EU Exit Day Amendment

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Matthew Pennycook

Wednesday 27th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Matthew Pennycook]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman to the extent that we have to do everything possible to avoid a disastrous no-deal exit. This SI does not do that; the extension agreed by the European Council and the UK does it. This SI ensures that our domestic legislation aligns with what has already been agreed and that we do not create legal confusion.

It is certainly the case that no one, including those who have no problem with the extension, expected that this Government would fail so miserably that an extension of any kind would be required, but it was always a possibility. That is precisely why the EU withdrawal Bill, at least in its original form, was drafted to provide for circumstances in which a withdrawal agreement came into force later than 29 March, following an extension. As the Government themselves put it at the time in their delegated powers memorandum:

“Exit day will be dependent on the withdrawal negotiations with the EU.”

As my hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey (Ms Eagle) has commented, it was the Government’s decision to play politics with the issue of exit day for the purposes of our domestic legislation—constraining the flexibility provided for in the original drafting of the Bill by putting in a fixed exit date and time in a vain attempt to curry favour with the hardliners on their own Benches—that means we require a statutory instrument in the form before us. That said, it remains the case that it is simply not reasonable to question the legitimacy of the Government’s actions in agreeing to an extension to the article 50 process or the fact that these regulations have sequentially followed that agreement.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I want to correct the hon. Gentleman’s account of recent history. In fact, the Government agreed to put in the date voluntarily, and then were blackmailed by the remain faction in our party to provide flexibility on the date. That is actually what happened.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I think the hon. Gentleman would agree with me that the original draft of the Bill did not include the date. The reasons why the Government put it in and the actions of the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) in again helpfully coming to the rescue, I will leave to the hon. Gentleman and his view of what happened at the time.

It follows that, if the House votes against this statutory instrument, it cannot prevent an extension of the article 50 process until at least one of the two proposed dates. In short, and much to my delight, there is nothing that right hon. and hon. Members on the Conservative Benches can do today to force the UK out of the EU in two days’ time. All that would be achieved by voting against these regulations would be immense legal confusion, with two parallel sets of regulations in place—those deriving specifically and directly from EU law, and those made under the 2018 Act, which would diverge from it. As the Minister put it, our statute book would be in a complete mess. That is why this statutory instrument should self-evidently be supported, and why the Opposition will be doing so when we divide on it.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Matthew Pennycook

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jenkin]

I am listening carefully to what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but is it really that unreasonable that the Government might need to avail themselves of these powers in clause 9 while the withdrawal and implementation Bill is proceeding through the House of Commons? If the timetable is compressed, that Bill would not be on the statute book and the powers there would not be available. So clause 9 is necessary for that purpose. Of course the withdrawal and implementation Bill could circumscribe the powers in clause 9 and indeed close them off once that Bill is on the statute book.

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Gentleman has pre-empted a point I was going to come to. In the scenario he gives, there is no need for the timetable necessarily to be compressed. If it were squeezed, what would that say about the role that Parliament will have on the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill? In his scenario, there would also be no need for the secondary legislation in this Bill, which could be included in a similar form in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill, when we would have a better idea about what it will be needed for and can more adequately circumscribe its scope. As for this idea that we have a withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill making its way through this House at the same time as secondary legislation implementing elements of that agreement hang over this place, such an approach would create serious confusion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Gentleman is right that the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 and the article 50 notification gave effect to their own timetable. That is why it is so important that we have transitional arrangements on current terms that allow us flexibility to negotiate the final deal. I will return to this point later, but there is no way that, before we leave in March 2019, we will have agreed the future relationship. We will have agreed heads of terms at best.

[Mr Jenkin]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way on that point?

[Matthew Pennycook]

If it is all right, I am going to make a bit of progress because many Members wish to speak.

As I have said, I do not think there is a need for the powers in clause 9 because secondary legislation of a similar type could be included in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. Why the need for such powers? We do not think there is any justification for them. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s justification for why the clause needs to stand part of the Bill but, unless amendment 7, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), is passed, the Opposition will vote for the clause to be struck from the Bill.

If clause 9 remains part of the Bill at the end of the parliamentary process, its constitutional potency and scope must be highly circumscribed. I do not intend to dwell extensively on what limits should be placed on the clause 9 power because, in general, the same arguments apply as those that I set out at length in the Committee’s deliberations on clause 7 yesterday. I will say, though, that amendment 27 to clause 9, similar to our amendment 25 to clause 7, would constrain the capacity of the powers in clause 9 to reduce rights or protections.

The powers in clause 9 are different from the powers in clause 7 in a particular way: namely, the extraordinarily wide power explicitly provided for by clause 9(2) gives Ministers the power by regulation to modify—a term that clause 14 makes clear covers amendment and repeal—the Bill itself once enacted. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) pointed out on Second Reading, there is no example throughout the history of the 20th century of a Bill that has ever sought to do that—not in time of war and not in time of civil emergency. In fact—this is a point that my hon. Friend continues to make, and should—every single emergency powers Act has specified that there should not be a power in such legislation for Ministers to alter primary legislation. We do not believe the power is justified, and amendment 30 would limit the potency of the delegated powers in clause 9 by preventing them from being used to amend or repeal the Act itself.

Let me turn briefly to the purpose, scope and limits of clause 17, which gives powers to Ministers to make any consequential provisions that they consider appropriate in consequence of the Act and to make any transitional provisions that might be needed as a result of the Bill coming into force. In contrast to our position on clause 9, we acknowledge that there is an established precedent with regard to consequential and transitional provisions, so we will not be voting against clause 17 standing part of the Bill, but it must be circumscribed.

A clause as widely drawn as clause 17—it is arguably the most widely drawn of all—set in the context of a Bill of such constitutional and legal significance that it covers almost every element of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and, it could be argued, nearly every facet of our national life, means that the power to make consequential provisions under clause 17 is not as tightly limited as it might be in other pieces of legislation. As such, it inevitably throws up the possibility that the powers in subsections (1), (2) and (3) of clause 17 could be used to make changes to vast swathes of secondary and primary legislation, including legislation in this Session up to May 2019.

When he responds, the Minister will no doubt cite other statutes that provide for not dissimilar powers, but having looked closely at a fair number of them, I am not convinced that any are so widely drawn as this one, and none are contained in legislation as constitutionally significant as this Bill. The Hansard Society was right to refer to clause 17 as a “legislative blank cheque” for the Government, and the power must be restricted. Amendment 29 would achieve that aim by removing subsections (1), (2) and (3) of clause 17. If the Government believe that that is the wrong way to restrict the sweeping powers in the clause, they can of course come forward with their own suggestions, but the principle of circumscribing the powers in the clause must be accepted.