Sale of Student Loans: Regulation

Barry Sheerman Excerpts

Tuesday 7th March 2017 Westminster Hall

[Mr Cunningham]

I agree with my hon. Friend. Frankly, retrospective law is always bad law. The three previous sales were of mortgage-style student loans. There have been no sales of income-contingent loans. In 2013, the Government announced that the final sale of outstanding loans had been made to Erudio Student Loans for £160 million. There have been problems with those loans and a number of complaints about their handling. Can the Minister guarantee that the loans we are discussing will not be resold to overseas buyers? What mechanisms will be put in place to protect students?

[Mr Barry Sheerman (Huddersfield) (Lab/Co-op)]

My hon. Friend knows of my interest in this issue. I have only one university in my constituency, the University of Huddersfield. My students, too, fear that the sale is an ideological fix. We heard this morning in Justice questions that the Government are selling off a young offenders prison—it is ideology that is behind this. Does he agree that we should have an independent commission to look at the issue? I have never seen a compelling economic case for the sale.

[Mr Cunningham]

I totally agree with my hon. Friend. It is about time we stopped social engineering with education. We are getting to a point where we want some sort of commission established. I hope the Minister will announce that when he responds to the debate.

Will the personal details of students be secure? How will repayment work for European Union students? How will Welsh students be affected? The National Union of Students has consistently expressed concerns that such a sale is not in the interests of students, graduates or taxpayers. What implications will the sale have for students?

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[The Minister for Universities, Science, Research and Innovation (Joseph Johnson)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. I congratulate the hon. Member for Coventry South (Mr Cunningham) on securing this debate. It provides a useful opportunity for me to set out the Government’s approach to the proposed sale of part of the student loan book. I would like to explain the rationale for the sale and make sure that some important points, particularly those relating to the protection of students and graduates and to our commitment to securing value for money for the taxpayer, are firmly on the record.

We are all aware that tomorrow the Chancellor of the Exchequer will make a statement to the House on the Budget. I have been re-reading the statement he made in November of last year. He set out then his commitment to fiscal responsibility, and as part of that, he was clear that public sector net debt must be falling by the end of this Parliament. It is vital that the public finances continue on the path to sustainability.

Selling assets can reduce fiscal pressures and allows the Government to invest in other policies with greater economic or social returns. The Government’s policy is to sell assets where there is no policy reason to own them and where it is value for money for the taxpayer to do so. There is clearly no policy purpose to continuing to hold the student loan book on the Government’s balance sheet.

When we provide student loans, our purpose is to ensure that people who want to pursue higher education and have the qualifications that come from it are able to do so, regardless of their personal financial situation and with no limit, now, on their numbers. As soon as a loan is issued to support a student as they study, its purpose has been met. As I will explain in more detail, the planned sale would have no impact on the position of students or graduates.

A comprehensive assessment indicates that we have a good prospect of achieving value for money. The sale process is designed to achieve the best possible price to benefit taxpayers. As additional reassurance, I must emphasise that we will only proceed with the sale if market conditions remain favourable and the final value-for-money assessment is positive.

I know there is interest in the reasons why a private investor might be interested in the student loan book. The student loan book generates a long-term, inflation-linked set of cash flows, through an efficient and established collection mechanism. Our engagement with the markets has shown that that is attractive to investors—crucially, at a price that represents value for money for the taxpayer.

[Mr Sheerman]

Could the Minister tell us who the Department has been consulting—which experts, City firms or organisations have been giving the advice that this is a viable enterprise?

[Joseph Johnson]

There has been a process of engagement with the market, which has been conducted on behalf of the Department by a number of financial advisers, including Barclays and Rothschild among others. Our engagement has shown us that this is attractive to investors at a price that represents value for money for the taxpayer.

The private sector is willing to take on the risk and uncertainty of future repayment cash flows because it values this long-dated asset, while Government are looking to transfer that risk and generate cash for reinvestment in policies with greater economic and social returns. I hope hon. Members will therefore agree that there is a strong rationale for selling part of the student loan book. It is good financial management by the Government; it can help support policies with greater economic and social returns; and can be achieved without affecting the position of students or graduates.

Hon. Members, including the hon. Member for West Bromwich West (Mr Bailey), asked whether terms might be changed. I can tell them that investors have no rights whatever to change terms as a result of any sale process.

Oral Answers to Questions

Barry Sheerman Excerpts

Tuesday 31st January 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Barry Sheerman (Huddersfield) (Lab/Co-op)]

The Minister surely knows that all kinds of alternative energy, including tidal power, need good recruits; they need trainees and, indeed, apprentices. Is he not hanging his head in shame this morning because of the report of the highly respected Institute for Fiscal Studies which says that this Government’s apprenticeship programme is a disaster and should be ripped up and started again? When is he going to get real?

[Mr Speaker]

But purely in relation to tidal lagoons; we are not talking about apprenticeships more widely or seeking to shoehorn a personal interest into a question to which it does not ordinarily apply. But the Minister is a philosopher and dextrous to a fault, so I am sure he will cope.

Oral Answers to Questions

Barry Sheerman Excerpts

Tuesday 13th December 2016 Commons Chamber

[Joseph Johnson]

Yes, I am happy to provide a brief update. My hon. Friend is an aficionado of space policy and former chair of the parliamentary space committee, so he will be delighted to know that we had an excellent outcome at the European Space Agency’s Council of Ministers. We committed a further €1.44 billion, which has secured the future of the ExoMars programme, among many other things.

[Mr Barry Sheerman (Huddersfield) (Lab/Co-op)]

I do not want to ruin the Minister’s Christmas celebrations, which are imminent, but if he looks at the deplorable investment in research and development—the figures that came out only this week—does he not see that he needs to wake up and smell the coffee? The fact of the matter is that research and innovation will be deeply damaged by leaving the European Union. He should ask the universities what they think.

[Joseph Johnson]

I know that the hon. Gentleman will welcome the Government’s commitment to research and development, which was underscored in the autumn statement with a further £2 billion by the end of this Parliament—perhaps the biggest single increase in R and D expenditure by any Government in the memory of anyone in this Parliament.

Oral Answers to Questions

Barry Sheerman Excerpts

Tuesday 8th November 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hurd]

My hon. Friend makes a valid point. The CBI surveys and others are encouraging, but we are determined not to be complacent. Clearly, Brexit raises a number of questions and there are a number of concerns out there in sectors across the economy. It is the responsibility of this Department to engage fully with the sectors to understand their priorities for the negotiations.

[Mr Barry Sheerman (Huddersfield) (Lab/Co-op)]

Ministers should come to the beating heart of manufacturing in this country in Huddersfield. Throughout the country manufacturers are in turmoil post-Brexit. There is no Government policy and no preparation. We are going to lose markets all over Europe and replace them with nothing.

[Mr Hurd]

That is a very defeatist statement from someone whom I associate with sunny optimism. It is a priority for the Secretary of State that Ministers get out there and engage with areas and with LEPs to understand their priorities fully. The hon. Gentleman is too defeatist about the competitiveness of British manufacturing.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Jesse Norman)]

I will not add to what we have already said about the Swansea Bay tidal lagoon, but I want to celebrate—the industrial strategy will celebrate—the work of world-leading companies such as GE Energy in my hon. Friend’s constituency and their capacity to benefit from opportunities arising from low-carbon technologies.

[Mr Barry Sheerman (Huddersfield) (Lab/Co-op)]

T3. I have always got on very well with the Secretary of State, but may I ask him not to be complacent? I have just been to a meeting of the leaders of Russell Group universities, who are saying that the sector is in meltdown post-Brexit in terms of staff, students, and research and innovation. What is the plan? I am known for asking, “What’s the plan, Stan?” What is his plan to put this right?

[Greg Clark]

Our universities and scientific institutions continue to be the best in the world. We are opening the Francis Crick Institute this very week, which is an emblem of our leadership in this sector. As the hon. Gentleman will see as we discuss our industrial strategy in the weeks and months ahead, I am determined that reinforcing the position of scientific excellence and innovation will be central to our economy and to how we project the strategy forward.

Industrial Strategy

Barry Sheerman Excerpts

Thursday 20th October 2016 Commons Chamber

[Chris White]

I thank my hon. Friend for his contribution, but I gently suggest to him that that slightly misses the point. It is just one element of an industrial strategy.

[Mr Barry Sheerman (Huddersfield) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Chris White]

I would be delighted to give way, so long as the hon. Gentleman keeps to the subject.

[Mr Sheerman]

Is Germany the only model that the hon. Gentleman is examining? The challenge that we face, with only 10% of our people in the manufacturing workforce, is that with a smart bit of kit it is possible to manufacture anywhere in the world. That is a wonderful opportunity. Does he not think that Germany is an outdated model to follow?

[Chris White]

With the economic advances in our technology and with institutions such as the Warwick Manufacturing Group and other such groups, including in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency, we need to invest in research and development to make sure that we maintain the cutting edge and lead in those technologies.

Central Government, or perhaps more accurately Whitehall, generally responds well to objectives and targets, which provide focus and concentrate minds. A cohesive document would allow the public and business to hold the Government to account. Debate would be unavoidable and long-term consensual policy would prevail. The document, or statement, would lay out policies to support manufacturing for the medium term—around 10 years, say—giving clear objectives for the economy.

[Chris White]

The Government should intervene before a sector is failing. We always seem to miss the problem when it occurs, which makes it much more difficult to resolve, not least in some of our strategic industries.

The Government need to state how they intend to achieve their objectives through a long-term framework. Although it is recognised that manufacturing does not make up the majority of the economy, it can be seen as a driver for other sectors in respect of efficiencies, processes, skills, exports and so on. It requires more explicit planning than other sectors, which can be seen as interdependent, with the state playing a more active role. This should not come, however, at the expense of creativity or productivity, and it should assist rather than hinder.

One of the most consistent calls from manufacturing has been for the Government to articulate a long-term commitment to the sector and to give an indication of the policy framework they are likely to operate in the medium-to-long term. That should be a rolling document, updated regularly and taking into account fluctuations in the wider global economy and in the sector in the UK. It should be debated in Parliament to provide transparency and accountability. It should address a wide range of challenges. How effective is the British Business Bank in terms of access to finance? What capital is required to radically change manufacturers’ investment decisions? Can incentives be created to encourage business to invest? What progress is being made with green manufacturing?

Education is a vital component of the strategy. There is currently little planning associated with supporting the development of STEM subjects—science, technology, engineering and maths—in primary education, which is a major factor in creating the skills gap the industry is now experiencing. Those subjects are the bedrock of degrees and apprenticeships, but they are left to the latter stages of education—often too late to influence a child’s decision-making process.

[Mr Sheerman]

Does the hon. Gentleman know that tens of thousands of young people in further education colleges up and down our land are desperate to get into apprenticeships, but they cannot, because they cannot get their GCSEs in English and maths? When will the Government introduce a practical maths GCSE to unblock that blockage? Will he persuade them to do that?

[Chris White]

I will leave the Minister to answer that question in his remarks.

In a truly global trading nation, more provision should be made for studying languages. What is the number of children at school studying Chinese or Russian? How can it be improved? A welcome manifesto commitment—the hon. Gentleman has touched on this—was to increase the number of apprenticeships to 3 million by 2020. How are we going to take down the barriers that prevent that from happening?

Infrastructure is an essential part of the strategy, not least in improving the quality and reliability of supply chains. That should include the comprehensive development of a digital infrastructure that is fit for purpose. Other elements of the strategy would, of course, include an energy policy, procurement, immigration, export—including the role of supporting bodies such as UK Trade & Investment—catapult centres, research and development, through-life engineering services and the wider contribution from Whitehall.

Social enterprises may not be the first issue that springs to mind in this context, but they are a sizeable part of our economy. The positive impact social enterprises have on local communities is of huge value, and it is through an inclusive approach to shaping our industrial strategy that such sectors can be supported.

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[Mr Wright]

I think that smart procurement can engineer proper prosperity, but I warn the hon. Gentleman that what I have to say next will give him spasms. It relates to the link between a proper industrial strategy and foreign takeovers, and how the state can intervene to perhaps limit the range of foreign takeovers.

In her speech launching her campaign to be Conservative party leader in July, the Prime Minister said:

“A proper industrial strategy wouldn’t automatically stop the sale of British firms to foreign ones, but it should be capable of stepping in to defend a sector that is as important as pharmaceuticals is to Britain.”

I welcome that approach. One of Britain’s virtues is its openness and the fact that that openness lends itself to dynamism and a willingness to consider new ideas and innovate new products. That ultimately leads to better competitiveness, yet there is a risk that this country will sell off the crown jewels, which would be detrimental to the long-term success of British business. We are at the heart of a dynamic and connected global economy, but we are at greater risk of investment in capital allocation decisions that affect British industry being made far away from these shores by parent boards headquartered overseas.

Indeed, within days of the Prime Minister entering No. 10, it was announced that SoftBank was buying Cambridge-based Arm Holdings for £24 billion. That was not an old-fashioned, obsolete, loss-making businesses, and it did not require a bail-out from the state. It was a successful British company in the growing global tech revolution. If the tests for stepping in to defend a sector that is important for Britain were not at work in that instance, it is difficult to see when they would be applied. Indeed, what would those tests be? For every instance of a welcome takeover, such as Tata’s purchase of Jaguar Land Rover, there are numerous examples of takeovers where industrial capacity was moved offshore, such as Kraft’s takeover of Cadbury. What are the criteria for stepping in and intervening?

[Mr Sheerman]

That is music to my ears. When I was a young man, I worked for Imperial Chemical Industries. These days it is called Syngenta and it has a big plant in my constituency. The leading agritech company in the world was taken over, including all its sites, not by a normal company, but by ChemChina, which is a part of the communist Government of China. That is not a normal takeover, but what are this Government doing about it? I have not heard anything.

[Mr Wright]

That is a fair point and it gets to the heart of what we mean by foreign takeovers and their link to industrial strategy.

I am conscious that colleagues want to make their own speeches, so I will finish. The Government have yet to articulate what is meant by picking winners, whether they be individual companies, sectors or technologies. There seems to be a move away from our previous sectoral approach, but there is no clarity with regard to the criteria. It is increasingly obvious that the Government are not entirely clear about what an industrial strategy looks like. Starting with a blank piece of paper gives the Select Committee a welcome opportunity to contribute meaningfully to the development of policy, but it does not provide much reassurance or certainty to the firms that are working hard to create wealth and prosperity for this country—and certainty is what they are crying out for at the moment.

BHS

Barry Sheerman Excerpts

Thursday 20th October 2016 Commons Chamber

[Frank Field]

Indeed. Whatever the legal issues, there is a mega, mega, mega-moral responsibility.

Let me conclude my third theme of this Greek tragedy. Here we see—we have seen him before us in this place—a man who has everything in life and risks losing everything important in life: his standing and how his friends regard him. He does so because he seems somehow unwilling to surrender a modest part of his mega-fortune, but that modest part would make such a difference to those pensioners who are still awaiting their fate.

I turn to my fourth theme: what is being tested through our report, starting with our debate today? First, Members will have a chance to comment on how two of their Committees have carried out their work. I really hope that Lord Pannick’s rather appropriately named report, which would begin the Americanisation of our Committee system in which we would have no role, because all the lawyers would just take over and we would sit there like puppets, will be strongly resisted. I know other Members will want to talk about this “judgment”, but Lord Pannick’s report has shown that if you pay a lawyer, and they are friends of yours, they will come up with the opinion you want. That report does nothing for the legal profession. It is interesting that within moments of publishing this supposed report, Lord Pannick had to admit that he was very close friends with two of the key players whom we examined in this undertaking.

There are clearly questions about the Pensions Regulator that people will touch on today and the Work and Pensions Committee will look at. Are the organisation’s legal powers up to the increasing challenge that it faces? Does it have the right staff? Is it run with the right culture, and if not, what needs to change? Of course, the latter would be much more difficult to deal with than changing legal powers or getting the right staff.

What are the lessons for the Government? My hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) has already mentioned one lesson, which I have now learned—perhaps I should have done so long ago. I had somehow thought that private companies govern the future destinies of only a few employees at a time. Wow, was I wrong about that, considering Sir Philip Green’s empire in BHS, with all those 11,000 jobs destroyed, and the jobs at stake in Arcadia? My hon. Friend’s point about corporate governance is mega. It is a theme that fits in with the Prime Minister’s wish that in trying better to protect the vulnerable, soft underbelly of British society, we must look at how capitalism behaves in this country.

I have two more brief points. First, how do we ensure the independence of the bodies that are put into operation to try to recover the assets of a company that has gone down like BHS? Very important questions have been raised in respect of the recovery operation for BHS. Secondly, if we needed to address the staffing, powers and approach of the Serious Fraud Office, given that we are still waiting to know how it is going to respond, how would the appropriate Committee, and then this House, do so in a non-threatening way?

[Mr Barry Sheerman (Huddersfield) (Lab/Co-op)]

My right hon. Friend is making a very good speech. He touched on the professional advice that was given to Sir Philip Green. Part of that issue is the ongoing problem that we have with how the big consultancies operate in our country—Grant Thornton in this case, and in others—and the fact that the Serious Fraud Office increasingly depends on those consultancies.

[Frank Field]

The quicker I finish, the quicker my hon. Friend the Member for Hartlepool (Mr Wright) will be able to deal with that matter and how his work on it has evolved.

This is the first time that I have stood before the House since I was elected Chairman of one of its Select Committees. I thank the House for electing me to that position. Despite the hard work, it has been a pleasure, particularly in relation to the work in which we, as comrades, have been involved during this inquiry.

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[Mr Iain Wright (Hartlepool) (Lab)]

It is a genuine pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller), who played such an important part not only in the BHS inquiry but in all other inquiries carried out by the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee. I am really proud of the work carried out by the members of my Committee and the Work and Pensions Committee. We came together extremely well to work forensically and diligently on the hundreds of hours of oral evidence and to consider thousands of pages of written evidence. It is significant that the final report was agreed unanimously, without a single vote being required. Such work was made possible only because of the professionalism and hard work not only of the members of the Committees but of their Clerks. I am very proud of the report and stand by every single word.

What came out of the evidence was a story of massive contrasts and of huge inequality—of tens of thousands of low-paid workers, and those trying to get by in retirement on a small pension, losing out because of the greed of a very small number of people who enriched themselves and gorged on BHS to the tune of millions of pounds.

BHS folded this year, a year after Sir Philip Green sold it to Dominic Chappell, but its demise was on the cards a lot earlier than that. In the three-year period between 2002 and 2004, BHS Group paid dividends of £423 million, even though operating profit for that period was significantly less than that amount, at £325 million. In 2004, BHS Group had dividends of £199.5 million, which exceeded the group’s operating profit of £137 million for that year. The dividends of £199.5 million also coincided with a long-term loan of £200 million being taken out that year.

That dividend policy is revealing, and it set the scene for the eventual demise of the company. The payout to shareholders—predominantly the Green family—did not reflect a corporate turnaround and good transformation in business. BHS did not have the cash flow or the profits to fund the dividend. It denuded the company’s reserves and, in the case of that final dividend in 2004, had to be funded by a long-term loan.

Sir Philip could say, quite reasonably, as he did to the Committee, that he received dividends for only a short period of time early on in his period of ownership. It was a long time ago, that is true, but the dividend policy is crucial to understanding the whole sorry business of BHS and the wider lessons that we need to learn.

Green was to enrich himself, his family and his friends at the expense of long-term and sustainable growth for the company. Certainly profits were made, but they were more akin to a short-term sugar boost than a nutritious diet that aided the long-term health and strength of the business. Upon taking over the company, he was able to cut costs—an achievement that should not be easily dismissed—but he was never able to boost turnover throughout his ownership of BHS. So much for the king of retail.

It is true that Sir Philip Green owned the company for a total of nearly 15 years, and that he retained ownership a full decade after taking the last dividends. In that regard, he cannot be described as a short-term corporate raider. But raid the company he did, and his ability to do so meant that he was then in a financial position to obtain the debt to acquire Arcadia and, through the same modus operandi that he operated at BHS, pay his family the biggest corporate dividend in British history. He took the rings from BHS’s fingers, beat it black and blue, starved it of food and water and put it on life support, and then he wanted credit for keeping it alive.

BHS’s balance sheet was made considerably weaker during Sir Philip Green’s tenure of the company. His extraction of value early on in his ownership made the company less able to innovate, to retain a market share or to have a competitive place in the retail market that would allow the firm to generate profits and be in a better position to survive the growing pension deficit. That drip-drip decline provided the backdrop to Sir Philip’s wish to sell the business.

It would be difficult to come up with a more unlikely or incredible knight in shining armour than Dominic Chappell. He was a former bankrupt, with no experience either in retail or in running a company of any sort of comparable size to BHS. He was introduced to the deal by a convicted fraudster for whom he was carrying out driving duties. He boasted that he had senior retail figures on board for key roles in the new business, when that was not the case. He stated that he would be investing his own money in the deal and that he had £120 million of working capital available, when that was not true. His own investment bankers walked away when they discovered that he had lied about the nature of the deal.

Yet the due diligence carried out by the myriad advisers on the transaction did nothing to stop or even pause the deal. There was a remarkable amount of group-think among the supposedly independent advisers. Grant Thornton received four times the fee that it normally receives from similar transactions. Retail Acquisitions Ltd did not have the means to pay advisers for their services unless the deal with BHS went through. The fact that RAL did not have the cash to pay the invoices, let alone to provide the working capital for a loss-making £600 million business with a half-a-billion-pound pension deficit, should have rung alarm bells up and down the City as to whether the engagement should have been taken on. The fact that it did not clearly gives rise to questions about whether impartial advice was provided, or whether blind eyes were turned to ensure that the fees would be paid through a successful transaction, regardless of whether the company toppled over soon after that.

Goldman Sachs provided Sir Philip with “preliminary observations” and was not paid. The lack of any clear letter of engagement showed appalling levels of informality, given that tens of thousands of jobs were at stake. As the hon. Member for Bedford said, the fact that Dominic Chappell was able to say that Goldman Sachs was on board gave his bid credibility. There is a certain irony in the fact that the firm that was not paid, that had an ambiguous role in the transaction and that claimed that it was merely providing preliminary observations was the only one that really expressed concern about the transaction, noting that

“there were risks attached to the proposal in light of the lack of retail experience, the bankruptcy and the highly preliminary nature of the proposals and so on and so forth”.

Goldman Sachs’ attitude to document management seemed to be on a par with that of a dodgy and ramshackle cowboy operation, rather than that of supposedly the world’s premier consulting firm. If that approach was deliberate, in the belief that an informal approach to the transaction would exonerate it of any involvement, it was wrong. Although it was ultimately not responsible for the decisions taken—that was the responsibility of Sir Philip Green—its involvement mattered. It was up to its neck in it, even to the extent of offering a £40 million credit facility.

The risk to their reputation should have made those advisers think again. Much store is placed on the high-quality advice given by such advisers—certainly, in the case of BHS, the use of such prestigious names gave parties credibility and legitimacy when they should have had none.

This was all made possible by weak and incompetent corporate governance. We on the Committee saw opaque structures, overlapping board membership of a complex web of companies and ineffective leadership at board level. Lord Grabiner, chairman of the ultimate selling company, played no effective part. He was not present at, or even invited to, a meeting of the Taveta board that took the ultimate decision to approve the sale of BHS to Chappell. Lord Grabiner showed no curiosity in the deal. He was docile and demonstrated no effective scrutiny, challenge or leadership. That was indicative of a culture, common in corporate governance scandals, in which a domineering, overbearing and bullying individual was able to get away with things with little, if any, challenge.

That is a key reason for the Select Committee’s decision to undertake an inquiry into corporate governance. Given our experience with BHS, we want to look at whether company law is sufficiently clear on the role of executive and non-executive directors and whether their duties are the right ones. We are examining how the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders are balanced, and how decisions of boards could be better scrutinised and open to challenge. Given BHS’s status as a private, non-listed company, how should we align the corporate governance arrangements and requirements between listed and private companies more clearly, so that it is not in the interests of chief executives or directors to take firms private to hide them from effective scrutiny and transparency?

It may be argued that the Green family, as ultimate shareholders, could do whatever they wanted with BHS, and they did. But a company with tens of thousands of workers and former employees dependent on its long-term viability cannot be run as a personal fiefdom or a massive piggybank—even though BHS was run in that way—and corporate governance rules and regulations should, no doubt, be adapted to reflect that.

The duties of directors are somewhat vaguely defined. Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 states that a director of a company must promote the success of that company in such a way as to have regard for

“the likely consequences of any decision in the long term…the interests of the company’s employees…the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others”

and

“the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct”.

[Mr Sheerman]

The BHS employees who lost their jobs in towns such as Huddersfield say to me, “Why is it that the advisers, consultants and auditors who did not do their job in the banking crisis are, all this time later, still not doing their job as auditors and professional people?”

[Mr Wright]

As the hon. Member for Bedford mentioned, we need to look at more than just reputational risk. A lot of deals go through simply because such advisers are involved. Is that good enough?

To return to my point about directors, can anybody look at BHS and say that the spirit and the intention of section 172 of the 2006 Act were being enforced? In companies legislation, directors are equal in status, but in the corporate governance code, chairs and leadership are given much more priority. Given the shocking absence of leadership or challenge from Lord Grabiner, who was truly hopeless, and the weak and impotent corporate governance operating here, there is a strong case for enshrining the requirements of the code in legislation.

As the hon. Member for Bedford said, Sir Philip received his knighthood for services to retail. During our inquiry, however, it became increasingly evident that he was not particularly good at retail at all. True, he was able, in the early days, to sniff out a corporate bargain and cut costs to boost profit. There is nothing wrong with that; that is not a criticism. But during his ownership, he did not boost BHS’s turnover, he lost market share to more nimble and even to not-so-nimble competitors and he failed to anticipate the online retail revolution. By failing to innovate and invest in the brand, he made BHS—an important anchor in the high street—look like a remnant of the 1970s and 1980s in a cut-throat, competitive sector, where grabbing the customer’s attention and retaining their loyalty are paramount.

Sir Philip lacked the success, the ingenuity and the business acumen of the likes of Charlie Mayfield, whose John Lewis group responded well to the internet and whose employee ownership model genuinely motivates staff. He could not match the virtues of Zara, which has increased market share through its superfast turnaround from design to manufacture and shop, which is based on the use of customer data and local suppliers, the rapid turnover of stock and an innovative online platform. Based on company performance, people such as Charlie Mayfield and the founder of Zara, Amancio Ortega, should, it seems to me, be classed as the true kings of modern retail—not Sir Philip Green.

BHS is one of the biggest corporate scandals of modern times. I am sure that the whole House has sympathy for the thousands of workers and pensioners who have lost their jobs and seen their pension benefits reduced as a result of greed, incompetence and hubris. The reputation of business has been tarnished as a result of that greed. The vast majority of businesses are not run and managed in such a way. It would be wrong to tar all businesses with the same brush, but it is vital that this mess is sorted.

Oral Answers to Questions

Barry Sheerman Excerpts

Tuesday 13th September 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hurd]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on his persistence and passion in pursuing this important issue—there are significant risks attached to misuse. I assure him that the Government are taking the matter seriously. A cross-Whitehall group is urgently looking at our options, including the case for further legislation. In that context, I am happy to meet him.

[Mr Barry Sheerman (Huddersfield) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will the Minister help the leading manufacturer of laser pens, which is situated in my constituency? The company is—or was—a great supporter of the northern powerhouse and will be attending Thursday’s big conference in Yorkshire on innovation and creativity, supported by the all-party parliamentary group on Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire. It wants to know why Lord O’Neill was suddenly pulled as a speaker with no substitute offered. We hear that the Government will have nothing to do with elected mayors or the northern powerhouse. What is the situation now?

[Mr Speaker]

In relation to laser pens, rather than the speaking engagements or otherwise of Lord O’Neill.

[Mr Sheerman]

I mentioned laser pens.

[Mr Hurd]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on his ingenuity in asking a question that he was frustrated about not getting answered previously. I reject absolutely any suggestion that the Government have lost any commitment to the northern powerhouse. As for the specifics of speaking engagements, if he would like to speak to me afterwards, I can try to throw some light on the matter.