All 1 Debates between Bernard Jenkin and Stuart Anderson

Russia’s Grand Strategy

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Stuart Anderson
Thursday 6th January 2022

(2 years, 10 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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Stuart Anderson Portrait Stuart Anderson (Wolverhampton South West) (Con)
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It is a pleasure to follow my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), with whom I serve on the Defence Committee. I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) for securing this important debate, which has been a delight to listen to so far. I will try to maintain that standard.

I have served on the Defence Committee and in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly for the past two years, and the threat of Russia comes up in many of our discussions. Each time there are differing viewpoints on what Russia’s grand strategy is. There are many ideas and thoughts and, as have heard today, although we are united on what the threat is, there are differing views on the grand strategy. We need to establish the ultimate goal that Russia or President Putin, which is the same thing, is looking to achieve. If we can understand this strategy, it will be easier to work backwards, allowing us to counter any possible threat that the grand strategy could pose.

We tend to look at what has happened in the past and think it will be replicated in the future, which is not always the case. I am not saying it will or will not be replicated, but we should look at what happened in Georgia and Crimea, and at the build-up of troops on the Ukrainian border. We could take the viewpoint that, logically, Ukraine will follow the same route as Crimea and be taken over by Russia. I am not saying that will or will not happen; I am trying to have an informed debate on the overall grand strategy of Russia, not necessarily Russia’s next steps.

We have heard numerous Members say today that we are taking a tactical approach, and not necessarily a strategic approach. For example, if Ukraine is the next play for Russia but not the end goal, we are no wiser about the grand strategy and we will always be playing catch-up. We will always deploy ineffective deterrents or countermeasures, and we will always be working on a reactive approach rather than a proactive approach to counter any threat to our nation.

I do think Russia has a grand strategy, and I do not take the argument that Russia is just continuing on a whim. I believe that President Putin has a clear view of what he is trying to achieve, whether it is day to day or in the longer term. He knows what he is trying to do, and the reason I take that view is not just because of the build-up of troops on the Ukrainian border.

I recently visited Kirkenes near the Norwegian-Russian border with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to see the threat that Russia could pose in the High North. The Arctic ice is melting far quicker than most people believed it would, which has opened a huge commercial trade area, as well as a larger area for conflict, in the High North. Russia has amassed a navy and a nuclear capability that we have not seen in that region since the cold war.

I also believe there are many inaccuracies in the general viewpoint on the current state of the Russian armed forces.

Bernard Jenkin Portrait Sir Bernard Jenkin
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One thing I did not have time to mention is that the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty, which was concluded by Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev, has fallen into disrepair because Putin has deployed a new missile—an intermediate nuclear missile, which NATO calls the Screwdriver and which we believe is stationed in a position to threaten western European powers in breach of that treaty. The Russians are now calling for us to remove all nuclear weapons from European soil. They have breached the INF treaty, and now they accuse us of doing so by refusing to withdraw nuclear weapons that do not breach it. That shows the inequality of the analysis that Russia presents in its propaganda.

Stuart Anderson Portrait Stuart Anderson
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Yes; what Russia is trying to do is completely incoherent and unbalanced, and I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention.

As I have said, Russia’s military is not what it was two decades ago. While we have spent the last 20 years in the middle east with our allies, Russia has invested heavily in a capability far beyond what it has ever had. I am not for one minute trying to make Russia appear 10 feet tall, but let us look at what it is doing. It has modernised its naval capability, and it understands the importance of sea warfare. It has made an advance in its hypersonic missile capability. I do not think it is as advanced as some media reports make out, but it is getting there. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly has recently produced a report on the matter, if anybody would like to have a look at it.

Russia has increased its nuclear capability at a rapid rate, and, as my hon. Friend has mentioned, the development of the Poseidon nuclear weapon is of major concern. We talk about the Wagner Group, which everyone refers to as being in Africa. Its advance parties were recently seen in the High North and on Svalbard. No weapons were seen there, but it is of concern that the group is expressing an interest in that area.

Russia’s cyber capability and its disinformation—operating in the grey zone, with sub-threshold hybrid warfare in that space between peace and war—should give us a huge inkling that we are not at the stage of peace with Russia. Many examples have been highlighted in this debate, and I am sure there will be many more. It is of the utmost importance that we understand the grand strategy of Russia to ensure that we can counter any threat that should arise.

I will finish on this point. The former Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, has said that the biggest concern that kept him awake at night was miscalculation. I have recently read the book “Countdown to War” by Sean McMeekin, which describes the build-up to the first world war—35 days of probably the biggest miscalculation we have ever seen. That was the time it took from no war being expected to the start of a war, with catastrophic events. That happened very quickly. If we had had effective statecraft, it could have been avoided. Let us learn from history and understand the grand strategy of Russia, but it is vital at this time that the highest level of diplomacy is used to prevent another miscalculation.