Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Keir Starmer

Wednesday 4th September 2024 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

It is important that there is full accountability and that, where appropriate, people are brought to justice—that is the least that the families, the survivors, the bereaved and the community deserve. I absolutely understand my hon. Friend’s point about the wider community. This tragedy has impacted the wider community, as he well knows from his work as the constituency MP. I saw a bit of that when I visited. There are various writings on the wall around the memorial, where people from the area have recorded their private views, and they are an important read for anybody who wants to be in a position of leadership.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I thank the Prime Minister for his statement, and I also thank Sir Martin Moore-Bick.

May I refer the Prime Minister to recommendation 113.58? After Piper Alpha, an independent offshore safety investigation body was established. After the Paddington rail crash, we established the independent Rail Accident Investigation Board. Former Fire and Housing Minister Nick Raynsford, former chief investigator of the air accidents investigation branch Keith Conradi, a leading building control specialist and I made a submission to the inquiry recommending that there should be independent incident investigation of serious building failures of this nature, which would be able to conduct an investigation far more quickly than a public inquiry and with accumulated expertise. However, that role has been left to the London Fire Brigade, which has been heavily criticised and would therefore be conflicted in any investigation of a similar incident. That is why the LFB was not put in charge of investigating this incident in the first place. Could we come and see the Prime Minister about this very serious matter?

[The Prime Minister]

I thank the hon. Member for raising a really serious issue. We will, of course, look at that recommendation. We will report to the House, and I will make sure that a meeting is set up so that he is able to input directly into our considerations on that particular recommendation and any others that he has concerns about.

Exiting the EU: Sectoral Impact Assessments

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Keir Starmer

Wednesday 1st November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

I will come to that, because we gave some thought to the process, and if the principle of disclosure is agreed, we are open to a discussion about exactly how that works. The Brexit Committee seemed the obvious Committee, but there is clearly interest in other Select Committees in the subject matter, not least medical services and social care, which I know will be of great interest to the hon. Lady.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

rose—

[Keir Starmer]

I am going to press on, because I have barely got a sentence in. I will give way later but I am really not making much progress at all.

The list of sectors was initially not disclosed, but it was then disclosed on Monday. In her freedom of information request of 30 August this year, my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston also asked for the scope and the terms of reference of each sectoral analysis. This request too has been rebuffed, in a letter of 29 September. This time, the Secretary of State’s Department relied on two grounds: first, that to disclose the terms of reference would prejudice relations between the UK and another state; and, secondly, that it would prejudice the formulation and development of Government policy. The first of those grounds seems a bit far-fetched, to say the least. The scope and the terms of reference are not even being disclosed.

The second of those grounds is surprising, coming from the current Secretary of State. Back in December 1999, he was Chair of the Public Accounts Committee when the freedom of information legislation was before Parliament. Then, when he was on the Back Benches, he intervened strongly in the debates. He said:

“I do not approach the issue from the perspective of a freedom of information enthusiast…my test is whether it makes democracy and government work better.”

He then said:

“The class exemption applying to all information relating to formulation and development of Government policy, including factual information, is a ludicrous blanket exemption.”—[Official Report, 7 December 1999; Vol. 340, c. 774.]

Today, from the Front Bench, he relies on that ludicrous blanket exemption that he rallied against from the Back Benches.

I shall now turn to the analyses and reports themselves. In a joint letter dated 11 October this year and supported by 120 Members, my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston and my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) sought the disclosure of all the sectoral analyses. I salute their work in pressing the Government time and again on this issue. The Government have responded by saying that the impact assessments could not be disclosed because to do so would undermine the UK’s negotiating position. That is an important consideration, and I have accepted all along that the Government should not put into the public domain any information that would undermine our negotiating position. However, this requires some probing and testing.

The House will recall that when we, the Opposition, were calling for the Government to publish a Brexit plan this time last year, our request was initially refused. It was claimed that—guess what?—to do so would undermine our negotiating position. Thus, in an exchange on 7 November last year, my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn) pressed the Secretary of State to reveal the Government’s plan. The Secretary of State said:

“It is no good creating a public negotiating position, which has the simple effect of destroying our ability to negotiate—full stop.”—[Official Report, 7 November 2016; Vol. 616, c. 1264.]

The Prime Minister then coined the phrase “no running commentary” and stuck to it like glue. And so it went on until 7 December last year, when we won an Opposition day motion calling on the Government to publish a plan. The publication of that plan has not undermined our negotiating position, although its contents might well have done so.

On the claim that any disclosure will undermine our negotiating position, I also bear in mind what the Secretary of State said to the House of Lords EU External Affairs Sub-Committee last night when he was pressed on this. He said:

“I don’t think you should overestimate what’s in them. They’re not economic models of each sector, they are looking at how much of it depends on European Union markets versus other markets, what other opportunities may be, what the regulatory structures are, all those sorts of things that inform the negotiation, but they are not predictions. So I wouldn’t overestimate what they are.”

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[Keir Starmer]

I am going to try to make some progress.

The Secretary of State made it clear that the Cabinet had only seen the summary outcomes. If that position has changed, I am sure that the Minister will intervene to clarify the position. If the assessments are so important, the relevant Cabinet members ought to read about the sectors that concern them. It is extraordinary that that has not happened. It is also extraordinary because it raises the question of who is making the decision that these reports cannot be disclosed. Who is making that decision? It cannot be the relevant Cabinet members, because they have not read the reports. When he appeared before the Brexit Committee, the Secretary of State was pretty hazy about that:

“The Government do. To a very large extent it comes to me, but it would depend on which department it is”.

That is interesting, given that the other Departments have not read the reports. He continued:

“Some of the stuff is also held in other departments.”

Who is the decision maker on the non-disclosure of these reports? Is it the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union? If not, who is it? [Interruption.] I see that instructions may be being taken.

Is there a record of the decision being made? It is a significant decision to withhold information from Parliament. Is a record made of the decision for each report? Where is that record? What criteria are actually applied?

A number of Members, including me, have experience of handling sensitive information—in my case, very sensitive information about very serious criminal offences—and everyone who has been in that position knows that a blanket ban can be justified only if no lesser form of publication is possible. Blanket bans are very rare. Even in the field of counter-terrorism, where there is highly sensitive material, blanket bans are very rare and the Government will normally find a way of publishing some of the material in an acceptable form. The current situation is extremely unusual, even for sensitive material.

Has consideration been given to redacting some of the sensitive material? Has consideration been given to providing a summary to Parliament? That is not uncommon in sensitive criminal cases. Can the gist not be given, or are we seriously expected to believe that not one paragraph, not one sentence, not one word can be disclosed to anyone in this House?

[Mr Jenkin]

I am listening carefully to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but I can only conclude that it is foolish and irresponsible to have called this debate. He knows there is a blanket ban on disclosing advice to Ministers—that is in the ministerial code and the civil service code, and it is absolutely standard. It is normal for Select Committees to request information themselves, rather than getting the official Opposition to do it on their behalf. This is game playing.

[Keir Starmer]

I am surprised by that intervention, given the concerns expressed by the right hon. Member for Broxtowe, the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and the hon. Member for Totnes (Dr Wollaston). The concern is shared on both sides of the House.

The intervention of the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) is typical of what has been going on for 16 or 17 months. Every time somebody raises a legitimate question, it is suggested that they are somehow frustrating or undermining the process. It is not unlike the interventions I took a year ago when I suggested that the plan should be published. The interventions were exactly the same.

This is lockdown, a blanket ban. If the exemption for ministerial advice is being relied on, it is curious that it is not mentioned as the ground being relied on in the letter in response to the freedom of information request. That is why we have brought this motion to the House—

Brexit and Foreign Affairs

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Keir Starmer

Monday 26th June 2017 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

I will make some progress, if I may.

Back home, the divisions are obvious. The Chancellor’s Mansion House speech last week was clearly an attempt to spike the Prime Minister’s Brexit approach. Thus he spoke of a “jobs and prosperity first” Brexit. That reflects the Labour party manifesto, in which we spoke of a “jobs and…economy first” Brexit. The Chancellor also spoke of an

“early agreement on transitional arrangements”

and no “cliff edge” for the economy, and that is in the Labour party manifesto, which said we would

“negotiate transitional arrangements to avoid a ‘cliff-edge’”.

He has clearly been reading about our position.

The Chancellor spoke of a “management of migration”, not shutting it down. The Labour party manifesto spoke of

“fair rules and reasonable management of migration.”

Was his speech a personal view, the Government’s view, or the view that he hopes the next Prime Minister will take? Clearly we cannot go on like this.

[Mr Jenkin]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Keir Starmer]

I will in just a moment.

This approach is damaging our reputation abroad and weakening our position. Like the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, I was in Brussels last week. The talk in Brussels is, “What is going on? How long are this Government going to last?” We have put ourselves in the worst possible starting position.

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[Mr Jenkin]

It is realistic to imagine that we will not get a comprehensive trade agreement with the EU when we leave and that interim arrangements will persist under WTO rules, which may well be zero-tariff rules, but we would have to believe the EU was seriously insane if it wanted to ground all flights between the UK and the EU, if it refused to offer the products and standards arrangements it has with 100 or more other countries—whether or not it has a free trade deal with those countries—or if it wanted to check every Mini exported to the EU to see whether it fits the EU’s definition of a car. Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman really think the EU is so insane that it would want to do that?

[Keir Starmer]

This mischaracterisation of the point I am making does not help. This is not the EU demanding here; if we do not have a lawful basis for these activities in the UK, we do not have the authority to do this. It is no good talking up a “no deal” as if it is a viable, tenable option.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I want to deal with this point, because I know it is an issue of real concern to my party. We have said that the outcomes are what matter, not the model for achieving them.

[Mr Jenkin]

I listened carefully to what the right hon. and learned Gentleman was saying, and he said he does not want to have to adopt rules of origin. How will we avoid doing so unless we are in a customs union relationship with the EU?

[Keir Starmer]

I have said on a number of occasions that we should leave being in the customs union on the table. What the Government have done is to sweep these options off the table without evidence, without facts and without assessing the risks. We have said that what we should do is focus on the outcomes. One of the best ways to achieve tariff-free access across Europe is to have the customs union on the table at least as an option to consider.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Keir Starmer

Ping Pong: House of Commons
Monday 13th March 2017 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

I have seen that poll, which is of course important, but this is a matter of principle. This is a question of whether this House should be able to vote on the deal reached in two years’ time before the European Parliament votes and should be able to have a meaningful say, and that is what it has been, in principle, from start to finish.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

The amendment does not simply give this House the right to vote on these matters; it also gives the other place the right to vote on these matters. Will the hon. and learned Gentleman explain what would happen if this House voted to accept what the Government want to do, but the other place dug in and rejected it? What would happen then?

[Keir Starmer]

There is a reason why the amendment spells that out in detail: it is precisely what the Minister said at the Dispatch Box should be the position last time this was debated. Lords amendment 2 carefully reflects what the Government say is their assurance, so such a question about the amendment should be put to the Secretary of State.

Parliamentary Scrutiny of Leaving the EU

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Keir Starmer

Wednesday 12th October 2016 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

The prerogative has come up so often that I will deal with it now in substance. Prerogative powers, of course, developed at a time when the monarch was both a feudal lord and Head of State. That is the origin of prerogative powers, but they have changed over time, yielding where necessary to the demands of democratic accountability. There are plenty of examples, as the Secretary of State will know, in the courts of that change in accountability, but there is also the example of the prerogative power to commit troops in armed conflict. In theory, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet retain the constitutional right to decide when and where to authorise action, but in practice Governments in recent times have ensured parliamentary debate and a vote.

Responding to the Chilcot report earlier this year, the then Prime Minister made the point during Prime Minister’s questions when he said:

“I think we have now got a set of arrangements and conventions that put the country in a stronger position. I think it is now a clear convention that we have a vote in this House, which of course we did on Iraq, before premeditated military action”.—[Official Report, 6 July 2016; Vol. 612, c. 881.]

A strong political convention modifying the prerogative has thus been set.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Keir Starmer]

I will just complete this section on the prerogative.

The underlying premise of the development of the prerogative is clear and obvious. The more significant the decision in question and the more serious the possible consequences, the greater the need for meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. That lies at the heart of this, and it is hard to think of a more significant set of decisions with very serious possible consequences than the terms on which we leave the EU.

I will press this point because all this is well known to the Secretary of State. After all, he tabled a ten-minute rule Bill in June 1999 that was concerned with

“the exercise of certain powers of Ministers of the Crown subject to control by the House of Commons”.

I shall quote his approach to the prerogative. When he introduced that Bill on 22 June 1999, the right hon. Gentleman, now of course the Secretary of State, said:

“Executive decisions by the Government should be subject to the scrutiny and approval of Parliament in many other areas... The Bill sets out to...make”

the prerogative

“subject to parliamentary approval, giving Parliament the right of approval over all Executive powers not conferred by statute—from the ratification of treaties to the approval of Orders in Council, and from the appointment of European Commissioners, some ambassadors, members of the Bank of England”.—[Official Report, 22 June 1999; Vol. 333, c. 931.]

So he has changed his position. Back then, he recognised that the prerogative ought to be subject to Parliament. It was 20 years ago, but progressive movement with the prerogative is usually in favour of greater accountability, not less, so the fact that he argued that 20 years ago is not an argument against doing it now. That Bill did not proceed, but the principles are clear and set out. The prerogative is not fixed; parliamentary practice and convention can change the prerogative, and have done so in a number of ways. In any event, I fall back on my primary point: even if the prerogative permits the Government to withhold the plans from Parliament, it does not require them to, and political accountability requires the Government to put their plans before Parliament.

[Mr Jenkin]

The hon. and learned Gentleman misses one rather important fact: there has been a vote of the British people—a vote delegated to them by the terms of the European Union Referendum Act 2015. This is the question that he has to answer: suppose there was a vote in this House; how would he vote? Would he vote against article 50 invocation, or in favour? Just give a straight answer to that.

[Keir Starmer]

I will not take long responding to that, because I have made the point, which is that the mandate on 23 June was not a mandate as to the terms, and I think that most people understand that; I cannot put it any clearer than that.

There is the question of how Members would vote, what they would vote on, and what happens if Parliament does not like the terms. The Secretary of State, in his statement on 5 September, emphasised that he would consult widely, including the devolved countries, which of course are very important in all this, and which deserve scrutiny of how exit will impact each of them. He also said he would

“strive to build national consensus around our approach.”—[Official Report, 5 September 2016; Vol. 614, c. 38.]

The question for the Secretary of State is: how will he build consensus around his approach if he will not tell the House what his approach is?