Huawei and 5G

Debate between Bob Seely and Jeremy Wright

Wednesday 4th March 2020 Westminster Hall

[Bob Seely]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend accept that the diversity argument is one of many flawed arguments, because Huawei is undermining diversity? Through Huawei and ZTE, the Chinese state is trying to build up other states’ dependency on it to provide advanced communications, so by getting Huawei in, we are undermining diversity in the market.

[Jeremy Wright]

I agree with my hon. Friend that it is sensible to make sure we do not undermine diversity through our own actions. However, as a matter of principle, taking suppliers out of the system does not assist diversity. The points he has made are substantially about security, and I agree that this debate must focus on that question. Whether we use market caps or bring along other suppliers in the market, diversity is a legitimate security objective, just as it is a legitimate economic objective. However, I am afraid that we do not have the luxury of inventing a domestic contributor to this market in a short space of time, so we have to deal with the market as it is.

There is a good reason why we focus on the security of the system as a whole and not on one supplier. If we are worried about China, as it is perfectly right for us to be, it is worth keeping in mind the fact that many of the competitor suppliers referred to in this debate use Chinese components in their equipment, or assemble their equipment in China. It is therefore important to recognise China’s potential to intervene.

Telecoms Supply Chain Review

Debate between Bob Seely and Jeremy Wright

Monday 22nd July 2019 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Wright]

I know that the right hon. Gentleman regularly raises this issue with colleagues from the Foreign Office. As he knows, we are concerned about it across Government. It is important that the UK Government, in their communications with the Chinese Government, stress the importance of human rights and their protections for minorities as well as for majority populations in China, and we will continue to do that. The judgments we make in this review will not diminish the UK Government’s enthusiasm for making that case.

[Mr Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

Given that Huawei is to all intents part of the Chinese state, given that China has extensive history of intellectual property theft, data theft, cyber-attacks and the development of a surveillance state in parts of its own country, given that it is building up a dominant position in advanced comms that will eventually put Nokia, Samsung and others out of business, given the increased warnings of the Cell, and given our Five Eyes colleagues’ positions, does the Secretary of State agree that having any tech from one-party authoritarian states in our critical national infrastructure raises difficult and potentially insurmountable obstacles when it comes to data protection and protecting our human rights, the rule of law, our value system in the 21st century and security?

[Jeremy Wright]

I certainly think that my hon. Friend’s description justifies his reference to difficult issues. As for whether they are insurmountable, if he will forgive me I will not answer that question, because it would predetermine the outcome of the review that still has to happen specifically in relation to Huawei. However, all the points that he has made are proper for consideration as we make that decision.

UK Telecoms: Huawei

Debate between Bob Seely and Jeremy Wright

Thursday 25th April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Wright]

First, there is no lack of UK strategy. We have a clear intent to make maximum use of 5G technology. That is important because, as the hon. Gentleman will recognise, in order for our economic development to be as successful as we all want it to be, this country will need to embrace this technology and make use of it in a variety of ways. The option of simply saying we will not engage in 5G technology is not available to us, nor should it be, and I know he does not argue for that.

If we need to provide for 5G networks, I repeat that it is important to be realistic and to recognise that Huawei is a significant player in this market. There are few others—and, by the way, the others that exist use Chinese equipment or assemble their components in China. The idea that any option available to us could completely exclude Chinese equipment or involvement of any kind is, I am afraid, not realistic.

It is also worth saying, for the reassurance of the hon. Gentleman and others, that we already take action to, for example, exclude Huawei from sensitive networks. There is no Huawei equipment in defence or intelligence networks. The division between core and access networks—which, as he says, is technically complex—is something we will need to address in the review, but I would much prefer that we discuss that review in the round when it has been properly developed, rather than attempt to do it piecemeal on the back of incomplete leaks.

[Mr Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

The Secretary of State talks about coming to the House with a final decision. Is this not an opportunity to have a wide-ranging debate about this issue? There are many technical, political and security considerations. If the US and Australia can block Huawei without damaging their trading relationships with China, it raises the question of why the United Kingdom could not do the same.

[Jeremy Wright]

I recognise my hon. Friend’s considerable interest and expertise in this field. I will say two things to him. First, he is entirely right that Australia has decided to exclude Huawei completely from these systems. The United States has not yet made such a decision. It does so from federal networks, but it has not yet decided what its approach will be in the areas we are considering.

As my hon. Friend knows, I always welcome wide-ranging debate and am happy to come to the House for it. The difficulty is that, in order to have such debate, we need to have access to material that is very hard to share with the House. That is why these discussions are had at the National Security Council and why decisions must, in the end, be reached there. It is then the responsibility of Ministers—I take this responsibility seriously—to come to the House and explain those decisions to the greatest extent possible, with those caveats. I always intended to do so and still intend to do so.