Trade Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Barry Gardiner and Faisal Rashid

Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 1st February 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Barry Gardiner]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I made brief reference to this new clause during our discussion of new clause 3, but let me set out in a little more detail why we believe it is required. We have heard from the Minister about the Government’s intention to engage with the devolved authorities in respect of matters that may fall within devolved competences. However, if the Government are to demonstrate that they are serious in this regard, they must ensure that such a consultation framework is established in the Bill.

Modern trade agreements are increasingly broad and comprehensive, and extend into all aspects of governance, public policy and commerce. Inevitably and invariably, trade agreements will impact on matters that have long been, and rightly are, considered to be matters of devolved competence, albeit that our obligations to date have been determined at European level. The Government need to give clarity in the Bill about when an obligation ceases to be a trade matter that is within the exclusive competence of the UK and becomes a matter that is within the competence of the respective devolved Administrations.

We have heard that this matter is not unique to the United Kingdom. It is an emerging issue around the world, so we must consider it from an international perspective and ask ourselves not just what satisfies immediate domestic policy objectives but what we would demand from would-be trade partners who face similar issues and, perhaps more importantly, what they would expect from us.

I again refer the Committee to Nick Ashton-Hart’s evidence:

“the political economy demands that you have the backing, as a negotiator, at home when you are sitting across the table from your counterparties and that they know that you have that. They can watch your processes of consent and agreement and evaluate where your weaknesses are—where there are buttons they can push, but also where you are likely to need support.”—[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 January 2018; c. 10, Q12.]

We would be nothing short of foolish to allow our trade negotiators to commence talks without first having consulted and engaged with our constituent interests, which absolutely must include the devolved authorities. Trade negotiations can be brutal. The Americans have no qualms in telling us that they refer to counterparties to such talks not as “partners” but as “adversaries”. Any weakness in position or failure to come prepared can be extremely costly and damaging—especially so if complications are presented later when the Government seek to ensure implementation and compliance with the obligations stemming from the concluded trade agreement. A whole-of-Government approach is required, not only to avoid later difficulties but to ensure the democratic will is represented fully in the determination of our international outlook and the relationships we will form with other states.

Other countries have sought to create a consultation framework to mitigate any such complications at the earliest possible stage of the process. The US has its Trade Promotion Authority, born of the fast-track scheme. There are problems and complications with it, but it is there. The Government of Canada have given a much greater role to the country’s provinces in setting mandates and consulting in negotiations, as a result of the EU’s refusal even to begin trade talks unless it had confidence that the provincial governments would ultimately agree to implementation. Will the Minister tell us whether any of the trade working groups and dialogues that the Government have established with would-be trade partners have yet covered that issue, or whether the issue has been raised in the provisional soundings taken of the third countries with which we seek a trade agreement that corresponds with one they might have with the EU?

It is rumoured that the Government’s preference is to mirror as much as possible the Australian trade policy model. In Australia, no such formal consultation exists with state governments. They have the same rights as any other lobbyist: they can submit responses to open consultation in advance of the conclusion of trade agreements. Of course, that approach presents entirely different problems, and it would be foolhardy to believe otherwise. We have seen the Queensland state government implement policy that ignores obligations under Australia’s trade agreement with New Zealand in order to deliver on Queensland’s public interest and economic performance duties.

Will the Minister tell us what discussions his Department has had with each of those countries in this respect? Have concerns been raised about consultation with our devolved authorities? Conversely, have we asked about theirs? Perhaps the Government have given assurances that they intend not to consult with the devolved authorities and will use the powers in the Bill to override devolved competence. Perhaps it is a case of “put up and shut up”.

[Faisal Rashid]

On that point, is my hon. Friend aware that the Institute for Government found that in other countries, such as Canada, buy-in from provinces is crucial to make trade agreements such as the comprehensive economic and trade agreement work? The institute states that, otherwise, it is “political hell”. Does he agree that, similarly, the political buy-in of the devolved Administrations in the UK is necessary to implement trade agreements, and that early consultation and involvement is necessary to avoid political hell?

[Barry Gardiner]

Absolutely. My hon. Friend uses language that I would not wish to use in the Committee, but it is certainly a political mess. I think we can see that other countries have taken their responsibilities to their trading partners seriously, as well as their responsibilities to their constituent states, provinces and members. That is what we are seeking to do through the new clause.

Trade Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Barry Gardiner and Faisal Rashid

Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 30th January 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Barry Gardiner]

I am delighted to see you in the Chair, Ms Ryan. I look forward to the Committee proceeding at a rapid pace under your guidance. I am tabling amendments 5, 9 and 10, in my and my colleagues’ names, as on the amendment paper.

We are now talking about the implementation of the new international trade agreements to be negotiated between the UK and those third countries that already have an agreement with the European Union. The Government are seeking to appropriate to themselves the power to make regulations to implement those new agreements without any scrutiny by Parliament. I cannot state it better than the House of Commons Library briefing paper, which states that the Bill

“seeks to minimise Parliament’s role”

in this regard, in that it will make all secondary legislation under clause 2(1) subject to a negative resolution procedure only.

The rationale behind this attempt to sidestep due democratic process is that the trade agreements that the EU had previously negotiated with the third country in question had already undergone scrutiny when they were prepared for ratification—that is the argument the Minister used last week when we debated this. By the Government’s sleight of hand, he would say there needs to be no parliamentary scrutiny of any new UK trade agreement because that job will already have been done on the earlier agreement negotiated by the EU.

The Minister was particularly keen to point out that we were suggesting that all the levels of scrutiny that took place at the EU would be done away with. I think he thought he was trapping us when he asked us to agree that a good level of scrutiny had taken place, and that we should allow these measures to go through on the nod because that scrutiny had already happened. We reject that argument, and we were pleased to register that business representatives who gave oral evidence to the Committee agreed with us. The Committee will recall that.

The new trade agreements are not only legally distinct, as the Government have admitted, but may well include substantial new obligations, which will have been through no process of scrutiny whatever. That is why we demand a new approach to these agreements in subsequent amendments to schedule 2, where scrutiny is addressed. However, the provisions of clause 2(3) and (4) go even further, in that they allow the Government to sidestep scrutiny of not only those new UK agreements that are set to replace existing ones, which have been through the full scrutiny process prior to ratification, but UK trade deals that replace EU agreements, which have not even been through the process of ratification. Our amendment speaks to that extraordinary attempt to undermine democracy still further, the significance of which might be demonstrated if I give the Committee an example.

The economic partnership agreement between the EU and Japan was finalised last month. Negotiations were concluded on 7 December last year, and the text of the agreement is currently undergoing the double process of what is called legal scrubbing and translation into the official languages of the EU, so that it can proceed to signing in 2018. The agreement will subsequently undergo the due process of ratification by Japan and within the EU, including parliamentary scrutiny by the European Parliament. However, that process will not be completed until later in 2019, if experience is any guide, and therefore after the point at which the UK is no longer a member of the EU.

Japan is also one of the countries with which the Government have established a trade and investment working group. That working group held its first meeting in Tokyo during November of last year, and is tasked with advancing the trade and investment relationship of the two countries, with the eventual aim of signing a UK-Japan trade agreement at some point in the coming years.

According to the Bill, any future UK trade deal with Japan will be counted as a roll-over agreement, and will therefore escape parliamentary scrutiny altogether, because the EU and Japan will have signed a trade agreement during 2018—that is, before the UK leaves the EU. Note that that will be the case even if the future UK-Japan deal bears no resemblance to the EU-Japan economic partnership agreement. As stated earlier, the Bill makes no requirement for the future UK deal to match the EU’s agreement in any way, shape or form; the Bill requires only that the other country and the European Union were signatories to a free trade agreement before Brexit takes effect. The regulations to implement those new obligations will be subject to a negative resolution procedure, which is the effective negation of parliamentary scrutiny, as the Government would have us consider the new UK-Japan deal simply to be a roll-over or a grandfathered agreement.

I would like to draw attention to the oral evidence provided last Tuesday by Dr Lorand Bartels of the University of Cambridge, who spoke to exactly that issue. Dr Bartels drew particular attention to the forthcoming trade agreement with Japan, and pointed out that

“there is a fundamental difference in international law between a signed and provisionally applied agreement and a ratified agreement.”—[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 January 2018; c. 42.]

The Government would do well to heed that distinction. I hope that the Minister might accept our amendment and that he will see it, in a friendly spirit, as one that might improve the Bill.

Without the amendment, we are in danger of effectively granting the Government carte blanche to do what they like to secure a new UK-Japan deal. That would be a major concern to businesses and workers up and down the UK. Japan is a major player on the world stage, and Japanese companies are important investors in our economy, so the obligations that we, as a nation, undertake in relation to those companies are critical to the future of some of our most dynamic industries. Are the Government really telling us that we, as parliamentarians, should have no right to scrutinise those obligations?

[Faisal Rashid (Warrington South) (Lab)]

Despite the fact that the Government have continued to argue that there is no need for parliamentary scrutiny in the Bill because existing deals have been subject to sufficient scrutiny in the European Union, does my hon. Friend agree that that is not the case here and therefore that it is vital in the interests of the British people that we secure such an amendment?

[Barry Gardiner]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention because he reinforces the very point that I am trying to establish. Despite the processes that are currently in place for scrutiny of trade deals as they proceed through Europe, and ultimately through the European Scrutiny Committee and through the House under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 procedure, we have here a situation in which a deal that was going to be concluded between the EU and another country can proceed to be signed, but not implemented. Then, in the lacuna—that is, the space between that signature and our leaving the EU—we could be confronted by the Government with a completely different set of trade relations. The trade agreement could be totally different, yet, under the Bill, the Government would have the power to sign and implement it simply because they had already signed a previous agreement before we had left the EU. That cannot be the right procedure for what could be completely new issues under that future agreement.

In one sense, the amendment is a modest one, given the seriousness of the issue it addresses. It merely seeks to exclude from the antidemocratic provisions of the Bill any regulations stemming from treaties such as a future UK-Japan trade agreement, where the correspondent EU agreement will have been signed but not yet ratified, along with all the scrutiny that ratification requires.

Other EU trade agreements could fall into this same category: the EU-Vietnam free trade agreement, the text of which is also being prepared for signing at some point this year; the EU-Singapore free trade agreement which has been initialled but held up by internal EU discussions as to whether it is a mixed agreement or exclusive EU competence, leading to the European Court of Justice ruling on this issue in May last year; and, potentially, some of the economic partnership agreements still to be finalised between the EU and different groupings of African, Caribbean and Pacific states, which were criticised so trenchantly by Professor Alan Winters of the UK Trade Policy Observatory in his oral evidence to the Committee last week. Also in this category is CETA, the comprehensive economic and trade agreement between the EU and Canada, which has been signed but not yet fully ratified, as it is a mixed agreement requiring ratification in each of the EU member states, in addition to the centralised EU institutions of the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.

Finally, the amendment tightens up the language of subsections (3) and (4) by requiring not just that the EU and the other signatory or signatories should have ratified trade agreements, prior to Brexit, but that they should have done so with each other. The Bill as it stands simply says that they must have signed “a” trade agreement; it does not say that they have to have signed it with Japan—with the corresponding party. This is ridiculous. The Minister is looking confused. If he wants to intervene, I would be happy to give way to him on this point because it is material.

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[Barry Gardiner]

I am happy to address the Minister’s point and have set out the Labour Front-Bench position very clearly. He should know that the provisions of the amendment do not do what he has claimed they do. What it says is that there must be proper parliamentary scrutiny. He is denying precisely the opportunity for that to happen when a treaty has been signed but not yet ratified. The point of the amendment is to ensure that proper scrutiny can take place and that ratification can have taken place to ensure that.

[Faisal Rashid]

On the point about CETA, does my hon. Friend share my concerns about the implications of bringing in certain provisions of the deal and not ratifying—for example, the investor-state dispute settlement provisions? The key point is that there will not be sufficient scrutiny or consultation or an impact assessment carried out.

[Barry Gardiner]

My hon. Friend pre-vents me—I think that is the sort of Latin term: he goes before me. He picks up a theme I was about to come to. The ISDS procedures have been a major concern of not just parliamentarians but many other people in this country and across Europe. Any hon. Member who says that his postbag and email have not reflected that has simply not been examining them carefully enough.

On my point about the requirement to sign “a” trade agreement, clause 2(3) states:

“Regulations under subsection (1) may make provision for the purpose of implementing a free trade agreement only if—

the other signatory (or each other signatory) and the European Union were signatories to an international trade agreement immediately before exit day”.

It does not specify that it must be the same agreement, and stating the need for a treaty “with each other” would clarify that, which is what the amendment seeks to do. There is no great confusion, but there might be some because the clause is ambiguous.

Amendment 9 speaks to the first of two Henry VIII powers. Those powers are the most egregious example of the power grab that characterises the Bill, despite the extraordinary spectacle of the Secretary of State using the letters page of The Guardian to claim the opposite—a travesty I detailed on Second Reading and which, for reasons of time, I do not wish to reprise here. For the record, though, I draw attention to paragraph 2 on the very first page of the delegated powers memorandum that accompanies the Bill, which states, in plain English:

“The Bill contains 6 individual provisions containing delegated powers. Two of these, clauses 2(1) and 7(3), include a Henry VIII power.”

I am still waiting for the Secretary of State to correct the record that he so carefully muddied previously. Amendment 9 simply seeks to remove the first of those two Henry VIII powers.

Ms Ryan, I am glad that your grouping of amendment 9 with amendment 5 has enabled me to speak to it now, because it follows nicely on from my comments on the UK-Japan trade agreement. It is bad enough that talks towards a trade agreement should have been initiated behind closed doors by a secret working group—no agendas, no minutes, no access to any documentation, no website to keep Parliament or the public abreast of what was being decided in our name—but at the end of that charade, a set of formal negotiations, still in secret, determined what obligations we as a country might or might not be saddled with for a long time.

[Faisal Rashid]

Does my hon. Friend agree that if the Government are certain of their ability to roll over existing agreements, there is surely no need for the Henry VIII powers?

[Barry Gardiner]

My hon. Friend is entirely right. The Henry VIII powers show that the Government also realise that it is not simply replica provisions that are being rolled over but, in fact, new agreements that may contain substantially different clauses. Because of that, they need powers to be able to progress those agreements. The Committee tried to address that during its sitting last Thursday afternoon but the Minister has been reluctant to take the matter on board, even when pressed on how he thought, given the Government’s red lines, he would be able to roll over our current agreement with Norway on the free movement of people, and that with Turkey on the relationships we have through that country’s agreement with the EU customs union. The Minister has failed comprehensively to address those points. It would be interesting if he were to do so when he responds to this group of amendments, but I fear my hon. Friend might languish in hope rather than expectation of the privilege of hearing such a response.

Trade Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Barry Gardiner and Faisal Rashid

Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 30th January 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Faisal Rashid]

Does my hon. Friend agree that, without limits on the renewability of the sunset clause and against the backdrop of a Government failure to commit to a second trade Bill, this Bill will certainly be seen by many as a potential Trojan horse for the Government to introduce future deals with minimum levels of scrutiny?

[Barry Gardiner]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right to be sceptical. The Minister has made much of the arguments that, first, there is a need for speed and, secondly, this is only a temporary Bill that puts in place temporary provisions to roll over the existing agreements. In fact, the powers—certainly the ones relating to the agreement on government procurement—are not temporary; they last longer.

Here, in the provisions of the sunset clause, we have not just one sunset period but the possibility of indefinite roll-overs of the sunset clause itself: five years, followed by five years, followed by five years. If the Minister is absolutely confident that the Bill is a temporary necessity, one must wonder why he wants the sunset clause to continue indefinitely into the future at the Government’s will, when it enables the Government to take on a Henry VIII power.

When I say that there should be a proper process of consultation and scrutiny by which to debate the negotiations, I am only replicating what Anastassia Beliakova of the British Chambers of Commerce demanded in her oral evidence during our final witness session last Tuesday, when she said that provision needs to be made not only for “appropriate scrutiny in Parliament” but for a proper process of “stakeholder engagement for business” and “civil society” in order to scrutinise any changes that might arise as a result of the negotiations.

If the Government are adamant that such a process is to be denied us, rejecting the advice of business and the demands of trade unions and other civil society bodies, it should be denied us for an absolute maximum of five years, with no renewal of the sunset clause, as provided for in clause 2(8) and (9). Every day longer that the Government have those powers is another day for which parliamentary democracy is put on hold. The first of our amendments says that five years is enough. We believe that it is five years too many, given the unmerited powers that the Bill grants to the Government and the rights that it strips away from Parliament, but certainly five years should be enough. If the Government still have not managed to roll over their agreements by March 2024, that power should disappear along with the expiry date.

I really wonder whether Government Members themselves believe that an indefinite use of a roll-over to give an unending Henry VIII power to the Government is a sensible power that this Committee should grant.

Let us say that the Government persist in getting rid of amendment 11. Amendment 12 would allow the Government one renewal only. That is, the Government would be allowed to ask Parliament for permission to renew the sunset clause for one extension, but no more. That would allow the Government the unmerited powers in the Bill right up to the end of March 2029. Can the Minister really demand, with any sense of integrity, that this Committee afford him and the Government greater power than that?

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[Faisal Rashid]

It has been widely documented that the use of the negative resolution procedure the Bill proposes affords Members less opportunity for scrutiny in the House than is currently enjoyed by Members of the European Parliament. Indeed, Jude Kirton-Darling MEP told the Committee in no uncertain terms that the Bill is

“an enormous step back in democratic oversight of trade agreements.”—[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 January 2018; c. 43, Q86.]

Does my hon. Friend therefore agree that, for the Government to meet their commitment that the Bill will replicate existing arrangements as closely as possible, they must support the amendment to ensure the opportunity for scrutiny enjoyed by Members is closer to that currently enjoyed by MEPs?

[Barry Gardiner]

Indeed—my hon. Friend is right. Many Members on both sides of the House think it a travesty that we are afforded less opportunity to scrutinise things and less transparency than is afforded to our colleagues in the European Parliament.

On the agreement on government procurement, once we have had our opportunity to debate and vote on the terms under which we will rejoin it, the Government will then lodge our annexes with the WTO. The next stage is to issue the regulations that will implement the terms of our accession to the GPA, and then, in the years thereafter, to make changes to our domestic legislation that reflect the accession of new parties to the GPA or the withdrawal of any countries that decide to leave it.

It is important to note that that is not a temporary power covered by a sunset clause, as with the international trade agreements in clause 2. This is a permanent power for the Government to issue regulations implementing the UK’s obligations under the GPA into the indeterminate future—for as long as the WTO remains and the GPA is one of its constituent agreements. When we look at the fine detail of the Bill, we yet again discover that it is not a temporary little Bill about rolling over existing agreements; it actually has permanent, lasting effect. The roll-over powers could give Ministers the powers in perpetuity, under the Henry VIII provision.

We hear that the Bill is small, necessary, timely and time-limited, but in actual fact it is not. Our amendment 13 seeks to replace the negative resolution procedure, which the Government wish to apply to clause 1(1), with the affirmative procedure. I will remind the Committee of what that means so that we have a proper understanding of what we are talking about in this context, because it will also be essential to several later amendments that we will bring forward to other parts of the Bill.

The scrutiny procedure for delegated legislation in the House of Commons has come in for intense criticism in the context of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. That criticism is well merited. The Hansard Society’s expert report, “Taking Back Control for Brexit and Beyond”, lifted the veil on just how badly the system is failing to deliver the necessary scrutiny of secondary legislation at precisely the moment we need full confidence in it as we rebuild our system of checks and balances for the post-Brexit future. That report does not make pleasant reading.

The negative resolution procedure the Government propose for regulations under clause 1(1) is the least rigorous of all parliamentary procedures available. Secondary legislation subject to the negative resolution becomes law automatically once it has been laid before Parliament and has remained unchallenged for the requisite number of days—no need for a debate, no call for a vote. MPs may pray against any regulation by means of an early-day motion, but there is no obligation for the Government to schedule parliamentary time to debate that prayer.

The convention is that prayers made by Her Majesty’s official Opposition should receive parliamentary time for a debate, yet even then there is no guarantee that the convention will be respected. In the 2015-16 parliamentary Session, the Leader of the Opposition tabled a dozen prayer motions for debate—five were granted. Of the 585 negative instruments laid before Parliament in that session, only 3% were even debated. In the following parliamentary Session, fewer than one in 100 statutory instruments subject to the negative resolution procedure were debated at all.

The main point of the negative resolution procedure is to allow the Government to have their way without any need to bother parliamentary democracy, and it has been spectacularly successful. The last time a negative instrument was successfully annulled in the House of Commons was the Paraffin (Maximum Retail Prices) (Revocation) Order in 1979. I think that tells the story about what is intended by making these provisions subject to the negative resolution procedure.

[Faisal Rashid]

Almost every individual who has appeared before this Committee over the past week, from business leaders to academics, civil activists and lawyers, has told us that more needs to be done by way of parliamentary scrutiny in this Bill. If the Government will not support these amendments, what good reason do they have to ignore the recommendations of these individuals?

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[Faisal Rashid]

The super-affirmative procedure closely replicates the powers that MEPs enjoy in the European Union, so does my hon. Friend agree that if the Government are to meet their commitment that the Bill will replicate existing arrangements as closely as possible, they must support the amendment?

[Barry Gardiner]

Again, my hon. Friend makes the point about the discrepancy between the scrutiny available to us here in this sovereign Parliament and the scrutiny available to members of the European Parliament. It would seem entirely at odds with the Government’s stated purpose for the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill if we ended up having fewer scrutiny powers than Members of the European Parliament. That would seem to be a travesty.

I look forward with perhaps slightly more than the usual expectation to the Minister’s response to the amendment, given that this is the issue on which not only the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield spoke on Second Reading, but on which several other hon. Members from across the House registered their profound concern. This is the moment when we discover whether the Government are prepared to heed the calls of right hon. and hon. Members alike and look at the Bill in a much more sensible way.

Trade Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Barry Gardiner and Faisal Rashid

Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 23rd January 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Faisal Rashid]

Q Thank you. According to the Queen’s Speech last June, the Bill is meant to set out the legislative framework for our independent trade policy. Do you believe that it establishes a proper framework to deliver what was promised?

Professor Winters: I would not hold myself up as an authority on exactly what was promised, but it does not deliver a satisfactory framework for negotiating new trade agreements. There are many different models, but experience from around the world suggests that one needs a good deal of consultation, input and legislative oversight of trade agreements. You cannot have a position where Parliament can unpick a trade agreement that has been concluded. If Parliament claimed that right, no one would negotiate with us. That means that Parliament and the devolved Administrations need to have an important role in setting mandates, and there need to be consultation and information during the process. Civil society would certainly claim that it, too, ought to be consulted, and I would advocate that, to the extent that one can generate one, there should be a discussion publicly.

Trade policy comes along in treaties. It is intrusive. It affects people’s livelihoods. It is a very good thing that we are talking about trade policy now in a way that we have not for decades—since before the EU existed, in fact.

George Peretz: I would add as a footnote that one of the best short things I have seen written about this is a piece by Stephen Harper, the former Prime Minister of Canada. He is not generally known as a politician who always wanted to do everything by consensus, but it is simply an explanation of how the Canadian side prepared itself for the CETA negotiations. It very much emphasises the need to consult with everybody in Canada, to bring the provinces together as well as all industry, trade unions, all the political parties and other actors to try to get as much consensus as possible on what Canada was trying to achieve at the outset of the process, before it started. It is a very good piece from somebody whose perspective on it is interesting.

[Barry Gardiner]

Q Picking up on both what Professor Winters said about not unpicking—Parliament should not be able to unpick a trade agreement—and what Mr Peretz said about Canada, Mr Clancy, once the UK Government, rather than the EU, set international trade agreements in place, what would be the implications if the devolved Administrations had a consent reserve and could implement some form of veto on internationally agreed obligations? How do you get that whole-of-governance approach where the consensus Mr Peretz was talking about is achieved so we know that what is agreed can ultimately be delivered without introducing an ex post facto power of veto that would stop it being implemented?

Michael Clancy: That is a very difficult question to answer without getting into uncomfortably hot waters.

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[Barry Gardiner]

Q To follow up, I want to ask you all a question as business people. If someone introduced a break clause in a contract with you or one of your businesses, would you not take the opportunity to renegotiate the deal? Given all that you have said about the importance of clarity, stability, understanding and certainty about the future, which we entirely agree with you on—that is why we need a Bill to do this—do you not think that, if we were seeing changes introduced by these countries because of this opportunity, and some of the changes were substantial, and changed that clarity and certainty, then actually there should be a process of parliamentary scrutiny looking at them?

At the moment, we may not be in control of that process. We know that we would like it to be very simple, but it may not be. Given that, should the scrutiny not be in place for Parliament either to assist procedure or, using some other mechanism, to say, “Yes, this is important, and we need to make sure that we, as Parliament, deal with it in the appropriate democratic way”?

Edward Bowles: I would say be careful what you wish for, and I do not say that completely comedically. It would very much depend upon the scale of the market that you are interacting with, and the significance of it. The experience that I had of TTIP was one where the lack of initial transparency, of engagement with civic sector societies, and of disclosure of the mandate for the first 15 months of the negotiations very much allowed the debate to be run by outside interests that felt disenfranchised. Effectively, that stymied the political will to take the negotiation further forward even before the new President was elected.

It was absolutely clear that there are lessons to be learned from a negotiation of that scale, ambition and impact for the UK’s economy, to make sure that you have the right level of engagement, transparency, scrutiny and so on in an ongoing manner. For a much smaller market, I dare say that, given the time involved, it may not necessarily warrant a full-scale similar application of scrutiny because, frankly, the relative impact for the UK economy, and therefore for consumers, healthcare and so on, would be much less. Judge each of them on their merits.

Anastassia Beliakova: To follow up on what Mr Bowles said, the TTIP example certainly shows us how critical it is to have appropriate stakeholder engagement mechanisms. At the moment, the Bill is meant to deal just with continuity of existing agreements that have already had the relevant scrutiny from the European Parliament and have passed through the European Scrutiny Committee here. However, if there are very substantial changes or if we are talking about completely new agreements, provisions certainly need to be made for appropriate scrutiny in Parliament, and for stakeholder engagement for business, civil society and non-governmental organisations. It might make sense for that to have some form of statutory underpinning so that there is input that is not contingent on the political environment, which may change. As has been said, negotiations take a long time, sometimes even up to a decade, and during those negotiations you still need to be able to test both the public views and the impacts. I would urge for these kinds of mechanisms to be put in place where new agreements are implemented.

[Faisal Rashid]

Q I will put Barry’s point in a different way. You mentioned continuity, which is absolutely fine—the industry needs continuity. You also mentioned that you do not want to see any change, but the Government have already noted that these agreements will be legally distinct and are likely to be different to the corresponding EU trade agreements. Do you believe that it is appropriate for any changes to be waved through using Henry VIII powers? That is one question. For British Chambers of Commerce members, how important is consultation on any elements that might change in these agreements?

Anastassia Beliakova: Consultation is absolutely critical. If there are changes through these agreements that would alter the benefits that businesses currently see, our members would want to be consulted. At the moment, there is a question as to how the UK will set out on having an independent trade policy. We are conducting a study with the London School of Economics on that topic, which I would be happy to share once it is published.

There is a balance of interests between continuation—ensuring that there is no gap between the current benefits and some new measures that will be implemented—and appropriate scrutiny. That has to be considered on a case-by-case basis when it comes to the existing agreements. For any new negotiations, however, there needs to be a more clearly set out process.

William Bain: There are two important points to make. First, if we look at the guidelines adopted by the European Council on 15 December and the drafts that are circulating in Brussels for the draft directive to be adopted next Monday, it is very doubtful that the EU will permit the UK to vary these agreements at all. It will basically be small changes that will require the UK to still be subject to its current obligations under these agreements. That is all that the EU will be prepared to accept.

Another important point is that if the mechanism for the transition is that the UK is under the common commercial policy and the EU common external tariff, the UK will be applying all the EU’s external tariffs vis-à-vis third countries. That means that Canada and South Korea will get the advantage of relatively low-tariff trade into the UK market, but unless we get the EU on board to help us with the transitioning process, we will not get the advantages of access to the Canadian and South Korean markets. That is the absolute imperative of why this task has to be completed—so that we can have certainty and continuity for business.