Preparedness for National Emergencies

Ben Spencer Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd June 2026 Westminster Hall

[Dr Ben Spencer (Runnymede and Weybridge) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Barker. I congratulate the hon. Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) on securing this important debate. Given the number of hon. Members here, we could have had a three-hour debate on his wide-ranging speech. I will be brief so colleagues can get in.

In Runnymede and Weybridge, we have flooding incidents almost every year. Thankfully, they are often not huge, but sometimes they very much are. The local resilience forum exists to deal with the really big emergencies, but we often have what I call sub-acute flooding events—where there is enough flooding to cause risk to properties and people, but not enough to trigger an LRF major response.

The problem for people facing flooding incidents is that Floodline operates as a telephone directory. The roads are dealt with by the county council. The Environment Agency deals with the direct response. The fire service deals with emergency rescue. The local authorities, Runnymede borough council or Elmbridge borough council, deal with different responses. We have Affinity Water, which is for direct freshwater coming to people’s homes, and we have Thames Water, which deals with the drainage. Each is responsible for a different bit. We have the county council, which leads on overall flood preparedness. It is too disjointed.

What we need locally, and also nationally, are flood control centres that can bring all these different organisations together to co-ordinate a flood response. A few years ago, during the last big flood that we had while I have been an MP, my team and I ended up dealing with a lot of the flood response and communicating directly with people. I am very happy to do that, but we need a flood control centre to be able to do so. I think that would help our national resilience.

MPs, broadly speaking, have a role in being embedded in our communities. We usually know what is happening at all different levels and we have key contacts on the ground. On that basis, for the local resilience response, does the Minister agree that MPs should have direct access to local resilience forum chairs, both before and during an emergency event?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Frith]

I will get on to preparedness and the impact of global events, including in the middle east, but I will come back to my hon. Friend on specifics. Responsibility for the overarching resilience system is led by the COBR Directorate in the Cabinet Office. Colleagues are rightly asking about the role the Cabinet Office takes in this work. It leads work on cross-cutting and high-priority risks, and in scenarios with major impacts, it uses the COBR mechanism to manage the Government’s response to major crises or events.

The UK Government define resilience as the ability to anticipate, assess, prevent, mitigate, respond to and recover from shocks. The resilience landscape is extensive and encompasses natural hazards, deliberate attacks, geopolitical instability and so on. The foundation of the Government’s approach is the national security risk assessment, which identifies and assesses the most serious acute risks facing the UK over a two to five-year time horizon. Under the lead Government Department model, each NSRA risk is owned by a lead Government Department, ensuring that those with the most relevant expertise, relationships and levers are responsible for putting the necessary planning response and recovery arrangements in place for each risk area.

The Government are also taking steps to enhance our readiness for the highest impact, whole-of-system crises called catastrophic risks, including by explicitly embedding the leadership role of the Cabinet Office in our central crisis management doctrine, the Amber Book. Alongside that, the Government have an extensive programme of assurance to understand how prepared we are to assess risks, including through a dedicated red teaming capability in the Government Office for Science and independent expert panel reviews.

Together, this approach ensures that the Government collectively understand and are prepared for the risks the UK faces overall, which relies on a collaborative approach and a shared ownership across Government Departments. The Government are committed to working in partnership with both the devolved Governments and the local tier to effectively plan for and respond to risks wherever they occur.

The Cabinet Office leads for Government on the overall response to severe weather. That is, in effect, a co-ordinating role, as individual Departments lead for the response, planning and longer term resilience of the sectors they represent. A key component is the severe weather resilience network, which is chaired by the COBR Directorate and comprises representatives across Government Departments.

On the matter of heat, periods of high temperature and heat waves are not a new phenomenon, and their risk—in terms of both impact and likelihood—is well documented in planning advice from the Government. There are tried and tested arrangements in place to warn of impending extreme temperatures, to review preparedness and, if needed, to co-ordinate the Government’s response to the impacts that they may have.

On the devolved authorities, it is vital that the four nations across the UK work together to keep communities safe, so that we can ensure that we are most effectively using the different levers that each Government hold. On the matter of local resilience forums, it is also essential that we strengthen resilience at the local level, and the Government are committed to the stronger LRF trailblazers programme, which provides selected areas with the opportunity to test approaches and strengthen leadership. I encourage local MPs to engage with that leadership.

[Dr Spencer]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Frith]

I will not, as I want to make some progress, and I am afraid there is still a lot to cover.

On covid, several Members made excellent points about the need to recall, remember and learn from that damning period. One such example is the significant improvement made to our crisis response structures and capabilities in line with the recommendations made in the covid-19 module 1 inquiry. That included establishing the National Situation Centre in 2021 to improve the use of data in crisis response, creating a single Cabinet committee for resilience to ensure ministerial oversight.

On the issue of education and resilience, we must provide excellent training, and exercising is also essential to ensure that individual sectors can work together to prepare for, respond to and recover from crises. The Government have also established the UK resilience plan.

On the matter of AI, AI sovereignty is defined as the UK having resilient access to key AI capabilities. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) referred to the need to counter the increasing threats posed by AI that is housed and created away from these shores. Sovereign capability is vital, and the launch of the sovereign AI unit is vital as we transition towards that authority, as it will help the UK to win at strategically important parts of that value chain.

Civil society also plays an important role in the UK’s resilience, including the many voluntary, community and faith sector organisations that contribute to community-level resilience and emergency planning. The resilience of the UK’s critical national infrastructure is of central importance to ensuring that the essential services on which the public rely continue to operate. Given the fundamental and connected nature of those services, failure has the potential to cause cascading and catastrophic consequences. The resilience action plan’s all-hazards approach, combined with the priorities in the strategic defence review, the national security strategy and the 10-year infrastructure strategy, underpins the Government’s commitment to improving the security and resilience of CNI.

On smart devices and tech resilience, the Government take an actor-agnostic, risk-based approach to supply chain resilience. Instead of reacting to individual firms or components in isolation, we must focus on the structural choke points and systemic dependencies that create national-level vulnerability, regardless of where in the chain they are. While cellular modules present some specific cyber-threats, those can be mitigated in effectively the same way as any other cyber-risks. Therefore, existing work to strengthen our cyber-resilience will impact how vulnerable sectors and organisations are to threats via the cellular internet of things.

In conclusion, the Government continue to regularly engage the public and parliamentarians on risk and resilience through our annual statement to Parliament, which gives a strategic overview of the current risk picture. The next annual statement will be made in July this year, and it will provide detailed updates on progress made to deliver against the commitments over the last 12 months.