Grenfell Tower: Fifth Anniversary

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Matthew Pennycook

Thursday 16th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Matthew Pennycook (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)]

It is a privilege to respond for the Opposition in this important and timely debate. I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds East (Richard Burgon) for securing it and the Backbench Business Committee for granting it. In so doing, they have given the House not only the opportunity to appropriately mark the fifth anniversary of the Grenfell Tower fire, but a chance for us to properly reflect on its aftermath and what could be, but is not yet its legacy.

It has been an excellent debate, and I thank all those Members who have taken part. We have had a series of incredibly well-informed and powerful contributions. On behalf of those on the Opposition Benches, I put on record once again the admiration we feel for the survivors and the bereaved, and for the wider Grenfell community. In the face of unimaginable loss, their pursuit of justice for their families and neighbours and their dedication to securing wider change command enormous respect.

The events of 14 June 2017 were, as many have said today, horrific. The fear that the residents of Grenfell Tower must have felt on that night is inconceivable. The loss of 72 innocent men, women and children is something we must never forget. The fire is frequently referred to as a tragedy. I personally have never been convinced that is quite the right word to describe the horror of Grenfell, because labelling it as such implies that it happened not only unexpectedly, but entirely by chance, yet we know that what happened could have been avoided. It could have been avoided if shortcuts were not taken when it came to safety, if the countless reckless and unforgivable decisions made by some of those within the product manufacturing and construction industry were not taken, and if repeated warnings, including those expressed, as so many Members have said, by the residents of Grenfell Tower themselves, had not gone unheeded. But they were, and it is the survivors, the bereaved and the community who must forever live with the consequences.

Doing so is made all the more difficult by the knowledge that those guilty of wrongdoing have not yet been punished. Many Members have rightly raised that point in the debate. While we can never fully appreciate the grief that those who were directly affected have experienced, I can understand the fury that they must feel as they watch the Grenfell Tower inquiry continue day after day to relentlessly expose a catalogue of malpractice and negligence. While we recognise the need to await the conclusion of the inquiry before it is determined precisely what steps must be taken, I can understand the frustration that they evidently feel—it was palpable on the silent walk on Tuesday—that the prospect of justice feels more distant than ever.

When it comes to the question of justice, it is our responsibility as Members of this House to recognise that the fire at Grenfell Tower was not simply the result of pernicious industry practice; it was also the product of state failure—the failure of successive Governments in presiding over a deficient regulatory regime and ignoring repeated warnings about the potentially lethal implication of that fact. The Government have a duty to ensure that everyone lives in a safe home. Sadly, while there has undeniably been progress toward that end over the past five years—and a quicker pace of progress over the past nine months, for which I give the Minister and his colleagues due credit—this debate has highlighted the serious concerns that remain.

Time does not permit me to respond to all the pertinent issues that have been raised during this debate, from the failure of the Government to implement all the recommendations from phase 1 of the inquiry, to the ongoing impact of the building safety crisis on blameless leaseholders in privately owned buildings and on social landlords. I therefore want to use the time I have left to pick up two particular issues raised in the debate that are incredibly important for how we go forward: the functioning of the new building safety regime, which was raised in considerable detail by the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin); and the extent to which the wider post-Grenfell building safety crisis has been comprehensively resolved.

When it comes to the new building safety arrangements, the Building Safety Act comes into force in 12 days’ time, but the practical implementation of the new arrangements is just as important as what the legislation itself provides for, and in that respect, we have real concerns about whether the new regime will be able to function effectively. In particular, we remain unconvinced that the new Building Safety Regulator, which the Act makes responsible for all aspects of the new framework, has what it needs to perform all the complex tasks assigned to it.

Take the issue of indemnity insurance for approved inspectors. The Minister will be aware that as a consequence of a late Government amendment to the Bill, the current Government-approved scheme comes to an end next month, yet there is no sign of an appropriate alternative arrangement being put in place to protect the public and the public interest. Indemnity insurance may seem like an incredibly technical matter, but it is nevertheless integral to the proper functioning of the new regime, and on this and a number of other pressing issues it simply is not good enough for the Government to pass the buck to the new regulator without providing it with the necessary support, as is clearly the case.

The Government will have to do more in the months ahead to ensure that the regulator can carry out its functions effectively, not least because the second phase of the Grenfell inquiry will almost certainly produce recommendations that place additional pressures on it. When he responds, can the Minister update the House on what more his Department is prepared to do to assist the regulator to discharge the duties the 2022 Act places on it?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I would go further than the hon. Member. The concept behind the architecture in the Building Safety Act is still not adequate. There are conflicts of interest for building control surveyors, and there is the complete lacuna of independent incident investigation. Would he undertake to allow Nick Raynsford, Keith Conradi and me to come and brief the Opposition Front-Bench team on this matter, so that they understand our submission to the Grenfell inquiry fully?

[Matthew Pennycook]

I am more than happy to meet the hon. Member and the other individuals he cites. I agree that there are gaps and deficiencies in the new regime, and I agree in particular that there is a conflict of interest with the Health and Safety Executive being the body that investigates major incidents. If those incidents were in in-scope buildings, it would be investigating the regulator that sits inside it, but there are also conflicts in building control, as he rightly raises.

When it comes to the wider building safety crisis, alongside its impact on blameless leaseholders, the overall pace of remediation is arguably the most pressing concern we face. It is agonisingly slow. In the debate that took place last week on social housing and building safety, the Secretary of State openly admitted what has been patently obvious for some time to any Member dealing with cladding casework, namely that the building safety fund

“has not been discharging funds at the rate, at the pace and in the way that it should”.—[Official Report, 9 June 2022; Vol. 715, c. 974.]

Despite Members from across the House having repeatedly expressed concerns about that fact with Ministers over a considerable time, little has seemingly been done to expedite the processing of applications.

The result is that of the 3,462 non-ACM-clad privately owned buildings over 18 metres that have made applications to the fund, remediation works have begun on only 259 and have been completed on just 30. Can the Minister tell us what is being done to expedite decisions on those applications not yet determined? As one would expect, given that it was established earlier and its scope is far more limited, better progress has been made in remediating ACM-clad buildings via the building safety programme, with 78% having been completed, but five years on from the Grenfell fire, how can it be the case that 55 residential buildings still have deadly Grenfell-style ACM cladding on them, and 16 of those have not even begun to remove or replace it?

Of course, in both those cases, the figures I have cited relate only to high-rise buildings over 18 meters. By its own estimate and published figures, the Department believes that there are likely to be between 6,220 and 8,890 mid-rise residential buildings that require full or partial remediation or mitigation to alleviate life safety fire risks. I suspect that the real numbers are far higher.

The bottom line is that if the Government do not accelerate markedly the pace of remediation across the board, we are likely to find ourselves marking the 10th or even 15th anniversary of the Grenfell fire while still bemoaning the fact that some unsafe buildings require fixing. It is essential that the Government continue to be urged to address those failures and the others that have been raised in the debate, because honouring the lives of the 72 involves not just commemoration, but the building of a fitting legacy, as other hon. Members have said.

As Grenfell United made clear in the statement it released on Tuesday to mark the fifth anniversary, the survivors, the bereaved and the community want those who were lost to be remembered not for what happened, but for what changed. Not enough has changed over the last five years and it is beholden on the Government to go faster and, in many cases, further so that everyone has a secure, decent, affordable and safe home in which to live.

EU Exit Day Amendment

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Matthew Pennycook

Wednesday 27th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Matthew Pennycook]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman to the extent that we have to do everything possible to avoid a disastrous no-deal exit. This SI does not do that; the extension agreed by the European Council and the UK does it. This SI ensures that our domestic legislation aligns with what has already been agreed and that we do not create legal confusion.

It is certainly the case that no one, including those who have no problem with the extension, expected that this Government would fail so miserably that an extension of any kind would be required, but it was always a possibility. That is precisely why the EU withdrawal Bill, at least in its original form, was drafted to provide for circumstances in which a withdrawal agreement came into force later than 29 March, following an extension. As the Government themselves put it at the time in their delegated powers memorandum:

“Exit day will be dependent on the withdrawal negotiations with the EU.”

As my hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey (Ms Eagle) has commented, it was the Government’s decision to play politics with the issue of exit day for the purposes of our domestic legislation—constraining the flexibility provided for in the original drafting of the Bill by putting in a fixed exit date and time in a vain attempt to curry favour with the hardliners on their own Benches—that means we require a statutory instrument in the form before us. That said, it remains the case that it is simply not reasonable to question the legitimacy of the Government’s actions in agreeing to an extension to the article 50 process or the fact that these regulations have sequentially followed that agreement.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I want to correct the hon. Gentleman’s account of recent history. In fact, the Government agreed to put in the date voluntarily, and then were blackmailed by the remain faction in our party to provide flexibility on the date. That is actually what happened.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I think the hon. Gentleman would agree with me that the original draft of the Bill did not include the date. The reasons why the Government put it in and the actions of the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) in again helpfully coming to the rescue, I will leave to the hon. Gentleman and his view of what happened at the time.

It follows that, if the House votes against this statutory instrument, it cannot prevent an extension of the article 50 process until at least one of the two proposed dates. In short, and much to my delight, there is nothing that right hon. and hon. Members on the Conservative Benches can do today to force the UK out of the EU in two days’ time. All that would be achieved by voting against these regulations would be immense legal confusion, with two parallel sets of regulations in place—those deriving specifically and directly from EU law, and those made under the 2018 Act, which would diverge from it. As the Minister put it, our statute book would be in a complete mess. That is why this statutory instrument should self-evidently be supported, and why the Opposition will be doing so when we divide on it.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Matthew Pennycook

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jenkin]

I am listening carefully to what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but is it really that unreasonable that the Government might need to avail themselves of these powers in clause 9 while the withdrawal and implementation Bill is proceeding through the House of Commons? If the timetable is compressed, that Bill would not be on the statute book and the powers there would not be available. So clause 9 is necessary for that purpose. Of course the withdrawal and implementation Bill could circumscribe the powers in clause 9 and indeed close them off once that Bill is on the statute book.

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Gentleman has pre-empted a point I was going to come to. In the scenario he gives, there is no need for the timetable necessarily to be compressed. If it were squeezed, what would that say about the role that Parliament will have on the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill? In his scenario, there would also be no need for the secondary legislation in this Bill, which could be included in a similar form in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill, when we would have a better idea about what it will be needed for and can more adequately circumscribe its scope. As for this idea that we have a withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill making its way through this House at the same time as secondary legislation implementing elements of that agreement hang over this place, such an approach would create serious confusion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Gentleman is right that the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 and the article 50 notification gave effect to their own timetable. That is why it is so important that we have transitional arrangements on current terms that allow us flexibility to negotiate the final deal. I will return to this point later, but there is no way that, before we leave in March 2019, we will have agreed the future relationship. We will have agreed heads of terms at best.

[Mr Jenkin]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way on that point?

[Matthew Pennycook]

If it is all right, I am going to make a bit of progress because many Members wish to speak.

As I have said, I do not think there is a need for the powers in clause 9 because secondary legislation of a similar type could be included in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. Why the need for such powers? We do not think there is any justification for them. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s justification for why the clause needs to stand part of the Bill but, unless amendment 7, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), is passed, the Opposition will vote for the clause to be struck from the Bill.

If clause 9 remains part of the Bill at the end of the parliamentary process, its constitutional potency and scope must be highly circumscribed. I do not intend to dwell extensively on what limits should be placed on the clause 9 power because, in general, the same arguments apply as those that I set out at length in the Committee’s deliberations on clause 7 yesterday. I will say, though, that amendment 27 to clause 9, similar to our amendment 25 to clause 7, would constrain the capacity of the powers in clause 9 to reduce rights or protections.

The powers in clause 9 are different from the powers in clause 7 in a particular way: namely, the extraordinarily wide power explicitly provided for by clause 9(2) gives Ministers the power by regulation to modify—a term that clause 14 makes clear covers amendment and repeal—the Bill itself once enacted. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) pointed out on Second Reading, there is no example throughout the history of the 20th century of a Bill that has ever sought to do that—not in time of war and not in time of civil emergency. In fact—this is a point that my hon. Friend continues to make, and should—every single emergency powers Act has specified that there should not be a power in such legislation for Ministers to alter primary legislation. We do not believe the power is justified, and amendment 30 would limit the potency of the delegated powers in clause 9 by preventing them from being used to amend or repeal the Act itself.

Let me turn briefly to the purpose, scope and limits of clause 17, which gives powers to Ministers to make any consequential provisions that they consider appropriate in consequence of the Act and to make any transitional provisions that might be needed as a result of the Bill coming into force. In contrast to our position on clause 9, we acknowledge that there is an established precedent with regard to consequential and transitional provisions, so we will not be voting against clause 17 standing part of the Bill, but it must be circumscribed.

A clause as widely drawn as clause 17—it is arguably the most widely drawn of all—set in the context of a Bill of such constitutional and legal significance that it covers almost every element of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and, it could be argued, nearly every facet of our national life, means that the power to make consequential provisions under clause 17 is not as tightly limited as it might be in other pieces of legislation. As such, it inevitably throws up the possibility that the powers in subsections (1), (2) and (3) of clause 17 could be used to make changes to vast swathes of secondary and primary legislation, including legislation in this Session up to May 2019.

When he responds, the Minister will no doubt cite other statutes that provide for not dissimilar powers, but having looked closely at a fair number of them, I am not convinced that any are so widely drawn as this one, and none are contained in legislation as constitutionally significant as this Bill. The Hansard Society was right to refer to clause 17 as a “legislative blank cheque” for the Government, and the power must be restricted. Amendment 29 would achieve that aim by removing subsections (1), (2) and (3) of clause 17. If the Government believe that that is the wrong way to restrict the sweeping powers in the clause, they can of course come forward with their own suggestions, but the principle of circumscribing the powers in the clause must be accepted.