The UK’s Justice and Home Affairs Opt-outs

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Jacob Rees-Mogg

Thursday 10th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

It is a particular pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall), although I am delighted that the Lord Chancellor will reply to the debate, because I believe he is the one person remaining in the Government who still believes what he believed in opposition. It is reassuring that at least some people do not find the trappings of office take them away from their previous beliefs.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) mentioned, we have already looked at the falsehood that is in the title of this debate. We are meant to be debating the opt-outs, but they were decided a year ago. We are debating the opt-ins. That is all of a piece with the spin and the flimflam around this issue. We are not trying to stick to the facts. We have had bold promises—promises raised by the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz)—about consultation with Parliament and how we would be kept fully informed: a fine promise and constitutionally proper, but regrettably ignored.

We found out some information about the Prüm declarations not from a statement to this House or from evidence given to a Select Committee, but via a website called Statewatch, which reproduces leaked documents. It reproduced a “Limité” document from the European Union. “Limité” documents from the European Union can be shared with the European Scrutiny Committee and we then hold them confidentially. This one was not, perhaps because what it said was rather embarrassing. It stated:

“The UK government has also indicated that in a number of other cases it will set in motion a process towards the subsequent opting in to certain other instruments of particular importance.”

So it is not 35 opt-ins; it is more than 35, which they are not willing to tell us about through proper processes. We find out through leaked documents. Actually, it is not 35 anyway, because 14 were already subject to the block opt-out. So we are starting at 49, not 35, and the spin around it tries to lessen the impact of what is happening.

The failure to inform Parliament is, I think, even worse. There was a Council meeting on 24 June, after which the European Union put out a press release stating that

“the Council noted the conclusion reached between the Commission and the UK on the list of non-Schengen ex-third pillar measures which the UK will seek to rejoin”—

I emphasise “conclusion”. The written statement from the Minister provided to the House about a week later—we should note the delay before we were informed—said that

“the UK Government and the Commission had reached an understanding”.—[Official Report, 30 June 2014; Vol. 583, c. 48WS.]

There is a significant difference between an understanding and a conclusion: one has a finality about it, which does not leave much room for parliamentary consultation, while the other implies a continuing process. We have thus had a series of failures properly to inform Parliament—a failure to be entirely straight with the British people.

The effects are severe. The change from the third pillar to Lisbon is a major transfer of sovereignty, as established by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North, who quoted the Government’s own words in saying that. It is not, however, only the Government and the European Scrutiny Committee that make this clear, as it can be seen in the Home Affairs Select Committee, too. This is important because that Select Committee is not made up of shaven-headed Eurosceptics; it is chaired by a former Minister for Europe who views himself very much as a pro-European. His Committee’s report said:

“If the Government proceeds with the opt-in as proposed, we note that it will not result in any repatriation. Indeed, the increased jurisdiction of the ECJ may result in a net flow of powers in the opposite direction.”

Yet we have heard statements from Ministers saying precisely the reverse. There must be a thin line between on the one hand the point at which Ministers say things that are different from what they say to House of Lords Select Committees and from what reports of respected Committees of this House have said and on the other hand the sin of misleading Parliament. I know we will watch like hawks to ensure that that thin line is never breached.

Of the much-trumpeted opt-outs of nearly 100 items, 43 never applied to the United Kingdom in the first place. I have a list of the remainder. I asked 190 parliamentary questions to establish this list and to find out how many of the items were of any importance. Thirty three have been implemented and will bring no change at all; 12 have been implemented de facto and, again, there will be no change; two have been implemented but never used; and two have not been implemented. That leaves one, the Council Act of 17 June 1998, which has been implemented and will suffer from some change. Excluding Prüm, there is no repatriation of sovereignty at all from any of our opt-outs.

That leads us to the alternatives—those measures that the Government wish to remain within, as is clear from the treaties and from questions of international law. The treaties make it clear that provision is made for transitional arrangements. Hence, there need be no worry about a great chasm opening up on 1 December, when this mass horde of 125 criminals will suddenly appear on our shores, about which we should be terrified. It will not be like that at all because of the transitional arrangements.

Then there is the possibility of bilateral arrangements. The Home Secretary’s response on bilateral arrangements was so feeble: we know she has lost her much-respected special adviser, but I had not realised that the person on work experience was now writing her speeches. Just because the European Union does not like it—the Commission indicated that it would not accept it—are we saying that we should not use our power and influence as one of the great nations of the world and even try to negotiate what we want with an international body? Should we immediately kowtow and give in? What sort of a Home Secretary takes that approach?

[Mr Jenkin]

It seems from the stance adopted by the Government that we are being invited to believe that the European Union is a deeply unreasonable institution that holds very hard and fast positions on which it is not prepared to compromise even in its own interests, let alone the interests of its member states. Does my hon. Friend not think that we should have tried a bit harder?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

That is exactly the point I was making. It bodes ill for any proposal for renegotiation if that is the starting point. The moment the European Union says “We don’t like that very much, chaps” and we say “Oh, we’re frightfully sorry, m’lord”, we are not even going to try. We shall perform the kowtow, that wonderful act performed in front of Chinese emperors, whereby people would abase themselves three times before approaching the throne. That may be appropriate to you, Madam Deputy Speaker, enthroned in splendour as you are, but it is not, I think, the way in which Her Majesty’s Government should behave when dealing with international bodies.

Then there is the European arrest warrant, and the so-called guarantees that we have. As has already been established during the debate, European law trumps Acts of Parliament. So we can say that the European arrest warrant must not apply unless there is dual criminality, but unless the European Union accepts it, that is not the case, and dual criminality does not have to be shown in relation to 32 specified crimes where the arrest warrant applies. What the Prime Minister said to my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North during Prime Minister’s Question Time yesterday was, I am sorry to say, not factually accurate.

As for the numbers, I have banged on about them because of the hysteria that we hear from the proponents of the arrest warrant, who claim that our whole nation’s security is dependent on it. On average, 125 people are brought back to this country each year to face trial. In that context, the arrest warrant is to our benefit and in our interest. The people whom we expel we ought to be able to expel under our own law, and would be able to if only we had the gumption to pass our own laws. As was said earlier, we are now willing to sacrifice the fundamental principle of Magna Carta: that no one will be imprisoned, fined or held against their will without the judgment of a court. We are now willing to allow that principle to be abrogated by a Polish magistrate. Surely, wise and good though Polish magistrates may be, it is not worth the theft of a wheelbarrow to undermine something that has been our protector for 799 years.

I want to deal with the politics of this as well, for where does it leave not only the Government but the Conservative party, which had, until a few weeks ago, a really sensible, logical, well-thought-through position on the European Union. It had a strong and sound and firm position, which was to go for renegotiation and repatriate powers. Repatriate powers? When we have just surrendered them? Wave the white flag, and then, two hours later, put up the Union Jack at half mast? Will anyone believe that we have a hope of repatriating powers if we surrender them now? Will anyone think that opting into 35 measures, 49 measures, and a few more secretly, is the beginning of a renegotiation? Will anyone believe the promises made by politicians or the policies on which we stood at the last election—as my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North revealed to us—or the soaring oratory of our Prime Minister, who in 2002, in opposing the European arrest warrant, said:

“If someone came before him who had committed an offence that was not a crime in this country, according to the district judge, the Home Secretary would have to say, ‘I am sorry. You may spend time rotting in a Greek or Spanish jail…But there is nothing I can do about it.’”—[Official Report, 9 December 2002; Vol. 396, c. 109.]

So, in 2002, the Prime Minister was worried that this would lead to people rotting in Spanish or Greek jails. Now he thinks that rotting in Spanish or Greek jails seems to be a good thing. I do not see the logic in that, but I equally do not see how anyone can rely on what politicians say if in opposition they have backbone and in government they are jellyfish. It is an entirely hopeless way of attempting to run the country.

Let me end with a reminder of Sir Robert Peel, a great Prime Minister and a distinguished man, one of the most intellectual figures ever to hold that office —and he was Home Secretary as well. When he did his final papers—they were vivas, not papers—so clever was he, so intelligent was he, that the public went to listen to him answering the questions, and he got a first-class degree in classics and mathematics. In 1846, he split the Conservative party. He got through a measure that the Conservatives loathed on the back of Opposition votes—something that may happen with the European arrest warrant—but he stood boldly at the Dispatch Box and said, yes, he had changed his mind, yes, what he now thought was different from what he thought before, but it was essential for the good of the nation.

Do we have that from this Front Bench? Do we have an avowal of the importance of this surrender to Europe, or do we have mealy-mouthed words about the difficulties of negotiation and the problems with coalition? There is not a bold, forthright, intellectual case for change, but merely the convenience of office, and it not only risks damaging the Government and splitting the Tory party, but it surrenders our sovereignty to a body from which we want to get it back. So I say to Her Majesty’s Government,

“Stiffen the sinews, summon up the blood . . . then imitate the action of the tiger.”

Multiannual Financial Framework

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Jacob Rees-Mogg

Wednesday 31st October 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jenkin]

I believe that the Labour party is picking up the anger of the British people about the idea of spending more money on European policies when we are having to cut back on policies of our own.

There is something rather chilling about the exchanges between those on the Front Benches, which tacitly suggest that a veto is a defeat and that it could lead to a worse budgetary outcome for the United Kingdom than could a negotiated settlement. That seemed to be the burden of the argument put by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie). I should just like to point out to him what that says about the relationship that we now have with the European institutions. Those institutions are so overpowering and so powerful that even the veto of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom cannot stop the European train on its way to its destination. The British people feel that something has gone wrong with that relationship. This was not the basis on which we were sold membership of the institution, and it was not the basis on which all the assurances were given by successive Governments that each treaty represented no substantial change and was just a “tidying-up exercise”.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that the veto does not really work. Ought we not therefore to be looking to amend the European Communities Act 1972, while recognising that this motion is dealing with the system as it is?

[Mr Jenkin]

I would just point out that we should not try to make ourselves too important in this debate. This is a take-note motion. I have spoken in many debates on such motions. The amendment expresses an opinion on whether the Prime Minister should adopt this little bit of body language or that little bit of body language. It will not make a blind bit of difference to what he does when he goes to the Council of Ministers. The amendment is simply a cry of despair from the British people who want their elected representatives to say something to the Front Benchers of both parties, who have betrayed the British people on the question of our relationship with our European partners throughout the 20 years I have been in Parliament.

The problem in this country is that the governing class is now so out of line with our people’s aspirations for the relationship with our European partners that they are putting the United Kingdom in the worst of all possible worlds. It cannot deliver the engagement of the British state with our European partners on the terms set down in the treaties, and it is not trying to deliver the different terms of agreement with our European partners that the British people would prefer, that our country needs, and that are in the national interest. So wide is this gulf that even the Labour party is picking up the vibrations and is beginning to respond.

Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Jacob Rees-Mogg

Wednesday 11th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Indeed; thank you so much for that sedentary intervention.

It is very interesting that, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) was saying, between 1688 and 1972, taxation could not be levied without the permission of the House. Since 1972, tax rates have been changed at the whim of the European Union. What is more, it happens to use duties levied on imports in exactly the way that James II would have been familiar with—it takes the same anti-parliamentary approach. James II called them tonnage and poundage; the European Union calls them anti-dumping measures but it changes them with arrogance as it sees fit.

I want to talk about the legal aspects of this issue, because they are the absolute crux of it. I raise this point with my hon. Friend the Minister because there is no point in negotiating for months if there is no legal basis in the first place. The Government should be very clear and rigorous about this and should take it, if necessary, all the way through to the European Court of Justice. That might be a Court in which many of us do not have a great deal of confidence and it might be a Court that is in principle a federalist Court, but none the less it is there and its procedures should be used.

Let me read out paragraph 2.12 of the European Scrutiny Committee’s conclusion on this issue:

“The draft Directive is concerned with direct taxation. The legal base cited for it is Article 115 TFEU. This article allows EU legislation to approximate national legislation which directly affects the operation of the single market, but”—

this is the key point—

“this provision is expressly ‘without prejudice to Article 114’. Article 114(2) TFEU provides that Article 114(1) TFEU ‘shall not apply to fiscal provisions’. Article 113 TFEU, the only provision referring to the harmonisation of taxation, is limited in its scope to ‘turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation’. There is therefore no express provision in the Treaty for the harmonisation of direct taxation.”

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

In that quote, my hon. Friend used the word “approximate”. What is the legal import of the meaning of “approximate”?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

My hon. Friend leads me away from the essential point, which is that the EU does not have any authority over direct taxation, whether it is approximating it or not, so the approximation is irrelevant in relation to direct taxation because the treaties do not provide for that. If the treaties do not provide for it, then the EU cannot provide for enhanced co-operation without a specific treaty amendment, which would of course be a separate veto-able activity under the treaties as they exist.

We often complain about European law, and I do not like the fact that laws made by this Parliament can be overturned by the European Court, but as that is the world in which we live, when European law is on our side we ought to use it. So I reiterate my plea to the Minister in the European Councils to say that we are uncertain of the legal base and that we would like a clear legal judgment from the European Court of Justice before we proceed with further negotiations.

Now there is also a fall-back position, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) said. If the European Court of Justice were, as a federalising court, to invent a legal base, we could then come back to the point of subsidiarity, where this debate is so relevant and important. We are putting the argument to Europe and saying, “You have put these fine protections into the treaties. You have used these grand-sounding words—not as clear as the 10th amendment to the United States constitution, but none the less words that are supposed to protect the rights of sovereign member states. Let’s now see if you mean it. Let’s now see if you, the Commission, will accept the argument for subsidiarity, and if you won’t, whether the court will back it up and whether the proposals will fall on that basis.”

If all this fails, then I accept the Minister’s position. I must confess that it is a reassurance to those of us on the Eurosceptic wing of the party that it is the Minister who will be conducting the negotiations, because at least we know that it is not, as some on the Opposition Benches would have said, a woolly Liberal negotiating. It is somebody who wields a handbag in as fine a way as the great lady—[Interruption]—the blessed lady, so we have confidence that the Government’s negotiations will be tough.

It is fair enough to go through a process, if that is where we end up, but ultimately the response must be no, not least because tax competition is a thoroughly healthy thing.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Jacob Rees-Mogg

Tuesday 18th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I think that I am defending just as much the interests of the socialists of Great Grimsby and other places, because it is not in the interest of the voters of Great Grimsby to have Governments who come in and play fast and loose with the constitution; that is a really bad idea. The hon. Gentleman has been a most distinguished advocate of less European intrusion in our affairs. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] As is obvious, he has the respect of the whole House for that, but Governments have been able to play fast and loose with our constitution in a European context because there has been no check from the upper House, and because anything, ultimately, can be jammed through under the Parliament Act 1911.

With this Bill, I want to begin to say—I have proposed the same change to the European Union Bill before the House—that such important constitutional changes need much deeper and broader support than that of some, to use the late Sir Robin Day’s term, “here today, gone tomorrow” politicians. We need constitutional change that is in the historic continuum of our great nation.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

It seems to me that my hon. Friend is very ably saying that the Government cannot have it both ways. Either they believe in a Fixed-term Parliaments Bill that requires future Governments to fix their parliamentary terms, and should therefore accept the new clause and remove the room for manoeuvre, or this is just a Bill of political convenience, they do not want fixed-term Parliaments and intend to retain the flexibility.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am enormously grateful to my hon. Friend for putting pithily in one intervention what it has taken me, I fear, 20 minutes to say. He is absolutely right that Her Majesty’s Government cannot have it both ways. Either the Bill is serious and important, in which case it should be exempt from the Parliament Act 1911, or it is simply the contract for a marriage of convenience and so should fall at the next general election.

European Union Bill

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Jacob Rees-Mogg

Tuesday 7th December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jenkin]

The Minister nodded at that point in my speech, and I accepted that as an indication of assent.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

rose—

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and Jacob Rees-Mogg

Wednesday 1st December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jenkin]

Sorry, 1689. My hon. and learned Friend will keep me up to the mark, because he is much more of a lawyer than I am.

In recent years, however, the tension between the courts and the independence of this House has been thrown into relief. I remind the Committee of cases such as the one brought by Lord Rees-Mogg for judicial review of the ratification of the Maastricht treaty after this House had passed an Act of Parliament.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I would like to clarify that the judicial review case brought by my noble kinsman was not in any way to challenge what had happened in this House. It was to challenge the use by Ministers of the royal prerogative, which is why the judicial review was allowed by the courts.

[Mr Jenkin]

I stand corrected—again. I fear that that may occur rather often during my presentation. The case relating to the Hunting Act 2004 was certainly an attempt to impede the free functioning of Parliament in its judicial function. In addition, an attempt was made to judicially review the lack of a referendum on what was then the Lisbon treaty. There are other examples of that tension, not least over the arrest of my hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Damian Green), and I believe that only today, in connection with another matter, are the limits of the courts being resolved.

The present situation begs for something that many have recommended for some time: that this Parliament should have a privilege Act to delineate clearly the immunities of Parliament in relation to the functioning of the courts, but we are in an even more tense situation because we are arranging our constitution in other areas that question the very sovereignty of the House. We now have a Supreme Court and it is widely known that many jurists who serve at various levels of the judiciary take differing views of the notions of parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary privilege. There was recently a case concerning the possible effective expulsion of an hon. Member as a result of a judicial decision. I do not comment on its merits as it is still sub judice. I merely advert to the fact that it represents another testing of the boundaries between the courts and Parliament.

We are told not to worry—the Bill’s provisions are immune from the courts, and nobody is going to interfere in what we decide is a Speaker’s certificate, certificating a vote of no confidence that satisfies the majority. When we are blandly and bluntly told that by the Government and at the same time told by the Clerk of the House who has bravely and independently—in his constitutional capacity as an independent guardian of our constitutional arrangements—issued a memorandum, to which I shall refer later, that flatly contradicts the Government’s view, we are obliged to take the matter very seriously.

I cannot think of a precedent, other than the Parliamentary Standards Bill, where a Government flatly refused to accept the advice of the Clerk of the House on a question of the potential justiciability of legislation before the House. The Bill before us is a major change to the constitutional settlement of this country, and it is backed by people in the Government who we know favour a written constitution—an entirely different constitutional settlement. That raises the question whether the Government have got it right when they say that the Clerk’s fears are to be disregarded.

With the indulgence of the Committee, I shall quote rather extensively from the memorandum submitted by the Clerk as written evidence to the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee. He states that the Bill is

“to make statutory provision for matters which fall within Parliament’s exclusive cognizance and which may affect the established privileges of the House of Commons as well as upsetting the essential comity which has been established over a long period between Parliament and the Courts.”

Erskine May makes it clear that “cognizance” refers to the right of both Houses

“to be the sole judge of their own proceedings, and to settle—or depart from—their own codes of procedure.”

The Clerk is clear in a bald statement in paragraph 12 of his memorandum:

“The Bill brings the internal proceedings of the House into the ambit of the Courts, albeit indirectly by the route of Speaker’s certificates.”

He goes on to explain how that occurs under clause 2(2), which we have already debated. In paragraph 16 he states:

“The provisions of this subsection make the Speaker’s consideration of confidence motions and the House’s practices justiciable questions for determination by the ordinary courts.”

That should be obvious. We know that Crown prerogative, as exercised by the Prime Minister, is subject to judicial review. We know that statute is subject to judicial review. We know that proceedings in the House and Standing Orders have not hitherto been subject to judicial review or judicial question. The Bill provides a connection between what happens in the House and in the rest of the world. We are providing a bridge of law that brings the courts into the House.