(2 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend is right. In anticipation of those training situations, the Defence Command Paper in March and “The Integrated Operating Concept 2025”, which preceded it, put in place measures to ensure that our Army is more ready, more forward and more deployable than it has ever been before, because speed and readiness are the one of the best ways to deter our adversaries.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberThat is not the point—it is about the principles. We have spoken at length about this and listed some of them. It is about the principles, and we are signatories to the ECHR as well. We should ensure that these principles and obligations are in this Bill; otherwise, in my view, we are not following those obligations.
Amendment 1, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, is an improvement on new clause 1, but my only small concern—the right hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Sir Edward Davey) may address this in his speech—is that it might not cover instances where data could be requested by another state through a different route, similarly to the issues that I set out with regard to new clause 1.
Amendment 12 simply refers to
“where the treaty provides for requests”
and therefore provides the most comprehensive level of protection. I urge Members from across the House to back this amendment, as our international reputation may well be degraded even further—if that were possible given the Brexit situation at the moment—if we enable this barbaric practice anywhere else in the world.
On journalistic protections, I very much welcome the amendments tabled by the Government and by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle (Huw Merriman), but they still do not go far enough. They are fine in and of themselves, but other areas of journalistic protection still need to be looked at.
If the hon. Gentleman was sitting where I am and he had a choice before him where the United States Administration was saying, “Look, here’s the deal—we’ve got 99% of the data and you’ve got 1%. We haven’t got equality of arms. This is the deal—you either take it without strings attached or you do not,” and if there were no deals and no treaty, as the amendment would provide, what would he do?
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am not saying that the review will be watered down in any way, but I will give way to the Minister on that point.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I would not like him to think that we ordered the review because we do not think that the strategy is safeguarding people. He refers to the fact that we must do much better based on his meeting with Safaa Boular, who by the way was convicted of planning a proper terrorist plot, no matter how nice she may have been in the detention centre. The reality is that the strategy has safeguarded hundreds of people away from violence and has been proving a success, so I would not want him to leave an impression that it has not. Of course, I agree that, like all schemes, it does not work for every single person, but it has had considerable success in all our constituencies.
I do not dispute anything that the Minister has just said, but there is a huge clamour for review because of the inadequacies of the Prevent strategy, as seen by many in the community. His points about the terrorist plot, and so on, are well made, and I do not dispute them for one second. I am not arguing that Safaa Boular should not have been punished or put in prison; my point is about the fact that she was radicalised in the first place.
Yes, we need legislation that gives the police everything they need to fight serious crime and terrorism, but the Government should bear in mind that this Bill is, in many respects, deeply controversial. They must get it absolutely right, and that will be impossible without a full, independent review—that review has been hamstrung by the Government before it starts. I ask that the Opposition be consulted on the terms of reference, to which the right hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Sir Edward Davey) alluded earlier, and on the timescale for that consultation.
(6 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt seems to me that the Minister is saying that there are circumstances in which he would make a different judgment. His judgment to me is that now is not the time to make a stand. Respectfully, I have to disagree with him. I believe that now is the moment to make a stand. The Opposition oppose the removal of the amendment.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Moon. The hon. Gentleman has set out the opposition to the Government amendment with commendable detail and clarity. I do not seek to repeat too much of that, but I will make a brief statement setting out the Scottish National party position.
The Minister spoke of principles and of tying the hands of Governments. I have a different set of principles: the SNP has not been a member of a Government who have passed on information without seeking or receiving assurances about the death penalty. The Minister also spoke about a compromise potentially before Report. That is largely a matter for the Government and the Labour party, although we would be more than happy to engage in that process.
To be crystal clear, the SNP will only support a compromise where the default position of Parliament would be not to provide data where assurances on the death penalty have not been received or sought and where it would be for the Government to argue otherwise in exceptional circumstances. At the end of the day, article 2 and protocol 139 obligations should be met and our shared principles across the United Kingdom on capital punishment should be protected.
The hon. Gentleman says it is for the Government to argue about exceptional circumstances. Is he saying that a Government should always seek death penalty assurances and if they do not get them, there could be exceptional circumstances, or is he saying that there are no circumstances or no exceptional circumstances—no nothing—where they would be allowed to seek that?
I am saying that it is our position, and it should be Parliament’s position, that we should not give information to any country seeking the death penalty or seeking information from the United Kingdom in pursuit of the death penalty.
We are trying to listen to the principle that the Minister has set out, and we are trying not to bind completely the hands of future Governments. If we are looking to achieve compromise and there is a small glimmer whereby the Government can argue in exceptional circumstances for that duty to be removed—we will be arguing against that at every turn, I am sure—it should be set out in the Bill, so that we are not handing over information, but Governments can argue for doing that in exceptional circumstances. What the Minister has been arguing should be flipped on its head. We will vote against the Government amendment.
I have listened to the SNP, and I am happy to look at further scrutiny of those decisions when we consider exceptional circumstances. The SNP, having been in government in Scotland for a long time, will know that Governments very occasionally encounter circumstances where they have to make difficult decisions. If the hon. Gentleman is looking for more scrutiny, we are absolutely happy to provide that. We are also happy to provide in the Bill a primary obligation to seek death penalty assurances in a way that has never been done before. We are happy to look at that.
What we cannot do is seek and acquire those assurances, because we are not in charge of the other country. We can certainly bind our hands to seek it in primary legislation and to explain why we have made an exceptional circumstance. I have no objection to trying to reach that position. My challenge is in the absolute. My challenge is in the bit where there is absolutely no position for a Government to make a choice or decision that is so exceptional that something has to be done. It was never any different with the previous Labour Government. In fact, a Secretary of State of that Government did exactly that when push came to shove, and the details around that are even more extreme.
Never did I hear an objection about the overseas security and justice assistance document, which is a public document that has been in circulation since 2014. It is not from the shadow Attorney General or the Liberal Democrat shadow Attorney General. It says absolutely clearly in part 9:
“Where no assurances are forthcoming or where there are strong reasons not to seek assurances, the case should automatically be deemed ‘High Risk’”—
I think we recognise that and agree on it—
“and FCO Ministers should be consulted to determine whether, given the specific circumstances of the case, we should nevertheless provide assistance.”
That is the reality.
If this is about making a stand, what has been the Labour party’s stand been since 2014, or since 2000, when it was carrying out these things? I venture that it has not taken that stand because it knows that in government—it aspires to be a Government sooner rather than later—it might have to make those decisions. That is why members of the Committee are seeking not to agree that amendment. We can offer more assurances and scrutiny of that decision, but as the Minister of State for Security, I make the decision to try to help our law enforcement agencies catch these people time and again, and I cannot bind their hands 100%. The United States has made it clear that we will not be able to progress with the treaty if the amendment falls in the legislation in the way it does.
The hon. Gentleman is right on that. I cannot speak for the next Government, but the Bill is about our requests to our courts, and this Government would not enter into an agreement with a Government that went around oppressing the press and the media. Despite the fake news, this Government believe that journalism and the press are vital to exposing the truth, corruption and everything else, and we absolutely would do all we could to protect that, both in domestic proceedings and with any international treaties. That is why the Bill is drafted so it is both compliant with European law and has high regard to the first amendment.
I was going to speak to amendment 18, but the hon. Member for Torfaen made points broadly similar to those I was going to make. The Minister has addressed some of them, but I have one question. He said he would never countenance handing over information to a country with fewer journalistic safeguards than we have here. If that is the case, why can we not have that safeguard in the Bill, which all these international treaties and agreements will plug into? What is the danger of building that safeguard into the Bill?
First of all, the Bill is simply the docking station from here to there. It is not about international treaties—when we sign our treaties, we can dock them into the Bill. The principle of allowing a Government to negotiate without their hands narrowly tied about what they can discuss is important.
Secondly, remember that—this probably comes down to how we would draft such a provision—for the purposes of security and so on we sometimes share information with countries that do not have the same high standards as us. If we had a credible threat against aeroplanes with British tourists taking off from third countries, we would not say, “We’re not going to tell you,” and let British tourists get blown out of the sky. Of course we share information with countries, but this is about journalistic information as it applies to investigations, criminal proceedings and so on.
We can do more to provide assurances about journalistic material, notification and journalists in court here, and I can give the Committee the assurance that we would enter into international agreements only where we felt there was high regard for the protection of journalists, but I do not think that safeguard needs to be in the Bill. There would be a challenge about how exactly to draft it. It would also go against the principle of letting the Government of the day be free to hold a negotiation in a way that would achieve the same things, but could address all the different issues. Every country will have things that we have issues with, and I bet that not one country will tick all our boxes across the board. What is my highest priority? Protection of the ECHR, the right to life, journalistic protections—those things will be right up there at the very top, which I think is the best way to do it.
The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Torfaen is probably more grammatically correct than mine—my high school English teacher would not be surprised by that—but the principle is exactly the same. Rigorous safeguards are required to ensure that overseas production orders are not open to abuse in terms of requesting access to bulk data.
As someone who suffered—served—on the Investigatory Powers Bill Committee, I used to read the excerpts on the levels of oversight on the various elements of bulk data collection and interception to help to put me to sleep at night; if this is a dry Bill, then the Investigatory Powers Bill, although incredibly important, was even drier. The Scottish National party held out strong opposition to bulk data collection, and it is important to explain why we tabled this amendment: to remind the Minister that we believe that surveillance should be targeted by means of warrants that are focused, specific and based on reasonable suspicion.
Although the Government produced an operational case for bulk powers in between the draft Bill and the Bill as scrutinised in Committee, it was inadequate because it was largely anecdotal. We still firmly believe that such powers do not pass the legal tests of necessity and proportionality, and the additional test that the same results could not be achieved using more proportionate and less intrusive means. Two American Committees that asked to look at these Bills concluded that the same information could be obtained using more proportionate and less intrusive means.
Amendment 21 in my name is straightforward; the hon. Gentleman has already outlined many of the arguments and quoted Baroness Williams, but we agree that applications for bulk data lack a careful consideration of specifically which data is to be targeted. However, the Bill does not contain any express provision requiring orders to be targeted in the manner the Government describe. It is perfectly possible for officers to argue to the Government’s satisfaction that bulk data will be of substantial value to criminal investigations and in the public interest, given that the Government already regularly make arguments about why bulk powers are required in a wide variety of circumstances.
That assumption on the Government’s part does not amount to an adequate safeguard against the potential for bulk data to be requested under an OPO. Any access to routine daily surveillance of communications en masse should be expressly prohibited, and that is what the SNP amendment and the hon. Gentleman’s amendment are both intended to do. I urge the Minister to accept our amendment.
I hope I can put colleagues’ concerns to rest. The Bill does not provide for the acquisition of bulk data. The only means of acquiring bulk data is provided for in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.
The test in clause 4 of this Bill clearly sets out that the power to obtain an overseas production order is to make a targeted request for specific data. When applying for an overseas production order, an officer must specify or describe what electronic data is sought, and applications must therefore be precise and specific. Moreover, the Bill provisions have been drafted to require officers to consider carefully what data they are targeting, and to be able to demonstrate that the data would help with the investigation and prosecution of a serious crime.
There are safeguards, also in clause 4, that require the judge to thoroughly test the need for the data sought and to be confident that
“there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person against whom the order is sought has possession or control of all or part of the electronic data specified or described in the application”,
and, in clause 4(5), that the data will be of “substantial value” to an investigation or proceedings and, in subsection (6), that producing the data is “in the public interest”. Those tests make clear that the quest for electronic data using overseas production orders will be targeted, specific and not about large volumes of data relating to a number of unknown persons.
I accept that hon. Members may be referring to bulk personal datasets, but those cannot be required using overseas production orders either. The Investigatory Powers Act fact sheet on bulk personal data, which the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North must have remembered from his reading, defines them as
“sets of personal information about a large number of individuals, the majority of whom will not be of any interest to the security and intelligence agencies. The datasets are held on electronic systems for the purpose of analysis by the security and intelligence agencies. Examples of these datasets include the electoral roll, telephone directories and travel-related data.”
The request for a large volume of data on a specific individual, or even a group of individuals such as a criminal gang if every individual is of investigatory concern, does not constitute a bulk personal dataset, as the request is still targeted and specific. For requested data to constitute a bulk personal dataset, it has to include the full bulk dataset, which would include the personal information of large numbers of unknown individuals of no interest to the investigation. Again, under the Bill, officers cannot just request bulk personal data that would not be of substantial value to their investigation.
To clarify, on the specific information request that the Minister speaks of, can that information be taken from data that is harvested in bulk?
Certainly not through this process. Any use or acquisition of bulk data is guided by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, and those conditions are set out. Someone could not use the Bill to go along to court and say, “Google, can I have data on everyone in Scunthorpe who uses the internet?” That would be a bulk dataset. However, they could go along to the court and say, “I’m investigating somebody called Gavin Newlands, and I would like to see the comms data record and some of his content.” They would make the request to the judge, possibly for more than one set of data—browsing history and mobile phone text history, perhaps. That would be two sets, but they would be specifically targeted at an individual, and would therefore not be a bulk dataset. That is the difference.
Bulk datasets are required under the 2016 Act by our intelligence service and so on, and they are overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office and the warrantry system, which now has the double lock in many cases. They can also be overseen by Ministers, and to some extent by the Intelligence and Security Committee when investigating operations and how that data was used. I do not know when it will be published—it might be about to be published, or have been published—but the latest annual report by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is out. Lord Justice Fulford’s report is a detailed analysis, and highlights where mistakes have been made or the law has not been applied.
That is how bulk data is regulated and acquired. The Bill does not apply to that, and none of those requests could involve bulk data applications.
The Minister will be surprised to hear that I am not content. He said that the Bill is not designed to replicate PACE. We and others argue that it should. I look behind me, however, and realise that attempting to divide the Committee would be a futile gesture this morning, so I shall not press the amendments. However, if the Government do not bring forward protections that we feel appropriate—
Given that the hon. Gentleman wants to put the provision in line with POCA, is he saying that he would want to amend the Terrorism Act to put many of the Terrorism Act orders and requests on exactly the same line as the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002? That is a consequence of his view.
We are talking about PACE, not POCA—I think that the Minister meant that, so I will answer accordingly. What he outlined is not before us today. If he introduces another Bill to make such changes to legislation, then perhaps on considering it we would argue the same points. That is for another day, but I take his point.
If the Government do not table appropriate amendments to provide protections, I suspect that we shall revisit the matter on Report, but for now I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 5 to 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Inclusion of non-disclosure requirement in order
I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 8, page 8, line 42, at end insert—
“(3A) A judge shall only include a non-disclosure requirement for a period which, in the judge’s opinion, is necessary and proportionate in all the circumstances.”
This amendment would require a judge to include a non-disclosure requirement to cover a period which was only as long as he or she deemed necessary and proportionate.
This is another quite discrete point. Clause 8 empowers a judge making an overseas production order to include a non-disclosure requirement. Subsection (3) provides:
“An overseas production order that includes a non-disclosure requirement must specify or describe when the requirement is to expire.”
However, the clause does not include a necessity and proportionality test. Of course, it is essential that a non-disclosure requirement should not run for longer than reasonably necessary. Whereas under subsection (3) an order with a non-disclosure requirement would certainly have to specify or describe when it would expire, the judge would not be asked to consider the necessity for and proportionality of the order and its duration.
The purpose of the amendment is simply to probe the Minister for an indication of why there is no necessity and proportionality test, and whether he thinks any reassurance can be provided that those factors would be borne in mind in any non-disclosure order, which he will appreciate is a powerful order to make. It has quite profound consequences in these circumstances.
The hon. Member for Torfaen made his points with force and alacrity, and I shall not seek to detain the Committee by repeating them. However, in supporting the hon. Gentleman, I urge the Minister to listen not only to those on the Opposition Benches, but to those on his own Back Benches, to concede the principles of the amendment, and to table Government amendments on Report. If he does not do so, we will.
The Minister shook himself. Amendments 3, 10 and 20 would provide that when journalistic data is sought as part of an overseas production order, the journalist is put on notice of application. Clause 12(1) of the Bill requires that when confidential journalistic data is sought as part of an overseas production order, the respondent is put on notice. The respondent in this context would be the communication service provider from which law enforcement agencies or prosecutors are seeking content data.
The Government intended to ensure that where an application for an overseas production order was made there was a presumption that any person affected by the order, which would include the journalist themselves, was also put on notice. That was to be included in the relevant court rules, as is the case with domestic production orders, including those made under PACE, the Terrorism Act and POCA.
I am pleased to see that the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Torfaen recognise that, should all journalists be put on notice when an overseas production order is served in respect of an application that relates to their data, certain exemptions must be in place. It is important that the requirement to provide notice for an overseas production order is not absolute. The difference between the Bill and PACE is that PACE production orders are served directly on the respondent themselves—that is, the journalist. Where PACE requires notice to be given to the respondent, notice has been given to someone who will of course be made aware of the order when it is served, as they are the person who will be required to comply with it. In practice, that will be the person handing over the data to law enforcement agencies.
However, in the Bill the orders are served directly on the CSP that owns and controls the data. Giving notice to a third party—the journalist, who is not required to act on the order—should not stand in the way of issuing an overseas production order where there are good reasons for notice not to be given. I believe that the judge is well placed to determine whether the journalist should be notified, and the circumstances in which it will not be appropriate for that to be the case.
The exemptions set out in amendment 10 are that
“the applicant cannot identify or contact the journalist…it would prejudice the investigation if the journalist were present…it would prejudice the investigation to adjourn or postpone the application so as to allow the journalist to attend, or…the journalist has waived the opportunity to attend.”
Those exemptions mirror what is currently in place in court rules for domestic production orders through PACE, and they seem a sensible approach. For example, we do not want to oblige law enforcement agencies into notifying an ISIS blogger or journalist when clearly that could prejudice the investigation. Those exemptions are fundamental to retaining a robust and sensible approach to evidence.
I thank Members for their detailed arguments, and for the time that they have taken to consider the protection of journalists. I reiterate that both the notice requirements and the important exceptions that underpin them will be provided for, as they are currently, in court rules. However, I am happy to consider whether they can be provided for in the Bill. I am happy to discuss that with hon. Members as we proceed to Report, if they will withdraw the amendment.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesLet me get to the next bit, which is also about the right not to be overheard—for legal privilege to be protected—and the idea that that is somehow absolute. It has never been absolute. The justification for that not being absolute was that the last Labour Government introduced paragraph 9 of schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000, which says:
“A direction under this paragraph may provide that a detained person who wishes to exercise the right…may consult a solicitor only in the sight and hearing of a qualified officer.”
The principle of, effectively, allowing the law enforcement agencies to do that, subject to chief officer authorisation, is not a new precedent that we are setting, as the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North seems to suggest. It has existed for 18 years. The last Labour Government viewed that as important enough for it to happen when it applies to TACT offenders in a police station setting, never mind in a schedule setting. That is where that policy idea came from. It has not been rustled up in the last year. It has been around for 18 years.
If I was arrested tomorrow morning and taken to a police station, rather than the border, and I wanted to consult a solicitor, I would find that, if there were reasonable grounds—or stronger than that—and the chief officer gave permission, that discussion could, on a very few occasions, be listened to. It is not at all about “inadvertently”; it is about the few individuals, who, as I witnessed in the early ’90s, exploit that relationship for the simple purpose of tipping off or undermining or disposing of evidence. Under those circumstances, the power has already existed.
I bring the hon. Member for Torfaen back to the point of this schedule stop. What is this stop really about? The verbal evidence given is not admissible in court, and this is not the same as sitting in a police station. This is about effectively establishing the intent, the identity and the basic details at the time of a border stop.
Given that we are a free and open society, it is at our border that we are most vulnerable. Once someone is within our community, because of the way we live our lives, quite rightly, they have free movement and free everything. I am delighted that those are our values, but if we are to keep that special, and maintain that freedom within the United Kingdom, we have to be able to give that power for the simple purpose of establishing the intent—the who and the what—at our border.
The new schedule applies to hostile state activities and to people who come here to attack and undermine the very state that allows us to enjoy those freedoms. That does not put in peril the strength of our justice system and the right to a lawyer and to a fair trial—I am a Scot, and we take a slightly different philosophical view on the right to a jury, which is a very Norman thing in England and Wales. That is why I believe that these measures are proportionate and necessary to keep us safe, and I do not believe that going back on the principle established 18 years ago would keep us safe; in fact, we would be unpicking well-established law.
Funnily enough, in my two years as Security Minister, I have had lots of representations on the use of schedule 7 and whether people have a right to compensation, whether the schedule is abused, and whether we should be cleverer and faster in using it, so it does not impinge on people’s journeys. I have not yet had a representation in those two years to ask for paragraph 9 of schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 to be undone. Therefore, the Government will not accept these amendments and will leave the schedule to stand, for the purpose of screening the who, what, where and when at our border and of taking into account the large amounts of data some of these individuals carry on their way into this country.
In the debate on the previous group of amendments, I indicated that I would keep my powder dry until this group. I have listened carefully to the Minister, but in making the point that each suspect should be able to consult a lawyer of their choosing, he seems to be arguing against some of the provisions in his own Bill. For that reason, I wish to press my amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI want to speak to clause 16 because I am conscious that, even if no amendments are tabled, some parts of the Bill are important and the concerns that we heard in evidence should be reflected. Even if hon. Members on both sides of the Committee agree with the provision, it is important that those on the outside can hear some of our justification.
The clause amends the Terrorism Act 2000 to exclude time spent in, and travelling to and from, hospital from the calculation of the time a suspect spends in pre-charge detention. General criminal law has long recognised that it is appropriate to pause the detention clock so that the time an individual spends in pre-charge detention does not include any time they are receiving hospital treatment or travelling to or from hospital, in the relatively rare cases where a detainee needs hospital treatment.
At present, the calculation of the maximum period of pre-charge detention for an individual arrested under the 2000 Act makes no allowance for any time spent by the suspect receiving hospital treatment. Consequently, if a suspect were to be injured or fall ill in custody, the amount of time available to the police to interview the suspect would be reduced. That could impair the police investigation and prevent a proper decision from being reached on whether to charge the individual before they must be released. They could therefore evade justice and the public could be put at risk.
The change will ensure that the police can use the full amount of time permitted to them under the law to question a suspect, investigate the suspected offence, and work with the Crown Prosecution Service to reach a charging decision. Terrorist investigations are often exceedingly complex and can involve a high level of risk to the public. As such, it is important that the police are able to investigate fully and get such decisions right.
The change will also apply to the calculation of the maximum time for which an individual may be detained for the purpose of examination under schedule 7 to the 2000 Act, which stands at six hours including the initial hour during which a person may be examined without being detained. That will give effect to a recommendation made by the former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson, QC, and will bring the provisions of the 2000 Act in line with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Retention of biometric data for counter-terrorism purposes etc
I beg to move amendment 14, in schedule 2, page 26, line 5, leave out paragraph 2.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to see you in the chair again, Ms Ryan. I support amendments 5 to 8 in the name of the hon. Member for Torfaen. As has been outlined at various stages, clause 3—and the Government’s three clicks policy—has received the most attention and probably the most public criticism of any part of the Bill. Furthermore, I think the Minister knows that it is imperfect in its current guise. He has been open about the fact that the Government are not fully aligned to the three clicks policy, as the Home Secretary commented on Second Reading.
The Minister and the Government have my sympathy on this. The first job of any Government is to keep their citizens safe in these difficult times of high terrorist threat combined with the constant march of technology and online communication. It is very hard to keep legislation up to date and answer the calls of police and security services for further powers, while maintaining the balance of freedom and civil liberties that we expect and enjoy.
The SNP has serious concerns about how the policy will work in practice, and the impact that it may have on innocent individuals who have no interest in, intent to engage in, or no wish to encourage terrorist acts. It is self-explanatory that anyone who downloads or streams content for the purpose of planning or encouraging terrorist activity should face a criminal charge and, if convicted, a long sentence. Nobody would disagree with that, but this is about finding the most effective approach that targets the right individuals.
I accept the Government’s point that more people now stream material online than download it to a computer or other device, and as such it is vital that we continue to review our counter-terrorism approaches and ensure they meet the current threat level, but the Government’s approach to tackling streaming content through the three click policy is riddled with difficulty. Amendment 5 deals primarily with timing and does not take into account when a prosecution may be made.
The Government suggest that the three clicks policy is designed as a protection for those who accidentally access certain content online, but we must consider how easy it is for someone to click on a relevant source that could put them into conflict with the provision. It could catch someone who had clicked on three articles or videos of a kind likely to be of use to a terrorist, even if they were entirely different and unrelated and the clicks occurred years apart. Timing is crucial, because it would be difficult to accuse someone of being involved in terrorist activity if they had clicked on a certain source three times over a 10, 15 or 25-year period. Those concerns were echoed in the evidence session, and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Max Hill—who we should all listen to—expressed his concern about the variable threshold proposed. We should act on that independent and expert advice by introducing a safeguard that could effectively help to identify a pattern of behaviour.
Richard Atkinson, the chair of the Law Society, also voiced his concerns about the Government’s three clicks policy, stating that it could undermine or restrict those with legitimate cases, and that the lack of any consideration of timing makes the measure very vague. He said:
“To leave the law in the hands of prosecutorial decision as to whether or not it meets the public interest is a step too far. I think there is a need for greater definition around what is being sought to be prohibited.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 31, Q74.]
Amendment 5 would add the safeguard that an individual would have to view the information three times or more in a 12-month period to have committed an offence, and that position was supported by Max Hill during the evidence session.
On Second Reading many Members made clear their concerns about the lack of other safeguards in clause 3, particularly regarding intent—for example, the clause does not take into account the length of time that anybody watches a video or views a website. That point was raised by the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine on Tuesday in a question to Gregor McGill, who confirmed that the length of time that someone watches a video is not defined in the Bill, so watching a video or viewing a website for one second by mistake could be counted under the Government’s three strikes policy.
I accept the point made by Mr McGill that such breaches would be harder to prosecute, and that discretion would be applied, but as I have said, I am not comfortable with leaving such a wide area open to prosecutorial discretion. More importantly, as Max Hill said, such an offence without a test of intent is too broad and would capture too many innocent individuals. It is important that the Home Secretary accepts that a balance can be struck between liberty and security. Hoda Hashem, a law student at Durham University and one of many individuals and groups who sent helpful briefings to the Committee—I thank them all on behalf of the SNP—summed it up well by saying,
“the certainty and precision of laws are essential principles of our legal system. It allows ordinary people to know when their behaviour might veer into the realm of criminality, and it also means that the government and police cannot arbitrarily choose who to prosecute. In effect, it is wrong for the Home Secretary to argue that it would be down to the Police and CPS to fix a bad law. As a matter of principle, it is for Parliament to ensure that the laws it passes are clear enough to be applied consistently and, more importantly, predictably…If the government is serious about striking the right balance between liberty and security, the offence must include a criminal intent, or it must be withdrawn altogether.”
The Government may claim that adequate safeguards are in place to protect innocent individuals, but as we have heard, few agree with that position. That is why we support amendments 7 and 8, which have been tabled by the Labour party. The Government are asking for wide and vague powers, and we need safeguards in place to protect innocent individuals by ensuring that they are not prosecuted in the first place, and to provide for an adequate defence in the event that non-terrorists are taken to court. The stress placed on someone who was being investigated in that scenario would be extreme. Unless the safeguards are strengthened, and notwithstanding the Minister’s commitment regarding journalists and academics, it would be a brave journalist or researcher who would not be deterred or at least have second thoughts before viewing such material. Max Hill warned that thought without action must not be criminalised. We all agree that real terrorists should have nowhere to hide. We should also agree that legislating in the name of terrorism when the targeted activity is not actually terrorism would be wrong.
As we have heard, the French courts struck down a similar attempt by the French Government. In addition, a UN special rapporteur, Professor Joe Cannataci, expressed concerns about this provision, saying:
“It seems to be pushing a bit too much towards thought crime…the difference between forming the intention to do something and then actually carrying out the act is still fundamental to criminal law. Whereas here you’re saying: ‘You’ve read it three times so you must be doing something wrong’.”
In our view, amendments 5 to 8 are eminently sensible and, indeed, vital if the Government are to have any chance of surviving a legal challenge to elements of clause 3 and—almost as importantly—if they want to make good on the Home Secretary’s commitment that a balance can be struck between liberty and security.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Ryan. I thought that instead of embarking on a long prosecution of clause 3, it would be best to meet the hon. Member for Torfaen to discuss his amendments. I have said from the outset of proceedings on the Bill that my intention was to seek advice and suggestions from all parts of the political spectrum, and I felt early on that the three clicks provision presented a challenge. It opens up a whole debate about whether there were three clicks or four clicks, how far apart the clicks were, whether a time limit should apply to the clicks and so on. We were getting away from what we all agree on, which is the need to amend the legislation to reflect modern use of the internet—the streaming of online content. Partly because of technological advancements and the speed of the internet, people no longer download podcasts in the way they used to; they just click on their 4G device and stream the content. That is, of course, a problem for our intelligence services and law enforcement agencies, which often have to deal with people streaming content rather than downloading and holding it.
As I said, I have spoken to the Opposition Front-Bench spokesman on this issue and the Government will go away and examine a better solution to the three clicks issue. I hear the strong views about a reasonable excuse, and a debate can be had about judicial discretion. Campaigners for judicial discretion are sometimes also those who want much more prescriptive legislation that can contradict their earlier motives. If we included a list of reasonable excuses, rather than leaving it up to a judge to decide, would we end up with a list of 150? That is a matter for further debate, but I have asked officials to see whether reasonable excuses are listed in full anywhere else in statute. I understand that it may be possible to give examples rather than a full list.
I can assuage some of the fears expressed by the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North about section 58. First, I cannot find a record of a journalist being prosecuted under the existing section 58, which has been in existence since 2000. Over 18 years, journalists and academics have downloaded some of this content, and they have not, I understand, been prosecuted even if they have failed to provide a reasonable excuse. That relates to section 58(3) of the original Act. We have heard claims of armageddon and the fear that suddenly everyone will be arrested, but that will not materialise—it certainly has not done in 18 years. I hope that that assuages the fear expressed by the hon. Gentleman.
I do not think that simply updating the provision should be cause for concern. It is an attempt to tackle the difficult issue that modern terrorism unfortunately uses incredibly slick recruiting videos—they are grooming videos—to pull people away from the society they are in, to radicalise them and to get them to do awful things. Recently, a young man was found on the way into Cardiff—not far from the constituency of the hon. Member for Torfaen—with knives and an ISIS flag. We found no evidence that that young man had ever met a Muslim, was from a Muslim family or had been to a mosque. He had simply been radicalised by watching streamed videos online. That is the power of such persuasion, and we also see it reflected in cyber-bullying and sexualisation. It is a real issue that we have to face.
I should say at the outset that although ATTROs have been available for a long time they are not a substitute for the existing public order powers to put traffic management systems in place, and for the protection of large crowds. I would not want the measures to be used as a new opportunity for imposing charges when events are held, or for concocting a spurious terrorist link to try to regain money. They are designed for occasions when there is a specific terrorist threat to an event, or when an event is likely to attract a terrorist attack. That might be said of the recent Commonwealth summit, or similar events, as opposed to a champions league football match that is in the diary, a major sporting event that everyone knows is about to happen. For such events the local authority has always had the power under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 to charge the organisers. I would not want a situation in which everything—the galas or village fetes we attend—suddenly becomes a terrorist threat, to some over-eager person.
I appreciate what the Minister is saying. Will he commit, on that basis, to giving further consideration to whether we can tighten the provisions and ensure that what he has said is in the Bill?
I was hoping that we would get to this moment, because I have good news: I shall now have to arbitrate on whether Scotland’s or Wales’s drafting is better.
I totally agree with my hon. Friend. I will make it clear to police chiefs and to the LGA on the conclusion of the Bill’s passing that this should not become a wheeze to either not do something or to impose fines. That is important.
On reducing costs and maximising policing at events, we are also keen to enable the better use of personnel charged with protecting sites subject to ATTROs. To put this in context, the 1984 Act provides that an ATTRO may include a provision that enables a constable to direct that a provision of the order shall be commenced, suspended or revived, or that confers discretion on a constable. We want the police to be able to make more effective use of officers’ time and also of the other available resources in providing security for a site protected by an ATTRO.
To that end, subsection (9)(c) will provide that an ATTRO may
“enable a constable to authorise a person of a description specified in the order or notice to do anything that the constable could do by virtue of”
the 1984 Act. Under such delegated authority, it might be left to a security guard or steward to determine when a provision of an ATTRO is to commence or cease operating on a given day. The ATTRO might, for example, provide for a road to be closed off from 10 am to 10 pm, but a security guard could determine that, on a particular day, the road could be reopened an hour earlier.
An ATTRO’s ability to confer discretion on a constable may be utilised, in particular, to enable a police officer manning a barrier or gate that has closed off a road to exercise his or her discretion to allow accredited vehicles or persons through that barrier or gate. Subsection (9)(c) would enable another authorised person to exercise such discretion. I suppose that that is where I differ from the hon. Member for Torfaen. I want our police officers to be in a lead position at events. Freeing up constables from checking passes at barriers and handing that responsibility to a security guard enables them to better use their powers at an event. That is why we are keen to give that discretion to constables.
The clause will place on a statutory footing the power of the police to deploy obstructions to enforce compliance with temporary traffic restrictions imposed under section 67 of the 1984 Act. That section empowers the police to deploy temporary traffic restrictions in exceptional circumstances linked to the prospect of terrorism, and to deploy signs on the road indicating what those restrictions are. Those powers currently only relate to vehicular traffic, so the clause will apply them to pedestrian traffic.
I am grateful to the Minister for his comments; indeed, I am heartened. If it makes any difference to his consideration, I am not concerned in the slightest whether he picks the Scottish or Welsh drafting—or the third way he will no doubt find—to amend the clause. With that in mind, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesGPs are not covered by the Prevent duty.
Abigail Bright: On another view, much training of general practitioners goes into how to deal with Prevent.
Q
Peter Carter: I am afraid I am going to disagree slightly with Liberty on this one. It is a bit like personal data: it needs to be constantly reviewed. There needs to be a finite term to begin with; then if necessary, continued retention needs to be justified. I do not think there should be an automatic prohibition on the retention of data by those who are not prosecuted, because it might well be that a person is diverted from prosecution even though there is very good reason and very strong evidence that they did actually have the material and were on the verge of getting involved with terrorist activity. In those kinds of cases, it is justified to retain the material. I think it is a question of proportionality—two years to begin with, with the possibility of extending it to five or further, if there is justification.
Abigail Bright: From the specialist Bar associations, I would add two things. First, the Bill incorporates a review by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. That is very welcome and it is a good part of the Bill as drafted. As the Committee knows, the commissioner is to have two functions: to monitor and to keep under review the operation of provisions of the Act, and after that to report as a long backstop every calendar year. Within that, the commissioner has the power to report to the Secretary of State as and when the commissioner thinks appropriate much before a year.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Mr Hayes), who made some thoughtful remarks but inexplicably failed to stick to his 15-minute time limit, which was a surprise to us all in the Chamber.
In the past couple of years, we have seen deadly terrorist attacks across the world, including in Mosul, Baghdad, Istanbul, Kabul, New York, Paris, Nice, Munich and Stockholm, and last year the UK was subjected to five terrorist attacks in London and Manchester that killed 36 innocent victims and injured many more. We may have honourable disagreements about many aspects of the Bill, but we owe it to the people affected by last year’s attacks to debate these differences as a matter of principle and efficacy rather than on the basis of petty party political interests.
Glasgow airport, in my constituency, was the target of an attempted terror attack in 2007. It came as a huge shock to all Scots given that we had had very little experience of dealing with terrorist acts on Scottish soil. It proved that nowhere and no one is immune to the threat of terrorism. With that in mind, I can assure the Minister and the House that the Scottish National party will engage in this debate in the appropriate manner, treating it with the respect and seriousness that it deserves.
In an increasingly changing and digital world, the SNP supports giving law enforcement agencies the necessary powers to fight serious crime and terrorism. The world is becoming ever more complex, and terrorists are utilising sophisticated measures to plan their attacks. As such, it is of extreme importance that we keep our response and policies under continual review to ensure that we take the most effective action possible to prevent terrorist acts from occurring, while—crucially—respecting and upholding our civil liberties.
During the debates that will follow, the SNP will judge any proposed new powers or the extension of existing ones according to whether they are appropriate, effective, proportionate and respectful of civil liberties. This is the approach we adopted during the passage of the Investigatory Powers Act, during which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) and I argued that aspects of the Bill were unlawful. We might have been defeated in this place, but we were not alone, and successful court challenges by the hon. Member for West Bromwich East (Tom Watson) West Bromwich and the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), and subsequently by Liberty, proved that we had been right to oppose the measures. I hope that the Government have learned from that experience.
I just want to clarify the point about the Investigatory Powers Act. It is important for the House to know that in the legal challenge the Government were successful in defending the Act on three out of four measures. It was on the measure about judicial oversight that we conceded, as hon. Members will see in the Bill.
I appreciate the Minister’s intervention. As I outlined, my hon. and learned Friend made these points during the Committee stage of the 2016 Act, but I accept his point.
I hope that the Government have learned the lesson and will work with all parties to ensure that the policy can survive any potential legal challenge and carry the support of the House. There will be no petty opposition for opposition’s sake, but we will cast a critical eye on the Bill and table amendments to improve it in Committee and on Report.
After the London Bridge attack last year, the Prime Minister announced a review of the Contest strategy to establish whether the police and the security forces had the powers that they needed to tackle those who would seek to cause us harm. Following David Anderson’s very thorough review, the Bill is intended to bolster the Government’s counter-terrorism approach and strengthen a variety of measures to respond to the terrorist threat, allowing earlier intervention to disrupt terrorism.
I agree with the Government’s desire to intervene at an early stage. Such intervention is not only effective in stopping terrorist attacks, but helpful in preventing young people from becoming radicalised. Terrorist organisations are using 21st-century measures, including social media, to promote their propaganda as a means of radicalising youngsters. It is only right for the Government to review their approach to ensure that it is fit for the 21st century and future-proofed as far as is practically possible, but the internet providers and the social media companies also have a responsibility to ensure that terrorists cannot exploit their systems to promote their poisonous agenda. They must be involved in this process as well. On too many occasions they have been unwilling to take down terrorist content, and slow in doing so.
We are broadly in favour of the aims of the Bill but, while some of its provisions will attract our support, others will need to be tested in Committee. We must ensure that lowering thresholds and the burden of proof does not become so extreme that it impinges severely on civil liberties.
The Bill seeks to amend the offence of collecting terrorist information to cover the repeated viewing or streaming of material online. I accept the point that streaming material has become far more common since the previous legislation was drafted, and that we need a more robust approach. The implementation of this policy will give our police and security services the power to compel internet companies to assist them in carrying out covert surveillance on suspects streaming terror-related content. However, the way in which the process is set in motion is key.
In Committee, the Government will need to set out their case very well, explaining their proposed definition of “streaming” and the new three strikes, three clicks approach to people who stream extremist terror content. The right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) pressed the Home Secretary on that point earlier. In all likelihood, the approach will prove to be over-simplistic. While we are sympathetic to the Government’s goal of early prevention of potential terrorist acts, we must ensure that their proposals are evidence-based, and that civil liberties are not eroded or forgotten in the process. Like others who have spoken, I feel that the Government should be doing much more to stop the material at source by placing a statutory duty on the online platforms on which the material is viewed.
The Government intend the offence to cover circumstances in which the defendant is in control of a computer but, in addition, and with a much higher degree of difficulty, circumstances in which an individual is viewing the material, for example, over the controller’s shoulder. That may prove to be impossible, and is an obvious example of parts of the Bill which, if unamended, may be open to challenge in court. Campaigners have already voiced concerns about the proposed policy, suggesting that it unfairly targets innocent people. Rachel Robinson, of Liberty, has said:
“Blurring the boundary between thought and action by locking people up simply for exploring ideas undermines the foundations of our criminal justice system. Terrorists’ primary goal is to undermine our freedom. With proposals like this, the government risks giving them exactly what they want.”
Along with the Scottish Government. we will work with the Minister to ensure that that is not the case and that we get this important part of the Bill right. Campaigners have also pointed out that an attempt to introduce a similar terror streaming law in France last year was struck down twice. I should be keen to learn from the Minister what discussions he has had with his counterparts in France about their experience of trying to introduce a similar law, and whether the Government have been able to learn any lessons from them.
The Home Secretary also seeks to amend the offence of encouragement of terrorism so that action can be taken to target those who seek to radicalise children or young people who may not understand what they are being encouraged to do. It is vital that we reassess our approach to preventing vulnerable youngsters from becoming radicalised, and send a clear message to the recruiters that they will face the full force of the law if they attempt to prey on our young people. In my role on the Justice Committee, I had a long conversation with a now convicted terrorist. That has had a profound effect on me and, in particular, on my thoughts about how we can try to protect young people from terrorist influence online.
I understand the arguments that certain provisions in this Bill unfairly target innocent individuals’ personal liberty. The fact that the Home Office guidance that accompanies the Bill also accepts that point is telling. However, it attempts to alleviate the concern by stating that it would not be
“unlawful to hold a private view in support of a terrorist organisation”;
it would be unlawful only to
“recklessly express those views, with the risk others could be influenced”.
I think that the Government will need to clarify what is meant by recklessly expressing a particular view. That seems to me to be an unnecessarily wide and vague phrase that will undoubtedly be tested later in the Bill’s progress.
There will always be a fine balance between giving the police, the security services and the judiciary enough powers to keep us safe, and liberty itself. Ultimately, it could be argued that, if we restrict our personal freedoms excessively, the terrorists have already won. The Government must tread very carefully, and engage fully not only with the Opposition, the Scottish Government and other Administrations, but with those who instinctively oppose any perceived restrictions of liberty.
The Scottish Government support giving law enforcement agencies and the intelligence services the necessary and proportionate powers that are required to fight terrorism. In the past, the UK Government have chosen not to engage with the Scottish Government before publishing Bills and guidelines on the issue. I am pleased that that has not happened in this instance. I also welcome last week’s telephone conversation with the Minister, but will he assure me that he will engage with the Scottish Government at every opportunity and throughout this process?
Keeping people safe is the primary function of any Government. By means of the Prevent strategy, the Scottish Government will continue to work with key partners to tackle all forms of violent extremism—for instance, through Police Scotland’s model of community engagement. Working with the Scottish Government will enable people to learn lessons about the range of positive work that Police Scotland and other agencies do in our local communities to keep people safe. The distinct Scottish approach to the delivery of Prevent benefits from the positive relationships that are fostered in our communities. That includes our work to develop a range of credible grassroots community-led projects that help to challenge extremist narratives, giving support and guidance to people who are potentially vulnerable to radicalisation.