Financial Services and Markets Bill

Debate between Bim Afolami and Alison Thewliss

2nd reading
Wednesday 7th September 2022 Commons Chamber

[Bim Afolami (Hitchin and Harpenden) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to speak in support of the Bill. I will not repeat what so many hon. Members have said about the excellent work of the former Economic Secretary—my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (John Glen)—and the present Economic Secretary in bringing it to the House, but I want to bring up a couple of specific issues that may not have come up in the debate as much as they might have.

The former Chancellor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond (Yorks) (Rishi Sunak), mentioned the call-in power. There has been some criticism in the press, which may or may not have come from people within the regulators or from people speaking on their behalf, suggesting that the Government’s call-in power will somehow damage our regulatory system or that it is somehow illegitimate for the elected Government or this House—in extremis, if they feel that something is badly awry—to override the non-elected regulators in a specific area of financial regulation.

I put it on record that those concerns may be well intentioned, but I think they are wrong. It is critical that this House and the elected Government have that power over something as significant as the financial regulation of the sector that is our jewel in the crown. The sector employs millions of people, two thirds of whom are outside London. We all accept, on both sides of the House, that we should champion the sector and work with it. It is almost unconscionable that such a power does not already exist, so we should stand firm if, in the other place or in Committee in this place, Members wish to reject the call-in power. I think it is critical.

[Alison Thewliss]

The hon. Gentleman speaks with a lot of expertise in the area. Could he give an example of when the power might be used? In what circumstances might the Government want to use it?

[Bim Afolami]

Lest anybody should think I have any particular specialist knowledge, I stress that this is entirely my own view, but I could imagine a scenario in which the Government, supported by this House, intended certain changes to a regulation such as MiFID II. A strategy document might say that the intention is for a, b and c to occur, but when the regulations were drafted, that intention might not appear to come through. In that instance, it would be very legitimate for the House or the Government to say, “No, what we intend is the following, and we will change the detailed regulation in order to achieve the aim—the democratic aim, supported by the Government and the House—that we seek to achieve.”

There are a couple of other areas in which I think the Government could have gone further in the Bill, and which I hope we will consider in the coming weeks and months. The first is the bank levy. I know that this is not always a popular thing to say, but in politics it is sometimes important to say unpopular as well as popular things. When we have an internationally competitive sector, if the tax burdens of jurisdictions with which we are competing for people, for capital, for institutions or for new investment reach a point at which they are significantly, or even a little bit, less than ours—and people may find those jurisdictions attractive for other reasons—we should consider finding ways of reducing our own tax burden, which has risen in recent years. The bank levy was one of those, but it came during the aftermath of the financial crisis, which happened quite a long time ago. I think we should consider getting rid of it, in order to emphasise as much as we possibly can that Britain is still the leading centre of financial services for the world.

I am not saying that this is a panacea; far from it. The Bill contains 300-odd pages because we have a great deal to do. However, the bank levy is a tax, and if we impose high taxes on internationally mobile capital or institutions, there may well be a penalty for this country in terms of attracting those institutions. I ask the House, and in particular those on the Treasury Bench, to reflect on that point.

My second point concerns ringfencing, which the former Chancellor mentioned. When I was at HSBC—I probably should have declared at the beginning that I worked at HSBC before I came to the House, and indeed in other institutions in the City—I had the good fortune to work for quite a long time on the internal restructuring of the bank as part of a strategy of which ringfencing was a huge element. HSBC and Barclays were the two big British banks that had big consumer retail bits and big investment banking bits.

Even at that time, it was obvious to many of us that the most critical part of what we were doing in ensuring the safety of those institutions—and indeed, because they were so big, helping to ensure the safety of the whole financial services sector—was the recovery and resolution power, and not just the ringfencing aspect. While I think the review that has been carried out is very capable and very thorough, I urge the Treasury to look a bit further, and to ask whether we still need ringfencing even under the terms of the way in which it has been reviewed. Can we look again at the thresholds? Can we make this less onerous for big institutions?

Why should we do that? I return to what I said about competitiveness. If there are ways in which we can improve our competitiveness without compromising on safety, I think we should consider them.