Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Tuesday 8th October 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I should say at the outset that I do not intend to move new clause 1, although I want to take the opportunity to raise matters that concern it and to support Government amendments 28 and 29. Similarly, I do not intend to press amendment 1 to a vote.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. May I advise the hon. Gentleman that he needs to move his new clause so that we can debate the amendments? When he replies to the debate, he can ask the leave of the House to withdraw it.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am rather appalled, Madam Deputy Speaker, that I have had to be pulled up on that procedural matter in my 21st year in this House.

New Clause 1

Bill of rights

‘Nothing in this Act shall be construed by any court in the United Kingdom as affecting Article IX of the Bill of Rights 1689.’. —(Mr Jenkin.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mr Jenkin]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 28.

Amendment 1, in schedule 1, page 51, line 6, leave out paragraphs 1 and 2.

Government amendment 29.

Amendment 78, page 51, line 15, leave out sub-paragraph (2).

[Mr Jenkin]

I want to use this opportunity to draw the attention of the House to the report by the House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, which was produced only a month or two ago. I believe that it sets down the terms on which we should consider parliamentary privilege, its importance and its relevance. In particular, chapter 2, on general principles, draws attention to privilege’s continuing relevance and value and notes that parliamentary

“proceedings must be immune from interference by the executive, the courts or anyone else who may wish to impede or influence those proceedings in pursuit of their own ends.”

The principle of parliamentary privilege rests on the concept of exclusive cognisance. That is referred to at the beginning of schedule 1, which quotes an extract from the 1689 Bill of Rights and refers to any matter that

“otherwise affects the scope of the exclusive cognisance of Parliament.”

The term “cognisance” might seem rather archaic, but it encapsulates what privilege is about. That is, as our report states:

“Parliament enjoys sole jurisdiction—normally described by the archaic term ‘exclusive cognisance’—over all matters subject to parliamentary privilege.”

That concept underpins parliamentary privilege. As we explain:

“Thus Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, the most important statutory expression of parliamentary privilege, states that ‘the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament’.”

We go on to explain that the most important part of that is that

“both Members and non-Members… are not legally liable for things said or done in the course”

of our parliamentary proceedings,

“nor are those outside who are adversely affected by things said or done in Parliament able to seek redress through the courts.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

It seems to me that the kernel of the problem is that this is a Bill to regulate lobbying. An important part of an MP’s job is to lobby for his or her constituency and constituents, and we are paid salaries, so in that sense we are paid lobbyists; but surely that part of our role, like every other part of the role, must be immune from the interventions of the court and must not be in any way modified by the legislation before us.

[Mr Jenkin]

I hear what my right hon. Friend says, but it is not generally asserted that, for example, correspondence between him representing his constituents and a Minister is privileged, because it would be difficult to prove that that constituted proceedings in Parliament. I do not think, therefore, that we can seek to extend parliamentary privilege in the Bill. What we do as our job to represent our constituents is clearly not intended to be included in the regulation of lobbying. It would be intolerable if Members of Parliament had to register as lobbyists in order to represent their constituents, or indeed represent any other interests. I will return to that point later, if my right hon. Friend will forgive me.

[Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)]

The hon. Gentleman will recall that in the previous Parliament there was concern about the way that certain Members were behaving, and two were summoned to the Committee. One was receiving £75,000 to represent a company; the other was receiving £105,000. They received those sums entirely to lobby on behalf of a commercial organisation. One of their excuses was, “The organisation has employees in my constituency.” But surely it is the core job of an MP to lobby for his constituents, and if MPs are offered money to do it, that should be seen for what it is, which is a bung, an inducement or a bribe.

[Mr Jenkin]

I recognise the sentiment the hon. Gentleman expresses, and I share his outrage at any abuse that he suggests took place, but we have our own rules in this House. We adjudicate on these matters, and in fact we apply very harsh terms to people we believe to be guilty of paid advocacy. For many decades, since 1945 or even earlier, paid advocacy has been utterly abhorrent to this House. No longer do we have MPs sitting in the railway interest, as they did during the 19th century. The important distinction here is that we regulate that from within this House, as proceedings of this House. We do not need or require the courts to interfere in those matters. I do not think we are providing any leniency to Members that the courts would not also afford. Indeed, it might be far harder to obtain a prosecution in court for a matter such as that than to create in this House the right atmosphere of discipline and self-discipline that we expect from all hon. Members.

[Mrs Cheryl Gillan (Chesham and Amersham) (Con)]

I am following my hon. Friend’s argument closely. Rather than my standing here in the railway interest, I stand in the anti-railway interest in respect of HS2, hoping that the Government will see sense and abandon the project. Will he confirm that there should be nothing in the Bill that would restrict my standing up on behalf of my constituents against HS2, or restrict my constituents in lobbying this place against that project?

[Mr Jenkin]

I wholly agree with my right hon. Friend. I just want to emphasise that the amendments I am speaking to deal with the narrower question of privilege, although I will return to the risk, which I think the Minister must address, of the wider drawing in of Members’ activities into the scope of the Bill.

[Mr Redwood]

Further to that exchange, does my hon. Friend not see my case, which is that if the Bill is in danger of restricting our privilege to write letters on behalf of our constituents as properly paid advocates for our constituents, we need to stop that happening? Otherwise, my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan) will not be able to campaign against something in her constituency by writing to a Minister without registering under the Bill.

[Mr Jenkin]

I will return to that matter, but when my right hon. Friend employs the word “privilege” in that context, he is not employing it in terms of parliamentary privilege. It is not a parliamentary privilege that protects our ability to write to Ministers on behalf of our constituents. That is not covered by parliamentary privilege.

With the indulgence of the House, I wonder whether I might quote the Lord Chief Justice when he made it clear that we should, if possible, avoid legislating on matters regarding privilege. He said:

“Parliament has to decide whether it has sufficient privilege to be able to conduct its business in the way that Parliament wishes. If you have reservations about that, you have to produce a system that enables you to have the conditions under which you can perform your responsibilities properly. If you had no real reservations about it, I would not go down the legislative route that defined, semi-defined, subdivided, allowed for, or exercised this and that, because you would end up in interminable discussions, and, in court, interminable arguments, about what that really meant. Unless you are dissatisfied with the way in which your privileges operate, I would leave this well alone.”

By that, I think he means that the courts are predisposed to defer to proceedings in Parliament, whatever statutes may say.

The 1689 Bill of Rights is one of those special statutes in our legal system that is implicitly present in every statute. We do not need to repeat what is in the Bill of Rights 1689 in every statute in order to immunise it for the purpose of parliamentary privilege. The one exception that we have made is in respect of the IPSA legislation—the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009—in which we inserted the words that I am proposing in my new clause:

“Nothing in this Act shall be construed by any court in the United Kingdom as affecting Article IX of the Bill of Rights 1689.”

I submit that the House of Lords put that clause in the Parliamentary Standards Bill in rather extreme circumstances. When that Bill arrived in this House, it seemed that it was going to go into areas that were previously considered part of the exclusive cognisance of this House. It was going to refer to disciplining Members for what we did in this House, and that was going to draw parliamentary proceedings into the consideration of the courts in a way that was unprecedented. All that was eventually taken out by the House of Lords. In those exceptional circumstances, when the courts were under enormous public pressure to take more draconian action following the expenses fiasco, it was reasonable for Parliament to put that clause into that Bill, but generally we should try to avoid putting any reference to the Bill of Rights 1689 into legislation.

My amendment 1 suggested that we delete paragraph 1 of schedule 1. I note that the Government have now proposed that we remove both paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 of schedule 1. Paragraph 1 removes language which is lifted from the Bill of Rights 1689, without referring to the 1689 Act. Because there is no reference to it, paragraph 1 does not place the wording in the special category in which the Act exists.

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is reaching the nub of the issue. With something as delicate as article IX of the Bill of Rights, there is nothing worse than trying to produce another version of what it is supposed to mean, which is bound to cause confusion and uncertainty and raise the question of interpretation, making it more likely to be adjudicated by the courts, whereas the Lord Chief Justice said that that should be left well alone.

[Mr Jenkin]

My hon. Friend has, typically, put more pithily than I could a complex legal argument. By drawing the courts into adjudicating on these words, we would be devaluing the 1689 Bill of Rights. That would be irresponsible. If the courts start arguing about all this, we will have to legislate on the matter and risk losing our historic immunity.

Our conclusions, clearly stated in the report, were:

“The extent of Parliament’s exclusive cognisance changes over time, as the work of Parliament evolves”

and it would be impractical

“to draw up an exhaustive list”.

We continued:

“Where there is uncertainty in a case brought before the courts, the extent of Parliament’s exclusive cognisance will be determined by the courts.”

We stated that

“if Parliament were to consider that its privileges had been reduced to the extent that it could no longer effectively perform its core work, it could in the last resort change the law”,

but finally that

“legislation should only be used when absolutely necessary, to resolve uncertainty or in the unlikely event of Parliament’s exclusive cognisance being materially diminished by the courts.”

Neither of those last two conditions exists. There is no uncertainty.

We made further recommendations about how our 1689 privileges could be clarified. It is fashionable to believe that over the years parliamentary privilege has been eroded by the courts. That is a two-way street. In certain circumstances, Parliament might exercise privilege in a manner that has recently been ruled to be subject to court proceedings. It would depend on the circumstances, and we need to hold out the prospect that in extremis we would exercise privilege in a way that the courts might not expect us to do, given the way that privilege has been exercised in the past.

We no longer send out a posse of soldiers to arrest people on behalf of Parliament, and I do not suppose we will return to that in these democratic days, but who knows what will happen in the future? Parliament should reserve its right to assert its privilege in order to be able to conduct its proceedings immune from the courts, immune from the Executive, under any circumstances.

[Mr Christopher Chope (Christchurch) (Con)]

My hon. Friend and my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) tabled amendment 1, which is exactly the same as amendments 28 and 29 tabled by the Government. Is my hon. Friend saying that he no longer thinks amendment 1 and therefore amendments 28 and 29 are appropriate and that new clause 1 should be the preferred way forward?

[Mr Jenkin]

I have moved new clause 1, but I shall wait to hear what the Minister says in response to the debate. I suspect that I will be greatly reassured by what he says in respect of parliamentary privilege, and that by removing any reference to the Bill of Rights or any wording thereof, the two Government amendments put this Bill back in the normal category of all Bills, that privilege applies and that the unstated presence of the 1689 Bill of Rights looms over this Bill as it does over any Act and our privileges are therefore secure, there is no ambiguity about that and it is accepted by the courts.

Indeed, I do not expect that the courts wish to be drawn into adjudicating on detailed matters of privilege. It remains uncomfortable and untidy that hon. Members might try to avail themselves of parliamentary privilege when they are not entitled to it and we end up with embarrassing court actions, but that is not an excuse for legislation in this area. The courts have demonstrated, as we saw in the Chaytor case, that they are capable of disposing of those cases in a manner that we would find perfectly acceptable.

Echoing the comments of my right hon. Friends the Members for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) and for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan), I still have concerns about the implications of the Bill. These measures were drawn up, presumably, to protect Members of Parliament. Paragraph 2 of schedule 1 states:

“A Member of Parliament who makes communications within section 2(3) on behalf of a person or persons resident in his or her constituency does not, by reason of those communications, carry on the business of consultant lobbying.”

How have we written a Bill that could possibly construe Members of Parliament going about their ordinary course of business as carrying out consultant lobbying? Yes, we are paid by Parliament and therefore we are paid, and yes, we are paid, in part, to represent our constituents, but is it assumed that any court might by accident include us in the definition of lobbying and therefore require us to register as lobbyists in order to represent our constituents?

I am pleased that that is being taken out because it was absurd to confine the exemption merely to representing residents in our constituencies, as defined by section 4 of the Representation of the People Act 1983. If I were representing a 15-year-old, I would be caught by the Act. It was an absurd piece of drafting. Why was it necessary to put it into the Bill? I hope the Minister will be able to give us an assurance that the Government are taking it out of the Bill now. That is the right thing to do.

[Mr Gareth Thomas (Harrow West) (Lab/Co-op)]

The hon. Gentleman has made an extremely interesting speech, which thus far has touched on issues surrounding Members of this House. Has he given any thought to the possible implications of the Bill as originally drafted, and as it will be without the offending paragraphs if the Government carry the House, for Members of the other place?

[Mr Jenkin]

I note the earlier debate on the guillotine. All I can say is thank God for the other place. The hon. Gentleman raises a point that Members there may want to address, though if the Minister can give us the assurance that we need that he has complete confidence and has had advice that no court could possibly construe a Member of Parliament as a lobbyist, I imagine that would also apply to a Member of the other place. But the hon. Gentleman raises a perfectly valid point.

The point, of course, is that we are paid by Parliament to serve the national interest, and to exercise our independent judgment on behalf of that interest, to represent our constituents and to play our part in proceedings as members of political parties, because without parties democracy would not function. Will the Leader of the House give an assurance that all the normal dealings of a Member of Parliament, whether or not he or she is paid or sponsored by outside interests in the usual legitimate way, will not fall within the scope of the Bill and that we will not be required to register as lobbyists? It is important that he gives that assurance so that the courts are clear that that was the intention of the Act.

[Mr Thomas]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin), who made an extremely interesting speech to which I listened carefully. Like him, I am encouraged by the Government’s decision to table the amendments deleting the two offending paragraphs to schedule 1. We tabled amendment 78 as a probing amendment, but I do not intend to move it if the Leader of the House is suitably convincing when he comments on Government amendments 28 and 29. Nevertheless, there is a series of questions that merit asking about how we got to this point and whether the amendments will resolve all the concerns.

I will deal first with some of the context of these discussions. Until the Government tabled their amendments, it appeared that they were determined to write into legislation a set of paragraphs that would have meant more Members of Parliament being affected by the Bill than actual lobbyists being registered under it. Lynton Crosby and all those in-house energy company lobbyists to whom the Government listen will not have to register because the Bill is still so badly drafted, but Members of Parliament raising concerns, perhaps on behalf of people under the age of 18 or asylum seekers fleeing torture who are resident in their constituencies, might have had to register.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Thomas]

The hon. Lady makes a very good point and underlines the problems there would have been had the Government not listened to the concerns of Members on both sides of the House and tabled their amendments.

[Mr Jenkin]

The hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) has made an extremely valuable point. It shows how narrow a view some of the people who draft this legislation have of what Members of Parliament actually do. They think that we are simply a post box for our constituents. They do not understand that we are meant to exercise our judgment and represent interests from outside our constituencies as well as views and opinions, and indeed the national interest. They have no conception of that, which I am afraid is reflected in the Bill’s original drafting.

[Mr Thomas]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman, and I want to explain how those two paragraphs arrived in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Cash]

I am sorry for inhibiting my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House for a short moment.

I just want to endorse what my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) said and draw attention to the real reasons why this matter is so important. I have already made the point that the proposal would simply create confusion and the extreme likelihood that there would be interpretations by the courts as a result of a difference of language between what is contained in schedule 1 and the wording of article 9 of the Bill of Rights. It is best left alone; that was the essence of what the Lord Chief Justice said.

As someone who served on the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege with my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex, I want to make something absolutely clear. Curiously enough, the word privilege is almost a misnomer. It is not a privilege; it is a necessity. I would say that of any Member of this House. We cannot have freedom of speech to protect our constituents without having the right to be able to say whatever needs to be said in this House to protect them. That is whether in relation to HS2, on which I share the views of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan)—I am totally against it—or anything else. The absolute necessity for maintaining the right of an MP to speak within the framework of the rules of the House must not be interfered with by any court or any outside agency. We have to have that right as that is the essence of our democracy.

What we are really discussing here, apart from the very important question—I concede that it is important—of not getting into a conflict with the courts or having differences of emphasis or wording that could give rise to interpretations, is that it is absolutely essential to remember that these issues are for the benefit of our constituents and the national interest.

In 1999 the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege —our predecessor committee—said:

“Parliament makes the law and raises taxes. It is also the place where ministers are called to account by representatives of the whole nation for their decisions and their expenditure of public money. Grievances great and small can be aired regardless of the power or wealth of those criticised.

In order to carry out these public duties”—

I repeat the word “public”—

“without fear or favour, parliament and its members and officers need certain rights and immunities. Parliament needs the right to regulate its own affairs free from intervention by the government or the courts. Members need to be able to speak freely, uninhibited by possible defamation claims.”

The Irish Government argued recently at the European Court of Human Rights that

“parliamentary immunity has developed throughout the world not as a constraint upon the rights of the citizen but as a fundamental liberty.”

I could enlarge on this but I do not need to do so.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am most grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way at this point. He says “around the world”. It is often thought that parliamentary privilege is unique to our rather odd partly written constitution, where the fundamental principles are accepted and not written down. That is not the case. Every parliamentary democracy in the world grants its legislative authority some kind of immunity in order to ensure that it can carry on its function of holding the Executive to account, and legislating and discussing with impunity. It is not unique to us; it exists in America, Australia and elsewhere. They all wrestle with this problem of how to make it work.

[Mr Cash]

That is the very point I am seeking to make. I would also point out that a number of other countries have got themselves into serious turmoil and trouble where the right of the people to speak freely is inessential and incidental to the manner in which their constitution is construed. In many countries, whether dictatorships or quasi-democracies, the inhibitions on the freedom of their members of parliament to speak as they must on behalf of the national interest or on behalf of their constituents is constrained by a lot of activities which, in effect, put them in fear. It is precisely because this House as a whole ensures, through its own regulation of the behaviour of Members, that that freedom is maintained, that we can guarantee that we can serve our constituents in the national interest.

That is all I need to say, Mr Deputy Speaker.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lansley]

My hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex explained the matter well. A provision was inserted into the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009 because that statute would have impinged directly on the privileges and rights of Parliament. A saving provision was necessary in that context.

Lord Judge was right in what he said to the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege and that is at the heart of our thinking on the matter. If we say in some Bills that nothing in the Bill infringes the principle of parliamentary privilege, not only would that be subject to judicial interpretation, but courts might conclude that other statutes that do not have such a saving provision may infringe parliamentary privilege. They might take the lack of a saving provision as an indication that Parliament did not expressly wish to avoid that happening. That is not our view. Our view is that parliamentary privilege subsists, that nothing in the Bill will infringe it and that courts should not interpret any part of it as infringing parliamentary privilege, for the reasons that my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex explained.

The second issue under this group is the exemption of Members of Parliament. The Government have always been clear that the normal activity of a Member of Parliament will not be captured by the definition of consultant lobbying. The right hon. Member for Rother Valley (Mr Barron) referred to the report by the Standards Committee. I wrote to him with an explanation at the end of August, which stated:

“In order to be required to register under the Bill a person must lobby ‘in the course of a business’ and ‘in return for payment’.”

That is part of the definition of consultant lobbying. I continued:

“Performing one’s public role as a Member of Parliament does not amount to carrying on a business and is therefore exempt. This is equally true of anyone holding an elected office such as an MEP or councillor.”

I might add, in response to an earlier question, that the same would be true of a Member of the House of Lords. A Member of the House of Lords, in exercising their public duty, would not be regarded as carrying on a business and would therefore be exempt.

Concern was expressed by various people that the normal activities of elected officials might be captured by the provisions on the register. I am happy to provide the reassurance that they will not be. That was never our intention and, in our view, the Bill will not have that effect.

Out of an abundance of caution, in addition to the “in the course of a business” requirement, the Bill included a specific, overlapping exemption for Members of Parliament because of their uniquely high level of communication with Ministers and permanent secretaries. However, it became clear on Second Reading that there was dissatisfaction with the exemption, as drafted. That has been expressed again in this debate. There was concern that paragraph 2 of schedule 1 described the normal activities of a Member of Parliament inadequately.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am listening carefully to what the Leader of the House is saying. Of course, all this depends on what one means by the normal activities of a Member of Parliament. Does he agree that the normal activities of a Member of Parliament include representing anybody, so long as we are not paid to represent them? We are free to represent anybody, whether they be a business in the City or a charity.

[Mr Lansley]

I understand that completely. If I have not explained my point fully, let me explain it again. Under clause 2(1)(a), part of the definition of consultant lobbying is that it is carried out

“in the course of a business and in return for payment”.

When the Bill was introduced, in order to make it absolutely clear that Members of Parliament were not covered, we included a provision about the communications that are made by Members of Parliament in paragraph 2 of schedule 1.

On Second Reading, I explained that we believed that Members of Parliament were exempt by virtue of their public duty meaning that they were not engaged in the course of a business. It was clear that the inclusion of the additional provision in schedule 1 created an unnecessary and unhelpful confusion because, as has been said in this debate, it does not encapsulate all the activities of a Member of Parliament in carrying out their functions.

Members will recall that my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich North (Miss Smith) said in Committee that we would therefore adopt a different approach. I thank her for all her work on the Bill and welcome the Minister of State, Cabinet Office, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark), who has responsibility for cities and constitution. I will not ask him to explain the Bill at this stage, but will allow him to take responsibility for the policy when he has had a chance to apply his considerable talents to it.

We discussed, welcomed and accepted what the Chair of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee said and, in Committee, we accepted an amendment that he tabled. That amendment resulted in an improved exemption in schedule 1, which clarified the interaction between parliamentarians and the register. Members will recall that the definition of consultant lobbying states that it must be

“in the course of a business and in return for payment”.

Paragraph 6(2) of schedule 1 states that “payment” in those circumstances

“does not include any sums payable to a member of either House of Parliament”—

again, this refers to the point about Members of the House of Lords—under the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009, pursuant to a resolution, or out of money provided by Parliament or the Consolidated Fund.

Members of Parliament are therefore exempt under both limbs of the definition. They are not engaged in the course of a business and the payment that they receive is not regarded as payment for the purposes of the Bill. For that reason, we think that there is now a cast-iron, belt-and-braces exemption for Members of Parliament.

I might add that Members of the House of Lords are exempt in so far as they are acting in their public duties. If a Member of this House received payment for contacting a Minister or permanent secretary, it would be contrary to the Members’ code of conduct. The Chairman of the Standards Committee will correct me if I am wrong. The code in the House of Lords makes it clear that nobody can undertake paid advocacy in the House of Lords or advise somebody on the proceedings of the House, but it does not preclude somebody engaging in lobbying activity in the course of a business and in return for payment. My reading is that it is not inconceivable that some Members of the House of Lords would be required to register as consultant lobbyists as a consequence of their business activities. They would certainly not be required to register by virtue of their activities as Members of the House of Lords. I apologise for that detour.

As a consequence of accepting the amendment tabled by the Chair of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, we would have removed paragraph 2 of schedule 1 in Committee, but it was not reached. Amendment 29 will remove that redundant paragraph. I hope that the Opposition accept that amendment 78 is therefore unnecessary. I also ask my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex to withdraw new clause 1.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lansley]

The hon. Gentleman knows from our previous conversation that we talked to the House authorities about parliamentary privilege. The implication of what he says is that the Bill was in a sense deficient because Members of Parliament were caught, but they were not. In the original Bill, Members of Parliament were exempt by virtue of the fact that they were engaged in a public duty as office holders, not in the course of a business. To that extent, we included provisions intended to give additional reassurance, but that simply muddied the waters and it was simpler to do it in the way that we, together with the Chair of the Standards and Privileges Committee, accepted. We accepted an amendment in Committee, and all I am doing today—I hope—is making it clear that the combination of those amendments in Committee and the amendments now being considered respects the views of the Standards and Privileges Committee and protects the rights of this House in relation to privilege. It also entirely protects the position of Members of Parliament who are undertaking their duties, however they construe them. On that basis, I hope Members will support Government amendments 28 and 29.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for being utterly clear about the intention of this Bill, which is that Members of Parliament and Members of the other place are not intended to be included in the provisions of the Bill. He has listened and read the report from the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege and the Standards and Privileges Committee of this House, and has understood the concerns raised. I emphasise the importance of removing the second paragraph in schedule 1, subject to amendment 29, because were it to remain it would have the effect of narrowing the exemption to an absurd degree. That is why it is important to remove it; it is not only redundant but would be highly damaging because it would suggest that what is not excluded by the clause would implicitly be included under the Bill. I will not press new clause 1 to a vote, because the Leader of the House is dealing with these matters in an exemplary manner, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 4

Duty to apply a code of conduct

‘(1) The Registrar shall, after wide consultation with relevant stakeholders including the Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee, prepare a code of conduct with which all registered persons will be required to comply, and may produce revised codes from time to time.

(2) The Secretary of State must lay any professional lobbying code of conduct before Parliament.

(3) Any code shall provide that any inappropriate financial relations between registered persons and Parliamentarians are strictly forbidden.

(4) An organisation or person included on the register which contravenes the provisions of the code of conduct shall be liable to civil penalties as set out in section 14.’.—(Mr Thomas.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mr Thomas]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.