European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Grieve]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. He has correctly analysed what the issues are and the categories of rights on which we probably ought to focus.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

Some of these rights are going to be incorporated in different statutes. For example, there is going to be an environment Act, which will create a new regulator and, we hope, protect those rights. Is the present proposal not a very broad brush, which is ill fitted to dealing with these rather detailed matters? Can my right and learned hon. Friend give us some reassurance that Supreme Court judges will not be left dealing with more legal uncertainty, rather than less, because they will have to adjudicate between two different rights regimes—one that is directly applicable from our own statute, and the other where they may have to declare an incompatibility with European convention rights? How will that diminish legal uncertainty, which is what Supreme Court judges are looking for?

[Mr Grieve]

If I understand my hon. Friend’s question, it goes to the point I made a moment ago, which was that it ought to be possible to consider whether some of these rights should be incorporated in a Bill of Rights that provides equivalent protection to that currently provided in the Human Rights Act. I think it is possible to distinguish between what matters and what does not. I am not suggesting that all environmental law would have to enjoy that protection, but I think it is possible, and an exercise that this House and the Government will have to carry out—the pressure will build for this—to give this issue some consideration. Equally, the House may decide that it is not concerned about some categories of rights and that it just wants to stick to things such as equality, data privacy and children’s rights. We will need to debate that.

[Mr Jenkin]

But it will create uncertainty.

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[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Dominic Raab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield). At the outset, I would like to thank hon. Members from right across the House for their contributions to today’s debate, whether in speeches or in amendments. The Government will approach the Bill in the spirit of collaboration, and I certainly welcome the constructive contributions and diligent scrutiny hon. Members are rightly providing today. I shall seek to address clause 5, and the Solicitor General will address schedule 1 a bit later in the debate, to make sure we dwell adequately and with due consideration not only on the provisions of the Bill, but on the various issues and amendments, for which I am grateful to hon. Members, that have been raised.

Clause 5 serves two key strategic objectives: taking back democratic control over our laws and making sure we leave the EU in a way that facilitates a smooth Brexit and minimises legal uncertainty. The Bill aims to provide that the laws which apply immediately before exit day will continue to apply in the same way after we leave. Of course, the act of leaving the EU in itself means it is inevitable that some things will not and cannot stay the same. The changes made by clause 5 relate to certain aspects of EU law which are no longer appropriate, or which will not make sense when we leave the EU because we will then cease to be under the obligations that apply to us as an EU member state. The provisions are therefore essential.

Clause 5(1) ends the supremacy of EU law in relation to new law from the date of exit. That is crucial if we are going to give effect to the mandate from the referendum. At the same time, clause 5(2) makes sure that EU law passed before exit still applies as before, for the sake of legal certainty. That is important for mitigating the risks of legal uncertainty that are inevitable and inherent in departure from the EU. The rest of clause 5 reinforces those critical objectives, including by removing the instrument of the charter on fundamental rights as part of domestic law. I want to come on to address that in detail.

[Mr Jenkin]

May I refer my hon. Friend to clause 5(2)? My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), in his rather amazing speech which I think we all found very illuminating, said that this was a completely new principle to be applied in British law. Is it not just a translation of an existing principle in EU law into United Kingdom law for the purposes of a smooth Brexit? Is it not, in fact, less exceptional than being a member of the European Union and allowing a court in a wholly different jurisdiction to impose itself on parliamentary sovereignty?

[Dominic Raab]

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention and I will come on to address very carefully the speech made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). I agree that there is an inherent sense that, as we move to change, things are not going to be exactly as they were before. I want to draw a very important distinction. We are leaving the EU and taking back control over our laws and the way we make our laws, so that Members across the House can exercise proper democratic control. At the same time, the substantive law—the rules and the principles—will remain the same, because of the snapshot we are taking on exit day and retaining in UK law, thereby avoiding the putative legal cliff-edge.

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[Joanna Cherry]

I beg to differ. The Solicitor General is right about the dates, but as we know, the charter is merely a codification of various general rights and principles. We have significant concerns about not incorporating it, notwithstanding the little list that the Minister is going to give us on 5 December, because with all due respect, a list prepared by a Minister does not have the same weight in a court of law as a codification that has been signed up to by a number of countries.

It is not just my view and that of the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) that there will be an issue for the Good Friday agreement. A briefing produced by none less than the Bingham Centre for the rule of law has raised the question of whether non-retention of the charter will impact on Northern Ireland. It has raised a series of questions, which I have just paraphrased, and I look forward to the Solicitor General answering them in more detail, rather than merely saying that there is not a problem. If I may say so, this illustrates the whole problem with the British Government’s approach to the unique situation in which Northern Ireland finds itself as a result a Brexit. There is a constant parrying, and saying, “There is not a problem, it can all be sorted out. It will all be fine.” This is what is causing us problems in the negotiations with the EU27, and particularly with the Republic of Ireland. Mere platitudes and assurances are not enough. We need some detail as to why removing the charter of fundamental rights from domestic law in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland will not pose a problem for the Good Friday agreement. However, I am sure that as we have the Solicitor General here, we will hear that detail later.

[Mr Jenkin]

I wonder whether the hon. and learned Lady recalls the Mostyn judgment of 2013, in which a very senior member of the judiciary expressed astonishment that there was direct applicability of the charter in UK domestic law, given that the protocol had been attached to the charter when we originally signed up to it. Given the rather temporary nature of the charter rights, how can it be so fundamental to the Good Friday agreement? It did not exist in law in this country, and was not recognised by the judiciary, even after it had been brought into force in the treaties.

[Joanna Cherry]

If I may say so, I think that that is to misunderstand. I am not responsible for the false assurances that were given about the opt-out when this country signed up to the charter. They did not come from the Scottish National party, and I think it is fair to say that they have now been disowned by the Labour party. In reality, the incorporation of the charter in our law has meant enhanced direct effect. I use the term “direct effect” rather than “direct applicability” because people are able to take an action and refer to those rights in the course of their action, as we saw in the Supreme Court case last summer when a gentleman named Mr Walker was able to realise equal pension rights for his husband, despite a loophole in UK law about the equalisation of pension rights for gay couples, because the EU charter closed that loophole.

I want to give the House a brief list of some of the rights involved. We have heard a lot about data protection, and I know that others will want to address that issue, but it is worth remembering that the right to be forgotten on Google and other search engines—which I believe is of interest to some Members—stems from the EU charter. There is more to it than that, however. Let us look at the words of others, rather than simply accepting the argument on my say-so.

When the Exiting the European Union Committee took evidence on these matters, Caroline Normand, the director of policy at Which?, told us that

“the Charter of Fundamental Rights contains some really important principles for consumers. The particular ones that I would highlight are the right to a high level of human health protection, which is article 35, and a right to a high level of consumer protection.”

She referred to the case last May—it has already been mentioned today—when the large tobacco companies brought judicial review proceedings challenging the regulations that introduced standardised packaging for tobacco products. The High Court dismissed the case, referencing the public health and other rights set out in the charter. That is a pretty meaningful right for public health in these islands.

Dr Charlotte O’Brien, a senior lecturer at York Law School, told the Select Committee that she had produced an approximate count for the number of times the charter was referenced in case law. She found that the charter was cited in 248 cases in England and Wales, 17 in Northern Ireland, 14 in Scotland and 98 in the European Court of Human Rights, and in 832 EU judgments, 515 of which were from the Court of Justice. Her point was that that is an awful lot of cases that would have to be read differently, and it is not clear how they are to be read differently.

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[Mr Jenkin]

It is for the European Court of Justice to continue to interpret what the charter of fundamental rights actually means within the European Union, so if the charter was incorporated into our law, what relationship does my hon. Friend think would exist between our Supreme Court and the interpretations that would continue to be developed in the European Union?

[Sir William Cash]

The Supreme Court would be applying the European interpretation in that context, and I simply say that it will involve disapplication of law. It is a matter not of assertion but of fact and law that that is precisely what will happen.

I urge my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and others not to press their amendments on the charter, because to do so would be totally unacceptable. I refer to what I have alluded to already: the principle set out by Lord Justice Bingham in chapter 12 of his magisterial book on “The Rule of Law and the Sovereignty of Parliament?”, in which he publicly criticised the attitude of Baroness Hale, now President of the Supreme Court, and Lord Hope of Craighead in suggesting that the courts have constitutional authority, as against an Act of Parliament. With respect to the whole question of parliamentary sovereignty and the issue of the courts, he says that various remarks had been made but:

“No authority was cited to support them, and no detailed reasons were given.

I cannot for my part accept that my colleagues’ observations are correct... To my mind, it has been convincingly shown”—

by Professor Goldsworthy, one of the greatest authorities on this subject—

“that the principle of parliamentary sovereignty has been recognised as fundamental in this country not because the judges invented it but because it has for centuries been accepted as such by judges and others officially concerned in the operation of our constitutional system. The judges did not by themselves establish the principle and they cannot by themselves change it… What is at stake”—

said Professor Goldsworthy—

“is the location of ultimate decision-making authority… If the judges were to repudiate the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, by refusing to allow Parliament to infringe on unwritten rights, they would be claiming that ultimate authority for themselves.”

Moreover, Lord Bingham went on to say that they would then be transferring the rights of Parliament to judges:

“It would be a transfer of power initiated by the judges, to protect rights chosen by them, rather than one brought about democratically by parliamentary enactment or popular referendum.”

With some irony, the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law has put some of the contrary arguments.