Iraq and Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Monday 16th June 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

The hon. Gentleman’s second point is a matter for my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, but I will of course draw it to her attention. We have a clear precedent established about coming to the House, when circumstances permit, in relation to the use of military force. We did that over Syria, even though we were then defeated. The hon. Gentleman is trying to extend that precedent to support for other states taking military action. This House does not govern actions taken by other states. The Government will of course always come to explain our diplomatic posture on all those things.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

In the post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan conferences, and in the Syria peace conferences, Iran was consistently left off the guest list. Does my right hon. Friend not agree that what we are seeing in Iraq is the inevitable outcome of our picking and choosing our regional players and leaving Iran off the guest lists? In future we should learn the lesson and invite all sides to try to resolve these issues, especially those that live closest and suffer the greatest threat through such conflict.

[Mr Hague]

My hon. Friend must bear in mind that there is also a lesson for those not invited. In the case of the unsuccessful Geneva peace conference that we held earlier this year on Syria, we and others were entirely open to the inclusion of Iran. We only wanted to know that Iran would support the creation of a transitional Government in Syria as a solution to the problem, in the same way that Russia has done through its support for the Geneva 2012 declaration. That was quite a small requirement for adding it to the guest list, but Iran was unable to do that. The effort has to come from Iran as well as from the rest of us.

US Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (British Foreign & Commercial Policy)

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Wednesday 26th March 2014 Westminster Hall

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

I congratulate the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), my neighbour in Lancashire, on securing the debate. I am delighted to focus on the issue of extraterritorial sanctions. I recognise that this behaviour is a growing trend. It often emanates not from the US Executive, but from Congress, whose members would say in their defence, “It’s not our business how our laws and sanctions impact on other people. This is what I, as a US law maker, have a responsibility to my constituents to do.” However, we live in a globalised world; we live in a world of international trade; and we live in a world in which we are supposed to respect the international rule of law and trade deals.

I want briefly to take this back. It is not just about Iran. I want to take it back to Cuban cigars. I like a Cuban cigar from time to time, and many hon. Members may remember that in 1992 the United States passed the Cuban Democracy Act, which was followed closely by the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. One might think that came from the Greater London council and Ken Livingstone, judging by its title. The effect of that legislation was to make anybody—US citizen, EU citizen or anyone else—who was involved in the trafficking of Cuban products guilty of an offence and prosecutable in the United States, or even to bar them from going to the United States. That was quite a formidable threat. It meant that an individual selling Cuban cigars in London who had a shop or an entity in the United States might be liable to prosecution. Even if they did not but they took a trip to America, they would be a trafficker of Cuban goods.

The European Union said that that was simply unacceptable and that a British citizen carrying out trade that was lawful under British and European law should not be a victim of such extraterritorial reach. In 1996, the EU passed a directive with the catchy title of Council regulation 2271/96 protecting against the effects of the extraterritorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom. In effect, we are still obliged by the conditions of that regulation. It basically told European Union citizens and member states that, if they complied with an extraterritorial threat from a third country, they would be vulnerable to civil claims from people affected. For example, British banks could be sued by European citizens who were prevented from using their facilities in Iran, Cuba or anywhere else, and the banks would be liable to pay damages.

The regulation covered a number of Acts and it is still in existence today. Funnily enough, it worked. The United States adapted its legislation so that it covered only US citizens. If we were to put it in law, we would be saying, “We, as British law makers, do not really care about what American law makers think; our duty is to our constituents and to the sovereignty of this country, so we will make the decision, thank you very much.” That was in 1996, which was a long time ago. The annex to the regulation contains a list of Acts, and I am sure that, if the European Parliament were so minded, it could add more to that list. One that still resonates today is the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 1996, which was recently modified to become the Iran Sanctions Act.

Some of those provisions are still in existence and we are still bound by the regulation. Will the Minister tell us why the United Kingdom Government are not enforcing the regulation as they are obliged to? Why are they not saying—perhaps they are—to the US and to third parties, “We are obliged to comply with the regulation, otherwise British banks, businesses and entities will be vulnerable to handing over sums of money to injured parties”?

We need to find a way through. We must speak to the United States and others engaged in such extraterritorial legislation to see whether we can drive a way forward. As far as I am concerned, I will soon be ringing up British banks and saying to them, “By the way, you are covered by this regulation.” I will recommend that anyone who comes to my surgeries invoke the regulation, if relevant legislation is listed in the annex, and seek damages. It is simply not good enough that we should be increasingly prohibited, even when we are doing things that are legal under British and European law and within a sanctions regime, for the sake of some far-off idea of protectionism elsewhere.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Simmonds]

As I said in response to the right hon. Member for Blackburn, I do not think we can conflate the issues relating to the complexity of a bilateral trade relationship with alleged extraterritorial US sanctions. Many other issues are at stake—for example, the fact that the UK Government currently do not encourage or provide support for UK companies to trade with Iran. However, where trade is allowed under the existing sanctions regime—for example, within the scope of the humanitarian issues raised earlier, such as medicines and pharmaceuticals—the UK’s trade with Iran has increased by 80% since 2012. Where it is allowed within the sanctions regime, therefore, there is a significant uplift in UK trade.

I want to assure my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre and Preston North that we are implementing the EU regulation. The right hon. Member for Blackburn rightly mentioned the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, but that cannot stop the US applying its laws to the US arm of a British multinational company. It stops the enforcement of US sanctions here in the UK, but cannot stop British businesses making commercial decisions on the basis of perceived risks in the United States.

[Mr Wallace]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Minister for his clarification. Is he saying that a British bank choosing to trade in euros, and therefore not clearing through the United States, in order to carry out a transaction in correspondence function for an Iranian, Cuban or any other type of entity, based in London, should not fear any US sanctions? Does he also not recognise that, if they do business in euros and there is no transaction that touches the United States, it would be grossly wrong for the United States Administration to have a go at the US entity of the British parent company, because they have not broken any law in the United Kingdom or Europe?

[Mark Simmonds]

The Act to which reference was made—as well as the subsequent statutory orders, most recently updated in 1997—provides measures to protect British companies from the impact of, and prevent them from complying with, US sanctions. Judgments against UK companies that result from such sanctions, in the way that has been described, cannot be enforced in the UK. That sends a signal to the US that the EU is opposed to such an approach to sanctions.

What both the right hon. Gentleman and my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre and Preston North have described is a result as much of perception as of legal issues. It is true that all UK banks must ensure that they are taking a risk-based approach to transactions, and that they comply with relevant anti-money laundering and sanctions legislation. EU sanctions law does permit avenues through which certain types of key transactions with Iran can be made legitimately. Her Majesty’s Treasury works very closely with the financial sector to ensure that it is clear about applying for licences and authorisations that allow legitimate financial transactions involving Iran, particularly in the sphere of humanitarian trade, where the limit has recently been increased tenfold, since the agreement on the joint plan of action.

I am coming towards the end the time allotted for the debate, so I want to reiterate that our best approach must be to work with the US and others in seeking to minimise conflicting approaches. Although our objectives on particular policy issues vary on occasion, in most cases any difficulties arise from different regulatory approaches—we have similar objectives. That does not imply any loss of sovereignty: it is a clear UK foreign policy position.

Ukraine

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Tuesday 18th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

I do not need to repeat the profiling of President Putin that, like the problems, was completely and comprehensively set out by the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), but the real challenge at the heart of the issue is how to respond. We could of course do lots of huffing and puffing. There has been plenty of that during the past few years, which is one reason why Mr Putin has felt that he can carry on with impunity.

The most traditional route is that of sanctions. Although I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), I am afraid that I am slightly cynical about whether we will in the end get to a stage at which sanctions are robust enough to make a difference. The view at large is that sanctions are somehow pain-free, being effective at only one end, but major sanctions usually end up also affecting the people who put them in place. It will take real courage on behalf of the Germans, for example, to push for something in an area such as gas.

There is also the military way to respond. The Foreign Secretary, like many other countries, has been absolutely adamant that a military response is not on the table. I recognise that it is not a political solution or one that would help the situation, but we should not entirely rule out some form of military assistance or aid to the Ukrainian forces, who are equipped with obsolete and rather poor equipment. They are standing guard against the Russian bear almost as a Dad’s Army force at the moment. Russia never hesitates to help Syria with the latest weapons systems when trying to undermine the United Nations or, indeed, the international community. At the very least, expertise in military hospitals should be given to help people who are already suffering.

[Bob Stewart]

I think that we should reinforce the troops in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, because they are on the front line.

[Mr Wallace]

I think that the real thing we must deal with here and now is Ukraine. We must make sure that Ukrainian people have the ability to defend themselves should the Russians overstep the mark.

The long-term solution is of course through economics. It is important to resolve the EU-US free trade treaty to make Mr Putin feel what isolation is like, and to help Europe come to terms with its apparent energy dependency on Russia, which only makes it more and more vulnerable to a man who has proved time and again that he uses energy as a weapon.

There does not always have to be a hot war or a high -stakes conflict for us to face each other down. How quickly we rushed to forget the lessons of the cold war and sought to retire members of the intelligence agencies who were put out to grass when it ended in 1990-91. Let us remember that intelligence agencies around the world helped to change the behaviour of the Soviet Union and to make it collapse from within. Not a month now goes by without people denigrating our intelligence community —most recently thanks to Mr Snowden, who is now enjoying the hospitality of Mr Putin, and there is an irony in that—but they largely understand the Russian bear, know what makes Mr Putin vulnerable and know how to turn up the heat.

Let us remember that the source of Mr Putin’s power is the secret state, in which he can imprison people without trial, and in which he can persecute homosexuals and non-governmental organisations in the Russian state. He gets his power from manipulation, intimidation and corruption, but that is where he is vulnerable. If we can deter and deny him the ability to use that state within Russia and further afield, we can weaken him, and in doing so we can certainly deter him in future.

Let us unleash our intelligence services and capability. Let us no longer be afraid to hide them and run away from the accusations of Snowden. Let us make life a little more uncomfortable for Mr Putin. Let him feel what it is like on the other end of his intimidation in the secret state. Let us not put him in a cold war, but let him feel the cold winds of isolation that we can bring about if we isolate him economically, isolate him militarily and isolate him in his ability to break international law around the world. One cannot be a major player, riding bareback on a horse, if one is isolated from the international stage.

Iran (Joint Plan of Action)

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Wednesday 26th February 2014 Westminster Hall

[Dr Offord]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. He has asked a question, as identified by the House of Commons Library, on the effect of the P5 plus 1, Iran and the joint plan of action, and the continuing manufacture of new centrifuge devices. We know that the technology, which has many applications, continues to be used, but we do not know for what purpose. That remains a great concern, and I do not believe the joint plan of action addresses it.

On Iran’s agreement to freeze the enrichment and halt the production of uranium, Iran has halted the installation of new enrichment centrifuges and has ceased the installation of new components at the Arak reactor. It has allowed the IAEA to make inspections at Natanz, Arak and Fordow. I acknowledge that the regime has granted the international community some concessions. We must be aware, however, that in return, the P5 plus 1 agreed to provide £6 billion to £7 billion in sanctions relief, of which roughly £4.2 billion would be oil revenue frozen in foreign banks. The P5 plus 1 allow temporary relief on some sanctions, including trade in gold, precious metals, petrochemicals, auto parts and aircraft parts. The P5 plus 1 have also agreed not to impose new nuclear-related sanctions for six months during the agreement.

Although the interim accord interrupts Iran’s nuclear progress for the first time in nearly a decade, it requires Iran to make only a modest draw-down payment on the central problem. Iran has benefited from disproportionate sanctions relief in exchange for cosmetic concessions that it can do away with in a matter of weeks. It has been rewarded with sanctions relief despite remaining unbowed in its demand to continue uranium enrichment, which is the root of the international community’s concern. Most importantly, the deal fails to dismantle many of the military aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme. Without the requirement to dismantle a single centrifuge, Iran will remain a threshold military nuclear power. It will retain the capability to break across that line at any time it chooses.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend dispute the national intelligence estimates from the United States of 2007 and 2012, which directly contradict his proposition that Iran is on the verge of being able to break out in such a way? The United States national intelligence estimates are major pieces of work, and they are not done lightly. Does he dispute them?

[Dr Offord]

Yes, I dispute them. I am not a chemical engineer or a nuclear engineer, but on the basis of my research and the evidence I have read, I dispute those estimates and I maintain that Iran is on the verge of making a breakthrough. As the shadow Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire South (Mr Alexander), said in the House on Monday, with as many as 10,000 centrifuges in operation already, Iran retains the capability to break out and produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon in as little as two months. The deal does not roll back the vast majority of the advances that Iran has made in the past five years, which have drastically shortened what nuclear experts call its “dash time” to a bomb—the minimum time that it would take to build a weapon if Iran’s Supreme Leader or military decided to pursue that path.

Most concerning of all, the world’s leading powers have tacitly recognised Iran’s right to enrichment, which has been the Islamic Republic’s key demand for many years. The interim agreement states that the permanent deal will involve

“a mutually defined enrichment program with mutually agreed parameters”,

but the deal abandons the demand made by the six United Nations resolutions that Iran must halt all enrichment. That may undermine confidence in global non-proliferation norms. Iranian state media carried boasts by, among others, President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Affairs Minister Javad Zarif that the US had caved in on its long-standing position and recognised Iran’s right to enrich. President Rouhani said:

“No matter what interpretations are given, Iran's right to enrichment has been recognised.”

He went on to say:

“"Do you know what the Geneva agreement is? It means the superpowers’ surrender to the great Iranian nation. The Geneva agreement means that the world accepts [Iran’s] civil nuclear technology, which we achieved through the efforts and the sacrifice of our young scientists”.

The agreement does not stop Iran enriching uranium to a low level of 3.5% or compel it to dismantle any of its existing centrifuges, which can be used for military purposes. Iran can continue to enrich uranium with its 10,190 operational IR1 centrifuges. They are in addition to 8,000 machines that have been installed but are inactive. Iran can also continue to build new centrifuges to replace those that wear out.

The situation has not been lost on the Iranian rulers. In January this year, President Rouhani said that there would be no destruction of existing centrifuges “under any circumstances.” Iran’s Foreign Affairs Minister said in December last year:

“The structure of our nuclear program has been maintained and the 20 percent enrichment can be resumed in less than 24 hours”.

A month later, he said:

“We did not agree to dismantle anything”.

In January, Iran’s Parliament introduced a Bill to step up enrichment to the threshold of 60% fissile purity. That would put Iran on the technical verge of 90% fissile purity, which is enough for the core of a nuclear bomb. At least 218 of the Iranian Parliament’s 290 members have expressed support for the measure. The Bill’s supporters say that uranium refined to 60% concentration would be used to fuel nuclear-powered submarines. Some analysts have speculated that the Iranian Government might be using Parliament as a bargaining tool in nuclear talks with the P5 plus 1, because they would have no choice but to obey such a Bill if the Parliament passed it.

The deal also leaves untouched Iran’s portfolio of 1,008 installed advanced IR2m centrifuges, which can speed up break-out times using 3.5% enriched uranium. This month, Iran revealed that it had developed a new generation of centrifuges that are 15 times more powerful than those currently in use, and Iranian officials have stated that the centrifuges do not violate the joint plan of action. Although enrichment using those machines has not started, the vast majority of them are fully installed and under vacuum, which means that Iran could quickly begin feeding natural uranium into those cascades and more than double its enrichment capacity.

Centrifuges are not the only concern. Iran is in the process of constructing a 40 MW heavy water research reactor, for which there is limited peaceful civilian purpose. When it is operational, that facility at Arak will be able to produce plutonium, which is one of two substances that can form the core of a nuclear weapon. Iran is not required to dismantle the incomplete heavy water research reactor or convert the plant into a light water reactor, which would be less useful for military purposes.

Under the joint plan of action, Iran agreed to freeze progress on the Arak heavy water research reactor and not to commission it or transfer fuel or heavy water to the site. It also agreed not to produce or test additional fuel or install remaining components. The interim deal does not explicitly prevent Iran from manufacturing components offsite for Arak’s nuclear reactor that could then be installed later. Iran claims that its purpose is only to make medical isotopes and conduct research, but western countries believe that it could also produce plutonium, which is the plan B route to producing a full nuclear weapon.

The one mechanism we held over Iran was the sanctions, but the interim deal has unravelled the internationally imposed sanction regime that has taken years to enforce. Sanctions were having the desired effect, so why did we take a step back from a method that was working and put trust in a state that has given us no reason to assume that that trust will be guarded? However limited, the relaxation of sanctions will relieve the pressure that has brought Iran to seek an agreement, by giving direct financial relief and indirectly restoring confidence in the Iranian economy.

Many nations and companies—as well as the Iranians themselves—have interpreted the recent agreement as the beginning of the end of the sanctions regime. It is likely that a number of countries will apply pressure to resume trade with Iran, including its former key trade partners, such as South Korea, Japan, India and China. Within weeks of the interim deal, Iran’s petrochemical sector alone had appreciated by $9 billion—that is a capital gain of almost 40%, generated entirely by a new market psychology that bets on the end of sanctions. On top of that, Iran is already making efforts to recapture its dominant role in OPEC.

All of that goes to ensure that the agreement is rewarding Iran despite the fact that its long history of clandestine nuclear activities, support for international terrorism and repeat calls for the destruction of Israel are cause for legitimate trepidation and scepticism over its intentions. Although President Rouhani’s negotiating team has reportedly been more constructive in talks, supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei has the final say on major issues, including national security and Iran’s nuclear programme. Most worryingly, Iran continues to support terrorism in the region. It is a leading sponsor of state terrorism, providing financial and material support to extremist Islamist terrorist groups across the middle east, including Hamas, Hezbollah and insurgencies against allied forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Iran agreed to the deal as part of a long history of exploiting international talks to buy time and further advance its nuclear programme. The six-month timetable to reach a final agreement could be extended by a further six months by mutual consent. President Rouhani has previously spoken of Iran buying time to advance its nuclear programme. In 2004, he gave a speech to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, in which he explained how he was playing for time during the nuclear talks he was conducting with the EU3. He said:

“While we were talking with the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in parts of the [nuclear conversion] facility in Isfahan. By creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work there”.

Answers to the parliamentary questions I have asked provide little assurance that the IAEA will ensure that inspections take place. Iran has agreed to the IAEA conducting only limited inspections at the main enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz. Its history of deception about its nuclear projects requires higher levels of accountability. Iran is not required to provide unfettered access to its full portfolio of nuclear facilities, including many underground and undeclared sites where the USA, Europe and Israel believe that hidden enrichment facilities might exist. It is not possible to rule out the existence of secret nuclear sites in Iran without it agreeing to allow the IAEA to conduct snap inspections anywhere beyond declared atomic installations under the agency’s additional protocol regime.

Iran is still not required to grant IAEA inspectors access to the nuclear-related Parchin site, a suspected weapons-testing facility, but it is required to declare all facilities containing nuclear material under its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Under the joint statement on a framework for co-operation between Iran and the IAEA, Iran has agreed to give the IAEA information on the 16 sites designated for the construction of new nuclear power plants, clarification about its announcement about new enrichment facilities, and information about all new research reactors. Fully verifying and monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities will require a level of co-operation and information-sharing between the IAEA, the western powers and Iran that is probably unprecedented for one country’s nuclear programme.

The overt military actions of missile development are also of concern. The interim agreement does not include a promise by Iran to abstain from pursuing work on ballistic missiles or weaponisation. UN Security Council resolution 1929 requires Iran to cease activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Dr Offord) on securing this debate. Iran is a topic that often needs a good airing. At this critical time, it is important that we give strong scrutiny to the Geneva accord agreed at the end of last year.

First, may I declare my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests? I am chairman of the all-party group on Iran and have been for the past eight years. I have twice visited Iran—including recently, three or four weeks ago. I have also visited on a number of occasions the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna at the United Nations.

We always have to go back to the beginning on Iran. We have to remember that the nuclear programme for Iran did not start last Tuesday or last year; in fact, it started in the mid-1960s, when the Shah was in charge—funded by the United States, ironically. General Electric came to its aid, to develop the first reactor in the heart of Tehran. Iran has had nuclear ambitions, whether civil or military, for decades. They have been part of its psyche. It lives in a rough neighbourhood; it has rivalries that we can, perhaps, only understand as having similar aspects to those in the cold war and with the Soviet Union; and it is surrounded by ethnically and religiously different economic and military rivals. That has often driven some of its insecurities.

The history of the nuclear programme is long and sporadic and it has jumped, depending on which country has helped Iran. The Russians helped it build a reactor in the past, the United States has done so and I suspect that the North Koreans have, too. Certainly, other members of the international community have stuck their oars in. That is why there is a rather illogical, sporadic and often bizarre civil nuclear programme.

Iran is not the only country in that region to have a civil nuclear programme. The United Arab Emirates is developing one right now, as we speak. Many middle east countries have sought to acquire nuclear technology. The most striking examples are India and Pakistan, which developed in total secrecy a nuclear weapons programme that ended up in actual nuclear weapons. We in the west either chose not to know or did not seem to know.

The process goes on. It is not new. It has, unfortunately, become entwined with the Iranian psyche and its view of itself in the world. However, let us remember that middle east politics is often as much about rhetoric as about action. Throughout the 1980s, for example, at the height of Ayatollah Khomeini’s rhetoric against the country of Israel, Israel sold Iran nearly half a billion dollars’ worth of arms. In fact, Israel broke the UN sanctions on arms embargo to Iran and Iraq in that period. It suited Israel at that stage to ignore the rhetoric and to side with Iran against Iraq, while the west was unfortunately supporting Iraq, by supplying it with some pretty dubious methods.

We have to go forward. In 2001, Iran helped the west bring down the Taliban. We might remember the Lion of Panjshir, Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was the west’s favoured leader of the Northern Alliance—the man who was going to liberate Afghanistan on our behalf. The irony was that he was Iran’s man in Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance helped America and Britain in their targeting and intelligence gathering against the Taliban.

Throughout these processes, Iran has stepped forward, sometimes against its nature, but sometimes for its own self-interest, and it has often been rewarded by immediate rejection. The “axis of evil” phrase was used discended on Iran, despite its assistance to the British and Americans in getting rid of the Taliban.

Trust is the problem in much of this, whether in respect of the nuclear programme, human rights or exporting terrorism. The Iranians’ knowledge of Britain’s poor behaviour towards it in the last centuries is better than mine. The Iranians understand that we supported the constitutional revolution in 1906 and then undermined it, when we removed the democratic constitutional revolution, to put in a Shah, and then we moved that Shah when he became too friendly with the Nazis. Then we moved their Prime Minister in the ’50s and put in another Shah. They understand that we—the United Kingdom—play power games and that we are not to be trusted, in the same way that we, quite rightly, have every reason not to trust Iran in the near future.

We have not trusted Iran on its nuclear programme. It has hidden things and has certainly done its best. There is proof that, in 2003 and 2002, it acquired from the AQ Khan network—not funded by Iran, but by one of its regional rivals—military plans for a weapons programme.

Trust is failing on both sides. That has been the real issue. I do not argue with my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon that, really, at the heart of the Geneva accord, the issue is about trying to fix this trust and to see what steps we can take to build together. We will have to stick our neck out to build that trust. That is the problem. I understand; if I was living in Israel right now, I would be worried about that. It is not me under direct threat from Iran. In fact, British national interests and British security are not threatened by Shi’a Islam, but by Salafist Sunnis emanating from al-Qaeda. They are the people who will blow up our trains and tube stations. That is nothing to do with Iran; that is to do with other major players in the region, who are either tacit or have yet to deal with that problem.

If I was in Israel, of course I would be worried and rightly so. But I also recognise that, within Israel, there is a split about the extent to which the Iranians are rational or irrational and how much Iran really wants to do nuclear damage or blow up Israel. Meir Dagan, the ex-head of Mossad—not a boy scout organisation—said on the record that Iran is rational and that he does not think it intends to go to that next step.

Nevertheless, the situation is real and we should look at the facts and the evidence as they are presented. The first things that I look at are the national intelligence estimates of the United States, the first of which, in 2007, was made under George Bush. The estimates are put together by the National Security Council, the CIA and the Pentagon. President Bush was not known as a dove on any areas in the middle east, but the national intelligence estimate produced at the time said, “We do not believe—we believe they did previously—that they are now on the verge of a break-out”. That is an important document. It was dismissed at the time by the hawks, but in 2012, under President Obama, another one appeared that effectively reaffirmed that national intelligence estimate.

[Dr Offord]

I appreciate my hon. Friend’s counter-view on some of these issues. It is easy to talk about organisations presenting reports. I have found the 2012 Institute for Science and International Security report, containing information from former weapons inspectors, who disagreed with Binyamin Netanyahu at the UN General Assembly in 2012 and felt that Iran would have a nuclear capability within months. It is okay to say that certain organisations say that is not possible. Equally, it is valid to say that other organisations contradict that point of view.

[Mr Wallace]

I register the point, but these are not national institutes. This is the CIA and the Pentagon—okay, they do not have the best track record on intelligence, but they never gave the benefit of the doubt to the doves; they always gave it to the hawks. These are major national institutions—Government organisations—that share intelligence with Israel and all the other allies that we have, so they are certainly serious. It is important to look at that fact.

We should not pass over the grand bargain offered by Iran in 2003. The grand bargain was something that every hon. Member in this Chamber would have signed up to tomorrow. It was an offer by Iran to suspend enrichment; to join the additional protocol, with further and more intrusive inspection than even Britain has under the non-proliferation treaty; and to demilitarise Hezbollah. It was even to have gone as far as to recognise Israel, which many countries in the middle east, which may be against Iran but are not necessarily allies, still do not recognise. They may help Israel, but they still have not taken the next step. That grand bargain was rejected out of hand by the White House.

People sitting now in Iran would say, “Hang on, we offered all this and this was all thrown away”. That goes back to the heart of the matter. The trail of trust has been full of missed opportunities on both sides. We really need to try to rebuild it. I commend this Government, the Obama Administration and the P5 plus 1 for sticking their necks out.

I do not mind who visits Iran. I have been to Iran, but I do not approve of what the Iranians do to Christians, Baha’is or other minorities. I condemn that absolutely, but I believe that visiting Iran does not mean supporting Iran. If people criticise or propose policy against a country, it is a good idea for them to take time to visit that country. That is important. I do not sit around and get involved in debates on Israel because I have not been there. One day I might decide to do so, mainly because it affects other middle east policy that I might want to discuss. Going there is important.

[Jim Shannon]

I accept the hon. Gentleman’s logic. I might be reading it wrong, but is he saying that we need to go to a country to appreciate and understand it fully? I have never been to Israel, but I would say that I have a full appreciation and understanding of Israel and of how it feels threatened by many countries across the world. I have no less knowledge of Israel because I have not been there. Not going there does not lessen my enthusiasm for the state, which I feel is threatened. Does he accept that?

[Mr Wallace]

I accept that, but I would not support the hon. Gentleman if he criticised people who have visited Israel to find out. I do not think that can be a point of criticism. He is from Ulster, where I have spent a lot of time. In fact, I have sat down with members of the IRA. That does not mean per se that I supported the IRA when we were trying to negotiate a peace deal. People increase their knowledge by going somewhere and understanding it. They do not become a world expert, but they increase their knowledge. When we speak to normal Iranians or see at first hand the split between the Iranian Government, the different Ministries and the different politicians, we understand a bit more. We do not become an expert or an Iranian any more than we would become an Israeli if we went to Israel.

[Guy Opperman (Hexham) (Con)]

I apologise for not being present for the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Dr Offord), whom I congratulate on securing this debate. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre and Preston North (Mr Wallace) for allowing me to intervene. I support the thrust of what he says. I have visited Israel with Conservative Friends of Israel, and going there benefits those who go. Any situation that establishes better relations between the west and Iran has to be the way forward if we are to have long-lasting peace in the middle east.

[Mr Wallace]

I totally agree. It is important that we understand that there is a prize to be had: stability, a resolution to the nuclear threat—if there is a nuclear threat—and a chance to build new alliances in the middle east. We cannot avoid the issues in Saudi Arabia, which seem to be ignored.

The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) mentioned apostasy and the persecution of Christians. There are not many Muslim countries in the world that allow Christians to proselytise. Try taking a Bible to Saudi Arabia; Bibles can be taken to Iran. People might not be able to proselytise in Iran, but try going to a church in Saudi Arabia any time soon. We have to realise that there are opportunities.

I will finish so that there is time for the Minister and others. A battle is still going on in Iran between hard-liners and reformers. The reformers are trying to say to the population, “Look, Iran can be successful, but we need to concede certain things. We need to slow the nuclear programme”—or cancel it if there is a military aspect—“and we need to come into the international community. We will address human rights, too.” I met the President’s chief of staff, and I directly pressed him on the Baha’is. Iran needs to show that willingness.

The hard-liners and principlists like isolation and sanctions. The revolutionary guard profits from sanctions, because sanction-busting is very profitable. We have to say, “Here is a chance.” As of today, the Iranians are complying with their Geneva accord obligations. They are reducing the stocks of 20%-enriched uranium. Before the Geneva accord, the Iranians were diverting such uranium to fuel plates. Iran is starting that process, and it is increasing the number of inspections.

We need to judge Iran, day by day and week by week, on where it is going, but please remember that, if we decide to shut out that effort, we will bring in the hard- liners of Iran, who will not be interested in rapprochement or the international community and who will take refuge in a religious extremism that will not help the Iranian people, peace in the region or the countries of Britain and Israel.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

Ukraine, Syria and Iran

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Monday 24th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I will make that important point to the authorities in Ukraine when I visit. Britain has a lot to offer when it comes to well-functioning legal systems that create confidence in the rule of law and in property rights, which encourages investment. I can assure my hon. Friend that I will be making that point.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

Further to the question from the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), UK banks are often intimidated by extraterritorial US congressional sanctions on any business with Iran, even if those transactions are licensed by the Treasury and are in accordance with EU sanctions requirements. If we are to meet our Geneva accord obligation, I urge the Foreign Secretary please to do more than just leave it to commercial decisions and proactively to nominate a UK bank to handle future EU and Iran humanitarian transactions, in the same way that the French and German Governments have done.

[Mr Hague]

As my hon. Friend knows, and as I said to the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), there are explicit exemptions, but he is well aware of that point. As he and the right hon. Gentleman have raised it, I will certainly look at it again.

Diplomatic Relations (Spain)

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Wednesday 27th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

The contacts with the Spanish authorities have been at all appropriate senior levels. We remain ready, in the event of further serious incidents—we hope that they will not happen—to make representations to Spain at whatever level we consider appropriate given the circumstances.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

About 200 metres off the coast of Morocco lies Perejil island, a rocky and disputed outcrop in sight of the Moroccan coast. The Spanish refuse even to negotiate or discuss its position. Perhaps we could help our Spanish allies understand the frustration we feel with this type of interference if we recognised Morocco’s right to the island.

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend makes his point very plainly.

Iran

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Monday 25th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

Yes, absolutely; I am fully conscious, as are the Government and our allies, of the importance of that. That is one of the reasons why it has been important to respond quickly to Iran’s readiness to make such an agreement—so people in Iran can see that it is possible to make an agreement, that there are compromises that can be made and that it is in the interests of everyone, including the people of Iran, to do so. Showing that quickly gives the opportunity to those in Iran who want to be able to carry that on for the future.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

May I congratulate my right hon. Friend on all the hard work and effort he and the other P5 plus 1 nations have put into getting this interim agreement, often in the face of vested-interest opposition both here and in Iran? Of course, as many colleagues have mentioned, verification and inspection will be the best way to put aside those who oppose this deal. When President Rouhani was part of the nuclear negotiation teams in the past, he was instrumental in getting Iran to sign up to, or commit to, the additional protocol of the nuclear proliferation treaty. Was that discussed and should we seek that in future, because surely the best way to achieve this is through international law and UN verification?

[Mr Hague]

Of course we would want Iran to observe the additional protocol. This is an issue that will have to be addressed in the discussions on a comprehensive agreement, and my hon. Friend will be aware from his knowledge of Iran that Iran’s ratification and observance of the additional protocol would be dependent on the Majlis. It would have to have a vote about that, in the Iranian system. That could introduce an additional complexity, but it is something we would certainly want it to do.

Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Programme

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Tuesday 12th November 2013 Westminster Hall

[Mr Hollobone]

I agree with my hon. Friend that Iran has said some unfriendly and unpleasant things about the state of Israel and its right to exist, which he and I and most Members totally abhor. The question in the previous intervention was whether Israel’s possession of a nuclear weapon was not a big issue in itself. Of course it is, but the whole Israeli mindset has to do with defending Israel’s people, not projecting aggression elsewhere.

I know that the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) is looking at me quizzically because he will not agree with much of that, but the perspective of the state of Israel is that the Jewish diaspora throughout the world, but mainly in eastern and western Europe, suffered the horrors of the holocaust, and out of that was born the state of Israel. He and I and others can agree or disagree about that history, but the fact is that half the present world’s Jewish population lives in the state of Israel, and they have found nowhere safe in the world throughout the history of the Jewish people. The state of Israel now offers the best chance for Jewish people to live in peace. They have developed a nuclear weapon or weapons because they want to defend themselves. They do not want to deploy that weapon against anyone else; they just want to be left in peace.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

I fully accept many of my hon. Friend’s arguments about an expansionist versus a defending nation, but within the United Nations and the global community, there are rules about the development and holding of nuclear or any other weapons. Iran is a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which imposes certain obligations that ultimately involve its being taken to the Security Council; Israel is not. Does he therefore recognise the disparity there, and will he join me in urging Israel to sign the NNPT, or at least to allow inspection of its sites?

[Mr Hollobone]

Yes, I agree that Israel should be a signatory, but there would be no question of Israel giving up its nuclear weapons. Enough bad things have been done to the Jewish people over two millennia that they simply will not give them up.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr Hollobone) on securing this debate. May I also say what a thoughtful and principled speech my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) has just made? He is a true believer in the importance of the nuclear deterrent and of the logical application of standards that the deterrent must adhere to.

I had better declare that I have chaired the all-party group on Iran since 2006; my co-chair is now the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw). In that time, I have visited Iran and made a number of trips around the world to meet Governments and officials linked to the policy on Iran.

I should start my remarks by saying, briefly, that there is a real certainty in the debate that there is a nuclear weapons programme in Iran. However, that certainty is not shared by the United States Government. The US national intelligence estimate of 2007 said that Iran had halted the programme, and in 2010 the US national intelligence estimate yet again confirmed that Iran was not on the verge of breakout. These national intelligence estimates are significant bodies of work, drawing on intelligence from around the world and on the work of different agencies, so we should not just brush them aside.

A country does not just jump from 20% to a nuclear weapon. The uranium has to be weaponised, the grade of the uranium has to be increased and the weapon must be tested, which would usually leave a very significant footprint and take some time. If we take those facts in conjunction with the US national intelligence estimate—and, indeed, with some of the reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency—we see that there is not such an urgency. Iran is not suddenly going to produce a nuclear weapon. In addition, there is the supreme leader’s fatwa that nuclear weapons are un-Islamic. I have visited Iran and if anyone wants to understand the country they have to understand its supreme leader. When the supreme leader says that about nuclear weapons, he means it. It is absolutely imperative that people follow that ruling.

That does not mean that there are not people in Iran who want a nuclear weapon; I suspect that there are plenty of people there who wish to have one, for the purposes of deterrence. If a sane-minded Iranian who represented New Forest East was living in downtown Tehran, I suspect that he would believe in the principle of deterrence, given that his neighbours are Pakistan, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. Those are sworn enemies of Iran, ideologically different and religiously opposed—there are all sorts of issues that we could say we faced in the cold war in the late 1940s. Those differences are often brought home to Iran by the terrorist attacks across its border. We should certainly remember that the supreme leader—for now—has made that ruling and that it is not something to sniff at.

I totally agree that the nature of the regime goes hand in hand with the issue of nuclear weapons. Obviously, Iran’s record on human rights is abhorrent. It has engaged in the persecution of the Baha’is, the suppression of women’s rights and the persecution of lawyers and of people who lead strikes, including bus drivers who lead strikes and have their rights under the constitution denied. It is very important that we do something to put pressure on Iran about those issues and ensure that they are resolved.

Let us remember that the only democracy in the whole region, other than Israel, is Iran. Iran’s democracy may not be one that we think perfect, but it is a democracy that operates at all sorts of levels—the guardian council, local councils and the mayor of Tehran are all elected. Iran has an active democracy. There is no democracy in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Syria or others of our allies to whom we sell weapons systems around the world.

There is a democracy and a constitution in Iran. One of the reasons for the green movement in 2009 was the desire among the Iranian people to follow the rule of law. If someone reads the Iranian constitution, they will see that it is quite good, even though it was authored by a Belgian. One of the reasons for the green movement was the demand that the denial of rights to people should stop. Label someone a “terrorist” or a “Zionist spy” and they do not have those rights. Well, we live in a democracy that labels someone a “terrorist” and they are then locked up for 90 days, without the same rights that they would have if they were labelled a “criminal”. Iran is certainly more extreme, but let us not forget that the temptation to deny people their rights for all sorts of reasons is not just confined to Iran.

Then we talk about security guarantees. It is a rough neighbourhood down there—a very rough neighbourhood, with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. No one has mentioned the recent discovery that in Saudi Arabia there is a ballistic missile launch-pad facility with two aiming marks: one to Tel Aviv and one to Tehran. It is a rough neighbourhood and I think that if I were there, I, too, might like to look out for myself.

At the heart of all this is trust, rhetoric and history. Let us not forget that Iranians distrust the west as much as we distrust Iran. That is at the heart of this process. Let us remember that we distrusted Gorbachev, but we did not say that because he was from the Soviet regime—the regime that was pulling people’s toenails out and torturing them—we could not do business with him and we could not find a solution. We did not write him off. I was involved with the peace process in Northern Ireland in 1994 with the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds), who would have been appalled by the people I had to meet in the course of trying to make peace with our enemy. We do not necessarily just write people off.

The history of Iran, the great game, the fact that the BBC World Service was used in 1953 to trigger the coup against Iran’s only democratic prime minister—if we were Iranian, we might be a bit suspicious of western media, although now I think that would be wrong. Then there was the grand bargain offered up in 2003, which was the demilitarisation of Hezbollah, the offer to suspend enrichment of uranium and even a movement to a Saudi recognition of Israel, which was dismissed out of hand by the United States Administration.

We are in the business, with this peace process and the process at Geneva, of trying to build trust. We cannot indulge in rhetoric and history to rule that out. We have to give it a chance. We are not stupid and we have all been here before. No one has rose-tinted spectacles when it comes to dealing with Iran; it is a straw man argument to say that we do. We need to work on that and the Government are engaging. I am confident that we will get there, if we just give it a chance.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Hugh Robertson)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr Hollobone) on securing this debate at such an important moment in the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue. I also congratulate the other hon. Members who have spoken this afternoon. I will address the points raised in their various contributions.

To set the scene, it is worth saying three things. First, Iran has shown over the course of recent months that it is genuinely taking a new approach to negotiations. We need fully to test that and explore the opportunity—I go no further than that at this stage—for a deal. We believe there may well be a deal on the table that would give us meaningful assurance on our immediate proliferation concerns and create the space for a comprehensive solution.

Secondly, let me absolutely clear: there is no question of our seeing this issue through rose-tinted spectacles. We approach this negotiation with our eyes wide open. We are fully aware of Iran’s history of concealment and its defiance of its international obligations. We will continue to be firm in our approach to Iran on that and other issues. Thirdly—this addresses a point raised by the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and others—despite the fact that progress on nuclear talks remains possible, we are not blind to Iran’s nefarious activities in its immediate region and beyond, or its terrible human rights record.

I hope my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering will take some comfort from what I have just said. He was worried about the possibility of the talks becoming a space in which the Iranians could continue to enrich. The obvious point is that, without the talks, Iran will continue to enrich anyway, so we might as well give the talks a chance. I cannot go into the detail of the negotiations and the terms around which they revolve, but clearly the basis of the deal is that Iran will take concrete and verifiable action to address the international community’s concerns about its nuclear programme, and the E3 plus 3 may consider some measure of sanctions relief to offer in return. There will not be a deal unless Iran ceases its enrichment programme.

The hon. Member for Islington North made the obvious point that human rights in Iran remain in a terrible state, and we agree with him. The negotiations in Geneva are purely about the nuclear file, and the hope is that the twin-track approach of exchanging non-resident charges d’affaires, and so on, will create preconditions that enable progress to be made in other areas.

The hon. Gentleman asked the Foreign Secretary yesterday about the middle east weapons of mass destruction-free zone, for which we argued during the non-proliferation treaty review in 2010. There has been a small amount of progress on that recently, and we hope to be in a position to make an announcement in the near future.

The hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) made three clear points. The first was on the international relations dynamic. Tempting though it is, it is not my position to comment on Saudi relations with the United States. Perhaps it would be helpful if he considered that in the context of Iran’s history of negative involvement across the Gulf. There are many states beyond ours that are extremely suspicious of Iranian activities, and justifiably so. There is concern across the wider Gulf—the concern in Israel is often mentioned—about many of the worries raised this afternoon. We already keep all our key allies in the Gulf fully briefed on where we are.

I hope that I have answered the hon. Gentleman’s question on the nuclear-free zone in the middle east. He mentioned disarmament here in the United Kingdom, and I can do no better than repeat the comments of the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) by saying that we have a slightly different view on that.

My hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) talked about our approach to the talks, and I hope that I have reassured him on that. The phrase “rose-tinted spectacles” has come up on a number of occasions this afternoon, and there are no rose-tinted spectacles in the Geneva talks. Everyone knows exactly what is involved, the difficulties of what we are dealing with and the backdrop against which we are trying to do this. However—one only has to talk to the Foreign Secretary, who has met the regime on a number of occasions in New York and Geneva, to get a feel for this—there is a new feel to the talks. It is important that we test that to see what can be achieved. If we are able to get over the line, I doubt there is anyone anywhere in this Chamber who would not agree that that is a good thing. The question is, to test Iran’s resolve and to see what is achievable, but we must do so with our eyes wide open.

My hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) made a good and thoughtful speech, as he always does, and he is absolutely right that Iran ought to be the subject of a system of containment. In a sense, of course, that is what an interim deal before a final deal will seek to achieve, and he is right to make that point.

My hon. Friend the Member for Wyre and Preston North (Mr Wallace), the co-chair of the all-party group on Iran, talked about the importance of trust, which is a key component that he compared to Northern Ireland. I remember someone saying to me some years ago that, in relation to Northern Ireland, the Government of the day were in about the right place if everyone was marginally unhappy with them. I suspect that might be a principle that applies here, too. He is absolutely right about the importance of gaining trust. The hope is that, if trust builds during the negotiations, it could translate into other affairs. He has the Government’s approach in a nutshell—it is important to take the opportunity seriously but to be realistic about what can be achieved.

I thank the hon. Member for North Durham for supporting the process. I was struck in the Chamber yesterday by the level of support from Opposition Members, including the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) and others who dealt with the issue in the past and know what is involved. I am grateful for the continued support of the hon. Member for North Durham.

I do not know whether there is anything that Members feel I have not addressed, but I will provide a brief update on where we are.

As most people know, the Foreign Secretary returned on Sunday from the E3 plus 3 negotiations in Geneva, which were the third round of talks since President Rouhani’s election in June. The talks were detailed and complex. They covered every aspect of Iran’s extensive nuclear programme, and the Iranian negotiators were, as has been reported and as the Foreign Secretary mentioned yesterday, tough but constructive. The focus of the negotiations was to reach agreement on a first step—this was the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East—that would create confidence and space to negotiate a comprehensive settlement that resolves the Iranian nuclear issue.

Talks ended without that interim agreement because some key differences remained between the parties. Disappointing though that was on one level, it might comfort people to know that we are not running into the talks with rose-tinted spectacles. The negotiations are tough and have a long history, but the gaps are narrowing. At the conclusion of the weekend, the E3 plus 3 Foreign Ministers presented a united position, which we believe gives us a very strong foundation for the next round of talks on 20 November.

Provided the conditions can be met, the Government are in favour of reaching an interim agreement. As the Foreign Secretary told the House yesterday, the agreement being discussed would have real benefits for global security, but it needs to be detailed, clear and concrete. The agreement also needs to assure all countries that the threat of nuclear proliferation in Iran is being addressed and, therefore, it is crucial that the agreement cover all aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme. We believe that such a deal is on the table and is within reach.

Sanctions have undoubtedly played an indispensable part in creating the new opening. Sanctions are putting the Iranian leadership and the Iranian economy under serious pressure. We think that the sanctions are costing the Iranian economy at least $4 billion a month or $48 billion a year. There is no question of our relaxing the sanctions pressure before we have taken action to address the proliferation concerns.

It is worth noting in passing that, while the talks are going on—this goes to the centre of what my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering said in his opening remarks—the Iranian nuclear programme continues to advance. The most recent International Atomic Energy Agency report of 28 August noted that Iran’s stockpile of near-20% enriched uranium continues to grow. Iran has installed more than 1,000 advanced centrifuges, which are capable of enriching at a significantly faster rate, and there is also the heavy water research reactor at Arak. All that represents a breach of the United Nations Security Council and IAEA board resolutions and shows why, in the interest of international security, we want the talks to succeed.

Because of the time, I will finish by saying that this afternoon’s debate has revolved around two dynamics. There is a new opportunity to do something, and I think that everyone in the Chamber would agree that, if that opportunity exists, we should take it. Rest assured that we are going into the talks with our eyes wide open. We know what we are dealing with. I do not think anyone is in any doubt that a deal will be difficult to achieve, but such a deal would be in the interest of the international community.

[Mr Wallace]

On a point of order, Mr Sheridan. Throughout the debate my seat has been referred to as Lancaster and Wyre Valley, Lancaster and Wyre or Wyre and Preston North. Given that my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Fleetwood (Eric Ollerenshaw) is sitting behind me, I want to correct the record. Before the boundary changes, I was the Member of Parliament for Lancaster and Wyre, but I am now the Member of Parliament for Wyre and Preston North.

[Jim Sheridan (in the Chair)]

I am sure that Hansard will have recorded the hon. Gentleman’s constituency correctly.

Iran

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Monday 17th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

We urge Israel to join the non-proliferation treaty—that is the long-established position of the United Kingdom. However, those who ask Israel to address nuclear issues have to recognise that one way that would make it impossible for it to ever do that would be for Iran to develop a nuclear capability. That would be the end of any hope for a middle east free of nuclear weapons. The settling of this Iranian nuclear issue is very important to going on to any other issues.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

We never would have had a British empire if our diplomats had been worried about health and safety at work. Given that the new President-elect has said that he would like to reopen our embassy and that we have not broken off diplomatic relations, is it not perhaps time for us to try to reopen our embassy in Tehran and demonstrate that trust is built in small steps? Being absent from the discussion will not help us at all.

[Mr Hague]

First of all, we are not absent from the discussion; we are part of the E3 plus 3, so we have direct discussions with Iran on the nuclear issue. Nor have we broken diplomatic relations with Iran. I must say to my hon. Friend that the danger in which our staff were placed was sufficiently great and the destruction of their possessions and the invasion of the embassy sufficiently unacceptable that I find describing it as a health and safety issue inappropriate.

GCHQ

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Monday 10th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I think that the hon. Lady might be quoting the Justice Secretary slightly out of context, in that he will have been referring to other aspects of the proposals. I cannot give her any guarantee that these controversies make it easier to agree proposals for EU directives, but I will go with my right hon. Friend the Justice Secretary on these matters.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

Could the Guardian’s non-story be summed up as: foreign Government monitor international terrorists and share intelligence with their allies? Will the Foreign Secretary join me in paying tribute to our allies, who share intelligence so that British citizens remain safe, both here and abroad?

[Mr Hague]

I absolutely join in the tributes to our allies. We depend on the United States a great deal for our national security, particularly in intelligence matters, and they also depend on us. This is an important two-way relationship, greatly assisting the security of both nations, and reaffirms what an indispensible relationship this is for the UK.