s order of battle from reservists is my simple belief that the British Army is too small. We now have fewer infantry battalions than the small county of Cheshire had in the first world war. We have already cut the infantry too far. Four fine battalions: 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers; 2nd Battalion the Yorkshire Regiment; 3rd Battalion the Mercian Regiment (the Staffords); and 2nd Battalion the Royal Welsh Regiment are due to be disbanded over the next 18 months, a point made by the hon. Member for Coventry South (Mr Cunningham). That is well before the MOD will have anything like its forecast 30,000 trained and deployable reservists.

There will be at least a four-year gap between the battalions going and the surge of reservists ready and able to take their place. Obviously, I am a little sceptical about what will happen. Sense suggests that we should not cut our regular infantry until we have the Army Reserve in place. I would like to see these premature disbandments stopped until the MOD proves its case.

I am truly concerned that the future reserves will not be able to deliver what is expected of them. It will be through no fault of their own. The first duty of Government, above all else, is the defence of the realm. History must surely show us that cutting our defences to the bone—and, in my view, beyond that—is folly. Nobody knows what will happen in future. I believe we have a duty to maintain what we think to be sufficient soldiers to defend our country at whatever price.

I was and remain a huge supporter of the TA, but I simply have grave concerns about whether its successor, the Reserve Army, will be able to provide crucial and immediate support to our front-line troops if that is required. I have suggested some of my main worries in these opening remarks. I now look forward to listening to the opinions of the Minister and my colleagues.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—