Climate Change Conference

Barry Gardiner Excerpts

Thursday 18th November 2010 Westminster Hall

[Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)]

Setting out a realistic ambition for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change at Cancun must begin with a clear understanding of what happened at the fifteenth session of the conference of the parties in Copenhagen in December. It also demands humility on the part of the UK and the EU. In the UK we often behave as if we are the acknowledged global leaders on climate change, and as if we believe we punch above our weight. Indeed, that has already been suggested in this debate. It may be worth reminding ourselves that the final negotiations in Denmark took place between the leaders of China, the US, India, Brazil and South Africa. The meeting itself may have been in Europe but Europe was not in the meeting.

Europe has no leader, which means, in summit politics, that it has no voice. To say that EU negotiators played a considerable role in crafting the accord may be true, but in the final frame Europe was not present—never mind the UK. Europe needs to become a player once again. We have certain unique contributions to make to the ongoing debate, but we shall not be able to make them if we cannot agree on a spokesperson who is taken seriously by the leaders of the emerging powers and the USA. The problem may not manifest itself so much at Cancun, because we do not expect the influx of world leaders that went to COP 15. However, the situation is more likely to be a problem in South Africa in 2011 at COP 17, and it certainly will at the Rio plus 20 summit the following year. It needs to be addressed now.

There is no common narrative about Copenhagen. The western media proclaimed COP 15 a failure because it did not deliver a legally binding agreement. Cancun will not deliver a legally binding agreement either. The truth is somewhat more complicated. As the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, the USA is a critical player, but it has refused to ratify the Kyoto protocol because of the concern that it might damage US economic growth. Given the fact that Kyoto places no binding commitment to emission reductions on major developing countries such as China and India, the USA has made it clear that it is unlikely to join any post-2012 framework based on Kyoto. By contrast, developing countries are concerned that annexe 1 countries have failed to live up to the commitment that they took on at Kyoto. They want a second commitment period under the protocol, as that guarantees the important—in their view vital—principle of common but differentiated responsibility, which reflects the greater historic responsibility of the developed nations as well as their greater wealth and capacity to act.

Another group of countries, which includes Japan, Australia, Canada and the EU, believes that it is essential to bind in the United States to any future agreement, and wants the major developing nations to take on commitments of their own. The first commitment period of the Kyoto protocol will conclude in 2012, and most parties are conscious that we must establish a post-2012 settlement that is comprehensive and preferably legally binding. Copenhagen failed to do that. So will Cancun.

In the mean time the Copenhagen accord created a loose, open-architecture structure, which is very much a coalition of the willing. Under the accord, countries put on the table the national actions that they are prepared to take to reduce their emissions—nationally appropriate mitigation actions. They monitor their success in achieving their own targets. Interestingly, although the western press accused China of spiking an agreement at the time, that is precisely the sort of structure that China had already proposed two months before Copenhagen. It has the benefit of preserving sovereignty while maximising commitment. Obama’s insistence on international monitoring of China’s voluntary actions within the Kyoto process, when the USA had not even ratified the Kyoto protocol, was less informed diplomacy than strategic media grandstanding. The world’s press fell for it, but we should not.

President Obama’s political capital has now been expended on a weak health care Act. The cost is his inability to get a climate change Bill through what was the most amenable Congress in decades. The mid-terms have configured a very different Congress, and we in the UK must now consider where future progress on climate change can best be pressed to advantage. One thing is clear: that place is not America.

China’s 12th five-year plan was announced last week. It will be published in detail in the spring, and it makes it clear that China is looking to create an emissions trading scheme. In Europe we have considerable experience, both positive and negative, of the EU ETS and the EU must work with China to help it to learn from the initial mistakes that we made in setting it up. Indeed, those discussions are already going on at a high level.

It is time for the UK and Europe to refocus our efforts away from the United States to form a more strategic alliance with China. Last week I participated in a Global Legislators Organisation for a Balanced Environment forum on climate change in Tianjin—I refer hon. Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests—along with 70 legislators from countries ranging from South Africa to Brazil. Sixteen of the G20 countries were represented, including the US. It is clear to me that a radical programme for climate change would mean the EU joining forces with China, ultimately to create common standards in products, and a joint carbon market establishing an international price for carbon around the globe. That would be a game changer. More than that: it could be a game changer that market makers in the US would suddenly find extremely threatening. America can resist any opposition to its policies. What it cannot take is being sidelined or ignored. Let us imagine that the biggest pressure on President Obama to sort out climate change came not from the liberal left or even from some “blue dog” Democrats in the Senate, but from American industry and Wall Street itself. What if Wall Street were saying to Obama: “Climate change? It’s all about the economy, stupid!”

As we approach Cancun we need to be clear about why the accord is not sufficient and what is required to take the negotiations on a trajectory that may be able to deliver a legally binding agreement. The total emissions reductions pledged so far under the accord by the US, Japan, Europe and the major developing economies fail to match the scientific calculations on targets for stopping dangerous climate change: the accord agreed on a rise of no more than 2º C. The accord makes no enforceable provision for funding of capacity building in developing countries. It creates no binding obligation on developed countries to finance adaptation, or to effect technology transfer. It creates no structure to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation. I will try to deal with each of those aspects of the matter.

First, as to emissions reductions, currently almost 50% of global emissions come from the developed world, which represents just 20% of the global population. The World Resources Institute estimates that the developed country commitments at Copenhagen would reduce those countries’ emissions by no more than between 13% and 19% below 1990 levels. The IPCC has called for between 25% and 40% reductions. Therefore, the commitments from the developed world fall well below the minimum that the IPCC believes is necessary to avoid dangerous climate change of more than 2° C. Among the major countries, the USA has offered to reduce its emissions by 17% by 2020, but only below 2005 levels, which equates to a reduction of just 3% below 1990 levels.

Let us now look carefully at our own suggested target of at least 80% reductions from 1990 levels by the developed world. Why has that not been welcomed more fully by China and other G77 nations? Let us cash out the numbers. Global emissions in 1990 were 21 gigatonnes—21 million metric tonnes—so the global reduction of 50% required to sustain a 2° C trajectory would give the world a total of just 10.5 million tonnes of emissions annually to play with. In 1990, the developed countries emitted 15 million of those 21 million tonnes, so an 80% reduction would mean that they should emit no more than 3 million tonnes by 2050, or almost 30% of the world’s total annual emissions.

Today, the developed world accounts for just one fifth of the global population, and the proportion is estimated to fall to just one eighth by 2050. Why should we expect China and India to think it fair that one eighth of the world’s people should get 30% of the world’s emissions capacity? It would mean that developed countries would have exactly three times the emissions per person of developing countries, which is hardly the basis for a just and sustainable international settlement.

To date, the mitigation debate has been locked around a failure to agree on emissions reductions targets that will equate to a rise of no more than 2° C. The reason it has always stalled there is that the Chinese and the Indians are good mathematicians and so refuse to lock themselves into what is a manifestly unjust equation.

Let us now turn to finance. At Copenhagen, developed countries under the accord pledged a significant amount of money—$100 billion annually by 2020—as has already been mentioned. There is also fast-start funding approaching $30 billion cumulatively through 2012 for developing country mitigation and adaptation. However, that created new questions on both the sources of that money and the policies that it is supposed to pay for. Those are fundamental issues of trust between developing and developed countries. The accord did not specify how, from where or under what conditions the funding would be transferred, and developing countries urgently need that clarification before they commit themselves to the way in which they will account for how the funding is used.

Developing countries, on the other hand, first seek clarification on how the money they commit will be used. They want a clear system for measurement, reporting and verification—MRV—of the developing country mitigation actions. Understandably, we say that we cannot send our taxpayers’ money to pay for mitigation projects without a clear mechanism for MRV to hold people accountable and show that the money is actually achieving the desired outcome of emissions reduction. That has created a chicken-and-egg problem in the negotiations; developed countries are unable to provide clarity on financing until developing countries provide clarity on their mitigation measures, and vice versa.

How can we break that stalemate? The proposed wording mentioning the Copenhagen accord’s figure of $100 billion has made it into the negotiating text for Cancun, albeit as one of hundreds of phrases and options that are currently in brackets. Some parties have suggested referring to the $100 billion that is otherwise mentioned only in the Copenhagen accord, but not all parties have yet agreed to do so. Potentially, a critical bulldozer to remove the roadblocks is the high-level advisory group on climate change financing, which has already been mentioned, which was created by the UN Secretary-General after Copenhagen. Heads of state and Ministers have been studying sources of revenue for the promised $100 billion a year by 2020. That group has completed a report that will be released just before the negotiations in Cancun, and the sight of money on the table might be what is needed to restore the lost trust between the parties.

In addition, negotiating sessions since Copenhagen have produced general agreement on a fund that will channel rich countries’ financial contributions to poorer nations’ mitigation actions, and both developing and developed countries have put forward constructive proposals on how that fund could be operationalised. That means that Cancun could see a COP decision officially creating that fund and procedural rules relating to it. In Europe, we should certainly press for that to happen. With more clarity about the money, developing countries might be willing to agree to let the international community measure, report and verify what that money is used for. MRV of mitigation actions in developing countries is, in my view, the essential key to unlocking those funding flows. We should emphasise that point to everyone in the negotiations. What is required at Cancun is a clear decision on how such reporting will take place and possibly some sort of global registry of mitigation actions that can be scrutinised and verified so that funds can begin to flow.

At Cancun, a goal for REDD-plus—a development of the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries—should be written into the preamble of the decision text. That goal could be to reduce emissions from deforestation by 50% by 2020, for example. The type of activities recognised as part of the REDD-plus decision, however, must be nailed down. The REDD-plus decision text includes references to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of forest carbon stocks, sustainable management of forest and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. The accord, however, only mentions the first three goals. To clarify which activities will receive compensation, the definition of what constitutes REDD-plus needs to be made consistent within the UN process.

Another uncertainty relates to the mechanisms used to fund REDD-plus activities. The Copenhagen accord, like the Bali action plan, states that there should be positive financial incentives for countries that take action to reduce deforestation and degradation, but how countries would receive that money is still up in the air. It could be through a carbon market, a dedicated fund or something else. That question needs to be resolved in the REDD-plus decision text.

Industrialised countries expect a market mechanism for REDD, with the exception of Norway, whose Government, commendably, is donating billions to rainforest protection. Rich countries envisage significant participation of the private sector in REDD financing, through market incentives such as the clean development mechanism. On the other hand, developing countries are wary of markets, preferring direct Government-to-Government funding for REDD. Although the current negotiating text contains proposals in brackets that explicitly forbid the use of markets and the creation of offsets for REDD, it also leaves the key phrase “options to use markets” in brackets.

Several parties to the REDD discussions have highlighted in their statements the importance of maintaining the environmental integrity of any market mechanism associated with REDD. That shows that they still consider a market mechanism to be a potential outcome. Outside the negotiations, Governments have created infrastructure for REDD finance but will not necessarily come through with their financing pledges—again, something that was alluded to earlier. Donor members of the REDD-plus partnership—a group of more than 60 nations that have either pledged to fund REDD efforts in developing countries or are slated to receive them—are having trouble making good on their financing promises, and some donations constitute rebranding of previously allocated funds. Our own Government should take note of that.

In contrast, the private sector has shown real interest in REDD credits on the voluntary carbon market, presumably for both marketing and speculative purposes. For instance, the first REDD project is expected to be approved under the voluntary carbon standard this December. In addition, BNP Paribas has set up an option to buy up to $50 million worth of potential forest credits from an African project. If developing countries continue to perceive private sector interest in market mechanisms for their mitigation actions while they are waiting for industrialised Government funding to come through, they may remove barriers to markets in the negotiating text and thus open up the option for business to participate in global emissions reductions through tradeable REDD credits. That is another aim that our Government should pursue at Cancun.

Mr Chope, I seek your guidance on time. I wonder how we are doing.

[Mr Christopher Chope (in the Chair)]

The hon. Gentleman has been speaking for 21 minutes, according to the clock. I know that at least one other Member who has not yet spoken hopes to be able to chip in something to this debate. If the Front-Bench spokesmen take 10 minutes each and push right up to half-past 4, that means that we will have to start the Front-Bench speeches at 10 past 4, but they may want a bit more flexibility to answer some of the points that have been made. I do not know whether the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth (Sarah Newton) wishes to participate.

[Mr Christopher Chope (in the Chair)]

That is the score, so the hon. Gentleman can make his own judgment.

[Barry Gardiner]

I am grateful to you, Mr Chope. In that case, I will not pursue my remarks on land use, land-use change and forestry—LULUCF—because I believe that the Department is already familiar with what I would say. I understand that it is looking carefully at ensuring that there will not be half a gigatonne of free credits in any post-2012 LULUCF settlement, the fear that has been expressed by many.

Perhaps the most difficult question for this conference of the parties is whether it is possible to move forward on all of the issues without first dealing with the elephant in the room: the stalemate about the overall form of the agreement. The US has contended that all the elements of a global deal should be pursued simultaneously, and it objects to an approach that it says cherry-picks—that takes areas where we think progress may be likely, such as, for example, REDD-plus. However, if negotiators continue to pursue the so-called American balance package, they may spend so much time and effort discussing the form of an agreement after 2012 that they fail to take even relatively easy decisions that could achieve real progress.

Over the past two years, GLOBE legislators—legislators participating in the Global Legislators Organisation for a Balanced Environment—in 16 of the G20 countries have been discussing the architecture of a post-2012 deal. They have put forward a proposal that suggests a way forward that might be politically acceptable to the major economies. Negotiations under the Bali action plan are currently taking place on two separate tracks. The first is the Kyoto track—those who support Kyoto—whereby Kyoto parties are considering further targets for a second commitment period beyond 2012. There is also the convention track, where long-term co-operative action involving all parties including the US and major developing economies is considering how to strengthen action taken under the convention.

Based on those discussions over the past two years with more than 100 legislators in different countries, we believe that certain elements could be part of a politically acceptable deal: first, agreement on the overall level of ambition that has already been stated in the Copenhagen Accord to hold the increase in global temperatures below 2^oC; secondly, a decision under the Kyoto track that commits annexe I Kyoto parties—the developed countries—to a second commitment period, 2013-17, and involves quantified, economy-wide emissions reductions targets and the associated commitments of finance and technology, subject to addressing satisfactorily the issues of hot air and the rules for accounting for forestry emissions; and, thirdly, either a new parallel treaty under the convention track or a set of COP decisions under the convention track that place comparable commitments on the US without its having to join the Kyoto protocol. Such commitments could include an economy-wide emissions reduction target and a commitment to provide financial and technological assistance to developing countries, and formalising the actions of the major developing countries—for example, on carbon or energy intensity targets, renewables targets, efficiency targets, sustainable forestry targets and other central policies—with a commitment to increased transparency through national communications under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. We believe that that could be achieved through the recognition of national legislation and the role of Parliaments in monitoring, reporting and verification.

Hon. Members have alluded to many other aspects: air and sea bunkers, the EU position and whether we should have a more or less robust position in the negotiations. It is clear that Europe is split at the Commission level on European targets. They were offered at 30% if others participated and came in with further commitments before Copenhagen, and repackaged afterwards by Commissioner Hedegaard in such a way as to imply that they were good for our industry anyway, and we should just get on with it.

I met both Commissioner Hedegaard and Commissioner Oettinger the other day. In the morning, Commissioner Hedegaard told me that it was absolutely vital that we proceeded to reduce emissions by 30% by 2020. In the afternoon, Commissioner Oettinger told me that it was absolutely impossible to do so. The Commission is irrevocably riven on the subject, and there is clearly no desire to adopt a more robust position at Cancun and going forward.

I believe that we are not looking for a legally binding agreement at Cancun but for small stages of progress that can take us forward to Johannesburg in the following year, and to Rio plus 20 in 2012. However, we need to adopt a much more radical approach in the alliances that we form. We need to look across the globe to China and other BASIC countries—Brazil, South Africa, India and China—to see how we can develop common standards and frighten American business and industry into realising that they are being left behind, and that they need to come into a common framework under the UNFCC.

--- Later in debate ---

[Barry Gardiner]

So as not to mislead people, would the Minister care to correct the record? I think he meant 2°C, rather than 2%.

[Charles Hendry]

I did mean 2°C, and I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for clarifying that for me. I am not sure what 2% would work out at, but 2°C is the figure we should be working to. I am grateful for that clarification and correction.

A legally binding global deal is the best way to secure a stable, transparent framework for action, build confidence for investors and reassurance for the developing world that developed countries will deliver their commitments, but as Copenhagen showed us, we must be realistic about when such a deal can be achieved. We all now recognise that expectations at last year’s Copenhagen conference became over-inflated. That is a point brought home by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead), who speaks with such expertise on many of these matters. In reality, there was a lack of political will on the part of too many countries to reach a comprehensive deal. We need to win the argument that it is in countries’ political, economic and security interests to move towards low-carbon economies.

Although we will not agree a full legally binding treaty in Cancun, we can and must make solid progress. Cancun can set the stage for future negotiations and provide an essential stepping stone towards a legally binding agreement in the future. Our preferred outcome at Cancun would be to make solid progress on a package of issues that would benefit both developed and developing countries. That package could include bringing the emissions reductions offers countries have made since Copenhagen into the UNFCCC process; strengthening the measurement, reporting and verification arrangements, which will ensure progress on emissions is transparent; and establishing the structures for climate finance beyond 2012, including an international green fund for climate change.

Achieving even that will be challenging. All countries must be prepared to show flexibility in their positions to maximise the chances of success and progress. That is why the EU has signalled its willingness to sign up to a second commitment period of the Kyoto protocol, subject to certain conditions being met. But success does not depend solely what happens at the negotiating table. Given the challenges in securing a global deal, we must increase our support for practical action on the ground, in parallel with negotiations if we are to persuade other countries that taking ambitious action is in their economic and security interests. We must demonstrate the benefits of moving to a low-carbon economy domestically, and support others who are willing to do the same; encouraging them to deliver on their existing commitments to reduce emissions and go even further.

In that respect, I believe we have a strong record as a new Government in trying to achieve progress. We do believe in showing global leadership in the measures we are putting place to mitigate climate change. We have allocated £1 billion to the green investment bank, even in these difficult times, and made a commitment to come forward with additional funding. We are encouraging the most ambitious programme of energy efficiency improvements through the green deal, which will be the centrepiece of the energy Bill this winter.

We are providing £1 billion of investment to support the demonstration of carbon capture and storage technology—the most any Government anywhere in the world have allocated to a single project—thereby ensuring that the UK will continue to lead in that critical technology. The internationally renowned “2050 Pathways Analysis” helps us to consider some of the choices and trade-offs that we will face over the next 40 years if we are to move to a secure, low-carbon economy, and it allows us to explore the combinations of effort that will be needed to meet our emissions targets while matching energy supply and demand. We are taking action to switch from fossil fuels to cleaner and more sustainable green sources of energy by taking forward the renewable heat incentive, a world-leading scheme that provides long-term support for renewable heat technologies. There are also the feed-in tariffs to encourage microgeneration.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bristol North West mentioned the biomass facility that I was delighted to visit with her in her constituency. Another change that we have made will enable councils to generate their own electricity and sell it to the grid, freeing up a fantastic potential that has not been delivered in the past. My hon. Friend the Member for Stroud spoke about the critical use for technology in that area. British universities have global leading potential in the area. The genius of invention and innovation that is found in so many of our universities can provide fantastic opportunities to deal with the challenges we face. I am delighted that my hon. Friend, and many colleagues from all parties, are engaging with the Institute of Mechanical Engineers, because of the contribution that it can bring to the debate.

I shall now respond to some specific issues that have been raised. The hon. Member for Chippenham, and many others, raised the question of long-term financing. The United Kingdom is making a significant commitment to support action on the ground. The spending review provided £2.9 billion of international climate finance through the international climate fund. That will allow the UK to help developing countries to adapt to the impacts of climate change and move on to a low-carbon growth path. That fully funds the UK’s pledge to deliver £1.5 billion in fast-start finance between 2010 and 2012, including £300 million for reducing deforestation.

[Barry Gardiner]

Will the Minister clarify whether those funds included any element of the previously announced £750 million for the environmental transformation fund?

[Charles Hendry]

The £2.9 billion is new in that it is drawn from the rising aid budget. Part of the £1.5 billion to which I have referred relates to the fiscal years 2011-12 and 2012-13. That is included in the figure of £2.9 billion. Funding for years three and four of the spending review period represents a further commitment of resources for climate finance. The hon. Gentleman may like more detail on that, and I would be more than happy to correspond with him if any further clarification is necessary.

Such figures demonstrate the UK’s commitment to scaling-up climate finance to meet its fair share of the $100 billion of public and private international finance per year from 2020. We welcome the recent report from the UN Secretary-General’s advisory group on climate finance, which makes a number of recommendations on how to meet the $100 billion goal. We look to make good progress in implementing its recommendations.

We need things to happen now, and that is why we call for international bodies such as the United Nations framework convention on climate change, international financial institutions, the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the G20, and others, to take action in their areas on the back of the report, so that we can deliver progress at Cancun with a view to producing concrete proposals by the time of the climate change negotiations in South Africa next year. It is clear that public finance alone is not enough; we also need to mobilise private investment. That is why we have launched the capital markets climate initiative to help create the right commercial conditions to drive economic investment in emerging economies.

The fast-start programme has been mentioned. As I have said, the United Kingdom will provide £2.9 billion through the new international climate fund and the spending review to help developing countries to adapt to the impact of climate change and move to a low-carbon growth path. That fully funds the UK’s commitment to deliver £1.5 billion in fast-start finance between 2010 and 2012. My hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park asked about the importance of bilateral agreement. We are absolutely clear that any action must be taken through bilateral and multilateral discussions. It will be a priority to deploy some of the finance to tackle deforestation.

The hon. Member for Brent North (Barry Gardiner) asked whether developed countries need to be clear about the finance they will provide to developing countries. We could not agree more about that, which is why we are pushing other countries to be transparent about how and where they are spending their fast-start finance. We support a Dutch-led website that allows countries to make information about their fast-start spends publicly available.

In his opening comments, the hon. Member for Chippenham asked about which AGF sources are a priority. He asked about the levy on aviation and shipping and the financial transaction tax. The report identifies a range of proposals on how to achieve the goal of £100 billion, and we now need to work with others to make that happen. The United Kingdom continues to work with the International Civil Aviation Organisation and the International Maritime Organisation to develop co-ordinated global solutions to tackle emissions from those sectors. Many questions need to be explored about whether proposals for a financial transaction tax offer a stable and efficient mechanism to raise revenue. Those are issues that the Government will take forward.

My hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park asked about aviation, and we want to ensure that action to limit emissions from aviation is discussed at Cancun and in further negotiations next year. However, we must look at the potential perverse consequences that can sometimes emerge. It is clear that some freight is being brought by air into mainland Europe and then by lorry into the United Kingdom because of different levels of aviation tax in different countries. If we act unilaterally, we must be aware that the ingenuity of the business community will find ways around that, and it could be British consumers who end up paying without the important carbon savings being delivered.

My hon. Friend also asked whether the United Kingdom would support an end to World Bank lending to fossil fuel projects. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development said this morning, we will press the multilateral development banks to support a shift towards climate-smart lending across their portfolios. As part of that, the Government are reviewing the role of the multilateral development banks in energy lending. My hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park has publicly asked the Department for International Development questions about that, and I am sure that the Secretary of State will be aware of the comments that he has made during this debate. He also asked whether we will press for reform on fossil fuel subsidies. We strongly support the G20 commitment to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. That commitment was restated at last week’s G20 summit, and I assure my hon. Friend that we will continue to raise the issue in our bilateral contact with counterparts in other countries.

We have covered many issues during the debate, but I will conclude with the extent to which there should be international agreement. We would all like to see the EU take an international leadership role in these debates, but we must also recognise that we have our own national perspectives to push forward. As a country with a strong Commonwealth link, we perhaps have a different perspective from that of other countries in the EU. Although we would all welcome greater EU co-ordination and a greater ability to speak with one voice on such matters, we also greatly value the ability of independent nations and Governments to speak on behalf of their own populations and the expertise that they bring to the debate.

The situation is not about us and China against the United States. This is a global issue and we must bring the United States with us. I am not sure that trying to bully the American business community will work. We must build bridges with the American people and the American Government to persuade them of the urgency of doing what needs to be done. We know that they are facing particularly difficult times, as are we. The work of international organisations such as GLOBE International plays an extremely important part, and in that respect I pay tribute to the work carried out by many hon. Members of this House. If we are to make progress, we must do so in a co-ordinated way.

My final point relates to forestry, and a couple of contributions have mentioned the programme on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries—REDD-plus. Our overarching goal is to maximise the contribution to global mitigation from forest and land management action in developing countries. We seek to achieve that by agreeing to strengthen the UNFCCC rules on counting emissions from forest management action towards the targets of developed countries. Those rules should incentivise action beyond business as usual and ensure environmental integrity, but avoid unfairly penalising countries that are practising sustainable forest management. We are also seeking an ambitious deal on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.

The Minister of State, Department of Energy and Climate Change, my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle (Gregory Barker), who leads on these matters in the Department, is talking to some of his international counterparts at this moment, which is why I have been standing in for him and responding to the debate. I hope that I have been able to reassure my hon. Friends and the Opposition Members who spoke that this is a matter of profound importance to the Government and we are determined to continue to make progress.